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Abstract 
Electricity is the cornerstone of modern life.  It is essential to economic 
stability and growth, jobs and improved living standards.  Electricity is also the 
fundamental ingredient for a dignified life; it is the source of such basic human 
requirements as cooked food, a comfortable living temperature and essential health 
care.  For these reasons, it is unimaginable that today’s economies could function 
without electricity and the modern energy services that it delivers.  Somewhat 
ironically, however, the current approach to electricity generation also contributes to 
two of the gravest and most persistent problems threatening the livelihood of 
humans.  These problems are anthropogenic climate change and sustained human 
poverty. 
To address these challenges, the global electricity sector must reduce its 
reliance on fossil fuel sources.  In this context, the object of this research is twofold.  
Initially it is to consider the design of the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 
(Cth) (Renewable Electricity Act), which represents Australia’s primary regulatory 
approach to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  This analysis is 
conducted by reference to the regulatory models that exist in Germany and Great 
Britain.  Within this context, this thesis then evaluates whether the Renewable 
Electricity Act is designed effectively to contribute to a more sustainable and 
dignified electricity generation sector in Australia. 
On the basis of the appraisal of the Renewable Electricity Act, this thesis 
contends that while certain aspects of the regulatory regime have merit, ultimately its 
design does not represent an effective and coherent regulatory approach to increase 
the production of renewable sourced electricity.  In this regard, this thesis proposes a 
number of recommendations to reform the existing regime.  These recommendations 
are not intended to provide instantaneous or simple solutions to the current 
regulatory regime.  Instead, the purpose of these recommendations is to establish the 
legal foundations for an effective regulatory regime that is designed to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity in Australia in order to contribute to a 
more sustainable and dignified approach to electricity production. 
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1. Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
Electricity is the cornerstone of modern life.  It ‘is essential to economic 
stability and growth, jobs and improved living standards’.1  Electricity is also the 
fundamental ingredient for a dignified life; it is the source of such basic human 
requirements as cooked food, a comfortable living temperature and essential health 
care.2  For these reasons, it is ‘unimaginable that today’s economies could function 
without electricity’3 and the modern energy services that it delivers. 
Somewhat ironically, however, the current approach to electricity generation 
also contributes to two of the gravest and most persistent problems threatening the 
livelihood of humans.  These problems are anthropogenic climate change and 
sustained human poverty.4  As the Secretary-General of the United Nations explains, 
the world faces two urgent and interconnected challenges related to [the 
provision of] modern energy services – based on where they are available 
and where they are not.  One out of every five people on Earth lives without 
access to electricity and the opportunities it provides for working, learning, 
or operating a business ... Where modern energy services are plentiful, the 
challenge is different.  Emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases from fossil fuels are contributing to changes in the Earth’s climate, to 
the detriment of those who depend on the planet’s natural systems for 
survival.5 
                                                 
1 'WEHAB Working Group: A Framework for Action on Energy' (United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2002), 7. 
2 See, eg, The Future We Want, UN Doc. A/CONF.216/L.1 (2012), 24 and 'Sustainable Energy for 
All: A Framework for Action' (United Nations and The Secretary-General’s High-level Group on 
Sustainable Energy for All, 2012), Ban Ki-moon, 'Sustainable Energy for All: A Vision Statement by 
Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General' (United Nations and The Secretary-General’s High-
level Group on Sustainable Energy for All, 2011), Fatih Birol and Abeeku Brew-Hammond, 
'Sustainable Energy for All: Technical Report of Task Force 1' (United Nations and The Secretary-
General’s High-level Group on Sustainable Energy for All, 2012) and Nebojša Nakićenović, Daniel 
Kammen and Jessica Jewell, 'Sustainable Energy for All: Technical Report of Task Force 2' (United 
Nations and The Secretary-General’s High-level Group on Sustainable Energy for All, 2012). 
3 Ki-moon, above n 2, 1. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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In response to these complex and multidimensional challenges, it is now 
accepted that it is necessary for the global electricity sector to reduce its reliance on 
fossil fuel sources – which currently fuels approximately 67 per cent of the world’s 
electricity6 – and in their place, increase the reliance of renewable sources.7  Inherent 
in this suggestion is the need to develop a sustainable electricity generation sector 
that is designed to recognise, protect and promote the dignity of humankind without 
undermining the Earth’s natural resources.8 
While the task of reforming the global electricity generation sector is critical to 
the livelihood of humankind, this task also represents one of the most complex 
challenges facing modern legal and governance systems.  Conceptually (and ideally), 
reforming the global electricity generating sector requires broad consensus among 
nation states to contribute to a sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector 
by, among other things, committing to increase the use of renewable sources to 
generate electricity.9  Practically, redesigning the global electricity generation sector 
                                                 
6 OECD, OECD Factbook 2011-2012 (OECD Publishing, 2012), 132. 
7 See, eg, European Energy Charter Conference: Final Act, Energy Charter Treaty, Decisions and 
Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 
I.L.M. 360 (1995), art 19(d), Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002) 
A/CONF.199/20, Ki-moon, above n 1, H. Graßl et al, World in Transition – Towards Sustainable 
Energy Systems (Earthscan, 2004), Hannah Wiseman, Lindsay Grisamer and E. Nichole Saunders, 
'Formulating a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables Component' (2011) 28(3) Pace 
Environmental Law Review 827, 840, Richard L. Ottinger, Lily Mathews and Nadia Elizabeth 
Czachor, 'Renewable Energy in National Legislation: Challenges and Opportunities' in Donald N. 
Zillman et al (eds), Beyond the Carbon Economy: Energy Law in Transition (Oxford University Press, 
2008) 183, 'Energy Indicators for Sustainable Development: Guidelines and Methodologies' 
(International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
International Energy Agency, Eurostat and the European Environment Agency, 2005), 11-15, Adrian 
J. Bradbrook, 'Creating Law for Next Generation Energy Technologies' (2011) 2(1) The George 
Washington Journal of Energy and Environmental Law 17, Adrian J Bradbrook and Ralph D 
Wahnschafft, 'International Law and Global Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption' in 
Adrian J Bradbrook, Rosemary Lyster and Wang Xi (eds), The Law of Energy for Sustainable 
Development (IUCN Academy of Environmental Law and Cambridge University Press, 2005) 181, 
José Goldemberg and Thomas B. Johansson, 'World Energy Assessment: Overview 2004 Update' 
(United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs and the World Energy Council, 2004), 'World Energy Assessment: Energy and the Challenge 
of Sustainability' (United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs and the World Energy Council, 2000), IPCC, 'Climate Change 2001: Synthesis 
Report. A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change' (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001) and 
'Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report' (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007) 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf>. 
8 The concepts of human dignity and sustainable development, particularly in the context of 
electricity, are considered in Chapter 2. 
9 See, eg, Neil Gunningham, 'Confronting the Challenge of Energy Governance' (2012) 1(1) 
Transnational Environmental Law 119. 
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in this way requires that such consensus be translated into politically palatable and 
enforceable legal norms and rules within local, national and international legal fora. 
While a global international governance framework arguably represents the 
most effective means to contribute to the achievement of a sustainable electricity 
generation sector, it is also probably the least practical.10  This conclusion reflects the 
persistent failures of the international community to achieve consensus on issues 
relating to energy and the environment.11  In this regard, there is growing momentum 
for a ‘bottom-up’ approach to law making.12  This approach holds that the task of 
addressing critical social, environmental and economic problems rests principally 
with nation-states and local institutions, whose role it is to drive the desired change 
rather than relying on the development of international legal institutions to provide 
the strategy for such action.  Over the longer term, such an approach is designed to 
engender greater international cooperation and even consensus among nation states.  
In this way, a bottom-up approach may, at least in the long-term, precipitate a 
meaningful international legal framework for a sustainable and dignified electricity 
generation sector.13 
A legal strategy to encourage a more sustainable and dignified electricity 
generation sector from the bottom-up requires well-designed policies and regulatory 
measures that can successfully increase the production of renewable sourced 
                                                 
10 See, eg, Bradbrook and Wahnschafft, above n 7, 195-6. 
11 This failure was reflected most recently by the official text of the 2012 United Nations Conference 
on Sustainable Development that has been widely criticised for failing to provide a clear strategy to 
enhance sustainable development using a clear and well-defined legal strategy (see: The Future We 
Want, UN Doc. A/CONF.216/L.1 (2012)).  Similarly, the conferences in Copenhagen and Durban 
concerning the long-term design of an international climate change framework yielded few 
meaningful outcomes regarding the long-term legal strategy to address the challenges that are posed 
by anthropogenic climate change (see, eg, Daniel Bodansky, 'The Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference: A Postmortem' (2010) 104 The American Journal of International Law 230 and Gwyn 
Prins and Steve Rayner, 'Time to ditch Kyoto' (2007) 449 Nature 973). 
12 See, eg, Lutz Weischer et al, 'Grounding green power: Bottom-up perspectives on smart renewable 
energy policy in developing countries' (The German Marshall Fund of the United States, World 
Resources Institute and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2011), 1, Kirsten Engel and Scott R Saleska, 
'Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change' (2005) 32 Ecology Law 
Quarterly 183, 23, Nick Pennell et al, 'Bottom Up & Country Led: A New Framework for Climate 
Change Action' (Booz & Company, 2010) 
<http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/Bottom_Up_Country_Led.pdf> and John C. Dernbach, Acting 
as if Tomorrow Matters: Accelerating the Transition to Sustainability (Island Press, 2012). 
13 A bottom-up approach to law making has proven to be effective in driving the creation of a large 
body of private international law (see, eg, Janet Koven Levit, 'Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: 
Reflections on the New Haven School of International Law' (2007) 32 Yale Journal of International 
Law 393, Janet Koven Levit, 'Bottom-Up Lawmaking: The Private Origins of Transnational Law' 
(2008) 15(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 49 and Janet Koven Levit, 'Bottom-up 
lawmaking through a pluralist lens: The ICC banking commission and the transnational regulation of 
letters of credit' (2008) 57 Emory Law Journal 1147). 
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electricity.  In the short-to-medium term, such regulation must be designed to 
overcome the ‘many and varied’14 fiscal, legal, institutional and regulatory barriers 
that currently limit the deployment of renewable sourced electricity generating 
technologies.  Taking a longer-term view, these regulatory approaches must be 
designed to advance these technologies ‘towards both subsidy independence and 
long-term international competitiveness’.15 
In response to these short, medium and long-term challenges, various 
regulatory, fiscal and policy techniques have been designed to encourage the 
deployment and production of renewable sourced electricity.  Of these, two 
techniques have emerged as the most prominent.  These are feed-in tariff 
mechanisms and renewable portfolio standards.16 
Renewable portfolio standards typically impose an obligation on electricity 
utilities to purchase renewable sourced electricity.17  To enable the utilities to do so, 
a market-based trading scheme operates to encourage compliance using a flexible 
and cost effective approach.  Together, the obligation on the electricity utilities and 
the existence of the market are designed to create a demand for the construction and 
deployment of new renewable sourced electricity generation facilities. 
Unlike renewable portfolio standards, traditional feed-in tariff mechanisms 
compel electricity utilities to purchase renewable sourced electricity for a regulated 
and predetermined price independent of any market.18  Generally, the level of the 
prescribed tariff is designed to meet the financial demands of potential developers 
and investors, which, in turn, encourages the further deployment of renewable 
sourced electricity generation facilities.  
Notwithstanding the obvious differences in design between renewable portfolio 
standards and feed-in tariff mechanisms, their ultimate object is the same.  Both 
regulatory techniques encourage the production of renewable sourced electricity by 
overcoming some of the most pervasive barriers that currently limit its deployment 
                                                 
14 Ottinger, Mathews and Czachor, above n 7, 184. 
15 Jesse Jenkins et al, 'Beyond boom and bust - Putting clean tech on a path to subsidy independence' 
(Breakthrough Institute, Brookings Institute and the World Resources Institute, 2012), 5. 
16 The design and core features of renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariff mechanisms are 
considered in Chapter 3. 
17 Renewable portfolio standards are considered in Chapter 3. 
18 Feed-in tariff mechanisms are considered in Chapter 3.  Further, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, 
the design of feed-in tariff mechanisms have evolved so that they may now be integrated, at least 
partially, with the operation of the broader electricity market. 
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and production.  Consequently, it is these regulatory techniques that offer hope to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity and, ultimately, contribute to 
a more sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector. 
The object of this research is twofold.  Initially it is to consider the design of 
the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) (Renewable Electricity Act),19 
as it is this regulatory regime (which employs a renewable portfolio standard) that 
represents Australia’s primary regulatory approach to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  Having done so, this thesis is able to evaluate whether 
the Renewable Electricity Act is designed effectively as a regulatory instrument to 
contribute to a more sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector. 
On the basis of the appraisal of the Renewable Electricity Act, this thesis 
contends that while certain aspects of the regulatory regime have merit, ultimately its 
design does not represent an effective and coherent regulatory approach to increase 
the production of renewable sourced electricity.  In this regard, this thesis proposes a 
number of recommendations to reform the existing regime.  These recommendations 
are not intended to provide instantaneous or simple solutions to a problematic 
regulatory regime.  Instead, the purpose of these recommendations is to establish the 
legal foundations for an effective regulatory regime that is designed to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity in Australia in order to contribute to a 
more sustainable and dignified approach to electricity production. 
In order to examine the effectiveness of the Renewable Electricity Act, this 
thesis addresses the following questions: 
1. What are the key legal values that are necessary for the design of a 
regulatory regime to increase the generation of renewable sourced 
electricity in Australia for the purpose of contributing to a more 
sustainable and dignified approach to electricity production? 
2. Have developed nations (other than Australia) been able to create 
effective regulatory regimes that are designed to increase specifically 
the generation of renewable sourced electricity for the purpose of 
contributing to a more sustainable and dignified approach to 
electricity production? 
                                                 
19 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth). 
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3. Does the legal regime in force in Australia that is designed 
specifically to increase the generation of renewable sourced electricity 
provide an effective regulatory model to achieve this objective? 
4. How should the legal regime considered in response to question three 
be reformed to more effectively increase the generation of renewable 
sourced electricity in order to contribute to a more sustainable and 
dignified approach to electricity production? 
WHAT IS RENEWABLE SOURCED ELECTRICITY? 
Before proceeding to set out the approach that this thesis adopts to respond to 
these questions, it is critical to understand what is meant by the term ‘renewable 
sourced electricity’, particularly as this concept is frequently used (and sometimes 
misused).  Similarly, it is also critical to appreciate how such electricity is generated, 
although only a brief understanding is necessary to provide context to this thesis. 
A. The concept of renewable sourced electricity 
To appreciate the concept of renewable sourced electricity, it is useful to 
commence with the more general concept of ‘renewable energy’, as it is this concept 
from which the concept of renewable sourced electricity is derived. 
Renewable energy refers to 
those forms of energy which occur naturally and repeatedly in the 
environment – energy from the sun, the wind and the oceans, and from 
plants and from the fall of water.  The heat of the earth itself, geothermal 
energy, is widely defined as renewable energy even though its continuous 
extraction cannot be sustained at one location.  While non-depletable ... they 
are flow-limited and as a result these renewable energy sources are often 
known as the ‘flow’ [(or intermittent)] renewables.  In addition, the term 
renewable energy is often taken to include energy from recurring wastes 
[(which are more constant than ‘flow’ renewables)] such as farm wastes 
from animals or crops, sewage gas, landfill gas, municipal, domestic, 
industrial or hospital wastes.20 
                                                 
20 Catherine Mitchell, The renewable non-fossil fuel obligation: A case study of the barriers to energy 
technology development (Doctor of Philosophy in Science and Technology Policy Thesis, University 
of Sussex, 1994), 14.  The first two sentences of this quote were originally sourced from 'The 
Renewable Energy Research, Development and Demonstration Programme' (HMSO 156, National 
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The energy that is derived from available renewable sources may be ‘captured 
and used either as heat energy or turned into electricity’.21  In this regard, this thesis 
considers renewable sourced electricity to include electricity that is generated by 
harnessing both flow (or intermittent) renewable sources and those resources, such as 
waste, that are able to generate electricity more consistently. 
B. Technological approaches to generate renewable sourced electricity 
Various technologies are available to produce renewable sourced electricity.  
While many of these technologies operate on different scales, the focus of this thesis 
is on those technologies that are capable of generating renewable sourced electricity 
on a large scale.  Such facilities are commonly referred to as ‘utility scale’ facilities, 
as they are able to produce ‘electricity in quantities similar to traditional power 
plants’.22  These facilities can therefore ‘typically displace wholesale electricity’23 that 
is currently produced by large, centralised and fossil fuel-powered facilities.  Typically, 
utility-scale facilities are those facilities with installed generating capacities – being 
the technical full-load sustained output of a facility24 – of greater than 30 
megawatts.25 
While this thesis is principally concerned with utility-scale facilities, the 
regulatory regimes considered in the following chapters do not always make a 
similar distinction.  Consequently, the analysis in the following chapters touches on 
features that encourage the deployment of smaller scale renewable facilities, as these 
features form part of the broader regulatory regime that is assessed. 
                                                                                                                                          
Audit Office, 1994), 5.  The above definition of ‘renewable energy’ is similar, although more 
expansive, to that offered by the International Energy Agency, which defines ‘renewable energy’ as 
energy that ‘is derived from natural processes that are replenished constantly.  In its various forms, it 
derives directly or indirectly from the sun, or from heat generated deep within the earth.  Included in 
the definition is energy generated from solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, hydropower and ocean 
resources, and biofuels and hydrogen derived from renewable resources’ (see: Policies and Measures 
Databases (2012) International Energy Agency <http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/glossary.asp>, 
definition of ‘renewable energy’). 
21 Mitchell, above n 20, 14. 
22 Wiseman, Grisamer and Saunders, above n 7, 831. 
23 Chad Augustine et al, 'Renewable Electricity Futures Study' (National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory, 2012) <http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/re_futures/>, 10-10. 
24 Glossary (2012) Energy Information Administration <http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/>, 
(definition of ‘generator capacity’). 
25 Augustine et al, above n 23, 8-1. 
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a. Hydropower 
Hydropower refers to electricity that is generated from the flow of water.26  
The technologies that are used to produce hydropower are: 
• storage facilities; 
• run-of-river technologies; and  
• pumped storage facilities.27 
A storage facility operates by impounding water in a large reservoir.  Once 
impounded, the water is released to create an intense flow of water that is used to 
power turbines that are, in turn, used to generate electricity.28  Rather than 
controlling the flow of water using artificial means, run‐of‐river schemes ‘use the 
natural flow of a river’.29  However, despite their differences, both of these 
approaches may require the diversion of water.  This may involve water being 
‘channelled from a lake, river or reservoir to a remote powerhouse containing the 
turbine and generator’30 that is used to generate electricity. 
The third approach to produce hydropower relies on pumped storage 
technology.  This approach utilises two reservoirs and is able to generate electricity 
by pumping water from a lower to an upper reservoir.  The water from the upper 
reservoir can then be released to create the flow of water, which is harnessed to 
create power.31 
Hydropower technologies represent particularly mature technologies compared 
to other renewable technologies.32  The reason for this is that these technologies have 
                                                 
26 Adam Brown, Simon Müller and Zuzana Dobrotková, 'Renewable energy markets and prospects by 
technology' (International Energy Agency, 2011), 27. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 A ‘mature’ renewable technology is a technology whose initial faults and problems have been 
identified and either removed or negated by its further development.  The use of the term ‘mature’ 
may also refer to technology that has been deployed widely.  However, with regard to renewable 
technologies deployment may not always occur on a large scale, as other financial, economic and 
social barriers may limit the deployment of an otherwise mature renewable technology (a number of 
these barriers are considered in Chapter 3).  By contrast, ‘immature’ or ‘emerging’ renewable 
technologies refer to technologies that are still at the research level or are slightly more progressed and 
have ‘moved from the research laboratory into the field and [are] currently in the early demonstration 
to full scale demonstration period of development’ (see: 'Emerging Technologies summary' (Clean 
Energy Council, 2009), 1). 
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been used in various forms in their modern design since the late nineteenth century.33  
These technologies are therefore considered commercial, meaning that in the 
appropriate conditions they are able to compete financially with fossil fuel sources 
without any financial support. 
Despite the potential of hydropower to contribute to an increase in the 
production of renewable sourced electricity, the widespread use of these technologies 
has also led to significant environmental problems, particularly where hydropower 
facilities have been developed on a large scale.34  This is because hydropower 
facilities can ‘affect the hydrology of freshwater systems, obstruct upstream and 
downstream migration, and change the water flow and sediments’.35  As a result, 
such facilities have profound social and economic impacts for those communities 
that rely on the water systems that are affected if the impacts of such facilities fail to 
be managed carefully.36 
b. Biopower 
Biopower refers to electricity that is generated using biomass, which is the 
organic non-fossil material of biological origin that is a by-product or is otherwise 
regarded as a waste product.37  Biomass (or, more specifically, biomass waste) 
includes municipal solid waste from biogenic sources, landfill gas and agricultural 
crop by-products.   
The principal technological approach that is used to produce biopower on a 
large scale involves the direct combustion of biomass in a furnace.  This process 
creates steam, which is then used to power a steam turbine generator.38  The steam 
turbine generator then converts the high-pressure steam into mechanical energy, 
which is subsequently converted into electricity.  The use of a steam turbine is 
                                                 
33 'Renewable Energy Technologies: Cost Analysis Series - Hydropower' (International Renewable 
Energy Agency, 2012), 4. 
34 See, eg, Brown, Müller and Dobrotková, above n 26, 27, Giulio Volpi, 'Renewable Energy for 
Developing Countries: Challenges and Opportunities' in Volkmar Lauber (ed), Switching to 
Renewable Power: A Framework for the 21st Century (Earthscan, 2005) 83, 84-5, 'Dams and 
Development: A New Framework For Decision-Making - The Report of the World Commission on 
Dams' (World Commission on Dams, 2000), 98 and 'Towards efficient use of water resources in 
Europe' (EEA Report No 1/2012, European Environment Agency, 2012), 19. 
35 Towards efficient use of water resources in Europe, above n 34, 19. 
36 Dams and Development, above n 34, 98-133. 
37 Energy Information Administration, above n 20, (definition of ‘biomass’ and ‘biomass waste’). 
38 Augustine et al, above n 23, 6-17. 
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similar to the process used to produce electricity from the combustion of coal.39  It is 
principally because of this similarity that the direct combustion approach to 
producing biopower has been deployed widely, with the effect that it is regarded as a 
‘mature, commercially available technology’.40 
c. Wind power 
While there are a variety of technologies available to harness the wind to 
generate electricity, ‘large, horizontal axis turbines with three separate rotor blades 
overwhelmingly dominate installed capacity’.41  These turbines generate electricity 
by allowing the wind ‘to turn the blades around the rotor hub which then turns a 
generator ... to produce electricity’.42 
Wind turbines are typically located at the top of towers that are 80 metres or 
more above the ground.43  The height of the tower ‘enables the turbine to access 
higher wind speeds subject to less turbulence than [if it was] closer to the ground’.44  
Utility-scale wind farms are generally designed to house between 50 to 150 turbines 
that range from one to three megawatts.45 
Wind power technologies can be installed both on and offshore.  According to 
a 2012 study conducted by the Australian Bureau of Resources and Energy 
Economics,46 onshore wind technologies represent ‘the most mature form of 
renewable energy generation technology to emerge in the past 30 years’.47  However, 
when compared to fossil fuel power stations, onshore wind power stations continue 
to require financial support to operate commercially in many instances.48 
By comparison, offshore wind turbines are far less mature than their onshore 
counterparts and, as a result, are only now entering the early stages of subsidised 
                                                 
39 See, eg, ibid, 6-17 and 'Renewable Energy Technologies: Cost Analysis Series - Biomass' 
(International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012), 6-9. 
40 Renewable Energy Technologies, above n 39, 6.  See also: Tony Wood et al, 'No easy choices: 
which way to Australia’s energy future? Technology Analysis' (Grattan Institute, 2012), 8-2. 
41 Ibid, 2-2. 
42 Ibid. 
43 See, eg, ibid, 2-2 and 'Australian Energy Technology Assessment' (Bureau of Resources and Energy 
Economics, 2012), 44. 
44 Wood et al, above n 40.  See also: Australian Energy Technology Assessment, above n 43, 44. 
45 Australian Energy Technology Assessment, above n 43, 44. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid, 44-5. 
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commercial deployment.49  The reason for this is that until recently, proponents of 
wind power had focussed almost exclusively on the deployment of these facilities 
onshore.  More recently, however, a greater emphasis has been placed on the 
deployment of these facilities offshore as a result of community and political 
challenges associated with onshore wind facilities. 
While the technology used by an offshore wind facility remains immature (and 
therefore particularly expensive when compared to onshore wind facilities), these 
facilities avoid many of the barriers faced by their onshore counterparts.  In addition, 
offshore wind facilities are able to harness more robust wind resources.50  However, 
notwithstanding these benefits, offshore wind facilities have their own challenges, 
including the cost of development and the need to be able to transmit the electricity 
generated back onshore.51 
d. Solar power 
Two forms of technologies are available to produce solar powered electricity.  
These are solar photovoltaic (or solar PV) and concentrating solar power (or CSP) 
(also known as concentrating solar thermal) types. 
Solar PV refers to ‘electronic devices that convert sunlight directly into 
electricity’.52  The photovoltaic effect occurs ‘when two different ... semiconducting 
materials [(such as silicon or germanium)], in close contact with each other generate 
an electrical current when exposed to sunlight’.53  During the course of the previous 
decade ‘[t]here have been significant increases in solar PV installation’.54  This has 
resulted in ‘significant price reductions ... as large scale manufacturing facilities 
                                                 
49 'Renewable Energy Technologies: Cost Analysis Series - Wind power ' (International Renewable 
Energy Agency, 2012), 7-8. 
50 Ibid, 7. 
51 Brown, Müller and Dobrotková, above n 26, 53. 
52 'Renewable Energy Technologies: Cost Analysis Series - Solar Photovoltaics' (International 
Renewable Energy Agency, 2012), 10.  A further useful explanation of solar PV is provided by 
Redfield in David Redfield, 'Photovoltaics: An Overview' (1981-1982) 3 Solar Law Reporter 217. 
53 Renewable Energy Technologies, above n 52, 10.   
54 Australian Energy Technology Assessment, above n 43, 42.  See also, eg, Augustine et al, above n 
23, 10-5, Brown, Müller and Dobrotková, above n 26, 34-5 and Patrick Hearps and Dylan McConnell, 
'Renewable Energy Technology Cost Review' (Melbourne Energy Institute, 2011), 8-10. 
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reduce production costs’.55  However, for the purpose of commercial deployment, 
solar PV facilities generally still require some form of financial aid.56 
CSP technologies operate very differently from solar PV technologies.  While 
the former converts sunlight directly into electricity, CSP technologies use 
mirrors or lenses to concentrate the sun’s rays ... to heat a fluid and produce 
steam.  The steam drives a turbine and generates power in the same way as 
conventional power plants.57 
In addition to being able to generate electricity, CSP technologies can also be 
equipped with a heat storage system.  This can allow these facilities to generate 
electricity even when there is insufficient sun to produce the required steam (for 
example, on cloudy days or after sunset).58  Notwithstanding the potential of CSP 
technologies, these technologies remain the subject of low deployment, as they are 
currently financially uncompetitive in wholesale electricity markets.59 
e. Ocean power 
Ocean power refers to the extraction of power from the ocean to produce 
electricity.  Currently, five technologies are under development to extract the ocean’s 
power.  These technologies represent immature and uncommercial approaches to 
generate large amounts of electricity.60 
The technologies that are currently under development to extract power from 
the oceans seek to harness the following types of energy:  
                                                 
55 Australian Energy Technology Assessment, above n 43, 42.  See also, eg, Augustine et al, above n 
23, 10-5, Brown, Müller and Dobrotková, above n 26, 34-5 and Hearps and McConnell, above n 54, 
8-10. 
56 Renewable Energy Technologies, above n 52, 10-11. 
57 'Renewable Energy Technologies: Cost Analysis Series - Concentrating Solar Power' (International 
Renewable Energy Agency, 2012), 4.  The mirrors or lenses that are used to concentrate the sun’s rays 
can take many forms.  These include: (i) parabolic trough systems; (ii) solar towers; (iii) Linear 
Fresnel reflectors and (iv) parabolic dishes.  These different approaches operate in the following 
manner: 
Parabolic trough systems consist of parallel rows of mirrors (reflectors), curved in one 
dimension to focus the sun’s rays.  Linear Fresnel reflectors ... approximate the parabolic 
shape of trough systems, but they use long rows of flat or slightly curved mirrors to reflect 
the sun’s rays onto a downward‐facing linear, fixed receiver.  Solar towers, also known as 
central receiver systems, use hundreds or thousands of small reflectors (called heliostats) to 
concentrate the sun’s rays on a central receiver placed atop a fixed tower.  Parabolic dishes 
concentrate the sun’s rays at a focal point propped above the centre of the dish (see: Brown, 
Müller and Dobrotková, above n 26, 41 (emphasis in original)). 
58 Renewable Energy Technologies, above n 57, 4. 
59 Brown, Müller and Dobrotková, above n 26, 43. 
60 Ibid, 31. 
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• the energy associated with the movement of ocean tides; 
• the energy associated with the currents of the ocean; 
• the energy associated with ocean waves; 
• the energy created by the different temperature gradient that exists 
between the surface of the ocean and its deep water; and 
• the energy associated with the different salinity levels found at the 
mouth of rivers where freshwater mixes with saltwater.61 
f. Geothermal power 
Geothermal power refers to electricity that is generated by harnessing the 
‘energy stored in rock and in trapped [underground] vapours or liquids such as water 
or brines’.62  Typically, the generation of electricity from these sources requires that 
the temperature of the energy sources exceed 100 degrees Celsius, with higher 
temperature resources capable of producing larger amounts of electricity.63 
Three types of geothermal resources exist from which electricity can be 
produced.  These resources are: 
• high-temperature hydrothermal resources (volcanic resources); 
• low and medium-temperature hydrothermal resources (also known as 
hot sedimentary aquifer resources); and 
• hot rock. 
Other than for geothermal power derived from high-temperature hydrothermal 
resources (which naturally rises to the Earth’s surface), the different processes of 
geothermal electricity production each follow a similar production approach.  The 
process commences with the  
the drilling of two wells – for injection and production – into rock several 
kilometres below the Earth’s surface.  Working fluid ... is pumped across 
rocks that are heated by radioactive decay and/or by flows from lower in the 
crust.  The fluid is then pumped to the surface ... When hot water is brought 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid, 21. 
63 See, eg, Augustine et al, above n 23, 7-1 and Brown, Müller and Dobrotková, above n 26, 21. 
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to the surface its thermal energy is transferred to a ... power station, [which 
then transforms the available thermal energy into electrical energy].64 
Of the three available geothermal resources, projects that extract power from 
high-temperature hydrothermal resources represent ‘well established and fully 
commercial’65 ventures.  However, these resources are not found in every 
jurisdiction (including Australia).  While not quite as developed, the second listed 
resource – low and medium-temperature hydrothermal resources – is also ‘relatively 
proven’,66 however still requires financial support to achieve commercial deployment 
on a large scale.67  The technology used to generate electricity from hot rocks is 
progressively maturing, with the result that some small commercial projects have 
been developed.  However, given the limited deployment of this technology it is still 
generally considered to be at a demonstration (rather than commercial deployment) 
stage, and as a result continues to require ongoing financial subsidies.68 
SCOPE OF THIS THESIS 
This research is concerned principally with an examination of the Australian 
Renewable Electricity Act to determine whether its design is conducive to increase 
the production of renewable sourced electricity and, ultimately, contribute to a more 
sustainable and dignified electricity production sector.  To do so, the appraisal of this 
regime is conducted within a multijurisdictional framework.  In this regard, before 
this thesis considers the design of the Renewable Electricity Act, it considers the 
principal regulatory regimes in Germany and Great Britain that are designed to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.   
Germany and Great Britain have been identified as appropriate case studies as 
they both offer useful points of comparison to the Australian regulatory regime.  In 
the case of Germany, it is widely regarded as having created one of the world’s most 
effective feed-in tariff mechanisms that has delivered strong growth in renewable-
sourced electricity since the regime’s inception.69  This has occurred largely 
                                                 
64 Wood et al, above n 40, 5-2. 
65 Brown, Müller and Dobrotková, above n 26, 21. 
66 Wood et al, above n 40, 5-3. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Australian Energy Technology Assessment, above n 43, 53-4. 
69 See, eg, Judith Lipp, 'Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark, Germany 
and the United Kingdom' (2007) 35(11) Energy Policy 5481 and A Klein et al, 'Evaluation of different 
feed-in tariff design options - Best practice paper for the International Feed-In Cooperation (3rd 
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independent of any market integration.  Given its design approach, a review of the 
German feed-in tariff law therefore offers a striking contrast to the design of the 
Renewable Electricity Act, which employs a renewable portfolio standard. 
In contrast to the approach used in Germany, the regulatory approach that is 
currently used in Great Britain provides an example of a long-standing, yet dynamic 
use of a renewable portfolio standard.  While prima facie the British regulatory 
regime employs the same technique as that used by the Renewable Electricity Act, 
the dynamic nature of the British renewable portfolio standard means that its design 
is different in many critical aspects from the Australian regime. 
In addition to its current regulatory regime, at the time of writing the British 
Parliament is considering a regulatory proposal to replace the existing renewable 
portfolio standard with a market integrated feed-in tariff mechanism.  In this regard, 
an analysis of the current and proposed regulatory regimes in Great Britain offers a 
further useful point of comparison to the Australian Renewable Electricity Act. 
In the context of discussing the regulatory arrangements in Great Britain, it is 
necessary to note that for ease of reference all references to the term ‘Great Britain’ 
throughout this thesis refer to the reforms and regulatory instruments that operate 
only in England.  This approach has been adopted because the reforms and current 
regulatory regimes concerning the electricity and renewable electricity sectors in 
England have been designed separately (although not necessarily differently) from 
the mechanisms in the other parts of Great Britain.  Therefore, all the references to 
‘Great Britain’ and the relevant legal arrangements in this jurisdiction relate only to 
England. 
In addition to the comments already made about the scope of this thesis, four 
further comments are also relevant.  First, it is recognised that the general issues that 
this thesis considers represent some of the most dynamic challenges that are 
currently being considered by governments and regulators throughout the developed 
and developing worlds.  As a result, a number of policies, stimulatory measures, 
regulatory techniques and education-driven approaches are in use or have been 
                                                                                                                                          
edition, update by December 2010)' (Energy Economics Group and Fraunhofer, 2010) <www.feed-in-
cooperation.org/...7/.../Best_practice_Paper_3rd_edition.pdf>. 
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suggested to assist with increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity.70  
While each of these techniques, approaches and incentives has a role to play in 
contributing to an increase in the production of renewable sourced electricity, the 
analysis in this thesis is limited to a review of the two regulatory techniques that have 
proven to be the most promising (and popular) to stimulate the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  These regulatory techniques are feed-in tariff 
mechanisms and renewable portfolio standards. 
Probably the most obvious examples of regulatory techniques that are gaining 
popularity but that are not considered in this thesis are so-called ‘pollution taxes’ and 
‘cap-and-trade emissions trading schemes’.71  These regulatory techniques are 
designed specifically to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and, by implication, 
encourage the uptake of renewable sourced electricity.  The decision not to include 
an assessment of these and other instruments in this thesis is not intended to discount 
their worth.  Rather, it merely emphasises that their contribution to the immediate 
task of increasing the deployment and production of renewable sourced electricity is 
more limited (and, at times, less direct) than feed-in tariff mechanisms and renewable 
portfolio standards.72 
The second comment relating to scope is that it must be recognised that this 
thesis seeks to contribute to the discourse on how to contribute to a more sustainable 
and dignified electricity generation section by increasing the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.  This thesis does not however seek to provide a definitive answer 
in this regard.  This is because for the electricity generation sector to operate in a 
more sustainable and dignified manner, many social, legal, institutional, behavioural, 
political, economic and environmental changes are required that is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  From a legal perspective, the breadth of reforms relate to such matters 
                                                 
70 Gunningham and Sinclair provide a useful overview of the principal measures, techniques and 
instruments that can be used to achieve beneficial environmental outcomes, including increasing the 
production of renewable sourced electricity.  These include: (i) command and control regulation; (ii) 
self-regulation; (iii) voluntarism; (iv) education and information instruments; and (v) economic 
instruments (see: Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy (Clarendon Press, 1998), 37-92). 
71 The economic basis for pollution taxes was first considered by Pigou in Arthur C Pigou, The 
Economics of Welfare (1920).  Early commentary on the merit of emissions trading schemes was 
offered by Coase and Dales in Ronald H Coase, 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3 Journal of Law 
and Economics 1 and John H Dales, Pollution, property and prices: An essay in policy-making and 
economics (1968). 
72 See, eg, Felix Mormann, 'Requirements for a Renewables Revolution' (2011) 38 Ecology Law 
Quarterly 903, 929-39. 
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as the patterns and modes of electricity production and consumption, technological 
innovation, planning considerations as well as issues relating to competition law.  In 
this regard, this thesis and its recommendations must be seen for what they are: a 
contribution to a much larger, complex and diverse set of multidisciplinary issues.73 
Third, the principal focus of this thesis concerns the effectiveness of the 
Renewable Electricity Act to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity.  Inherent in this analysis is an understanding of the economics, 
technological capabilities and politics relating to the production and transmission of 
renewable sourced electricity.  However, notwithstanding the importance of these 
matters, it is not the role of this thesis to review these matters in any more detail than 
is required to give effect to the legal merit of this research. 
Finally, this thesis reflects the law as at 30 September 2012. 
THESIS OUTLINE 
Following this introduction, this thesis is divided into four parts.  These parts 
are then further divided into chapters that elaborate on the general themes with which 
each part is concerned. 
Part One, which commences following this introduction, establishes the 
context for the broader thesis.  Chapter Two considers the conceptual basis for a 
governance and legal framework to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity that is informed by the concepts of sustainable development and human 
dignity.  This chapter considers these concepts individually before considering their 
formal convergence within the context of international environmental law, 
particularly in the context of the need to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.  This chapter then considers the manner in which the identified 
conceptual framework can be used to inform an effective legal framework. 
Having established the broader conceptual basis for this thesis, Chapter Three 
introduces the principal regulatory techniques that have already been identified to be 
the focus of this thesis, namely renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariff 
                                                 
73 Limiting the scope of the thesis in the manner that has been described ensures that the analysis in 
Chapters Four, Five and Seven considers only the specific design elements of the legal mechanisms 
that are assessed in these chapters.  As a result, this analysis does not extend to consider ancillary 
(albeit important) issues relating to, among other things, technological innovation, planning 
considerations as well as issues relating to competition law. 
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mechanisms.  The purpose of examining these regulatory techniques is to establish 
the technical foundations of the jurisdictional analysis that is undertaken in the 
following chapters. 
Part Two of the thesis transcends the theoretical issues considered in Part One 
by contextualising these concepts within a practical and multijurisdictional setting.  
This is done to enhance the analytical lens through which the Australian Renewable 
Electricity Act is considered. 
Chapter Four commences this process by analysing the design of the German 
feed-in tariff law.  The purpose of this analysis is to determine: (i) whether the 
incumbent German regulatory approach that is charged with increasing the 
production of renewable sourced electricity is effective; and (ii) if so, whether it 
contributes to the achievement of a more sustainable and dignified German 
electricity production sector. 
Chapter Five continues the practical approach by examining the design of the 
principal regulatory regime that is used in Great Britain to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  Chapter Five also examines the design of the proposal 
for a market integrated feed-in tariff mechanism that, if supported by the British 
Parliament, will replace the existing regulatory regime.   
Chapter Six offers a synthetical analysis of the regulatory regimes in Germany 
and Great Britain.  The purpose of this task is to identify the principal similarities 
and differences between the regulatory regimes that operate in these jurisdictions.  
This analysis is then used to contextualise and inform the analysis of the Australian 
Renewable Electricity Act. 
Part Three of this thesis focuses on the design of the Australian Renewable 
Electricity Act.  This part commences with Chapter Seven, which examines the 
design of the Renewable Electricity Act within the established analytical framework.  
On the basis of the appraisal of the Australian regime, this chapter identifies the 
positive and negative attributes of this regime’s design.   
Chapter Eight then offers recommendations to reform the many and varied 
deficiencies of the Renewable Electricity Act.  These reforms are critical if the 
Renewable Electricity Act is to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity in an effective manner so that it can ultimately contribute to the 
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achievement of a more sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector in 
Australia.   
The final aspect of this thesis is Part Four.  This part, which contains a single 
chapter (Chapter Nine), synthesises the conclusions of this thesis.  In addition to this, 
the concluding chapter also establishes a path, which if followed, can contribute to 
the creation of a regulatory regime to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity and, ultimately, contribute to the achievement of a sustainable and 
dignified electricity generation sector in Australia. 
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2. Governance for a sustainable and 
dignified electricity generation sector 
INTRODUCTION 
While the suggestion that the global electricity sector must steadily transition 
towards a greater reliance on renewable sourced electricity may appear to be 
commonplace, a number of societal, governance and legal issues relating to this 
transition remain unresolved.  For example, how can this transition be affected?  
What governance arrangements are required to pursue this transition?  What function 
is there for the law to contribute to a sustainable electricity generation sector that can 
protect and promote the basic and inalienable qualities of human beings without 
undermining the Earth’s natural resources?  With these questions in mind, this 
chapter considers how the concepts of sustainability and human dignity can inform 
the governance, legal and regulatory arrangements that are required to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity.   
Following this introduction, this chapter considers the two historically 
significant concepts of sustainable development and human dignity.  Following the 
completion of this task, this chapter then considers the convergence of these concepts 
in the context of international environmental law.  This review is concerned 
principally with the convergence of the concepts in relation to matters concerning the 
production of electricity. 
Having established the conceptual framework for this thesis, the second section 
of this chapter seeks to explain how the convergence of the concepts of sustainable 
development and human dignity may be used to inform the design of a regulatory 
framework that is designed specifically to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.  The third section then offers some concluding remarks. 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
Human dignity and sustainable development represent two of the most 
important concepts relevant to the governance of modern society.  However, despite 
their individual importance, there remains debate about the meaning of these 
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concepts, their scope and the appropriate means to give effect to the ideas that these 
concepts represent.  Considering the concept of sustainable development, for 
example, it has been noted that ‘[t]here has been over recent years ... a diversity of 
sophisticated but by no means consistent analyses ... from a range of different 
perspectives’.1  Similar conclusions have also been made in relation to the concept of 
human dignity.2  In light of the ‘diversity of sophisticated but by no means consistent 
analyses’, the following paragraphs seek to understand:  
• the minimum core content of human dignity and sustainable 
development; and 
• how the convergence of these concepts may contribute to a governance 
framework that can increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity. 
A. Sustainable development 
Judge Weeramantry, writing in his separate opinion in the matter of the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project,3 noted that the concept of sustainability was: 
derived from ancient civilizations and traditional legal systems in Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Europe, the Americas, the Pacific, and Australia – in 
fact, the whole world.4 
Judge Weeramantry continued by observing that it is the ancient cultures that 
practised the concept of sustsainability that first showed us that this concept involves 
the need to balance the exploitation and preservation of the natural environment with 
the ‘need for human activity to respect the requisites for its maintenance and 
continuance’.5  However, despite the view that the concept of sustainability emerged 
in the practices of ancient civilisations, it is only recently (relatively speaking) that 
                                                 
1 Douglas E Fisher, The Law of Governance of Water Resources: The Challenge of Sustainability 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), 21. 
2 See, eg, Christopher McCrudden, 'Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights' 
(2008) 19(4) European Journal of International Law 655, 656.  See also: Doron Shultziner, 'Human 
Dignity: Functions and Meanings' in Jeff Malpas and Norelle Lickiss (eds), Perspectives on Human 
Dignity: A Conversation (Springer Netherlands, 2007) 73, 73. 
3 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Judgement, Merits) [1997] ICJ Rep 162 (Vice-
president Weeramantry). 
4 Ibid, para 45. 
5 Ibid, para 80. 
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this concept has been ‘institutionalised and formalised’6 within international, 
transnational and national legal fora. 
The process to institutionalise the concept of sustainability began in 1972.  In 
that year, the Club of Rome published The Limits of Growth.7  This publication noted 
that ‘economic growth [was] on a conflict course with ecological sustainability’.8  To 
avoid such a catastrophe the authors contended that it was necessary to promote a 
governance approach that sought to better balance economic growth with ecological 
preservation. 
In the same year – 1972 – the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment was held in Stockholm.9  It was at the Stockholm Conference that the 
concept of sustainability began to emerge formally within the fibres of international 
law.  While the term sustainability was not itself used, the Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment10 emphasised the emerging 
recognition of this concept within international law.  The most general statement in 
this regard was set out in Principle 21 of this document, which encapsulated the 
foundation of international environmental law.  This principle affirmed that: 
States have ... the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.11 
The second – and probably more relevant – statement concerning the 
emergence of the concept of the sustainable development was set out in recital 6 of 
the preamble to the Stockholm Declaration.  This recital noted that: 
[f]or the purpose of attaining freedom in the world of nature, man must use 
knowledge to build, in collaboration with nature, a better environment.  To 
defend and improve the human environment for present and future 
                                                 
6 Fisher, above n 1, 21. 
7 D H Meadows, Randers J and Behrens W, The Limits of Growth: A Report for The Club of Rome's 
Project on the Predicament of Mankind (Universe Books, 1972). 
8 Klaus Bosselmann, Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance (Ashgate 
Publishing Group, 2008), 25. 
9 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm is hereafter referred to as 
the Stockholm Conference. 
10 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 11 ILM 1416 (1972) 
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generations has become an imperative goal for mankind – a goal to be 
pursued together with, and in harmony with, the established and fundamental 
goals of peace and of worldwide economic and social development.12 
The effect of these statements was to create an indelible link, initially within 
international law but more recently in transnational and national laws, between the 
pursuit of environmental protection and the ideas of economic and social 
development.13  In effect, these statements gave rise to the modern view of 
sustainable development. 
While the Stockholm Conference and its accompanying declaration reflected 
the birth of sustainability in the formal legal sense, it was not for another eight years 
– on the publication of the World Conservation Strategy14 in 1980 by the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (or IUCN) – that the ideas contained 
in the Stockholm Declaration were further refined.  The World Conservation 
Strategy was one of the first documents to employ the term ‘sustainable 
development’.  It used this term not only in an attempt to give greater clarity to the 
meaning of the concept of sustainability, but also to provide a conceptual and legal 
framework of how humanity can address its deteriorating ‘relationship with the 
biosphere’.15  Invoking the concept of sustainable development, the IUCN noted in 
the World Conservation Strategy that the relationship between humanity and the 
biosphere will continue to deteriorate 
until a new international economic order is achieved, a new environmental 
ethic adopted, human populations stabilize, and sustainable modes of 
development become the rule rather than the exception.  Among the 
prerequisites for sustainable development is the conservation of living 
resources.16 
In light of the tensions that existed between human development and the 
maintenance and protection of the environment, the World Conservation Strategy 
called for ‘the integration of conservation and development to ensure that 
modifications to the planet do indeed secure the survival and wellbeing of all 
                                                 
12 Ibid, recital 6. 
13 Christina Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law (2009), 13. 
14 'World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development' 
(International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1980) 
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15 Ibid, para 2. 
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people’.17  The essence of this recognised that sustainable development – and 
sustainability more generally – can only be achieved if humans consider social, 
ecological and economic factors that affect living and non-living resources together 
with the long and short-term advantages and disadvantages of a potential 
development.18   
The conceptualisation of sustainable development that was posited in the 
World Conservation Strategy was then further refined by the 1983 World Charter for 
Nature19 that was promulgated by the United Nations.  This document noted that: 
[i]n the planning and implementation of social and economic development 
activities, due account shall be taken of the fact that the conservation of 
nature is an integral part of those activities.20 
Notwithstanding the events that contributed to the emergence of sustainable 
development since 1972, it was not until the publication of the Brundtland Report21 
at the World Commission on Environment and Development22 in 1987 that the 
concept of sustainable development came to dominate ‘legal debates in the fields of 
social and economic development and environmental protection’.23 
The WCED represented a conglomeration of a diverse mix of representatives 
from the developing and developed worlds who were concerned primarily with the 
human aspects of sustainable development rather than with the concept of ecological 
sustainability.24  As a result, the representatives of the WCED were concerned 
primarily with the issues of environmental degradation and ‘the discrepancies of 
social and economic development between [the] “North” and “South”’.25  This 
approach was reflected in the Brundtland Report, which noted that among its primary 
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concerns was negating the ‘environmental trends that threaten ... the lives of ... the 
human species’.26   
It is in this context that the definition of sustainable development set out in 
Brundtland Report provided that sustainable development is ‘development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability for future generations to 
meet their own needs’.27   
Critically, the Brundtland Report recognised two limitations to the definition of 
sustainable development.  First, ‘overriding priority’28 should be given to the ‘needs, 
in particular the essential needs, of the world’s poor’.29  In other words, sustainable 
development must seek to end the plight of those living in poverty by focussing 
principally on the needs of the world’s most vulnerable.  The reason for the focus on 
the essential needs of the world’s poor was because 
[a] world in which poverty and inequity are endemic will always be prone to 
ecological and other crises.  Sustainable development requires meeting the 
basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to satisfy their 
aspirations for a better life.30 
The second limitation to development identified by the Brundtland Report 
recognised that there are environmental limits to the actions that can be taken to 
further development.  Development must therefore be limited by the ‘state of 
technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and 
future needs’.31  Therefore, sustainable development seeks to address the inherent 
tension that exists between social and economic development and environmental 
protection.  It has been noted that such an approach is necessary because without it 
there exists a greater risk that decisions will ‘destabilize economic and social 
conditions’.32 
Robinson offers a useful example of how the destabilisation of economic and 
social conditions may arise if the concept of sustainable development does not 
                                                 
26 Our common future, above n 21, Chapter 1: I para 7. 
27 Ibid, ch 2: I paras 1-2. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid, ch 2: I paras 4. 
31 Ibid, ch 2: I paras 1-2. 
32 Nicholas A Robinson (ed), Strategies Toward Sustainable Development: Implementing Agenda 21 
(Ocean Publications, Inc., 2004), 12. 
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inform decisions regarding development and the environment.  In this example, the 
author considers that the ‘[f]ailures to provide distributed energy systems in Africa or 
parts of Asia’.33  Robinson notes that these failures 
cause local communities to burn available trees and other biomass, with loss 
of forests, resultant soil degradation and erosion, and aggravation of 
desertification.  Ecological refugees flee uninhabitable conditions, and their 
numbers will rise as increases in sea levels [inundate] communities on small 
islands or [erode] low lying river deltas.34 
Robinson continues that these events will lead to the 
[m]igration of humans into mega cities [which will] spawn extensive slums, 
where the lack of decent infrastructure, jobs, education, parks or sanitary 
conditions breeds political unrest.35 
Based on this view, sustainable development is therefore ‘constructed to frame 
cooperative, integrated solutions to some of the most significant challenges of our 
era’.36  In this regard, sustainable development is not concerned with a single issue.  
Rather, its application is determined by the context in which it is considered.  
Sustainable development therefore represents a dynamic conceptual tool that is 
concerned with the priorities of the day relating to social and economic development 
and environmental preservation.37 
Following the publication of the Brundtland Report, the concept of sustainable 
development has been considered in various internationally relevant documents.  
Chief among these documents are the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development38 and the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable 
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Development.39  While the literature that has emerged since the Brundtland Report 
has contributed to the understanding and application of sustainable development, 
these documents have not altered its basic understanding.  In essence, the concept of 
sustainable development remains concerned principally with the following three 
matters: 
• economic – the perspective of resource development; 
• ecological – the perspective of environmental protection; 
• social – the perspective of conservation for present and future 
human needs.40 
While the concept of sustainable development is now well established, the ever 
expanding documents relevant to the concept of sustainable development do in rather 
subtle ways refine the way that this concept is considered in certain contexts.  It is 
from within these subtle variations that the concept of human dignity emerged in the 
Johannesburg Declaration as an important concept to inform the understanding and 
application of sustainable development.   
Notwithstanding the critical nature of this development, before this chapter 
considers the emergence of human dignity within the context of sustainable 
development, it is useful to consider the significance of human dignity in its own 
right.  Once the minimum core content of this concept is understood, this chapter will 
then be in a position to consider how the convergence of sustainable development 
and human dignity can inform governance and regulatory arrangements that are 
designed specifically to increase in the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
B. Human dignity 
Human dignity is understood as an ‘eclectic and ambiguous notion’41 that 
represents an amalgam of ‘several main ... developments’.42  While this may be so, a 
useful point at which to commence an analysis of human dignity is with its historical 
origins: dignitas hominis (or simply dignitas). 
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In one sense, the term dignitas hominis, which emerged during classical 
Roman times, refers to an individual’s ‘status’ and entitles one to respect and 
honour.43  Dignitas was also used during classical Roman times to refer to a second, 
broader (and, for current purposes, more relevant) concept that related to the inherent 
dignity of humans.  In this sense, the term dignitas was used to reflect humankind’s 
elevation above animals because animals are concerned only with ‘bodily 
satisfactions … Man’s mind, on the contrary, is developed by study and reflection’.44  
The term dignitas therefore distinguished humans from other living species.  This 
approach also reflected the need for humans to consider ‘nature and [the] 
organization of the universe and one’s place in it’.45  This introspective philosophical 
approach subsequently led scholars to offer religious,46 humanist,47 moral48 and 
anthropological49 views about the meaning of human dignity and, more broadly, the 
role of human beings within the universe. 
The religious interpretation of human dignity was informed by the distinction 
between ‘Man from beast’.  This approach holds that ‘humans are made in the image 
of God and [because] God became human, all humans have dignity’.50  This 
approach is reflected in the following passage from the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church: 
man ... is the only creature on earth that God has willed for his own sake ... 
Being in the image of God the human individual possesses the dignity of a 
person, who is not just something, but someone.  He is capable of self-
knowledge, of self-possession and of freely giving himself.51 
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During the period of the Renaissance, rationality and reason were concepts that 
became synonymous with the concept of dignity.52  It is on this basis that during this 
time the ‘root of Man’s dignity’53 was considered to be ‘his ability to choose to be 
what he wants to be based on reason, and that is a gift from God’.54 
This relationship between the human characteristic of human dignity was 
explored further during the period of the Enlightenment.  The approach adopted 
during this period held that, rather than God being the reason for human dignity, 
dignity is associated with the concept of free will.  This approach, which is 
commonly associated with the work of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, 
reflected that human dignity relates to ‘man’s autonomy, his capacity to be lord of 
his fate and the shaper of his future’.55  It is this approach that is often cited as the 
philosophical basis for human dignity and for its incorporation into various 
documents concerning the law of international human rights.56 
Despite the importance of the religious and philosophical approaches to human 
dignity, this concept did not receive popular attention until its recognition within the 
discourse on political philosophy.  This occurred during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.  During the French Revolution, for example, ‘dignities’ – used 
this time in the sense of privileges afforded to the aristocratic class – were provided 
to all citizens.  This meant that all citizens were ‘equally eligible to all public 
dignities ... without other distinction than that of their virtues and talents’.57  This 
formulation of human dignity subsequently became synonymous with a variety of 
social and political movements that advocated specific types of social reform.58  For 
example, human dignity informed the movements that were concerned with the 
promotion of the concept of equality, the abolition of slavery and the improvement of 
labour, social and living conditions.59  Despite the different subject matters, the 
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common thread among these modern political approaches to human dignity was the 
recognition of the inherent value of human beings and their entitlement to certain and 
fundamental rights that operate as the basis for a dignified life.60 
Based on the philosophical and political approaches, human dignity is 
considered to have strong moral implications that affect the operation of political life 
and human relations.61  It is for this reason that scholars have noted that dignity 
represents an ‘objective and intrinsic value’62 of humans.  Therefore, when one 
speaks of human dignity, one refers to: 
a value and intrinsic goodness greater than, and different from, a modest 
aesthetic value ... When we speak of human dignity, we speak of [a] morally 
relevant value, one which evidently imposes on us a moral call and an 
obligation to respect it.63 
On this view, human dignity is non-relational.64  It ‘endows each person with 
an intrinsic and objective preciousness’65 that emerges from the context in which the 
concept is considered.  In the modern context, human dignity therefore provides 
individuals with the basis on which individuals can claim rights and have those rights 
recognised, protected and promoted.  The recognition of this approach is evident in a 
number of international human rights documents, including the Charter of the United 
Nations,66 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,67 and the two human rights 
covenants from 1966 – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights68 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.69 
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The preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, for example, seeks ‘to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights [and] in the dignity and worth of the 
human person’.70  Similarly, the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights recognises that the ‘inherent dignity of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world’.71  Dignity, used in these contexts, has led some scholars to conclude that this 
concept is premised on the realisation, protection and promotion of certain ideas such 
as freedom and equality.72  This relationship, while evident in the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was expressed more 
overtly in the human rights covenants of 1966. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights represent probably the most 
significant documents that reflect the nature of the relationship between basic human 
rights and human dignity.  The preambles to these documents note that the 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world,  
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person.73 
Human dignity therefore operates as the founding principle of the established legal 
framework that is concerned with the protection of human rights. 
While the incorporation of human dignity within the framework of 
international human rights law reflects its relevance to the recognition and protection 
of the intrinsic value of humankind, its historical evolution indicates that this concept 
is relatively opaque.  For this reason, scholars have suggested that it is useful to 
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consider human dignity as a set of complex ideas with a ‘basic minimum content’.74  
These are represented by the following three pillars: 
• [The first is that] every human being possesses an intrinsic 
worth, merely by being human. 
• The second is that this intrinsic worth should be recognized and 
respected by others, and some forms of treatment by others are 
inconsistent with, or required by, respect for this intrinsic worth 
... 
• [The] third element [recognises that] ... the intrinsic worth of 
the individual requires that the state should be seen to exist for 
the sake of the individual human being, and not vice versa.75 
While the assessment of the concept of human dignity stops short of exploring 
its intricacies and its applications in different fora (particularly in the modern 
context), this overview offers an understanding of its core content.  Therefore, 
together with the assessment of sustainable development, the overview of human 
dignity provides us with sufficient context to consider the convergence of these 
concepts within the forum of international environmental law.  This overview also 
provides the context for a potential right to sustainable energy, as such a right 
represents the natural evolution of the emerging relationship between sustainable 
development and human dignity. 
So much for the individual assessments of human dignity and sustainable 
development.  Let us now consider the convergence of these concepts.  More 
specifically, let us consider how the convergence of these concepts is relevant to the 
governance arrangements that can contribute to the achievement of a more 
sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector. 
C. The convergence of sustainable development and human dignity 
The relationship between human dignity and sustainable development is well 
established in international environmental law.  This relationship was initially 
identified in the Stockholm Declaration.  Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration 
affirmed that ‘[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and 
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well-being’.76  The reference to a ‘life of dignity’ recognises that ‘an environment of 
a particular quality is necessary for a man to enjoy his fundamental rights to freedom, 
equality, and adequate conditions of life’.77  In other words, the Stockholm 
Declaration recognised that the protection of the environment is essential for humans 
to have their intrinsic worth – their dignity – recognised and respected. 
After the Stockholm Declaration, it took 20 years for the relationship between 
human dignity and sustainable development to be revisited formally within the 
framework of international environmental law.  This observation does not suggest 
that the emerging content of international environmental law ignored the relationship 
between dignity and sustainable development in the intervening years.  Rather, it 
suggests that for a number of years the relationship between human dignity and 
sustainable development was expressed in more subtle terms.  For example, Principle 
1 of the Rio Declaration proclaimed that humans ‘are entitled to a healthy and 
productive life in harmony with nature’.78  When considered in the context of the 
broader objects of sustainable development, one can suggest that to live a ‘healthy 
and productive life’ humans must first have their intrinsic worth recognised.  
However, unlike the approach of the Stockholm Declaration that recognised the 
relationship between dignity and sustainable development in express terms, the 
statement in the Rio Declaration merely inferred the existence of such a relationship.  
A similar approach was adopted in other documents, including in the Brundtland 
Report and in the programme of action that was published following the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development that was held in 1992 in Rio 
de Janeiro.79 
The concept of human dignity was however revisited in a formal sense within 
the context of sustainable development and international environmental law during 
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development80 and its accompanying 
Declaration – the Johannesburg Declaration.  In one of its initial remarks, the 
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Johannesburg Declaration noted that the governments that participated in the 
Johannesburg Summit were committed to ‘building a humane, equitable and caring 
global society, cognizant of the need for human dignity for all’.81  In addition to the 
general recognition of human dignity, the Johannesburg Declaration also identified 
the relevance of human dignity within the context of a number of specific issues 
concerning sustainable development.  This was evident in principle 18 of the 
Johannesburg Declaration.  This principle noted that the governments that 
participated in the Johannesburg Summit ‘welcome[d] the focus ... on the 
indivisibility of human dignity’82 as this would enable greater ‘access to such basic 
requirements as clean water, sanitation, adequate shelter, energy, health care, food 
security and the protection of biodiversity’.83 
Principle 18 of the Johannesburg Declaration represented an important 
milestone in the convergence of the concepts of human dignity and sustainable 
development.  This article formally recognised that to have one’s dignity recognised 
and promoted it was necessary to provide such basic requirements as clean water, 
sanitation and energy.  The provision of such basic requirements would then 
contribute to the achievement of sustainable development, as the access to such basic 
requirements would contribute directly to the eradication of poverty.  Therefore, 
principle 18 of the Johannesburg Declaration recognised specifically that the 
protection and promotion of human dignity could contribute to the achievement of 
sustainable development.  In this sense, the Johannesburg Declaration not only 
reaffirmed the relationship between human dignity and sustainable development that 
was originally identified in the Stockholm Declaration and developed implicitly in 
the years following the Stockholm Summit, but it also recognised that these concepts 
are inherently interdependent and complementary. 
The interdependence of the concepts of human dignity and sustainable 
development was considered further in the Plan of Implementation of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development.84  This relationship was considered specifically 
in the context of the role that energy could play in eradicating poverty and 
                                                 
81 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002), para 2. 
82 Ibid, para 18. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.199/20 (2002) (Plan of Implementation). 
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contributing to more sustainable patterns of energy consumption and production.85  
In relation to the issue of poverty, the Plan of Implementation recognised that access 
to sustainable energy represented ‘an indispensable requirement for sustainable 
development’.86  In this regard, the Plan of Implementation called for all levels of 
government to: 
improve access to reliable and affordable energy services for sustainable 
development sufficient to facilitate the achievement of the Millennium 
development goals, including the goal of halving the proportion of people in 
poverty by 2015, and as a means to generate other important services that 
mitigate poverty, bearing in mind that access to energy facilitates the 
eradication of poverty.87 
To achieve this objective, the Plan of Implementation suggested that it would 
be necessary to provide ‘access to reliable, affordable, economically viable, socially 
acceptable and environmentally sound energy services and resources’.88  A similar 
approach would also be required to address the unsustainable patterns of energy 
consumption and production.  In this regard, the Plan of Implementation noted that it 
would be prudent to ‘develop and disseminate alternative energy technologies, with 
the aim of giving a greater share of the energy mix to renewable energies’.89  
Therefore, the Plan of Implementation recognised that to contribute to the 
achievement of sustainable development while promoting the intrinsic worth of 
humans, it would be necessary to move beyond the traditional fossil fuel-based 
sources of energy and accelerate the deployment of energy sources that do not 
undermine the Earth’s ecosystem. 
The approach that was posited by the Johannesburg Declaration and the Plan of 
Implementation represented an extension of the approach that was elicited by the 
                                                 
85 Ibid, chs II and III. 
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87 Ibid, para 9. 
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Sustainable Development (see: Commission on Sustainable Development, Report on the ninth session 
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89 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. 
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Stockholm Declaration.  However, unlike the approach from 1972, the documents 
that were delivered during and after the Johannesburg Summit revealed that to 
address the challenges relating to the poverty-energy-environment nexus it would be 
necessary to recognise the intrinsic worth of humans.  This is because it is only by 
recognising and protecting the worth of humans – which is achieved by providing 
them with the requirements for a dignified life – that sustainable development is able 
to address the matters required to eradicate poverty and provide for more sustainable 
patterns of energy production.90 
While the extension of the relationship between human dignity and sustainable 
development represents an important point in the development of international 
environmental law, from a practical perspective the convergence of these matters has 
had little effect.  This conclusion is premised on the reality that more than 1.3 billion 
humans continue to live in poverty as a result of lacking access to electricity,91 while 
more than 80 per cent of the world’s energy continues to be sourced from fossil 
fuels.92  Ninety-five per cent of those living without access to electricity live 
in either sub-Saharan Africa or developing Asia and 84% live in rural areas.  
Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for only 12% of the global population, but 
almost 45% of those without access to electricity.93 
Further, the International Energy Agency has projected that if global patterns of 
electricity production and consumption continue unchanged, by 2030 there will still 
be approximately 1.2 billion people living in poverty as a result of lacking access to 
electricity.94 
Notwithstanding the prevalence of electricity-induced poverty in developing 
nation states,95 the issue of access to electricity also limits the advancement of 
                                                 
90 This conclusion was reaffirmed by a 2012 report that was published by the United Nations 
Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability: 'Resilient People, Resilient Planet: A 
future worth choosing' (United Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Global 
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91 'World Energy Outlook 2011' (International Energy Agency, 2011), 472 and Martin Ravallion, 
Shaohua Chen and Prem Sangraula, 'Dollar a Day Revisited' (2009) 23(2) The World Bank Economic 
Review 163, 180. 
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93 World Energy Outlook 2011, above n 91, 472. 
94 'World Energy Outlook 2010' (International Energy Agency, 2010), 248-9. 
95 For example, the International Energy Agency’s analysis of the issue of access to electricity is 
concerned only with this issue as it relates to humans that live in the developing world (see, eg, ibid, 
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humans living in developed nation states.  For example, it has been noted that a 
number of remote Indigenous and Torres Strait Islander communities in Australia 
have ‘no organised electricity supply’96 and, even if they do, they continually 
experience electricity interruptions.97 
Further, in 2009, approximately one quarter of households in the Australian 
State of New South Wales experienced financial difficulty in paying for their 
electricity.98  This represented a substantial increase from the two previous years.99  
Consequently, this has led to an increase in private agreements between those 
struggling to meet their electricity costs and electricity retailers.  These agreements 
are designed to avoid the disconnection of residential electricity services.100  In 
addition, other studies have concluded that ‘rising energy costs have contributed to 
financial hardship, in particular for low-income households’101 throughout many 
Australian jurisdictions.102  This is reflected by the ‘increased demand for emergency 
financial relief services’103 that are required to assist households with meeting the 
cost of their electricity bills.104 
Similar issues have also been identified in Europe, where approximately one in 
seven households find it difficult to pay their electricity bill.105  This problem is 
particularly pronounced in Great Britain, where 19 per cent of all households (or 
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97 Ibid. 
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102 See, eg, ibid, Australian Council of Social Service, Submission No 67 to the Select Committee on 
Electricity Prices, September 2012, John Lawrence, 'Electricity: it’s just essential: low-income 
Electricity Consumers Project final report' (South Australian Council of Social Service and Council on 
the Ageing (SA), 2002) and Kathleen Flanagan, 'Hard times: Tasmanians in financial crisis' (Social 
Action and Research Centre, Anglicare, 2009). 
103 Brotherhood of St Laurence, Submission No 86 to the Select Committee on Electricity Prices, 
September 2012.  
104 See, eg, ibid, 5, Australian Council of Social Service, Submission No 67 to the Select Committee 
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approximately 4.75 million households) live in ‘fuel poverty’.106  This means that a 
household ‘spend[s] more than 10 per cent of its income on fuel to maintain an 
adequate level of warmth ... water heating, lights and appliance usage and cooking 
costs’.107  This expenditure occurs to the detriment of meeting other fundamental 
financial commitments relating to such matters as accommodation and basic 
sustenance.  In this regard, these analyses indicate that lack of continuous access to 
adequate, reliable and low-cost electricity is a problem from which those that live in 
developed nations are also not immune. 
In this context, it is suggested that in order to recognise, protect and promote 
the intrinsic worth of all humans in a sustainable manner, it is critical to move 
beyond the traditional fossil fuel-based electricity sources and accelerate the 
deployment and use of renewable sources to generate electricity.108  This is 
necessarily the first step to provide adequate, dignified and sustainable electricity for 
humankind.109 
Breaking the structure and support for conventional sources of electricity is a 
difficult task, however.  It requires that governments and private institutions invest 
heavily in new technologies, new policies and bold new visions.110  Essentially, this 
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means that society must be steered in a new, more sustainable and dignified 
direction.  To achieve this objective in an effective, timely and prudent manner, the 
preordained societal direction must be institutionalised, formalised and grounded in 
reality.  This points us in the direction of governance.  More particularly, this directs 
us towards the role of a legal regime within a broader governance structure to 
promote a sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector. 
TOWARDS A DIGNIFIED AND SUSTAINABLE LEGAL REGIME 
Governance relates to ‘the act or process of governing’111 which is ‘centered on 
efforts to steer societies ... away from collectively undesirable outcomes and toward 
socially desirable outcomes’.112  Governance is therefore ‘not intended to be a lofty, 
transcendental theory.  It must be, literally and metaphorically, down to Earth, and 
grounded in our experience of the natural world’.113  Many actors contribute to the 
process of governance.114  However, arguably one of the most important actors in 
this regard is the nation state.115  This is because nation states own and manage 
a significant number of assets ... its programs affect the ability of others to 
adapt; it is an important provider of technical, fiscal, and other support; and 
it plays a crucial role in dealing with impacts that cross geographic or 
jurisdictional boundaries.116 
Therefore, in a number of instances, the process of governance relies on the primacy 
and sovereignty of the nation state and its ability to exert authority over its territory 
and its resources.   
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While the primacy of governance is often founded in the nation state, the 
process of governance often relies on a well-designed and effective legal system.  
Traditionally, such a legal structure would be designed according to a set of general 
and abstract rules.117  These rules are designed to afford individuals with rights and 
impose corresponding duties on others.  To give some clarity to these rules, they are 
organised in a logical hierarchy.  The hierarchy of rules is designed so that the most 
abstract rules sit at the apex and the more specific rules – the regulatory rules – 
operate lower down the hierarchical chain.118  This approach is designed to allow the 
most abstract rules to provide the context that is required to govern the operation of 
the more specific rules.  In this sense, the rules at the apex of the hierarchy operate as 
legal principles that are designed to provide for a ‘consistent legal system in the 
sense that they [engender] ... systematic unity of the law amid the disorder of the 
positive rules’.119  In a traditional legal structure, it is only these principles, rather 
than any external source, that can be considered when giving meaning to the legal 
rules that operate lower in the hierarchical chain of laws.120 
While the traditional legal structures have and, in many instances, continue to 
serve society well, new issues are confronting society that are challenging the 
effectiveness of existing legal structures.  One of the central features of these new 
challenges is that they pose communal – rather than individual – challenges.  For 
example, the challenges associated with anthropogenic climate change, the issue of 
international refugees, poverty and energy security are communal in nature and 
therefore cannot be governed effectively by prescribing rules that target only 
individuals.121  Consequently, these problems demand responses that have a 
‘profound understanding of their integration in social systems, their irreducibly 
complexity and intractable nature’.122  In other words, these challenges demand a 
legal response that can transcend the static, individualistic and insular nature of 
traditional legal systems. 
                                                 
117 See, eg, Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press, 1967 (translated from 
the Second (Revised and Enlarged) German Edition by Max Knight). 
118 Ibid and Iain Stewart, 'The Critical Legal Science of Hans Kelsen' (1990) 17(3) Journal of Law and 
Society 273. 
119 Michel van de Kerchove and François Ost, Legal System Between Order and Disorder (Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 82. 
120 Kelsen, above n 117. 
121 Prins et al, above n 109, 15. 
122 Ibid. 
  
42 
In light of the emerging nature of communal challenges facing society, ‘a new 
legal model [is emerging] that ... is replacing the classical law of modern 
societies’.123  This legal system is concerned more with the ‘management of the 
course of [public] events in a social system’124 rather than with the imposition of 
individual sanctions and the protection of individual rights.125  Further, the emerging 
nature of the public-oriented legal systems is characterised by a growing plurality of 
institutions and regulators whose role is premised on the development of goal-
oriented public policies and laws that are designed to respond rapidly to the diffuse, 
sustained and public challenges facing society.126  Therefore, unlike the laws that 
reflect traditional legal arrangements, the emerging nature of goal-oriented laws are 
‘characterized by a much greater openness towards the economic, ethical, and policy 
spheres’.127  Practically, this favours ‘more flexible modes of action, better adapted 
to dynamic social realities in order to ensure the effectiveness of public policies’.128 
This points us in the direction of regulation.  The reason for this is that 
regulation, as permitted by the law, is 
intended to alter activity or behaviour, or to carry out an ordering, often by 
restricting behaviour, but at times enabling or facilitating behaviour that 
would otherwise not be possible.129 
Further, regulation is designed to apply to a class or sector of society.  Regulation 
therefore offers an opportunity to govern general activities or behaviours by using a 
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variety of different instruments.130  It does so by providing society (or a class within 
society) with a future oriented and ‘positive sense of direction and prescription’.131 
Arguably, a critical feature of regulation is the principles that inform the 
direction in which the regulatory framework is designed to steer society.  Unlike the 
legal principles that apply in a traditional legal structure, these so-called ‘post-
modern’ legal principles 
are intended to spur public policies[,] ... mark a policy path to be followed, 
outline the context within which the law-maker must act, and guide the 
course of his passage.132 
Therefore, it has been noted that these legal principles set the strategy for ‘what a 
society is trying to achieve’.133   
At a more practical level, the legal principles operate to create a regulatory 
framework within which the specific, normative and enforceable legal rules can 
operate to achieve the preordained direction for society.  It is for this reason that 
rather than being referred to as ‘legal principles’ per se, these dynamic principles 
have been defined as ‘directing principles’,134 or ‘paralegal rules’.135  In this regard, 
it has been noted that these principles represent the ‘fundamental grundnorms which 
underlie the [regulatory] system and drive it in a particular direction’.136  This means 
that in the process of designing regulation, the task of recognising and defining its 
‘fundamental grundnorms’ is the critical first step to establishing the direction in 
which the regulation is designed to drive society. 
While the recognition of a regulatory regime’s grundnorms offers the critical 
first step to the design of regulation that is designed to respond to the emerging new 
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challenges facing society, these concepts play an equally important role in the 
continued pursuit of the direction set by the regulation.  This is because in the case of 
a dispute concerning regulation that has been designed to steer society in a 
preordained direction, its grundnorms offer an obvious and immediate point of 
reference to understand the underlying purpose of the regulation.  This was a point 
that was addressed specifically by Chief Justice Preston in Taralga Landscape 
Guardians Inc v Minister for Planning and RES Southern Cross Pty Ltd.137   
The case of Taralga concerned an appeal by a community association relating 
to the development of a wind farm.  In considering the merits of this case, Chief 
Justice Preston referred specifically to the policy framework – the grundnorms – that 
informed the legislation under which the development approval had been granted.  
Specifically, the Chief Justice considered matters relating to sustainable 
development, climate change and the necessity of renewable energy.  By referring to 
the regime’s grundnorms of the governing regulation, the Chief Justice was able to 
identify with clarity the publicly oriented direction in which the regulatory 
instrument was designed to direct society. 
Therefore, grundnorms serve two fundamental purposes.  First, they establish 
the principles that will inform a regulatory framework.  Second, grundnorms provide 
the conceptual framework in which legal problems relating to a regulatory regime are 
considered so that the regime’s direction does not falter. 
With this in mind, the question that arises is: what is the relevance of 
regulation and grundnorms to the pursuit of a more sustainable and dignified 
electricity generation sector?  The response to this is simple.  The current approach to 
electricity production is unsustainable and undignified.  This is an issue of 
fundamental public concern.  Regulation is therefore required to steer society in a 
particular direction that can address this issue.  That direction must be to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity.  To do so, such regulation must have as 
its fundamental grundnorm the concepts of sustainable development and human 
dignity, which have emerged (and converged) within the framework of international 
environmental law. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter commenced by noting that ‘electricity is the cornerstone of 
modern life’.  With electricity, humans can create, develop, invent and meet many of 
their fundamental needs.  However, one-fifth of the world’s population currently live 
without access to electricity and the benefits it offers, while even more live without 
consistent and affordable access to electricity.  These humans therefore live in 
circumstances that undermine the recognition of their dignity – their intrinsic self 
worth.  By contrast, for those that do have access to electricity and the benefits that it 
offers, current electricity production practices undermine the world’s natural 
resources.  These approaches reflect unsustainable and undignified patterns of 
electricity production. 
In light of these problems, this chapter considered how the concepts of 
sustainable development and human dignity offer the context for a legal regime to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  This approach explained 
that a regulatory regime that is premised on a grundnorm of sustainable development 
and human dignity is the first – and most critical – step to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.   
So much for the conceptual and governance arrangements to pursue a 
sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector.  Let us move beyond these 
matters to consider some more practical issues, including how regulation may be 
designed to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  Having done 
so, this thesis will be well placed to commence its review of the regulatory regimes 
in Germany, Great Britain and Australia that are designed to increase the production 
of renewable sourced electricity. 
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3. Regulation for a sustainable and 
dignified electricity generation sector 
INTRODUCTION 
Regulation is required to steer society in the direction of a sustainable and 
dignified electricity generation sector.  This means that regulation is required to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  While this much may 
already be clear, what is less evident is how such regulation should be designed.  In 
order to gain a deeper appreciation of this issue, this chapter is concerned principally 
with two matters that will shed light on how regulation should be designed to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
First, this chapter considers the most promising (and prominent) regulatory 
techniques that are designed to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity.  This directs us to the design of the two regulatory techniques that are of 
principal concern for this thesis, namely feed-in tariff mechanisms and renewable 
portfolio standards.  Having completed a general review of these regulatory 
techniques, this chapter then considers the key legal values that are necessary to 
inform the design of these regulatory techniques so that they can effectively increase 
the production of renewable sourced electricity.  These key legal values will operate 
as the lens through which the regulatory regimes in Germany, Great Britain and 
Australia are assessed. 
However, before commencing the review of the two identified regulatory 
techniques and the key legal values that must underpin their effective design, this 
chapter commences with a brief review of the major barriers that limit the production 
of renewable sourced electricity.  The reason for this approach is that an 
understanding of these barriers will provide the context to appreciate the design of 
the regulatory techniques and key legal values that are considered in this chapter. 
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BARRIERS TO THE PRODUCTION OF RENEWABLE SOURCED 
ELECTRICITY 
There are ‘many and varied’1 social, economic and political barriers that 
impede the production of renewable sourced electricity.2  Some of these relate to 
jurisdiction-specific matters, such as ‘the level of a country’s renewable and fossil 
fuel resources’.3  While these jurisdictional issues cannot be ignored, the most 
prominent barriers that operate to limit the production of renewable sourced 
electricity are universal, as ‘they arise in similar ways in countries around the world’4 
to place renewable sourced electricity ‘at an economic, regulatory, or institutional 
disadvantage relative to other forms of energy’.5 
What follows therefore is a review of these universal barriers that may be 
usefully grouped into the following categories: 
• legal, regulatory and institutional barriers; and 
• financial and market barriers. 
Given their prominence, let us consider each category in turn. 
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Law Quarterly 903, Matt Grudnoff, 'Pouring Fuel on the Fire: The nature and extent of Federal 
Government subsidies to the mining industry' (Policy Brief No. 38, The Australia Institute, 2012) and 
Lewis Milford, Ross Tyler and Jessica Morey, 'Strategies to finance large-scale deployment of 
renewable energy projects: An economic development and infrastructure approach' (Clean Energy 
Group and the International Energy Agency, 2011). 
3 Ottinger, Mathews and Czachor, above n 1, 185. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Beck and Martinot, above n 2, 366. 
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A. Legal, regulatory and institutional barriers 
Since the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, fossil 
fuels have dominated the production of electricity.  One of the many consequences of 
this dominance has been that the design of 
[r]egulations ... governing the power sector [are] designed for fossil fuels, 
[which] often discriminate against renewable fuels, whether deliberately or 
not.6 
Such discrimination has arisen because the regulation that has been designed to 
govern the electricity sector is designed to favour ‘enterprises running large, 
centralized power plants’,7 which reflects the traditional model for fossil fuel sourced 
electricity generating facilities.  The issue that arises with this approach is that ‘many 
types of renewable energy [facilities] do not fit this model well’.8  The reasons for 
this are that these facilities are typically smaller than their fossil fuel counterparts and 
are often located in areas that are not highly centralised due to the availability of 
renewable resources in those areas.  As a result, renewable sourced electricity 
generating facilities often find it difficult to operate within the regulatory framework 
that has been established to facilitate the development, generation and transmission 
of electricity that is sourced from fossil fuels.  To appreciate the practical impacts of 
this barrier, it is useful to explore some practical examples. 
The first example concerns the regulatory approaches that govern the 
connection of new electricity generation facilities to the electricity transmission 
grid.9  Generally, such regulation is designed to facilitate the connection of electricity 
generating facilities that are within close proximity to the existing electricity 
transmission grid.  This is to ensure that new electricity generating facilities can 
                                                 
6 Ottinger, Mathews and Czachor, above n 1, 189.  See also, eg, Chris Riedy, 'Subsidies that 
Encourage Fossil Fuel Use in Australia' (Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology, 
2003) <http://sydneypeakoil.com/downloads/CR_2003_paper.pdf> and Letha Tawney, Subsidy 
Reform to Power U.S. Clean Tech (2012) World Resources Institute 
<http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/04/subsidy-reform-power-us-clean-
tech?utm_campaign=wridigest&utm_medium=email&utm_source=wridigest-2012-
04&utm_content=hyperlink&utm_term=SubsidyReformToPowerUSCleanTech-FullStory>. 
7 Ottinger, Mathews and Czachor, above n 1, 189. 
8 Ibid. 
9 The concept of the ‘electricity transmission grid’ refers to the infrastructure than enables the transfer 
of electrical energy from electricity generating facilities to electricity substations.  The electricity 
transmission grid is distinct from the electricity distribution grid, as the latter refers to the 
infrastructure that deliver electricity from the substations to end users (although some commercial end 
users are able to receive electricity from the electricity transmission grid). 
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make use of the existing infrastructure, thereby minimising the cost of integration.  
However, this is not always an option for renewable sourced electricity generating 
facilities as these facilities are often located in remote locations, as this is where 
renewable resources are often available.  In such instances, these remotely located 
facilities are exposed to high costs to connect to the existing electricity transmission 
grid and, on occasions, can also be required to meet the cost of reinforcing or 
extending the existing electricity transmission grid.10 
A second institutional barrier to the production of renewable sourced electricity 
relates to the failure of many regulatory frameworks to enable the effective 
integration of flow (or intermittent) sources of renewable electricity.  This barrier is 
best reflected by the burdensome regulatory requirements that are imposed on 
generating facilities that rely on intermittent renewable sources – such as those that 
are powered by wind and solar – once these facilities are connected to the electricity 
transmission grid.  These requirements often include ‘excessive standby rates, high 
transmission access rates [and] fixed unavoidable charges’.11  These charges are 
imposed because the existing electricity transmission grid infrastructure is not 
designed to manage the transmission of electricity that is generated on an intermittent 
basis.  Instead, it is designed to support facilities that exhibit only ‘limited variable 
generation’,12 which is a trademark of fossil fuel sourced electricity generating 
facilities. 
A third example of the existing institutional barriers to the production of 
renewable sourced electricity relates to the planning restrictions that apply to these 
facilities.13  It is common for new renewable sourced electricity generating facilities 
                                                 
10 Beck and Martinot, above n 2, 369.  See also: Edoardo Binda Zane et al, 'Integration of electricity 
from renewables to the electricity grid and to the electricity market' (eclareon and Öko-Institut e.V., 
2012) <http://www.eclareon.eu/sites/default/files/res_integration_final_report.pdf>, 25-49. 
11 Ottinger, Mathews and Czachor, above n 1, 189.  See also: Gerard Reid et al, 'A Global Renewables 
Investment Plan: Scaling up investments in renewable energy technologies' (Delhi International 
Renewable Energy Conference, 2010), 18-9, Anne Kallies, 'The Impact of Electricity Market Design 
on Access to the Grid and Transmission Planning for Renewable Energy in Australia: Can Overseas 
Examples Provide Guidance?' (2011) 2 Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review 147 and Mark D. 
Safty and Giji M. John, 'An Overview of Transmission and Interconnection Issues Affecting 
Renewable Energy Projects' in Andrea S. Kramer and Peter C. Fusaro (eds), Energy and 
Environmental Project Finance Law and Taxation: New Investment Techniques (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 211. 
12 Reid et al, above n 11, 18. 
13 Rogier Coenraads, Monique Voogt and Attila Morotz, 'OPTRES report (D8 report): Analysis of 
barriers for the development of electricity generation from renewable energy sources in the EU-25' 
(Ecofys, 2006), 17.  See also: Ottinger, Mathews and Czachor, above n 1, 190, Zane et al, above n 10, 
59-69, Howard Rufus, 'Grid connection conundrum' (2011) 12(1) Renewable Energy Focus 8 and 
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to find it difficult to obtain adequate development approvals due to the complexity of 
planning regulations as well as the lack of familiarity by officials with the nature of 
renewable sourced electricity generating technologies.14  These barriers are then 
further exacerbated by opposition that exists towards these projects by local 
residents, whose opposition is based on aesthetic reasons or for reasons of local 
convenience – which is often referred to as the ‘NIMBY’ or the ‘not in my backyard’ 
effect.15 
B. Financial and market barriers 
Most renewable sources are free as one does not have to pay to access the 
wind, the sun, the waves or the tides.  However, the process of harnessing these 
renewable sources to produce electricity is more expensive than the cost of 
generating electricity from fossil fuels.  This conclusion is reflected in the findings of 
a number of studies that have uniformly concluded that the cost to produce one unit 
(typically one-megawatt hour) of fossil fuel sourced electricity is considerably lower 
than it is for facilities that use renewable sources to do the same.16  While these cost 
disparities currently represent a major barrier, the rising cost of fossil fuels (as a 
result of reduced availability) and the diminishing cost of renewable technologies (as 
they become more mature) is projected to lead to cost parity in the coming years.17 
                                                                                                                                          
Rosemary Lyster, 'The implications of electricity restructuring for a sustainable energy framework: 
what's law got to do with it?' (2003) 20(5) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 359. 
14 Coenraads, Voogt and Morotz, above n 13, 17, Corinna Klessmann, Christian Nabe and Karsten 
Burges, 'Pros and cons of exposing renewables to electricity market risks--A comparison of the market 
integration approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UK' (2008) 36(10) Energy Policy 3646, Georgina 
Crowhurst and Simon Davidson, 'Planning: A Roadblock to Renewable Energy in the UK' (2008) 10 
Environmental Law Review 181 and 'Facilitating Renewable Energy Development' (PP No 21, Session 
2010–11, Victorian Auditor-General, 2011). 
15 Coenraads, Voogt and Morotz, above n 13, 24. 
16 G. Booras, 'Australian Electricity Generation Technology Costs – Reference Case 2010' (Electric 
Power Research Institute, 2010), 'Annual Energy Outlook 2011 with Projections to 2035' (DOE/EIA-
0383(2011), U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2011) and Paul Graham, Luke Reedman and 
Peter Coombes, 'Options for electricity generation in Australia - 2007 update' (Cooperative Research 
Centre for Coal in Sustainable Development, 2008).  The levelised cost of electricity represents the 
sum of capital amortisation, interest payments to creditors and dividends to investors, and operation 
and maintenance over the entire life-cycle of an electricity generating installation. 
17 See, eg, Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2011 (2011) 
Energy Information Administration <http://205.254.135.24/oiaf/aeo/electricity_generation.html>, 
Manish Bapna, '2012: A Breakthrough for Renewable Energy?', The Huffington Post (New York), 9 
February 2012 2012 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/manish-bapna/2012-a-breakthrough-for-
r_b_1263543.html?ref=email_share>, Dexter Gauntlett and Peter Asmus, 'Distributed Solar Energy 
Generation: Demand Drivers and Barriers, Technology Issues, Competitive Landscape, and Global 
Market Forecasts' (Pike Research, 2011), Paul Denholm et al, 'Break-Even Cost for Residential 
Photovoltaics in the United States: Key Drivers and Sensitivities' (NREL/TP-6A2-46909, National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2009), John D. Quackenbush, Orjiakor N. Isiogu and Greg R. White, 
  
52 
However, even with the achievement of technical cost parity between 
technologies that rely on renewable and fossil fuel, other financial barriers will 
continue to limit the deployment of technologies that generate electricity from 
renewable sources.  One of the most persistent barriers in this regard relates to the 
high upfront investment costs of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities, 
which can account for up to 80 per cent of a renewable sourced electricity generating 
facility's costs.18  By comparison, electricity-generating facilities that rely on fossil 
fuels have much lower upfront costs, as their costs relate more to the operation and 
maintenance of the facility.19  Practically, the high upfront capital costs faced by 
developers of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities results in 
the payback period for renewable projects [being] longer than [for] 
conventional power stations.  The longer the payback period, the riskier the 
project is seen from the financier’s point of view; the riskier the project is, 
the higher the cost of capital required to finance those projects.  This in turn 
leads to a higher [cost to produce renewable sourced electricity].20 
A further financial impediment that restricts the production of renewable 
sourced electricity related to the fact that the current price of fossil fuels does not 
reflect its ‘true’ cost to society.  The reason for this is that the current price of fossil 
fuels ignores a range of negative factors – so-called ‘negative externalities’21 – that 
are not reflected in the price of fossil fuel sourced electricity.  These negative 
externalities include: 
• the direct costs of producing fossil fuel sourced electricity, 
which is shielded by the high production subsidies given to 
fossil fuels and nuclear energy worldwide;  
                                                                                                                                          
'Report on the implementation of the P.A. 295 Renewable Energy Standard and the cost-effectiveness 
of the energy standards' (Michigan Public Service Commission, 2012), Beck and Martinot, above n 2, 
366, Staffan Jacobsson and Volkmar Lauber, 'Germany: From a Modest Feed-in Law to a Framework 
for Transition' in Volkmar Lauber (ed), Switching to Renewable Power: A Framework for the 21st 
Century (Earthscan, 2005) 122, 144 and Keith Lovegrove et al, 'Realising the potential of 
concentrating solar power in Australia' (Prepared by IT Power (Australia) Pty Ltd for the Australian 
Solar Institute, 2012). 
18 Reid et al, above n 11, 20. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  See footnote 16 for the meaning of the term ‘levelised cost of electricity’. 
21 A negative externality exists where ‘the actions of one individual (or firm) have a direct, 
unintentional, and uncompensated effect on the well-being of other individuals or the profits of other 
firms’ (see: Nathaniel O Keohane and Sheila M Olmstead, Markets and the Environment (2007), 66). 
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• the health and welfare consequences associated with climate 
change and air, water, and toxic pollution that result from the 
use of fossil fuels to generate electricity; and 
• the risks of fuel price changes and volatility.22 
Because the cost of these issues are excluded from the price of fossil fuel sourced 
electricity, ‘investors rarely include such ... costs on the bottom line’23 when making 
investment decisions.  As a result, these investment decisions support the continued 
use of fossil fuels to generate electricity, as it represents a more fiscally prudent 
investment than a renewable sourced electricity generating facility. 
REGULATORY TECHNIQUES TO OVERCOME EXISTING BARRIERS 
A number of regulatory techniques have been developed to address the barriers 
that limit the production of renewable sourced electricity.  These techniques have 
been broadly grouped into two categories: ‘supply-push’ or ‘demand-pull’ 
techniques.24 
Supply-push techniques are designed to push renewable sourced electricity 
generating technologies towards cost parity with non-renewable electricity 
generating technologies by using specific and targeted approaches.25  These 
                                                 
22 Ottinger, Mathews and Czachor, above n 1, 188.  See also, eg, 'Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced 
Consequences of Energy Production and Use' (Committee on Health, Environmental, and Other 
External Costs and Benefits of Energy Production and Consumption; Board on Environmental Studies 
and Toxicology, Division on Earth and Life Studies; Board on Energy and Environmental Systems, 
Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences; Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy, 
Policy and Global Affairs Division; National Research Council of the National Academies, 2010), 
Anthony J. McMichael et al, 'Food, livestock production, energy, climate change, and health' (2007) 
370(9594) The Lancet 1253, O. Edenhofer et al (eds), IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy 
Sources and Climate Change Mitigation (Cambrdige University Press, 2011), Martin I. Hoffert et al, 
'Energy implications of future stabilization of atmospheric CO2 content' (1998) 395(6705) Nature 
881, Catherine Gautier, Oil, water and climate: An introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
and Claudia Sadoff and Mike Muller, 'Water Management,Water Security and Climate Change 
Adaptation: Early Impacts and Essential Responses' (TEC Background Papers No. 14, Global Water 
Partnership, Technical Committee, 2009), Ross Garnaut, 'The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final 
Report' (2008), Ross Garnaut, The Garnaut Review 2011: Australia in the Global Response to Climate 
Change (Cambridge University Press, 2011), Sir Nicholas Stern, 'Stern Review: The Economics of 
Climate Change ' (HM Treasury, 2006), Grudnoff, above n 2, Mormann, above n 2 and 'Energy 
Technology Perspectives 2012: Pathways to a Clean Energy System' (International Energy Agency, 
2012). 
23 Beck and Martinot, above n 2, 367. 
24 Sovacool, above n 2, 1785.  See also: Stern, above n 22, 348-51. 
25 Sovacool, above n 2, 1785.  See also: Emmanuel Guérin and Joseph Schiavo, 'Pushing and pulling: 
The bumpy road to effective renewable energy policy' (2011) 5(1) BioRes: Trade and Environment 
Review - A New Dawn? Renewable Energy at the WTO 5, 5 and ‘World Energy Outlook 2010' 
(International Energy Agency, 2010), 313.  For an overview of the various mechanisms available to 
regulators to increase the amount of renewable electricity see, eg, Richard L Ottinger, 'Legal 
Frameworks for Energy for Sustainable Development' in Adrian J Bradbrook, Rosemary Lyster and 
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approaches are generally designed to assist with the development of immature 
technologies that are not yet technologically sound but with sufficient financial and 
regulatory support may become a viable means of generating renewable sourced 
electricity.  Supply-push techniques are therefore often designed to support 
technology-specific research and development programs rather than the direct and 
large-scale deployment of technologies that are used to generate electricity from 
renewable sources.   
Common examples of supply-push techniques include: 
• government funding for targeted research, development and 
construction of demonstration facilities; 
• government procurement of experimental technologies; and  
• tax credits for investors who invest in early stage or speculative 
technologies. 
Demand-pull techniques are designed to encourage the mass deployment of a 
diverse portfolio of renewable sourced electricity technologies by creating the 
financial, institutional and regulatory conditions that can allow for this to occur.26  
These techniques are generally designed to target technologies that have progressed 
beyond their speculative stages.  By encouraging deployment, demand-pull 
techniques are designed to  
attract enough investment in ... [eligible] generation technolog[ies] to 
stimulate wider adoption of the[ese] technolog[ies] over time through 
economies of scale, increased efficiency of the technology, better 
understanding of the advantages of the technology and other lessons from 
actual deployment.27   
                                                                                                                                          
Wang Xi (eds), The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development (IUCN Academy of Environmental 
Law and Cambridge University Press, 2005) 103. 
26 Volkmar Lauber, 'Introduction: The Promise of Renewable Power' in Volkmar Lauber (ed), 
Switching to Renewable Power: A Framework for the 21st Century (Earthscan, 2005) 1, 14 and Jesse 
Jenkins et al, 'Beyond boom and bust - Putting clean tech on a path to subsidy independence' 
(Breakthrough Institute, Brookings Institute and the World Resources Institute, 2012), 38. 
27 David Grinlinton and LeRoy Paddock, 'The Role of Feed-in Tariffs in Supporting the Expansion of 
Solar Energy Production' (2010) 41(4) University of Toledo Law Review 943, 946. 
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Economies of scale refer to cost reductions that are brought about as a result of an 
increased volume, including increased production knowledge.28  This is particularly 
important for renewable sourced electricity generating technologies, because the 
reduction in technology costs allows these technologies to be more readily 
deployed.29  Eventually, it is intended that such support will therefore remove the 
need for financial aid altogether.30 
The International Energy Agency has noted that ‘push’ and ‘pull’ techniques 
are critical to developing a ‘comprehensive policy approach’31 that can effectively 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.32  While this conclusion is 
not in dispute in this thesis (although it has been criticised elsewhere),33 it is now 
commonly accepted that techniques which encourage the deployment of renewable 
technologies are more likely to contribute to the immediate and large-scale increase 
in the production of renewable sourced electricity.  The reason for this is that such 
techniques are most suited to addressing the most prominent barriers that limit the 
production of renewable sourced electricity, at least in the near term.34   
It is specifically for these reasons that this thesis is concerned with the most 
promising (and popular) demand-pull techniques that are designed to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity by encouraging the deployment of the 
relevant technologies.  This directs us towards the design of feed-in tariff 
mechanisms and renewable portfolio standards, as it is these techniques that have ‘in 
                                                 
28 Greg Buckman, Renewable Electricity Support Policy: Lessons for Australia from Overseas 
Experience (Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, Australian National University, 2011), 39.  The cost 
reductions associated with economies of scale are often referred to as ‘learning curve’ economies.  
This concept was first considered by Arrow in Kenneth J Arrow, 'The Economic Implications of 
Learning by Doing' (1962) 29(3) Review of Economic Studies 155. 
29 Buckman, above n 28, 39. 
30 See, eg, ibid and 'Background Information on the EEG Progress Report 2007' (German Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2007) 
<http://www.bmu.de/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/eeg_kosten_nutzen_hintergrund_en.pdf>, 11-2. 
31 'Clean Energy Progress Report: IEA Input to the Clean Energy Ministerial' (International Energy 
Agency, 2011), 15. 
32 Ibid.  See also: Jenkins et al, above n 26, 39-43. 
33 See, eg, International Energy Agency, above n 25, 309 and 'The Support of Electricity from 
Renewable Energy Sources: Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Promotion of the Use of Energy and Renewable Sources' 
(COM(2008) 57, 2008). 
34 See, eg, Cedric Philibert, 'Interactions of Policies for Renewable Energy and Climate' (International 
Energy Agency, 2011), 5 and Tony Wood, 'Building the bridge: A practical plan for a low-cost, low-
emissions energy future' (Grattan Institute, 2012), 6 and 9. 
  
56 
the last 10 years emerged as [the] two key [regulatory] policies to promote the 
development of [renewable sources] for electricity generation’.35 
A. Feed-in tariff mechanisms 
The United States Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 197836 is credited 
with having developed the first feed-in tariff mechanism, albeit not for the purpose of 
increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity.37  The Act imposed ‘long-
term fixed contracts between qualified independent [oil] producers and utilities, 
obliging the latter to purchase all electricity from the former’.38  The simplicity of the 
regulatory technique created by the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act led to 
feed-in tariff mechanisms being established in a variety of jurisdictions to increase 
the production of renewable sourced electricity.  Further, the simplicity has also 
contributed to feed-in tariff mechanisms becoming the most popular regulatory 
technique to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.39  This is 
reflected by the adoption of feed-in tariff mechanisms in approximately 65 countries 
and 27 states or provinces worldwide.40 
The underlying premise of a feed-in tariff mechanism is that it is designed to 
offer a generator of renewable sourced electricity with a high degree of certainty by 
providing it with a guaranteed offtake arrangement and a certain rate of return for its 
electricity.  The rate of return is generally set above the rate that the generator would 
otherwise receive by selling its electricity at the prevailing market price.  To do so, 
feed-in tariffs are most commonly designed to offer fixed and ‘long-term purchase 
agreements for the sale of [renewable sourced] electricity’.41  These agreements 
occur outside of any market in which electricity is traded.42  Therefore, participants 
                                                 
35 Judith Lipp, 'Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark, Germany and the 
United Kingdom' (2007) 35(11) Energy Policy 5481, 5482. 
36 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 USC Chapter 46 § 2601 (1978). 
37 Miguel Mendonça, David Jacobs and Benjamin Sovacool, Powering the Green Economy: The 
Feed-in Tariff (Earthscan, 2009), 77. 
38 Ibid. 
39 'Renewables 2012: Global Status Report' (Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, 
2012), 14. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Toby D. Couture et al, 'A Policymaker's Guide to Feed-in Tariff Design' (Technical Report 
NREL/TP-6A2-44849, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2010), 6.  See also: Philippe 
Menanteau, Dominique Finon and Marie-Laure Lamy, 'Prices versus quantities: choosing policies for 
promoting the development of renewable energy' (2003) 31(8) Energy Policy 799 and Lincoln L. 
Davies, 'Incentivizing Renewable Energy Deployment: Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-In 
Tariffs' (2011) 1 KLRI Journal of Law and Legislation 39, 42. 
42 Klessmann, Nabe and Burges, above n 14, 3650-1. 
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in a feed-in tariff mechanism are not affected by electricity market prices.  By 
offering a dependable and guaranteed price for electricity that is independent of any 
market, fixed feed-in tariff mechanisms ‘are perceived to offer a reduced price risk 
for the developer’43 and a cost-efficient means to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.44  For this reason, the certainty offered by this 
mechanism is considered to be its greatest strength.45 
Feed-in tariff mechanisms may also be designed to offer payments for the 
generation of renewable sourced electricity ‘as a premium, or bonus, above the 
prevailing market price’.46  Under this approach, a generator of renewable sourced 
electricity sells its  
produced electricity on the electricity market via bilateral contracts or the 
power exchange.  On top of the price achieved on the market, a technology-
specific premium is guaranteed by law.47 
The granting of a premium above the market rate of electricity is designed to 
facilitate the interaction of renewable sourced electricity producers with the 
liberalised electricity market by providing the premium tariff only once the 
electricity is sold. 
While premium tariffs are used as an alternative to or to complement fixed 
feed-in tariffs, the most promising feed-in tariff is one that operates independently of 
the electricity market and offers a fixed and certain rate of return.  For this reason, 
the following discussion of the core design features of a feed-in tariff mechanism is 
concerned primarily with the principal features of a fixed feed-in tariff mechanism. 
                                                 
43 S. L. Walker, 'Can the GB feed-in tariff deliver the expected 2% of electricity from renewable 
sources?' (2012) 43(0) Renewable Energy 383, 384.  See also: Jonathan A. Lesser and Xuejuan Su, 
'Design of an economically efficient feed-in tariff structure for renewable energy development' (2008) 
36(3) Energy Policy 981, 982 and Toby Couture and Yves Gagnon, 'An analysis of feed-in tariff 
remuneration models: Implications for renewable energy investment' (2010) 38(2) Energy Policy 955, 
955-6. 
44 See, eg, Janet Sawin, 'Policy Lessons for the Advancement and Diffusion of Renewable Energy 
Policy Lessons for the Advancement and Diffusion of Renewable Energy' (International Conference 
for Renewable Energies, 2004), 12-3, Menanteau, Finon and Lamy, above n 41, 805-8, Staffan 
Jacobsson and Volkmar Lauber, 'The politics and policy of energy system transformation: Explaining 
the German diffusion of renewable energy technology' (2006) 34(3) Energy Policy 256, 269-71 and 
Pablo del Río and Miguel A. Gual, 'An integrated assessment of the feed-in tariff system in Spain' 
(2007) 35(2) Energy Policy 994, 996-7. 
45 See, eg, Lesser and Su, above n 43, 982, Couture and Gagnon, above n 43, 955-6 and 994-6 and 
Catherine Mitchell, D Bauknecht and P M Connor, 'Effectiveness through risk reduction: a 
comparison of the renewable obligation in England and Wales and the feed-in system in Germany' 
(2006) 34(3) Energy Policy 297. 
46 Couture et al, above n 41, 6. 
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a. Level of the tariff 
Arguably, one of the most critical features of a feed-in tariff mechanism is the 
level of the tariff.  The reason for this is that a  
tariff that is too low will not spur any investment ... while a tariff that is too 
high might cause unnecessary profits and higher costs for the final 
consumer.48   
Therefore, it is important that a tariff encourage sufficient investment into the 
technologies that generate electricity from renewable sources without delivering any 
windfall profits for generators or investors. 
Four primary methodologies have been developed to calculate the level of the 
tariff.  The first methodology uses a cost covering methodology.  Applying this 
methodology, the tariff is intended to reflect the electricity generating cost for 
eligible electricity generating facilities.49  This tariff is typically calculated on a 
technology-specific basis.  To support commercial viability, the tariff is also 
designed to include a small profit margin.50 
The second tariff setting methodology is designed to derive the tariff from the 
value of the avoided external costs associated with generating electricity from 
renewable rather than fossil fuels.  Therefore, the purpose of this approach is to 
assign a value to the negative externalities that are avoided by using renewable 
sources to generate electricity, including (but not limited to) climate change, 
pollution and health issues.51 
The third methodology offers a fixed purchase price for renewable electricity 
that is based neither on generation costs nor on the avoided external costs.52  This 
methodology reflects the political will of the regulators to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.53  Finally, the fourth methodology relies on an 
                                                 
48 Mendonça, Jacobs and Sovacool, above n 37, 19. 
49 A Klein et al, 'Evaluation of different feed-in tariff design options - Best practice paper for the 
International Feed-In Cooperation (3rd edition, update by December 2010)' (Energy Economics 
Group and Fraunhofer, 2010) <www.feed-in-
cooperation.org/...7/.../Best_practice_Paper_3rd_edition.pdf>, 7. 
50 Mendonça, Jacobs and Sovacool, above n 37, 19. 
51 Klein et al, above n 49, 11.  Avoided costs associated with renewable sourced electricity refers to 
the external costs that result from the use of fossil fuels to generate electricity and which society as a 
whole is responsible for, including climate change mitigation and adaptation, health impacts and 
energy security. 
52 Couture et al, above n 41, 7. 
53 Ibid. 
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auction-based approach where potential generating facilities participate in an auction 
to determine the tariff rate.54 
While each of the methodologies has been used to set the level of the tariff in 
different contexts, the cost covering methodology has proven to be the most effective 
technique to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.55  The 
effectiveness of this approach relates to its ability to address a number of the 
financial, market and regulatory barriers that limit the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.  Among the factors that a cost covering methodology considers 
when setting the tariff are the investment costs, projected-related costs, planning 
costs and operation and maintenance costs to develop, construct and operate a 
renewable sourced electricity generating facility.56 
In addition to the specific costs relevant to each new renewable sourced 
electricity generating facility, it is not uncommon for a tariff that is calculated using a 
cost covering methodology to offer different tariff rates to reflect the particular 
nuances of eligible facilities.  In this regard, tariffs rates will often be designed to 
reflect the following differences between facilities: 
• the size of the facility (with larger facilities receiving a reduced tariff 
to reflect economies of scale);57 
• the type of fuel used (if the fuel must be purchased – for example for 
biomass facilities);58 and 
• the conditions operating at different sites, including, for example, the 
quality of resource available (with sites with better resources receiving 
a lower tariff in order to avoid site congestion).59 
This refined cost covering methodology is known as a ‘stepped’ tariff 
approach.  The most notable benefits of a stepped tariff approach are that it can 
encourage the development of projects of various sizes across a diversity of 
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locations.60  However, because the effect of stepped tariffs is to impose more than a 
technology-specific tariff, they may contribute to the administrative complexity of a 
feed-in tariff mechanism.61  Notwithstanding this limitation, the benefits offered by 
stepped tariffs have led to this methodology being adopted in a number of different 
jurisdictions, including Spain,62 Germany63 and the Canadian Province of Ontario.64 
In addition to the use of a stepped tariff approach, the level of the tariff can be 
further refined by the concept of tariff degression.  Tariff degression refers to a 
prescribed percentage reduction in the tariff that applies to new facilities.65  
Degression may be prescribed at the outset of a feed-in tariff program to take effect 
annually.  This is the approach that has been adopted by the German and French 
feed-in tariffs, for example.66  Alternatively, tariff degression may also be applied in 
a more responsive manner so that tariff rates are reduced in response to market 
growth of a particular technology.67  This approach has recently been incorporated in 
the German feed-in tariff law to manage the rapid growth of solar PV installations 
because the annual rates of degression were seen as inappropriate, as they did not 
reflect the rapidly reducing cost of this technology.68 
The rationale for the use of tariff degression is that it contributes to a feed-in 
tariff mechanism that is fiscally prudent and capable of increasing the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  Further, tariff degression – whether prescribed at the 
outset of the regime or operating in a responsive manner – is designed to encourage 
technology cost reductions, to mitigate the chance of overcompensation and 
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68 See, eg, 'Germany solar subsidy cut highlights policy risk for clean energy' (2012) 6(123) 
Bloomberg  New Energy Finance Week in Review and Krister Aanesen, Stefan Heck and Dickon 
Pinner, 'Solar power: Darkest before dawn' (Mckinsey & Company, 2012), 9-12. 
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stimulate early investment into renewable electricity technologies.69  However, a 
tariff reduction that is prescribed at the outset of a regime is limited by the difficulty 
in forecasting the reduction in costs of the eligible technologies over the life of the 
scheme.70  Therefore, if not calculated accurately (which is nearly impossible to do), 
prescribed degression may contribute to the over or under compensation of certain 
technologies, which can, in turn, contribute to an inefficient scheme.  This problem 
occurred in relation to solar PV installations in Germany where tariff degression was 
not sufficiently robust, which subsequently led to the development of a more 
responsive technique.71  The use of responsive degression may however add to the 
complexity of a regime that may, among other things, operate to undermine the 
overall confidence of investors in a scheme.72 
b. Eligibility 
A feed-in tariff mechanism must determine eligibility based on a specific set of 
criteria.73  These criteria may relate to the person entitled to receive the tariff, the 
nature of the technology used to generate electricity, the size of the project or its 
location.  The common approach to defining eligibility is to adopt a broad approach 
to enable as many people and as many technologies in a diverse range of locations to 
produce electricity.74  This is the approach to which most feed-in tariff mechanisms 
have subscribed, as it promotes the use of a diverse portfolio of renewable sources 
and is therefore considered to be the most effective and cost-efficient means of 
increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity.75 
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While a liberal approach to eligibility is useful, issues of sustainability and 
technology maturity may temper an inclusive approach to eligibility.  For example, 
eligibility criteria may exclude large-scale hydropower facilities because these 
facilities are sufficiently mature and, therefore, do not require additional financial 
support.  Further, such facilities may also pose threats to the environment and the 
communities in which they operate and therefore may not represent the most 
sustainable approach to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.76 
c. Duration of the tariff 
Like the level of the tariff, the tariff's duration is fundamental to the effective 
operation of a feed-in tariff mechanism.  The general approach adopted for most 
feed-in tariff mechanisms is to guarantee a tariff payment for a period of 15 to 20 
years, with the higher end reflecting the average payback period for many renewable 
sourced electricity generating facilities.77  A payback period refers to the period 
during which a facility will amortise the debt that it has obtained to construct and 
operate the facility.78  Therefore, the benefit of 15-20 year tariffs offers a high degree 
of certainty and financial security, with the effect that 
companies are willing to invest in technology, to train staff, and establish 
other services and resources with a longer-term perspective.  This certainty 
also makes it easier to obtain financing, as banks and other investors are 
assured a guaranteed rate of return over a specified period of time.79 
However, the risk of a long-term tariff is that it can contribute to windfall gains 
for generators of renewable sourced electricity if the tariff is too high or if it is 
provided for an unnecessarily long period.  For this reason, the duration of the tariff 
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must be determined only after close consideration of the level of the tariff and the 
potential for the application of tariff degression.80 
d. Mandatory purchase obligation 
Closely related to the provision of a tariff is the existence of a mandatory 
purchase obligation.  This feature compels operators of the electricity transmission 
grid (or, in certain circumstances, other relevant entities in the electricity supply 
chain) to purchase all of the electricity generated by eligible renewable electricity 
generation facilities.81  This feature removes the risk that an eligible renewable 
sourced electricity generator will not be able to sell the electricity that it produces via 
the electricity market or by entering into bilateral contracts.  Because of this, a 
mandatory purchase obligation is considered to be the ‘second most important 
ingredient (after a long-term tariff) for [fixed feed-in tariff] schemes as it assures 
investment security,’82 mitigates financial risk and, therefore, ‘lower[s] the costs of 
financing’83 renewable sourced electricity. 
While mandatory purchase obligations are an integral feature of a fixed feed-in 
tariff, they have been criticised for limiting the free market principles that define the 
liberalised electricity market structures in most developed nation states.84  It is this 
criticism that has contributed to the emergence of premium feed-in tariff mechanisms 
in Spain and Germany that attempt to integrate the concept of a prescribed tariff with 
the liberalised electricity market.85 
e. Immediate and prioritised grid access 
Because accessing the electricity transmission grid is a significant barrier to the 
production of renewable sourced electricity, orthodox feed-in tariff mechanisms are 
often designed to compel electricity transmission grid operators to connect new 
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renewable sourced electricity generating facilities to the electricity transmission grid 
immediately and with priority.  This approach is consistent with the view that holds 
that: 
[p]rice [(which is reflected by a suitable tariff)] [does] not matter if you [can] 
not access the grid, or [can] only be assured of your price for five weeks or 
five months or five years.  This is because what you need to raise investment 
capital [is] a longer-term commitment of both transmission access and 
prices.86 
The relevance of grid connectivity is a particularly important feature, as an 
eligible generator of renewable sourced electricity will only be entitled to receive the 
tariff once it is connected to the electricity transmission grid and generating 
electricity.  The importance of prioritised grid connectivity is reflected in the support 
for this concept under the European Union’s directive on the promotion of renewable 
sourced energy.  This directive requires that all renewable sourced electricity be 
connected to the grid in priority to non-renewable sourced electricity.87  The 
operation of this directive has subsequently informed the design of a number of feed-
in tariff mechanisms, including those in Spain and Germany that specifically provide 
renewable sourced electricity generating facilities with immediate and prioritised 
grid access.88 
f. Minimising grid connection costs 
Grid connection costs may be incurred when connecting a new electricity 
generating facility to the electricity transmission grid.  Further, costs may also be 
incurred for any reinforcement works that are required to be made to the existing 
electricity transmission grid infrastructure in order to accommodate the connection 
and integration of a new facility.89  These costs are an additional upfront cost that 
                                                 
86 Timothy P. Duane, 'Greening the grid: Implementing climate change policy through energy 
efficiency, renewable portfolio standards, and strategic transmission system investments' (2010) 34 
Vermont Law Review 711, 755.  See also: Lutz Weischer et al, 'Grounding green power: Bottom-up 
perspectives on smart renewable energy policy in developing countries' (The German Marshall Fund 
of the United States, World Resources Institute and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2011), 34-5. 
87 European Union, Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently 
repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140/16, arts 60 and 62 and Gesetz für den 
Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) [Act on Granting Priority to 
Renewable Energy Sources] (Germany) 1 April 2000, BGBI I, 2000, 2074. 
88 Kallies, above n 11, 157. 
89 Klein et al, above n 49, 68. 
  
65 
adds to the burdensome capital costs that new renewable sourced electricity 
generating facilities face. 
While grid connection costs may operate as a barrier to the development of 
new renewable sourced electricity generating facilities, the methodology used to 
allocate these costs may affect the severity of the barrier.  The four principal 
methodologies that are used to allocate connection costs are: 
• shallow connection charging; 
• deep connection charging; 
• mixed connection charging; and 
• true connection charging.90 
A ‘shallow’ connection methodology requires that renewable sourced 
electricity generating facilities need only cover the cost of the equipment required to 
‘connect the generator to the nearest point on the local grid network’.91  Any costs 
associated with reinforcement works that are required to enable the new facility to 
connect to the existing electricity transmission grid must be borne by the operator of 
the electricity transmission grid infrastructure.  The operator of the electricity 
transmission grid infrastructure may then be entitled to pass these costs through to 
electricity consumers in the form of additional fees.92  The benefits of this approach 
is that it reduces the overall connection costs for new facilities and enables the 
connection costs to be identified at the outset of the project, which contributes to the 
financial certainty of a new development. 
However, because new generators are immune from paying any network 
reinforcement costs they may ignore the capacity requirements of the existing 
electricity transmission grid when planning where to build a new facility.  In turn, 
this may contribute to the inefficient siting of new plants in the context of ensuring 
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an efficient electricity transmission grid.93  As a result, this approach may also 
contribute to higher costs for electricity consumers. 
‘Deep’ connection charges refer to the circumstance where: 
the generator pays all costs associated with its connection, including the cost 
of the physical connection to the grid along with the costs of any upstream 
network reinforcement work arising from the connection of the generator.94   
While deep connection charges may increase the connection costs for a new 
electricity generating facility, this approach does provide an incentive to generators 
to build their facilities at locations that will require the least amount of network 
reinforcement.  Notwithstanding that this benefit may assist with the management of 
the overall electricity transmission grid, it is disadvantageous for generators of 
renewable sourced electricity as the cost of any upstream reinforcement may impose 
much higher costs than if the shallow connection cost methodology was applied.  As 
a result, the use of deep connection charges may limit the development of new 
facilities at remote locations, even if this is where the most robust renewable 
resources are located.95 
‘Mixed’ connection charging is a hybrid of the deep and shallow connection 
charging approaches.  Under this approach, the generator must pay for all shallow 
costs ‘along with a proportion of the costs of network reinforcement that arise as a 
consequence of adding the generator to the network’.96  While this approach may be 
designed to balance the benefits of the deep and shallow approaches, problems arise 
with defining the proportion of costs relating to network reinforcement.97 
The final connection charging methodology is ‘true’ connecting charging.  This 
approach requires that a generator pay the costs that are equivalent to the costs that 
would be incurred in connecting its facility to the nearest point on the electricity 
transmission grid that has the capacity to incorporate the new electricity without any 
reinforcement.98  This approach is designed to encourage new generators to locate 
their facilities at sites that can make use of the available capacity on the existing 
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electricity transmission grid.99  However, because of the lack of proximity to the 
electricity transmission grid, the nearest point of connection may require the 
generator to incur large costs, which may be greater than deep connection charges. 
While the four connection cost methodologies offer different benefits, the most 
appropriate approach to reduce the financial barriers that limit the development of 
new renewable sourced electricity generating facilities is a shallow approach.100  This 
approach is designed to facilitate the development and connection of renewable 
sourced electricity generating facilities by distributing the various connection costs 
between electricity generators and consumers.  It is for this reason that this approach 
has proven popular with many Member States of the European Union, many of 
whom mandate that the economic burden of upgrading the electricity transmission 
grid to enable the connection and integration of renewable sourced electricity must 
ultimately fall with electricity consumers.  This is because it is the public at large that 
will ultimately receive the greatest benefit of renewable sourced electricity.101 
Together, these features represent the core features of a feed-in tariff 
mechanism.  While each of these features is critical to the ability of a feed-in tariff 
mechanism to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity, some of these 
features also form part of the architecture of a renewable portfolio standard.  With 
this in mind, let us now consider the minimum core content of renewable portfolio 
standards. 
B. Renewable portfolio standards 
A renewable portfolio standard (also known as a quota mechanism or tradable 
green certificate scheme) is a regulatory technique that is designed to achieve a fixed 
quota of electricity from renewable sources within a defined timeframe.  Like a feed-
in tariff mechanism, renewable portfolio standards are designed to support 
investment into eligible renewable sourced electricity generation technologies in 
order to facilitate the large-scale deployment and use of these technologies.  This 
regulatory technique has been enacted in approximately 71 countries, provinces and 
states.102 
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Renewable portfolio standards mandate that regulated firms – which are 
generally electricity suppliers but may also be electricity generators – must supply or 
sell (as applicable) a percentage (or quota) of their electricity from renewable 
sources.103  Rather than requiring regulated firms to source renewable sourced 
electricity directly, a renewable portfolio standard mandates that these firms acquire 
renewable energy certificates (or RECs) equivalent to a percentage of their annual 
electricity purchases (or sales) and then surrender those certificates to the regulator 
on an annual basis.104  The use of RECs allows regulated firms to meet their liability 
without purchasing renewable sourced electricity.  Failure by a regulated firm to 
surrender the required number of REC incurs a penalty. 
RECs represent a prescribed value of renewable sourced electricity that is 
produced by an eligible generator of renewable sourced electricity.  A REC is 
allocated to a generator of renewable sourced electricity by the scheme's regulator.  
A REC typically represents one-megawatt hour of electricity, although this differs 
across jurisdictions.  Generally, the allocation of RECs is based on the amount of 
eligible electricity that has been generated and not on the basis of the technology that 
has been used to generate this electricity.  In this sense, RECs and renewable 
portfolio standards, more generally, are traditionally designed to be technology 
neutral. 
An example of how a renewable portfolio standard might work is that such a 
regime could require a regulated firm to supply 10 per cent of its electricity from 
renewable sources.  In this case, a regulated firm that supplies 100 megawatt hours of 
electricity in a year must surrender RECs that represent 10 megawatt hours of 
electricity (provided that each REC represents one-megawatt hour of electricity). 
To obtain the number of RECs that it requires to comply with its obligations, a 
regulated firm has a number of options.  First, it may generate renewable sourced 
electricity of its own accord.  Having done so, the regulated firm may then apply to 
the regulator for the number of RECs that correspond to the amount of renewable 
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sourced electricity that is has generated, which it can then use to satisfy some or all 
of its liability under the standard.  Second, a regulated firm may purchase RECs 
bundled with renewable sourced electricity from an eligible renewable sourced 
electricity generator.  Third, a regulated firm may purchase RECs separately from an 
eligible renewable sourced electricity generator or from a broker that deals in 
RECs.105  None of these options is mutually exclusive. 
To facilitate the transfer of RECs between generators and regulated firms, a 
secondary market operates to facilitate the transfer of RECs.  This market is intended 
to provide regulated firms (rather than the generators of the electricity) with an 
economically efficient means of obtaining RECs while negating any rent-seeking 
behaviour among generators of renewable sourced electricity.106  Within this market, 
[r]etail suppliers and renewables developers conduct business privately to 
bring the supplier into compliance with the standard most cost-effectively, 
making all decisions about how to comply-whether to own, purchase power, 
or buy credits; which technologies to use; how to value an intermittent 
resource; what the contract terms should be; whether to use a central, niche 
or distributed application; and so forth.107 
The demand for RECs among regulated firms leads to these certificates 
attracting a financial value.  This value, which is monetised on the sale of the 
certificates, is intended to operate as a subsidy (or a price correcting measure) to 
support the production of renewable sourced electricity.  The price correcting 
measure is distinct from the revenue that a generator of renewable sourced electricity 
receives from the sale of its electricity, which it is required to sell through a separate 
electricity market.108 
Therefore, under a renewable portfolio standard, generators of eligible 
renewable sourced electricity realise the full value of their electricity only by dealing 
‘with the uncertainties of two independent markets’109 – the market in which RECs 
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are sold and the broader electricity market.110  The operation of these two markets is 
closely related.  For the revenue stream related to the sale of RECs to operate as an 
effective financial subsidy (that is, to provide a benefit greater than that available to 
conventional power sources that do not receive the benefit of a renewable portfolio 
standard), the revenue derived from the underlying electricity must be at or close to 
the amount achieved from the sale of conventional electricity.  While the reliance on 
markets is said to contribute to uncertainty and heightened risks among developers of 
renewable sourced electricity generating facilities,111 supporters of this technique 
consider that it encourages ‘competitiveness to a great[er] extent than [feed-in tariff] 
schemes’.112  It has been noted that this contributes to the cost-efficient deployment 
of renewable sourced electricity, which is considered the greatest strength of a 
renewable portfolio standard.113 
This represents the broad structural design of a renewable portfolio standard.  
While this structure is relevant, to appreciate how a renewable portfolio standard 
operates it is also useful to consider the basic features of this regulatory technique. 
a. Setting the quota 
Arguably, one of the most important features of a renewable portfolio standard 
is the quota of renewable sourced electricity that regulated firms must achieve within 
a prescribed timeframe.114  The quota establishes the demand for RECs among 
regulated firms, which then affects the value of RECs.  In turn, this value will 
determine the value that an eligible generator of renewable sourced electricity will 
receive on the sale of a REC and, ultimately, the financial benefit that is offered by a 
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renewable portfolio standard.115  Therefore, a quota that is set too low will not create 
the demand necessary to contribute to the financial support that is required to assist 
with the dissemination of technologies that generate electricity from renewable 
sources.  By contrast, a quota that is excessively high may contribute to windfall 
profits for generators of renewable sourced electricity. 
A quota will typically be designed to increase progressively during the life of a 
renewable portfolio standard.116  Such an approach is designed to facilitate the 
gradual, but steady increase in the production of renewable sourced electricity in 
order to enable regulated firms to comply with their ultimate obligations in a 
manageable way.117  This is the approach that has been adopted in a number of 
jurisdictions, including California, Colorado, New York, Australia and Great 
Britain.118 
b. Eligibility 
A renewable portfolio standard must specify the kind of renewable resources, 
technologies and generators that are entitled to receive RECs.119  Similar to the 
design of a feed-in tariff mechanism, the common approach to defining eligibility 
under a renewable portfolio standard is to adopt a broad approach that enables a 
range of technologies, renewable sources and generators to participate in the 
standard.  Such an approach is consistent with the market-based principles that 
underpin a renewable portfolio standard that are designed to support the most 
efficient means of renewable sourced electricity generation. 
c. Point of liability 
For generators of renewable sourced electricity to achieve a suitable value for 
the RECs, a renewable portfolio standard must be designed to create sufficient 
                                                 
115 Paul Gipe, 'Renewable Energy Policy Mechanisms' (Wind-Works.org, 2006) <http://www.wind-
works.org/FeedLaws/RenewableEnergyPolicyMechanismsbyPaulGipe.pdf>, 15. 
116 Robin J Lunt, 'Recharging U.S. Energy Policy: Advocating for a National Renewable Portfolio 
Standard' (2006-2007) 25 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law 371, 381 and Rabe, above n 114, 10. 
117 Lunt, above n 116, 381. 
118 For the regimes in the United States see: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency 
(US Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Interstae Renewable Energy 
Council and North Carolina Solar Center <http://www.dsireusa.org/rpsdata/index.cfm>.  For the 
British regime see: The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785.  For the Australian 
regime see: Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth). 
119 Lunt, above n 116, 381. 
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demand for these certificates.  The standard must therefore specify the class of 
persons that are liable to surrender RECs and comply with the standard’s quota.120 
In order to determine the class of persons that will be liable under a renewable 
portfolio standard one must consider at least two issues.  The first concerns the ease 
with which the regulated firms can be administered.  If a renewable portfolio 
standard requires that a vast number of firms be regulated, then it may be 
administratively burdensome for a regulatory body to monitor and enforce the 
standard.121 
The second issue of concern relates to whether the imposition of liability on the 
regulated firms will, in practice, lead to the desired increase in the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  Therefore, while not forgetting the need to maintain a 
level of administrative simplicity, it is also necessary for a renewable portfolio 
standard to impose liability on a class of persons that will enable the prescribed 
target to be achieved.  It is for these reasons that most renewable portfolio standards 
impose liability on electricity retailers, as most entities that fall within this class will 
have the resources to manage their liabilities under the standard.122  This is the 
approach that has been adopted by many of the state-based renewable portfolio 
standards that operate in the United States,123 as well as in the national context in 
Australia124 and Great Britain.125 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
121 See, eg, ibid, 382, Robert R. Nordhaus and Kyle W. Danish, 'Designing a mandatory greenhouse 
gas reduction program for the U.S.' (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2003), 17, 20-1, Inho 
Choi, 'Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches: The Ideal design features of 
Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading with an Analysis of the European Union's CO2 
Emissions Trading Directive and Climate Stewardship Act' (2005) 45 Natural Resources Journal 865, 
909 and Richard Morgenstern et al, 'The Near-Term Impacts of Carbon Mitigation Policies on 
Manufacturing Industries' (Discussion Paper 02–06, Resources for the Future, 2002), 910. 
122 Gregory K. Lawrence and Athena Y. Velie, 'Developing Markets for Renewable Energy 
Certificates and their Impact on Project Finance' in Andrea S. Kramer and Peter C. Fusaro (eds), 
Energy and Environmental Project Finance Law and Taxation: New Investment Techniques (Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 95, 97. 
123 Jurisdictions in the United States that adopt this approach include Arizona, California, Connecticut 
and Delaware (see: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, above n 118).  More 
generally, the majority of states in the United States use some form of renewable portfolio standard to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  The only states that do not do so are 
Tennessee, South Carolina, Nebraska, Mississippi, Louisiana, Kentucky, Idaho, Georgia, Arkansas, 
Alaska and Alabama. 
124 See, eg, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth). 
125 See, eg, The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785. 
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d. Operation of a secondary market 
The use of renewable portfolio standards in a range of jurisdictions means that 
this regulatory technique is designed to respond to the political, social and economic 
factors that are peculiar to the jurisdictions in which they operate.  While these 
factors may contribute to slightly nuanced design approaches, a universal feature of a 
renewable portfolio standard is the use of a market in which RECs are traded, whose 
purpose it is to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity in the ‘most 
effective and efficient means’.126  
Given the importance of the REC market to the overall ambition of a 
renewable portfolio standard, the design of this market is particularly relevant.  Of 
particular importance to this market are the following features: 
• it must be a highly liquid market in order to enable sellers and buyers 
of RECs to transact certificates freely; 
• it must be designed to encourage demand and price transparency in 
order for market participants to establish short and long-term market 
strategies;127  
• it must possess clear, transparent and consistent rules that regulate the 
behaviour of participants; and 
• it must be governed by a robust legal regime that provides for 
stringent monitoring, verification and enforcement mechanisms.128 
e. Penalties for non-compliance 
To encourage regulated firms to comply with their obligations, a renewable 
portfolio standard must impose penalties on these firms in case of non-
compliance.129  This is because 
                                                 
126 Rader and Norgaard, above n 2, 44.  See also: Morthorst, above n 103, 1087. 
127 See, eg, 'Electricity Market Reform: 4th Report - Electricity Market Reform (Volume 1)' (HC 742, 
House of Commons, Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2011), 3 and 20-5 and David Newbery, 
'Reforming Competitive Electricity Markets to Meet Environmental Targets' (EPRG Working Paper 
1126/Cambridge Working Paper in Economics 1154, Electricity Policy Research Group, University of 
Cambridge, 2011). 
128 Karl Mallon, 'Ten Features of Successful Renewbale Markets' in Karl Mallon (ed), Renewable 
Energy Policy and Politics: A Handbook for Decision-Making (Earthscan, 2006) 35, 35. 
129 Martinot, Wiser and Hamrin, above n 114, 9, Lawrence and Velie, above n 122, 97 and Lunt, 
above n 116, 381. 
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[w]ithout adequate enforcement, electricity suppliers will surely fail to 
comply with the [renewable portfolio standard].  In this environment, 
developers will have little incentive to build renewable energy plants.130 
Penalty regimes will generally require that a regulated firm that has failed to 
comply with its obligations pay an amount for each certificate that it did not 
surrender.  For example, if a regulated firm was required to surrender 100 RECs but 
only surrendered 90, then on the basis that the RECs represented one-megawatt hour 
of electricity, the regulated firm would be required to pay a penalty for each of the 10 
megawatt hours of electricity for which it did not surrender a REC. 
To be effective, penalty regimes must encourage compliance with the 
regulatory regime.  That is, they must act as a deterrence.131  Therefore, a penalty 
regime must impose greater costs on a non-compliant regulated firm than the firm 
would have incurred had it complied with the regime.  This is because a regulated 
firm  
will make a rational calculus on the costs and benefits of complying with ... 
regulation and will only comply when the expected costs of violation are 
higher than the potential gains.132 
With this statement about the importance of a robust penal regime we conclude 
our review of feed-in tariff mechanisms and renewable portfolio standards. 
KEY LEGAL VALUES FOR AN EFFECTIVE REGULATORY REGIME  
Before proceeding to consider the three regulatory models that form the 
analytical sections of this thesis, it is necessary to identify the key principles of 
effectiveness – the key legal values – against which each of the regulatory regimes 
must be assessed.  In this regard, the four key legal values that are identified by this 
thesis are: 
• a positive commitment to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity; 
• dependability; 
                                                 
130 Martinot, Wiser and Hamrin, above n 114, 9. 
131 Gary S Becker, 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach' (1968) 76(2) Journal of Political 
Economy 169. 
132 Michael G Faure, 'Instruments for environmental governance: what works?' in Paul Martin et al 
(eds), Environmental Governance and Sustainability (Edward Elgar Publishing and the IUCN 
Academy of Environmental Law, 2012), 12 
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• intrinsic coherence; and  
• cost consciousness. 
A. A positive commitment 
A clearly stated and positive regulatory commitment to increase the production 
of renewable sourced electricity represents ‘the most critical element’133 of a 
regulatory regime that is designed to realise this objective.134  The reason for this is 
that a clear commitment in this regard exhibits a robust willingness of the legislature 
to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  This then provides the 
intellectual, social, political and legal capital required to inform the design of the 
broader regulatory framework that is designed to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  While a positive commitment to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity is fundamental, the form of this 
commitment is less critical however.  In this regard, such a commitment may, for 
example, be presented in the ‘purposes, objects, principles [or] strategies’135 of the 
regulation that is concerned with increasing the production of renewable soured 
electricity. 
While a positive commitment to increase renewable-sourced electricity is 
regarded as a fundamental legal value for an effective regulatory regime that is 
designed to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity, the realisation 
of this value must be carefully balanced with a sense of pragmatism.136  Pragmatism 
– or practical ‘do-ability’,137 as it has also been referred to – refers to the creation of 
a commitment that is at the same time realistic, achievable, meaningful and robust.  
In this sense, an express and robust commitment to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity must therefore be capable of being achieved within the 
                                                 
133 Lipp, above n 35, 5493. 
134 Ibid.  See also: Jacobsson et al, above n 69 and Aviel Verbruggen, 'Performance evaluation of 
renewable energy support policies, applied on Flanders' tradable certificates system' (2009) 37(4) 
Energy Policy 1385. 
135 Douglas E Fisher, 'Legal and Paralegal Rules for Biodiversity Conservation: A Sequenece of 
Conceptual, Linguisitic, and Legal Challenges' in Michael I Jeffrey, Jeremy Firestone and Karen 
Bubna-Litic (eds), Biodiversity Conservation, Law and Livelihoods: Bridging the North-South Divide 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) 94, 86. 
136 Roger Pielke Jr, 'The British Climate Change Act: a critical evaluation and proposed alternative 
approach' (2009) 4 Environmental Research Letters 1, 4-6 and Simone Borghesi, 'The European 
Emission Trading Scheme and Renewable Energy Policies: Credible Targets for Incredible Results' 
(141.2010, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2010), 20-1. 
137 Pielke Jr, above n 136, 4-6. 
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bounds of current knowledge, capacity and the economic, social, environmental and 
political requirements imposed by society.138 
B. Dependability 
In its 2005 working paper, The support of electricity from renewable energy 
sources,139 the Commission of the European Communities observed that: 
[a]ny instability in [a] system [that is designed to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity] creates high investment risks, normally taking 
the form of higher costs for consumers.  Thus, the system needs to be 
regarded as stable and reliable by the market participants in the long run in 
order to reduce the perceived risks.140 
In essence, the purpose of the Commission’s statement was to emphasise that a 
regulatory regime that is concerned specifically with increasing the production of 
renewable sourced electricity must be dependable and certain.141 
To realise this objective, a regulatory regime must offer a ‘predictable, long-
term and consistent’142 legal strategy that is designed to facilitate an increase in the 
production of renewable sourced electricity.143  Importantly, a regulatory regime that 
is dependable must also be sufficiently robust so that it is capable of operating ‘under 
adverse changes in circumstances’.144  A regulatory regime that is designed to 
subscribe to these values is likely to engender confidence in the stability and viability 
of the regulatory regime, even in the case of changing circumstances.145  This is a 
crucial element for a regulatory regime that is designed to address a long-term and 
dynamic issue such as increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
While the benefits of a certain and robust regulatory regime are several, such 
an approach must not be resistant to change.  This is because a regulatory regime that 
                                                 
138 Roger Pielke Jr, The Climate Fix: What Scientists and Politicians won't tell you about Global 
Warming (Basic Books, 2010), 61-79. 
139 Commission Communication of 7 December 2005, The support of electricity from renewable 
energy sources [COM(2005) 627 final] OJ C 49. 
140 Ibid, 16. 
141 See, eg, Sawin, above n 44, 29, Gipe, above n 115, 9 and Verbruggen, above n 134, 1386. 
142 Sawin, above n 44, 29. 
143 Kira R Fabrizio, 'The Effect of Regulatory Uncertainty on Investment: Evidence from Renewable 
Energy Generation' (2012) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 28. 
144 Verbruggen, above n 134, 1386.  See also: Lutz Mez, 'Renewables in Electricity Generation: 
Germany as Pioneer?' in Burkard Eberlein and G. Bruce Doern (eds), Governing the energy 
challenge: Canada and Germany in a multi-level regional and global context (University of Toronto 
Press Incorporated, 2009) 373, 373. 
145 Borghesi, above n 136, 19. 
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resists change merely for the sake of blindly upholding the concept of certainty may 
fail to address the complex, dynamic and interdisciplinary nature of the problems that 
are at the heart of a regulatory regime that is designed specifically to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity.  In this sense, a regulatory regime that is 
designed to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity must, in addition 
to offering certainty and predictability, be sufficiently flexible to respond to 
unanticipated changes so that the regulation remains relevant and practical.146 
C. Intrinsic coherence 
A major challenge for any new regulatory regime is that it may not be 
integrated effectively with existing legal arrangements that govern overlapping 
subject matters.147  This risk is particularly real for a regulatory regime that is 
designed to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  This is because 
there already exist a range of different regulatory regimes that are designed to 
regulate aspects of the broader electricity-generating sector.  For this reason, to be 
effective a regulatory regime that is designed to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity must be designed to interact with the range of other relevant 
regulatory regimes so that it is able to address effectively the barriers confronting the 
growth of renewable sourced electricity.148   
Most notably, such a regulatory regime will need to interact with the regimes 
governing matters that include the transmission of electricity and the connection and 
integration of new electricity generation facilities with the existing electricity 
transmission grid infrastructure.  Therefore, given the potential – and, in some cases, 
the need – for interaction with other regulatory regimes, it is critical for a regime that 
is concerned with increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity to be 
                                                 
146 Nicolas De Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 248-61.  See also: Pielke Jr, above n 136. 
147 Weischer et al, above n 86, 34-7. 
148 Ibid.  Considering the issue of regulation governing the broader electricity sector in the European 
Union, Cameron refers to the following quote from the European Commission: 
For electricity the main problems can mostly be traced to the failure to create an integrated 
market ... This is the single most important issue for the electricity market. 
(Peter D Cameron, Competition in Energy Markets: Law and Regulation in the European 
Union (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2007), 125.  Original quote sourced from the Report 
on Progress in Creating the Internal Gas and Electricity Markets: Technical Annex, COM 
(2005) 568 final, 15 November 2005, 9). 
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cognisant of the requirement to maintain a level of coherence with the other regimes 
with which it must interact. 
D. Cost consciousness 
The final key legal value that must be reflected in a regulatory regime that is 
designed specifically to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity is 
that it must be capable of heeding and responding to fiscal pressures.  That is, such a 
regime must be conscious of costs so that ‘the diffusion [of renewable sourced 
electricity is] defensible on economic grounds’,149 as well as on ethical, moral and 
political grounds.  
However, being conscious of costs does not imply a fixation with a least-cost 
approach.  The reason for this is that while the issue of costs is ultimately relevant to 
the effectiveness of a regulatory regime that is concerned with increasing the 
production of renewable sourced electricity, it is important not to be overly 
consumed by this issue.  Sagoff, who through his various contributions, considered 
the relevance of costs to the design of regulation that is concerned with reducing 
pollution, seems to recognise the importance of costs without overstating its overall 
worth to the assessment of a regime's effectiveness.150  In this regard, Sagoff has 
noted that: 
[i]f regulations are oblivious to costs, they may slow or impair the growth of 
the economy on which social-well being, or the standard of living primarily 
depends.  Everyone will suffer on balance as a result.  Accordingly, it is 
important to identify “resting points” or “stopping points”.151 
Applying Sagoff’s principles to the subject matter of this thesis, these ‘resting 
points’ represent the points at which a principled belief in the need to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity intersects with ‘an equally principled 
belief that economic growth, [which] is essential to social progress and welfare’.152  
The process of discovering these ‘resting points’ seems to invoke a similar analytical 
                                                 
149 Jacobsson and Lauber, above n 17, 149. 
150 See, eg, Mark Sagoff, 'At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima, or Why Political Questions Are Not 
All Economic' (1981) 23 Arizona Law Review 1283, Mark Sagoff, 'Economic Theory and 
Environmental Law' (1981) 79 Michigan Law Review 1393, Mark Sagoff, 'On Markets for Risk' 
(1982) 41(4) Maryland Law Review 755, Mark Sagoff, 'Zuckerman's Dilemma: A Plea for 
Environmental Ethics' (1991) 21(5) The Hastings Center Report 32 and Mark Sagoff, The Economy of 
the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2008). 
151 Sagoff, above n 150, 10. 
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79 
approach to the application of sustainable development, which requires a balancing 
of economic, social and environmental concerns.  Therefore, appreciating these so 
called ‘resting points’ offers an important lens through which to assess the economic 
impacts of a regulatory regime without becoming overly fixated with the issue of 
costs. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has been concerned with refining the focus of this thesis from 
more abstract and conceptual matters to those matters of a more practical nature.  By 
doing so, this chapter has provided the context for a practical regulatory approach 
that is concerned with increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity.  
Initially, this was done by considering the principal barriers that operate to limit the 
production of renewable sourced electricity.  An understanding of these barriers 
provided the context for the most prominent regulatory techniques that have been 
employed to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  
It is on this basis that this chapter considered the role of feed-in tariff 
mechanisms and renewable portfolio standards, which represent the two primary 
regulatory techniques that are designed specifically to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  This chapter then proceeded to consider the four key 
legal values that are required for an effective legal regime that is concerned with 
realising this objective. 
The four key legal values that were identified for an effective regulatory 
regime are designed to provide an analytical tool to assess the effectiveness of the 
identified regulatory techniques under different jurisdictional circumstances.  These 
key legal values are therefore designed to provide the analytical lens through which 
to assess the regulatory regimes in Germany, Great Britain and Australia that are 
designed specifically to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity 
using either a feed-in tariff mechanism or a renewable portfolio standard. 
With this in mind, let us turn to these jurisdictional analyses now. 
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4. A review of the German feed-in tariff law 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent reunification of the 
German state one year later, the political, social, ideological and economic 
landscapes in Germany have changed dramatically.  One may point to a number of 
changes as being the most enduring.  In this regard, the increase in the production of 
renewable sourced electricity is arguably one of the most important in the pursuit of 
two of the country’s constitutional objectives: sustainable development and human 
dignity.1 
The growth in the production of Germany’s renewable sourced electricity has 
been profound.  Since 1990, the production of renewable sourced electricity has 
increased from approximately 3 per cent of total electricity generated to 20 per cent 
in 2011.2  Further, the amount of renewable sourced electricity as a percentage of 
total generated electricity is projected to increase to 80 per cent by 2050.3  This 
growth, both real and projected, is reflected in Figure 4.1 below.  As a result of the 
                                                 
1 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany], 
arts 1 and 20a.  See also, eg, Günther Kühne, 'Legal Incentives to Alternative Energy Sources in 
German Energy Law' in Peter D Cameron and Donald Zillman (eds), Kyoto: From Principles to 
Practice (Kluwer Law International, 2002), 62. 
2 Share of renewable electricity in gross electricity consumption (%) 1990-2007 and 2010 indicative 
targets (2012) European Environment Agency <http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-
maps/figures/share-of-renewable-electricity-in>, 'Development of renewable energy sources in 
Germany 2010: Based on statistical data from the Working Group on Renewable Energy Sources -
Statistics (AGEE-Stat)' (BMU – KI III 1, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety, 2011), 4 and 'Renewable energy sources 2011' (Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2012), 3. 
3 'Federal Republic of Germany - National Renewable Energy Action Plan in accordance with 
Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources' (Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2010) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/transparency_platform/doc/national_renewable_energy_action
_plan_germany_en.pdf>, 17.  See also: Lutz Mez, 'Renewables in Electricity Generation: Germany as 
Pioneer?' in Burkard Eberlein and G. Bruce Doern (eds), Governing the energy challenge: Canada 
and Germany in a multi-level regional and global context (University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 
2009) 373, 373-5, Judith Lipp, 'Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark, 
Germany and the United Kingdom' (2007) 35(11) Energy Policy 5481, 5487-9, Volkmar Lauber and 
Lutz Mez, 'Renewable Electricity Policy in Germany, 1974 to 2005' (2006) 26(2) Bulletin of Science, 
Technology & Society 105, 105, Miguel Mendonça, Feed-in Tariffs: Accelerating the Deployment of 
Renewable Energy (Earthscan, 2007), 48, Volker Oschmann, 'A Success Story - The German 
Renewable Energy Act Turns Ten' (2010) 1 Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review 45, 45 and 
Helmut Weidner and Lutz Mez, 'German Climate Change Policy: A Success Story With Some Flaws' 
(2008) 17(4) The Journal of Environment & Development 356, 356. 
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growth in its renewable sourced electricity, Germany is regarded as a global leader in 
the promotion, development and production of renewable sourced electricity.4 
 
Figure 4.1. Renewable sourced electricity as a percentage of final gross electricity consumption 
(Germany)5 
The rapid and sustained acceleration in the production of renewable sourced 
electricity in Germany can be attributed to a variety of regulatory, policy and fiscal 
measures that, in some form or another, have operated since the 1970s.6  However,  
the reason for the remarkable expansion of renewables in Germany in recent 
years can be attributed to a strategy that employs the use of [a national] feed-
in [tariff].7   
With this in mind, the principal task of this chapter is to review Germany’s 
current feed-in tariff law – the Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien 
(Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) [Act on Granting Priority to Renewable Energy 
                                                 
4 See, eg, National Renewable Energy Action Plan, above n 2, 17, Mez, above n 3, 373-5, Lipp, above 
n 3, 5487-9, Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 105, Mendonça, above n 3, 48, Oschmann, above n 3, 45 and 
Weidner and Mez, above n 3, 356. 
5 The data to produce this graph was extrapolated from the following sources: Development of 
renewable energy sources, above n 2, 7 and 'Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable 
and Affordable Energy Supply' (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety, 2010), 5). 
6 The emergence of Germany’s regulatory approach to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity is considered in more detail in the following section of this chapter. 
7 Michael T Hatch, 'The Role of Renewable Energy in German Climate Change Policy' (2010) 2 
Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review 141, 145. 
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Sources] (German feed-in tariff law)8 – to determine whether its design is effective 
to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  Having done so, this 
analysis will indicate that, notwithstanding the presence of certain regulatory 
deficiencies, Germany’s feed-in tariff law is designed to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  In essence, this means that Germany’s feed-in tariff 
law is designed to contribute to the pursuit of a sustainable and dignified electricity 
generation sector. 
While the primary focus of this chapter is concerned with the design of 
Germany’s feed-in tariff law, it is important to appreciate that other regulatory and 
non-regulatory measures operate within local, regional (Länder) and federal 
jurisdictions to contribute to an increase in the production of renewable sourced 
electricity.9  While these are supplementary to Germany’s feed-in tariff law (and 
therefore do not consume the attention of this chapter), it is important, at the very 
least, to recognise that these regulatory instruments contribute to the broader German 
regulatory architecture supporting the production of renewable sourced electricity.10 
For the purpose of considering the design of Germany’s current feed-in tariff 
law, this chapter is divided into three sections: contextual, analytical and synthetical.  
The contextual section begins by considering the ‘biggest triggers’11 for the rapid 
growth of renewable sourced electricity in Germany.  This section then considers the 
national regulatory architecture that has emerged in response to these ‘triggers’.  The 
analytical section then reviews Germany’s current feed-in tariff law through the 
established analytical framework.  The final section then offers some concluding 
remarks. 
                                                 
8 Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) [Act on Granting 
Priority to Renewable Energy Sources] (Germany) 1 April 2000, BGBI I, 2000, 2074.  All translations 
of this law are taken from the translated version made available by the Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) 
2012”, available at <http://www.erneuerbare-
energien.de/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/eeg_2012_en_bf.pdf> (last accessed on 30 September 
2012). 
9 For a discussion on the importance of sub-national legal measures to assist with the increased 
development and production of renewable sourced electricity see, eg, Hannah Wiseman, Lindsay 
Grisamer and E. Nichole Saunders, 'Formulating a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables 
Component' (2011) 28(3) Pace Environmental Law Review 827. 
10 For a detailed overview of the regional and national laws that support the increased production of 
renewable sourced electricity in Germany see, eg, National Renewable Energy Action Plan, above n 3, 
20-47 and 137-82. 
11 Weidner and Mez, above n 3, 358. 
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THE CONTEXT FOR A FEED-IN TARIFF LAW 
The shift towards a more sustainable and dignified approach to electricity 
production in Germany draws its inspiration from a variety of concepts.  The most 
notable of these are energy security, economic and social development, public health 
and safety and environmental protection.12  Understanding how these issues gained 
national prominence – together with the regulatory and policy responses that they 
have elicited – therefore provides a useful point of commencement to understand the 
motivation for Germany’s feed-in tariff law. 
A. Contextual background 
The emergence of the German energy policy that favours the continued and 
increased production of renewable sourced electricity occurred in response to the 
global oil crises that took place in 1973 and 1979.13  These crises, which led to a 
global oil shortage and a subsequent increase in global oil prices, had the effect of 
emphasising West Germany’s ‘weak natural resource base’14 as well as its ‘strong 
dependence on unsure foreign sources’15 for energy.16  The persistence of these 
challenges and the threats that they posed to the economic and social wellbeing of 
the West German state led to concerted efforts among regulators to develop new and 
alternative fuels and technologies for energy – in particular, electricity – production. 
The effort among West German regulators to develop alternative sources of 
electricity production is reported to have led to modest investments that were 
focussed on the research and development of renewable sourced electricity 
generation technologies.  In 1974, these investments amounted to the modest sum of 
                                                 
12 See, eg, ibid, 358, Volkmar Lauber and Lutz Mez, 'Three Decades of Renewable Electricity Policies 
in Germany' (2004) 15(4) Energy & Environment 599, 599, Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 105 and 
Hannes Weigt and Florian Leuthold, 'Experience with Renewable Energy Policy in Germany' in Jorge 
Padilla, Richard Schmalensee and Boaz Moselle (eds), Harnessing Renewable Energy in Electric 
Power Systems (RFF Press, 2010) 283, 284. 
13 The first global oil crisis was the result of an oil embargo imposed by the members of the 
Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates) in response to the escalation of 
Arab-US tensions relating to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  The second global oil crisis resulted from 
the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the resulting decrease in global oil supplies. 
14 Mez, above n 3, 373. 
15 Weidner and Mez, above n 3, 358. 
16 Lauber and Mez, above n 12, 599, Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 105, Weigt and Leuthold, above n 
12, 284 and Weidner and Mez, above n 3, 358.  The issue of energy security is not peculiar to 
Germany.  In fact, it has been noted that ‘ever since its inception, the European Union has been 
acutely aware of its economic and social risks that accompany its dependence on imports of oil and 
gas’ (see: Peter D Cameron, Competition in Energy Markets: Law and Regulation in the European 
Union (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2007), 125). 
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approximately €10 million (or, in the currency of the day, Deutschmark (DM) 20 
million).17  This investment increased to approximately €150 (or DM 300) in 1982, 
before declining thereafter.18  The decline in funding was attributed to the election of 
a conservative government that considered nuclear and coal (rather than renewable 
sources) to be the most effective and efficient sources to ensure the West German 
state’s energy security.19 
In addition to the modest investments into renewable technologies, in 1979 the 
West German Ministry of Economic Affairs, by way of the then-competition law, 
encouraged power utilities to increase their uptake of renewable electricity.20  It did 
so by mandating that power utilities purchase renewable sourced electricity at an 
amount equal to the ‘avoided costs’ associated with non-renewable sourced 
electricity.  If interpreted liberally this obligation could have resulted in large sums 
of money flowing to renewable sourced electricity generators, as avoided costs can 
amount to the projected costs of new coal or nuclear facilities, the fossil fuels 
required to power these facilities and the external costs associated with these 
electricity sources.21  However, ‘the large [power] utilities interpreted this 
[obligation] so narrowly (as avoided fuel costs only) that the obligation had little 
effect’.22  Compounding this was the fact that 
[t]he ministry [also] resisted all demands for market formation with the 
slogan that energy technologies had to prove themselves in the market and 
that it was not prepared to subsidize technologies that were not mature.23 
While the support offered to increase the production of electricity from 
renewable sources was limited, the West German government provided substantial 
support to develop nuclear powered electricity and to assist with the further 
exploitation of domestic coal resources for electricity production.24  In 1974, for 
example, the government invested an amount equivalent to approximately €943.81 
                                                 
17 Staffan Jacobsson and Volkmar Lauber, 'Germany: From a Modest Feed-in Law to a Framework for 
Transition' in Volkmar Lauber (ed), Switching to Renewable Power: A Framework for the 21st 
Century (Earthscan, 2005) 122, 129 and Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 105. 
18 Jacobsson and Lauber, above n 17, 129 and Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 105. 
19 Jacobsson and Lauber, above n 17, 129 and Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 105. 
20 Lauber and Mez, above n 12, 599-600. 
21 Eric Martinot, Ryan Wiser and Jan Hamrin, 'Renewable energy markets and policies in the United 
States' (Center for Resource Solutions, 2005) <http://martinot.info/Martinot_et_al_CRS.pdf>, 4. 
22 Jacobsson and Lauber, above n 17, 130. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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million into the research, development and deployment of nuclear power.25  This 
investment then increased to an amount equivalent to approximately €1,712.94 
million in 1982.26  As a result, Germany’s reliance on nuclear power increased 
substantially from the early 1970s.  This is reflected in Figure 4.2 below.27 
 
Figure 4.2. Electricity generation by fuel type (Germany)28 
At the same time that the issue of energy security elicited modest levels of 
investment into renewable technologies, a new political and social consciousness was 
emerging in West Germany that was concerned with environmental matters.  From 
its infancy, this movement was concerned with matters of energy production.29  For 
example, of particular relevance were the issues of  
acid rain and Waldersterben [(forest dieback)], [which] put air pollution 
control (especially of stationary sources) at the center of German 
environmental policy.30 
                                                 
25 International Energy Technology R&D Statistics (2011) International Energy Agency 
<http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd_bv_id=enetech-data-en&doi=enetech-data-en>. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Electricity generation by fuel: Germany (2010) International Energy Agency 
<http://www.iea.org/stats/pdf_graphs/DEELEC.pdf>. 
29 Weidner and Mez, above n 3, 358-9. 
30 Ibid, 359 (emphasis added).  The German term of Waldersterben refers to the concept of forest 
dieback, which is a condition in trees or woody plants in which peripheral parts are killed, either by 
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The prominence of the environmental movement in West Germany – which 
began as a social movement but quickly gained acceptance in the German political 
system – helped West Germany become one of the leaders among European nations 
in the 1980s to develop policies and technologies to control air pollution from 
stationary energy sources.31  This leadership was enhanced further following two 
landmark events that occurred during the 1980s that reflected the convergence of the 
emerging political and social consciousness and which, in turn, informed a redefined 
German energy policy. 
The first of these events was the nuclear meltdown that occurred at the 
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in 1986.  This accident had ‘a deep impact in 
Germany,’32 which had only recently turned to coal and nuclear sources for 
electricity production.33  The impact of this event was felt in the changing level of 
public support for nuclear power.  Prior to the accident in Chernobyl, it was reported 
that support for nuclear power ‘had been divided about evenly’34 within West 
German society.  However, within two years of the accident, ‘opposition to nuclear 
power increased to over 70 per cent, while support barely exceeded 10 per cent’.35   
The dissatisfaction of the German public with the use of nuclear power 
culminated in the 2002 decision by the German Parliament to gradually phase-out 
nuclear power.36  In place of these facilities, the German government expressed a 
desire to replace them with renewable sourced electricity generation capability.  This 
position was reaffirmed following the 2011 nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, 
which led the German Chancellor to expedite the phase-out of nuclear sourced 
electricity.37 
                                                                                                                                          
parasites or due to conditions like acid rain and drought (see: C.D. Allen, 'Climate-induced forest 
dieback: an escalating global phenomenon?' (2009) 231/232(60) Unasylva 43). 
31 Weidner and Mez, above n 3, 359. 
32 Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 105. 
33 Jacobsson and Lauber, above n 17, 129-30. 
34 Ibid, 132. 
35 Ibid, 132-133.  See also: D Jahn, 'Nuclear power, energy policy and new politics in Sweden and 
Germany' (1992) 1(3) Environmental Politics 383. 
36 Gesetz über die friedliche Verwendung der Kernenergie und den Schutz gegen ihre Gefahren 
(Atomgesetz) [Act on the Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy and the Protection against its 
Hazards] (Germany) 23 December 1959, BGBI I, 1959, 814 (last amendment on 24 February 2012).  
See also: Axel Vorwerk, 'The 2002 Amendment to the German Atomic Energy Act Concerning the 
Phase-out of Nuclear Power' (2002) 69 Nuclear Law Bulletin 7, 7. 
37 'Germany to Phase Out Nuclear Power by 2022', Spiegel Online International 2011 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,765594,00.html>.  For a review of the short-
term options and the price of the revised nuclear phase out on electricity prices in Germany, see: Felix 
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The second landmark event that redefined German energy policy was the 
German Physical Society’s pronouncement in 1986 that the Earth was facing an 
imminent climate catastrophe because of its overreliance on fossil fuels.38  The 
potential for such a climatic catastrophe led the then German Chancellor, Helmut 
Kohl, to establish a special commission in 1987 – the Enquête-Commission on 
‘Preventive Measures to Protect the Earth’s Atmosphere’.39  The Commission was 
charged with considering the challenges presented by climate change and proposing 
an appropriate response to these matters.40  The report issued by the Commission 
noted that: 
there is such massive and unequivocal scientific evidence on ... the man-
made greenhouse effect, the resulting climatic change and its repercussions 
... that there can be no doubt that preventive action must be taken 
immediately irrespective of any need for further research.41 
The Commission also noted that it was necessary to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions in Germany by 30 per cent from 1987 levels by the year 2005.  This 
proposal was supported by the West German Government who noted that to achieve 
these desired reductions there would need to be a dramatic decrease in the use of coal 
to generate electricity.42  The Commission’s report therefore led to a heightened level 
                                                                                                                                          
Chr. Matthes et al, 'Quick phase-out of nuclear power in Germany. Short-term options, electricity and 
price effects: Short analysis for WWF Germany' (Öko-Institut e.V., 2011). 
38 The prediction by the German Physical Society that there was an imminent climate catastrophe 
gained significant media attention in West Germany at the time.  The German newspaper, Der 
Spiegel, produced a ‘Climate Catastrophe’ issue not long after the statement by the German Physical 
Society that had as its front cover an image of Germany’s Cologne Cathedral landmark half-
submerged in sea water, while the cover of the paper read: ‘Ozone Hole – Ice Cap Melt – Greenhouse 
Effect: Scientists warn of THE CLIMATE CATASTROPHE’ (see: P Gosselin, Dr. Wolgang Thüne 
Slams Climate Policy: Efforts To Steer Climate Are “Utopian Pipe Dreams” (2011) NoTricksZone 
<http://notrickszone.com/2011/01/19/dr-wolgang-thune-slams-climate-policy-efforts-to-steer-climate-
are-utopian-pipe-dreams/>).  See also: Staffan Jacobsson and Anna Bergek, 'A Framework for 
Guiding Policy-makers Intervening in Emerging Innovation Systems in 'Catching-Up' Countries' 
(2006) 18 The European Journal of Development Research 687, 716 and Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 
105. 
39 Eberhard Jochem, 'Reducing CO2 emissions -- the West German plan' (1991) 19(2) Energy Policy 
119, 119. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Enquête-Commission of the German Bundestag, Protecting the earth : a status report with 
recommendations for a new energy policy : third report of the Enquete Commission of the 11th 
German Bundestag "Preventive Measures to Protect the Earth's Atmosphere" (Deutscher Bundestag, 
1991), 24. 
42 The German government at the time adopted a slightly revised commitment that required Germany 
to reduce its carbon dioxide levels by 25 per cent (rather than 30 per cent as was proposed by the 
Enquête-Commission) from 1987 levels by 2005 (see: Hatch, above n 7, 141).  See also: Jochem, 
above n 39, 119. 
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of interest in and pursuit of, regulatory activity that was concerned with increasing 
the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
In the years following the disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and 
the German Physical Society’s revelations about the dangers posed by anthropogenic 
climate change, Germany’s regulatory framework relating to energy production has 
changed dramatically.  Most notable among these changes has been the shift towards 
an increase in the production of renewable sourced electricity that began to gather 
political and regulatory momentum during the latter part of the 1980s and 1990s. 
B. Towards a German feed-in tariff law 
a. Support for the production of renewable sourced electricity 
In 1989, the German government commenced the process of regulatory reform 
to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  The initial regulatory 
approaches – which have been referred to as ‘demonstration cum market formation 
programmes’43 – focussed on the development of Germany’s wind and solar 
resources. 
The first of these programs was the 100 Megawatt Wind Program.  This 
program was designed to pilot, promote and demonstrate wind-powered electricity 
installations in order to encourage the installation of 100 megawatts of wind power.44  
This represented a five-fold increase from the installed capacity of wind-powered 
electricity in Germany in 1989.45  The initial success of this program led to its target 
being increased in 1991 to 250 megawatts.46 
Under the program, generators of wind-powered electricity generating facilities 
received a guaranteed rate of payment for generated electricity that it fed into the 
national electricity transmission grid.47  The money paid to the eligible wind-
powered electricity generating facilities was provided in addition to the remuneration 
                                                 
43 Jacobsson and Lauber, above n 17, 134. 
44 Ole Langniss, 'The German 250-MW-Wind-Program' (Paper presented at the Energy Foundation's 
China Sustainable Energy Program, Stuttgart, 6 September 2006), 1. 
45 At the time that the 100 megawatt Wind Program was introduced, Germany’s installed wind 
capacity was approximately 20 megawatts (see: Lauber and Mez, above n 12, 602). 
46 Jacobsson and Lauber, above n 17, 134, Weigt and Leuthold, above n 12, 285 and Langniss, above 
n 44, 1. 
47 Langniss, above n 44, 1.  When this program commenced, the guaranteed payment was €0.04 per 
kilowatt-hour of electricity.  This amount was reduced to €0.03/kWh when the program was expanded 
in 1991. 
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that these facilities received when they sold their electricity in the competitive 
wholesale electricity market in which all generators sold their electricity.48  As an 
alternative to the prescribed tariff, wind-powered electricity generating facilities 
could elect to receive grants that equalled an amount up to 60 per cent of the total 
investment cost of the wind-powered facility.49  The last grants under this program 
were approved at the end of 1996 for turbines that had to be commissioned by mid 
1998, with the complete program ending at the end of 2006 when the last grants were 
paid.50 
The second demonstration program was the ‘1000 Roof Program’.51  This 
program was concerned with the demonstration and deployment of solar PV 
installations.  From 1991 to 1995, the federal government provided applicants with 
50 per cent of the investment costs for these systems while the Länder provided a 
further 20 per cent.52  By the time the program ended in 1995, it had contributed to 
the installation of approximately 2,250 solar PV systems, with a peak capacity of 
between four and five megawatts.53 
b. The initial German feed-in tariff law 
While the ‘demonstration cum deployment’ programs had some success in 
increasing the production of wind and solar powered electricity, it was not until the 
introduction of Germany’s first feed-in tariff law in 1991 that this increase started to 
occur on a larger scale.54  Germany’s first feed-in tariff law required electricity 
transmission grid operators (or, where necessary, electricity distribution grid 
operators) to purchase all electricity generated by eligible renewable sourced 
electricity generating facilities.  When purchasing renewable sourced electricity, 
electricity transmission grid operators were required to pay an amount that was 
between 65 and 90 per cent of the average electricity tariff that was charged to 
                                                 
48 Jacobsson and Lauber, above n 17, 134. 
49 Langniss, above n 44, 1. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Lauber and Mez, above n 12, 601 and Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 106. 
52 Lauber and Mez, above n 12, 601 and Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 106.  During the course of the 
program, the ratio of funding changed to 60 per cent from the federal government and 10 per cent 
from the Länder. 
53 Weigt and Leuthold, above n 12, 285, Lauber and Mez, above n 12, 601 and Lauber and Mez, 
above n 3, 106. 
54 Gesetz über die Einspeisung von Strom aus erneuerbaren Energien in das öffentliche Netz 
(Stromeinspeisegesetz) [Law on feeding electricity from renewable energy sources into the public 
grid] (Germany) 7 December 1990, BGBI I, 1990, 663 (StrEG).  See also: Weigt and Leuthold, above 
n 12, 285. 
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consumers at the time.55  These tariffs were designed to reflect the avoided external 
costs relating to conventional sources of electricity.56  The exact rate of the tariff was 
also influenced by the technology used and the size of the generating facility.57 
In combination with other existing regulatory programs – including the 
demonstration projects already mentioned as well as the availability of soft loans 
provided by the Federal Government to renewable electricity projects58 – the tariff 
contributed to a considerable increase in wind-powered electricity generating 
facilities in Germany.  These installations increased 
from 500 in 1991 to almost 4 000 in 1995 [which led to an increase in] their 
output ... from 20 Megawatt ... in 1990 to 1 100 [megawatts] in 1995.  
Technological progress had moreover considerably reduced the costs of 
producing electricity from wind.59 
While wind-powered electricity generating facilities were beneficiaries of 
Germany’s first feed-in tariff law, this regulatory regime was found to have had little 
effect on increasing the production of electricity from other renewable sources.60  
The principal reasons for this was that the ‘[f]eed-[i]n [l]aw provided little help 
because [the tariff] rates did not come near [present technological] costs’61 and also 
failed to guarantee payment of the tariff for any period of time.62 
Compounding these design limitations, Germany’s first feed-in tariff law 
encountered opposition from Germany’s major electricity generators and electricity 
transmission grid operators.  This opposition was premised on two distinct issues.  
The first related to the concern expressed by Germany’s major electricity generators 
                                                 
55 Gesetz über die Einspeisung von Strom aus erneuerbaren Energien in das öffentliche Netz 
(Stromeinspeisegesetz) [Law on feeding electricity from renewable energy sources into the public 
grid] (Germany) 7 December 1990, BGBI I, 1990, 663, 2 and 3. 
56 Miguel Mendonça, David Jacobs and Benjamin Sovacool, Powering the Green Economy: The 
Feed-in Tariff (Earthscan, 2009), 19. 
57 Wind and solar obtained 90 per cent of the end-use tariff while all other small-scale plants (that is, 
less than 500 kW) obtained 80 per cent and all large-scale plants (500 kW to 5 MW) obtained 65 per 
cent (see: Gesetz über die Einspeisung von Strom aus erneuerbaren Energien in das öffentliche Netz 
(Stromeinspeisegesetz) [Law on feeding electricity from renewable energy sources into the public 
grid] (Germany) 7 December 1990, BGBI I, 1990, 663, 3(1) and (2)). 
58 During the period from 1990 to 1998, the Federal Government’s banking institution, the Deutsche 
Ausgleichsbank and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, granted more than €3 billion in reduced interest 
loans for renewable electricity installations (see: Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 108). 
59 PreussenElektra v Schhleswag (C-379/98) (Opinion of Advocate General) [2001] ECR I-02099, I-
02108.  See also: Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 108 and Weigt and Leuthold, above n 12, 285. 
60 Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 108. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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that the tariff breached aspects of the European Union’s competition law.  The 
second issue related to the perceived fiscal inefficiency of the law. 
In relation to the opposition premised on a breach of the European Union’s 
competition law, this culminated in a failed legal challenge that was brought by some 
of the major German electricity generators before the European Court of Justice.63  
The contention of the proponents in this matter was that the tariff amounted to a 
subsidy to German producers of renewable sourced electricity.  If this was correct, it 
would have meant that the tariff would have breached the prohibition on state aid 
under article 92 (now 87) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.64  
The prohibition on state aid provides that: 
any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts competition by favouring certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods [is prohibited] in so far as it affects trade 
between Member States. 65 
Despite the insistence of the major German electricity generators, the challenge 
to Germany’s first feed-in tariff law failed.  The reason for this is that the European 
Court of Justice held that the tariff did not amount to a public subsidy, as it was 
required to be paid by private companies rather than the state.  Therefore, the 
regulatory regime did not, in fact, offer any ‘state aid’. 
In relation to the second objection – the perceived economic limitations of 
Germany’s first feed-in law – this was concerned with two further issues.  First, the 
major electricity generators contended that the tariff would lead to an increase in the 
cost of electricity for consumers.66  Second, the operators of the electricity 
transmission grid contended the design of the feed-in tariff law contributed to a level 
of inequality. 
Under the design of the feed-in tariff law, electricity transmission grid 
operators (which operate as territorial monopolies) had to purchase all renewable 
sourced electricity that was fed into the grid in the location for which they were 
                                                 
63 PreussenElektra v Schhleswag (C-379/98) [2001] ECR I-02099.  See also: Sara Poli, 'National 
Schemes Supporting the Use of Electricity Produced from Renewable Energy Sources and the 
Community Legal Framework' (2002) 14(2) Journal of Environmental Law 209. 
64 European Union, Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ C 321. 
65 Ibid, art 87. 
66 Lauber and Mez, above n 12, 603. 
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responsible.67  This approach resulted in those operators in control of the electricity 
transmission grids in the north of the country paying more than those in the south, as 
it was in the northern regions of Germany that the majority of renewable sourced 
electricity was produced.68  In recognition of this inequality, a ‘hardship clause’ was 
included in the feed-in tariff law in 1998.69  This clause permitted electricity 
transmission grid operators to pass through their costs or, in certain circumstances, 
avoid complying with the feed-in tariff law’s purchase obligation.70 
In early 1998, the opposition to the German feed-in tariff law was further 
exacerbated following the adoption in Germany of the directive of the European 
Union concerning the liberalisation of the Union’s electricity market.71  This 
directive was designed to promote greater competition and price transparency in the 
electricity markets of European Union Member States.  The directive on market 
liberalisation led to the ‘tumbling of electricity prices’72 because of the perception 
that the new market conditions would lead to an increase in competition among 
Germany’s electricity utilities, which would, in turn, drive down electricity prices.73  
Because the rate of the tariff under the feed-in tariff law was linked to the price of 
electricity, the rate of tariff decreased along with the electricity price.74  As a result, 
the feed-in tariff law’s already limited ability to support an increase in the production 
of renewable sourced electricity was further diminished. 
The public opposition to Germany’s first feed-in tariff law and the limitations 
in its design manifested itself in a period of heightened uncertainty around the feed-
in tariff law’s ability to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity in 
Germany.75  However, by late 1998 this uncertainty had been reduced following the 
election of the new Red-Green governing coalition that, shortly after its election, 
                                                 
67 Weigt and Leuthold, above n 12, 285, Lauber and Mez, above n 12, 602 and Lauber and Mez, 
above n 3, 107. 
68 Weigt and Leuthold, above n 12, 285, Lauber and Mez, above n 12, 602 and Lauber and Mez, 
above n 3, 107. 
69 Gesetz über die Einspeisung von Strom aus erneuerbaren Energien in das öffentliche Netz 
(Stromeinspeisegesetz) [Law on feeding electricity from renewable energy sources into the public 
grid] (Germany) 7 December 1990, BGBI I, 1990, 663, 4. 
70 Ibid. 
71 European Union, Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC, 
OJ L 176/37. 
72 Hatch, above n 7, 146. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Weigt and Leuthold, above n 12, 285, Lauber and Mez, above n 12, 603. 
75 For a useful overview of the legal, policy and economic concerns relating to the design of 
Germany’s first feed-in tariff law see Kühne, above n 1, 66-71. 
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began to develop a new federal regulatory architecture to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  The underlying principle of this regulatory framework 
was to reduce Germany’s greenhouse gas emissions and to increase dramatically the 
share of renewable sourced electricity in the German electricity supply to 20 per cent 
by 2020.76 
The most notable aspect of the Red-Green governing coalition’s regulatory 
framework that supported the climate change and energy-related outcomes was a 
new feed-in tariff law – the Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien [Act on 
Granting Priority to Renewable Energy Sources].77  This law was enacted in 2000 
and commenced operation in 2001 and, by doing so, replaced the feed-in tariff law 
that had operated in Germany since 1991. 
In addition to the new feed-in tariff law, the Red-Green governing coalition 
also implemented a number of other regulatory and policy measures that were 
designed to support an increase in the production of renewable sourced electricity.  
The measures included: 
• an ecological tax on motor fuels, fuel oil, natural gas and electricity;78 
• the now defunct 100,000 Roof Program.  This program, which was 
adopted in 1999, supported the deployment of solar PV installations in 
a similar fashion to the 1,000 Roof Program.  The 100,000 Roof 
Program was terminated in 2000;79 
• the phase-out of nuclear power;80 and 
                                                 
76 Joachim Nitsch, 'Lead Study 2008: Further development of the "Strategy to increase the use of 
renewable energies" within the context of the current climate protection goals of Germany and 
Europe' (German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 
2008), Oschmann, above n 3, 55 and Lauber and Mez, above n 3, 109. 
77 Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) [Act on Granting 
Priority to Renewable Energy Sources] (Germany) 1 April 2000, BGBI I, 2000, 2074. 
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• the Market Incentive Program.  This program provides financial 
support to expand and support the deployment of renewable heat 
technologies using, among other things, low interest or ‘soft loans’.81 
While these measures were implemented by the Red-Green governing coalition 
more than a decade ago, the majority of them remain in operation.  This reflects 
Germany’s commitment, at least at the federal level, to develop a robust renewable 
sourced electricity generation sector.  While these regulatory and non-regulatory 
measures are of note in the broader context of Germany’s commitment to increase 
the production of renewable sourced electricity, it has been noted that ‘the strong 
growth in electricity production from renewable energy sources would have been 
unthinkable without the [current German feed-in tariff law]’.82 
In this regard, this chapter now turns to consider the design of Germany’s 
current feed-in tariff law.  This analysis will consider whether this regulatory regime 
is designed effectively to promote the generation of renewable sourced electricity 
and, ultimately, whether it is capable of contributing to a more sustainable and 
dignified electricity generation sector. 
A REVIEW OF THE GERMAN FEED-IN TARIFF LAW 
The German feed-in tariff law is designed as a fixed and premium feed-in tariff 
mechanism.  The fixed tariff component of the German feed-in tariff law is relatively 
straightforward.  Flowing from the eligible generator to an electricity consumer is 
renewable sourced electricity.  Flowing in the opposite direction is the 
reimbursement for the electricity.  This reimbursement is provided in the form of a 
prescribed tariff.83  The eligible generator receives the tariff from the relevant 
electricity transmission grid operator, whose network it supplies, from the date that 
                                                                                                                                          
'Regulating the Extension of Electricity Networks: A German Perspective' in Martha Roggenkamp et 
al (eds), Energy Networks and the Law: Innovative Solutions in Changing Markets (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 371, 375-7.  In 2011, following the nuclear disaster in Fukushima the German 
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friedliche Verwendung der Kernenergie und den Schutz gegen ihre Gefahren (Atomgesetz) [Act on 
the Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy and the Protection against its Hazards] (Germany) 23 
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81 Market Incentive Programme (Marktanreizprogramm) (2011) International Energy Agency 
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the facility ‘first produces electricity exclusively from [eligible sources] and has fed 
this electricity into the grid system’.84  The costs borne by the electricity 
transmission grid operators (being the difference between the prescribed tariff 
payments and the price at which the renewable sourced electricity can be sold into 
the wholesale electricity market) are then passed on to electricity customers in the 
form of higher electricity prices – this is referred to as the ‘EEG surcharge’.85  The 
flow of electricity and corresponding movements of capital under the German feed-in 
tariff law is reflected in Figure 4.3 below. 
 
Figure 4.3. Design of the German feed-in tariff law86 
In addition to the fixed feed-in tariff aspect of the German law, from 1 January 
2012 eligible generators have an option to receive a premium tariff rather than the 
                                                 
84 Ibid, 21(1).  Pritzsche and Klauer provide a useful overview of the organisational structure of the 
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Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation: Implementing the New Directives on Electricity and Gas 
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fixed tariff.87  Eligible generators can exercise this option monthly.88  Under the 
premium feed-in tariff, eligible electricity generating facilities may: 
claim a market premium from the grid system operator for electricity ... 
which they directly sell ... This shall only apply to electricity which has 
actually been fed into the grid system and purchased by a third party.89 
The premium feed-in tariff is designed to offer greater flexibility to eligible 
generators of renewable sourced electricity to achieve a higher rate of return than the 
fixed tariff.90  This approach operates by allowing eligible generators to sell their 
electricity into the liberalised electricity market.  If they conduct this transaction at a 
time when the demand for electricity is high, it will enable the generator to attract an 
elevated price for its electricity.  Once the premium tariff is added to the wholesale 
electricity price, it may be possible for an eligible generator to attract a higher rate of 
return for its electricity than it may otherwise receive under the fixed tariff.  This will 
however depend on a number of factors, including the current rate of the fixed tariff 
and the generation costs of a generator. 
While the premium feed-in tariff that is available under the German feed-in 
tariff law represents an important development in the structure and design of this 
law, ultimately the German feed-in tariff law remains principally a fixed feed-in 
tariff.  For this reason, the analysis that follows is concerned principally with those 
features of the law that relate to the fixed tariff component of this law. 
A. The issue of grundnorms 
A useful point to commence an analysis of any statutory code is the 
grundnorms that reflect the direction in which the law is trying to steer society.  The 
German feed-in tariff law’s broad societal objectives are set out in the following 
statement: 
[t]he purpose of this Act is to facilitate a sustainable development of 
[Germany’s] energy supply, particularly for the sake of protecting our 
climate and the environment, to reduce the costs of energy supply to the 
national economy, ... to conserve fossil fuels and to promote the further 
                                                 
87 Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) [Act on Granting 
Priority to Renewable Energy Sources] (Germany) 1 April 2000, BGBI I, 2000, 2074, 33g. 
88 Ibid, 33d. 
89 Ibid, 33g(1). 
90 Energy Concept, above n 5, 7. 
  
 99 
development of technologies for the generation of electricity from renewable 
energy sources.91 
While these opening remarks touch on a number of issues, the underlying 
matter to which they all relate is to ‘facilitate [the] sustainable development of 
[Germany’s] energy supply’.92  In short, this means that the German system of 
energy supply must be developed with regard to the economic, social and 
environmental needs of the present and future generations.  This is the grundnorm of 
the German feed-in tariff law. 
While the pursuit of the sustainable development of Germany’s energy supply 
is relatively uncontroversial at the level of abstraction, the challenge that arises in 
practice is how the different and often competing concepts of environmental 
protection and economic and social development should be integrated in order to 
pursue the overall objective effectively.93  In this regard, the German feed-in tariff 
law addresses the potential for any problems of interpretation or inconsistency by 
noting explicitly that: 
to achieve [its] purpose ... th[e] Act aims to increase the share of renewable 
energy sources in electricity supply to at least: 
1. 35 percent by no later than 2020; 
2. 50 percent by no later than 2030; 
3. 65 percent by no later than 2040; and 
4. 80 percent by no later than 2050; 
and to integrate these quantities of electricity in the electricity supply 
system.94 
In this sense, not only is the German feed-in tariff law concerned with the sustainable 
development of the German energy supply, but it recognises that the most critical 
aspect of this task requires a rapid and large-scale increase in the generation of 
renewable sourced electricity.  On this basis, the specific object of the German feed-
in tariff law reflects a robust and positive commitment to support the rapid increase 
in the production of renewable sourced electricity.   
                                                 
91 Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) [Act on Granting 
Priority to Renewable Energy Sources] (Germany) 1 April 2000, BGBI I, 2000, 2074, 1(1). 
92 Ibid, 1(1). 
93 'Renewable Energies: Perspectives for a sustainable energy future' (Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2011). 
94 Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) [Act on Granting 
Priority to Renewable Energy Sources] (Germany) 1 April 2000, BGBI I, 2000, 2074, 1(2). 
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While increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity may be the 
immediate task of the German feed-in tariff law, it also does more than this.  The link 
between the promotion of renewable sourced electricity and sustainable development 
indicates that the feed-in tariff law is also concerned with issues of more general 
concern.  Namely, it is concerned with the immediate and long-term protection of the 
German environment, the promotion of greater domestic energy security and the 
energy sustenance of the German population in an economically and environmentally 
responsible manner.95  Considered at this level of generality, it is evident that by 
increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity the German feed-in tariff 
law is designed to refine the operation of its electricity generation sector in order to 
provide, promote and protect the dignity of its citizens in a sustainable manner.  
Therefore, not only does the German feed-in tariff law offer a clear and robust 
commitment to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity, it also 
recognises the importance of creating the conditions that can contribute to a more 
sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector. 
While the broad societal values of the German feed-in tariff law are integral to 
its overall design, of equal importance are the regulatory rules that are designed to 
realise the law’s ambition.  Let us turn to consider these regulatory rules. 
B. The regulatory rules of the German feed-in tariff law 
a. The issue of eligibility 
The German feed-in tariff law mandates that electricity transmission grid 
operators must pay the operators of facilities that generate electricity using 
‘renewable energy sources’96 a prescribed tariff.97  The German feed-in tariff law 
defines ‘renewable energy sources’ as: 
hydropower, including wave power, tidal power, salt gradient and flow 
energy, wind energy, solar radiation, geothermal energy, energy from 
biomass, including biogas, biomethane, landfill gas and sewage treatment 
                                                 
95 Energy Concept, above n 5, 3 and EEG, above n 82. 
96 Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) [Act on Granting 
Priority to Renewable Energy Sources] (Germany) 1 April 2000, BGBI I, 2000, 2074, 3. 
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gas, as well as the biodegradable fraction of municipal waste and industrial 
waste.98 
The inclusion of a broad range of renewable sources within the definition of 
‘renewable energy sources’ indicates that the German feed-in tariff law is designed 
to permit the use of all major renewable sources that are available to generate 
renewable sourced electricity.  Moreover, the fact that facilities of all sizes are 
eligible to receive the tariff indicates that the German feed-in tariff law is designed to 
promote the production of renewable sourced electricity from utility and non-utility 
scale facilities. 
By providing for an inclusive approach to eligibility, the German feed-in tariff 
law is designed to encourage the production of renewable sourced electricity from a 
range of sources and from a variety of domestic and commercial installations.  Such 
an inclusive approach is recognised as contributing to the cost-effective development 
of renewable sourced electricity, as it underpins the growth of a broad portfolio of 
renewable sourced electricity generating facilities.99 
From a practical perspective, the inclusive approach to eligibility has 
contributed to the development of wind, solar PV and biomass renewable sources 
within Germany’s overall portfolio of renewable sourced electricity.100  Therefore, 
the definition of ‘renewable energy sources’ satisfies the basic requirement that an 
approach to eligibility be designed to be inclusive.  In this regard, this approach 
supports the view that the German feed-in tariff law provides a meaningful 
commitment to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
While the basic approach to eligibility under the German feed-in tariff law may 
be sound, its design is not without its limitations.  Most notably, the feed-in tariff law 
is available not only to those installations that generate electricity from renewable 
sources, but also to those that generate electricity using ‘mine gas’.101  Mine gas 
refers to the ‘energy-rich gas that escapes from coal mines’.102  Despite it not being a 
renewable resource, the rationale for including electricity generated from ‘mine gas’ 
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100 Renewable energy sources 2011, above n 1, 7. 
101 Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) [Act on Granting 
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as an eligible source under the feed-in tariff law is that it is intended to ‘improve the 
[atmospheric] carbon dioxide and methane balance’.103  In other words, rather than 
allowing mine gas – which contains large amounts of methane – to escape into the 
atmosphere, the German feed-in tariff law is designed to encourage its capture and 
combustion in order to reduce its environmental impact. 
The support for electricity produced using mine gas appears to be incongruous 
with a regulatory regime that is designed specifically to generate electricity from 
renewable sources.  This is because providing a tariff to a facility that generates 
electricity from mine gas, which is derived during the process of coal extraction, 
operates to support coal mining without increasing the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.  Therefore, if it is the policy of the German government to 
support the use of mine gas to generate electricity because of its potential 
environmental, social or economic benefits, then this activity should be supported by 
a separate policy that is concerned with reducing the greenhouse gas emissions 
relating to coal extraction. 
A further potential limitation to the inclusive approach to eligibility under the 
German feed-in tariff law concerns the support for small and large-scale hydropower 
facilities.104  In addition to being a mature technology, it has been established that 
hydropower facilities can contribute to major ecological problems.105  Because of 
these factors, the German feed-in tariff law requires that hydropower facilities 
comply with certain conditions concerning their location, environmental credentials 
and ecological impact.106  It does so by way of certain requirements imposed directly 
by the feed-in tariff law as well as by reference to certain limitations imposed by the 
German Federal Water Act.107  In this regard, the ecological and environmental 
requirements imposed on hydropower facilities are designed to balance the need to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity in a cost-effective manner 
                                                 
103 Explanatory notes, Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) 
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without undermining the broader objects of sustainable development.  In this sense, 
the support for hydropower under the German feed-in tariff law, while initially 
appearing to undermine the concept of sustainability, appears to be sound as it seeks 
to balance the three issues that inform the concept of sustainable development – 
environmental protection and social and economic development. 
b. A review of the tariff 
Like all feed-in tariff mechanisms, the German feed-in tariff law is structured 
around the payment of a tariff to eligible renewable sourced electricity generators.  
The tariffs provided by the German feed-in tariff law are paid to these generators for 
each kilowatt-hour of electricity that they generate and which they feed into the 
electricity transmission grid.108  Tariff payments are guaranteed for a period of 20 
years, as well as for the year in which the facility was first able to generate electricity 
and feed it into the electricity transmission grid.109 
Stepped tariffs 
The tariffs provided under the German feed-in tariff law are designed 
according to a cost covering methodology.110  The use of this approach is designed to 
provide eligible generators with a tariff that reflects their ‘real [electricity] generation 
costs plus a small premium’.111  To ensure that the tariff is appropriately priced for 
each of the eligible sources, the cost covering methodology adopts a stepped tariff 
approach.  Specifically, in the case of the German feed-in tariff law, this means that 
the tariff is calculated to reflect: i) the renewable resource used to generate 
electricity; and ii) the size of the electricity generating facility.112  In certain 
circumstances, the tariff is also differentiated based on the location of the facility.113 
Differentiating the tariff based on the renewable source used to generate 
electricity is an obvious (yet important) approach.  By doing so, the tariff is able to 
reflect more accurately the different costs associated with the technologies that are 
used to generate electricity from renewable sources.  In this regard, the German feed-
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in tariff law sets the level of the tariffs to reflect the relative maturity of particular 
technologies so that less mature renewable sources (such as geothermal) receive a 
higher tariff than electricity that is generated using more mature sources (such as 
wind).114 
This approach is therefore designed to contribute to the use of a diverse 
portfolio of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities, which further 
supports the conclusion that the German feed-in tariff law offers a robust 
commitment to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  Further, 
this approach also reflects that the German feed-in tariff law is conscious of costs, as 
it attempts to develop a portfolio of renewable resources. 
Size is also an important factor in determining the level of the tariff.  This is 
because ‘larger plants are generally less expensive’115 to operate because their output 
of electricity is proportionally higher than their capital costs when compared to 
smaller electricity generation plants.116  This means that larger plants require less 
generous tariffs.  The majority of the tariffs under the German feed-in tariff law 
reflect this proposition.117   
A useful example of the size-based tariff differentiation is provided by the 
approach applied to hydropower facilities under the German feed-in tariff law.118  
For these facilities, 
the tariff paid for electricity generated from hydropower shall amount to: 
1. 12.7 cents per kilowatt-hour for the first 500 kilowatts of the rated 
average annual capacity;  
2. 8.3 cents per kilowatt-hour for the rated average annual capacity 
between 500 kilowatts and 2 megawatts;  
3. 6.3 cents per kilowatt-hour for the rated average annual capacity 
between 2 and 5 megawatts;  
4. 5.5 cents per kilowatt-hour for the rated average annual capacity 
between 5 and 10 megawatts; 
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5. 5.3 cents per kilowatt-hour for the rated average annual capacity 
between 10 and 20 megawatts;  
6. 4.2 cents per kilowatt-hour for the rated average annual capacity 
between 20 and 50 megawatts;  
7. 3.4 cents per kilowatt-hour for the rated average annual capacity of 
over 50 megawatts.119 
For on and offshore wind-powered facilities, the German feed-in tariff law also 
differentiates the tariff based on the location of facilities.120  This approach is used 
because the location of wind-powered facilities is likely to affect the amount of 
electricity produced.  Therefore, in relation to onshore wind-powered facilities, the 
German feed-in tariff law notes that: 
1. [t]he tariff paid for electricity from wind-powered installation shall 
amount to 4.87 cents per kilowatt-hour. 
2. In derogation of subsection (1) above, the tariff paid in the first five 
years after the installation is commissioned shall amount to 8.93 cents 
per kilowatt-hour (initial tariff).  This period shall be extended by two 
months for each 0.75 percent of the reference yield by which the yield 
of the installation falls short of 150 percent of the reference yield.121 
The purpose of this section of the German feed-in tariff law is to reduce the tariff 
following the initial five year period if the wind-powered facility is exceeding the 
prescribed reference yield.  However, for a facility that is not able to produce 
electricity above the reference yield during the fixed five-year period the tariff will 
be extended.  This feature ensures that the German feed-in tariff law supports 
onshore wind-powered facilities that might not be as economically viable as other 
facilities simply because of their location. 
For offshore wind-powered facilities, tariffs are determined with reference to 
the location and depth at which these facilities are installed, as these are factors that 
affect the financial viability of a facility.  The German feed-in tariff law provides 
that: 
[d]uring the first twelve years after the commissioning of the offshore 
installation the tariff shall amount to 15.0 cents per kilowatt-hour (initial 
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tariff).  The period in accordance with the first sentence above in which the 
initial tariff is paid shall be extended by 0.5 months for each full nautical 
mile beyond 12 nautical miles that the installation is distanced from the 
shoreline ... and by 1.7 months for each full metre of water depth beyond a 
water depth of 20 metres.  
In some respects, these tariff methodologies applied to on and offshore wind-
powered facilities are analogous to the approach that is used to differentiate the tariff 
based on facility size.  This is because in both instances the tariff is designed to 
enable facilities to cover their costs, which are based on factors that affect the cost of 
electricity production, including size, location and electricity yield. 
In addition, the use of a tariff that is determined by the location of a facility 
also encourages the dissemination of wind-powered facilities at sites with less 
favourable conditions by providing these facilities with more generous tariffs.122  By 
encouraging the development of facilities at sites with less favourable wind 
conditions, the German feed-in tariff law is designed to encourage the construction of 
facilities at locations that have not yet been adequately exploited.  In this regard, it 
has been noted that such an approach can ‘potentially [save] many ... billions in 
transmission investment’.123 
The use of bonuses and tariffs for repowering  
While the use of stepped tariffs reflects the principal method used to set the 
level of the tariff, the German feed-in tariff law also provides that in certain 
circumstances eligible facilities will be entitled to receive ‘bonuses’ and tariff 
payments for the act of ‘repowering’. 
Tariff bonuses operate in limited circumstances to encourage particular types 
of activities that exceed that which is required by the operator of an eligible facility 
to receive the standard tariff.  Such bonuses are available in two circumstances.  The 
first bonus is available to facilities that process and feed into the natural gas network 
landfill gas, sewage treatment gas, biomass or biogas.  Having done so, these 
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facilities then withdraw that gas from a natural gas network to generate electricity.124  
The purpose of providing an additional tariff payment for this activity is to provide 
financial support to facilities that commit to the processing of gas from renewable 
sources, which can then be used to generate electricity. 
The second bonus offered by the German feed-in tariff law relates to onshore 
wind-powered facilities.125  This bonus provides that the 
initial tariff [for these facilities] shall increase for electricity from wind-
powered installations commissioned prior to 1 January 2015 by 0.48 cents 
per kilowatt-hour (system services bonus) if it demonstrably fulfils the 
requirements [of the Ordinance on System Services by Wind Energy 
Plants].126 
Among other things, the Ordinance on System Services by Wind Energy Plants 
requires that new and existing wind-powered facilities contribute to the ‘security and 
stability of electricity networks’.127  This is to be achieved by better managing the 
electricity output from wind-powered facilities by enabling electricity grid operators 
to control their real and reactive power.128 
Repowering is a further tool that is used to increase the level of the tariff paid 
to wind-powered facilities.  The concept of repowering encourages new onshore 
wind-powered facilities to replace older wind-powered facilities, provided that the 
new facilities have a capacity of at least twice that of the facility that they replace.129 
The rationale for the bonus and repowering incentives offered to onshore wind-
powered facilities is straightforward.  These features are designed to encourage the 
development of more efficient and effective wind-powered facilities.  Further, in 
addition to encouraging the growth of renewable sourced electricity production, the 
German feed-in tariff law, at least in relation to wind-powered facilities, is also 
designed to contribute to the effective integration of new renewable sourced 
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electricity generating facilities with the existing electricity transmission grid.  In this 
sense, the German feed-in tariff law is cognisant of the need for coherence between 
the various aspects of the broader German electricity supply sector, being the 
generation of electricity and its safe and secure transmission.130 
The issue of tariff degression 
In addition to the use of the stepped tariffs and limited bonuses, the German 
feed-in tariff law also applies the concept of tariff degression to the tariffs and 
bonuses that are offered.131  It does so in two ways.  First, it applies an annual rate of 
tariff degression for each ‘renewable energy source (other than solar PV) and mine 
gas, with the effect that the ‘tariffs and bonuses shall decrease ... on 1 January each 
year’132 in the manner prescribed by the law.  This approach reflects the more 
common prescribed degression model, where the rates of tariff decline are prescribed 
at the outset of the program to ‘anticipate technological learning and provide an 
incentive for the industry to further improve ... technologies’.133 
The second approach to tariff degression uses a different and more responsive 
model.  Currently, this approach applies only to those facilities that rely on solar PV 
to generate electricity.134  The general rule applied to facilities of this nature is that 
the applicable tariffs ‘shall be reduced on 1 January each year from the year 2012 
onwards’135 by the amount prescribed in the law.  However, this rate of tariff 
degression is subject to change based on the capacity of installed facilities that are 
registered within the previous 12 months.136  For example, depending on the total 
generating capacity of facilities installed within the previous 12 months, the rate of 
degression may either increase or decrease incrementally.  Therefore, the rate of 
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tariff degression applicable to facilities that generate electricity using solar PV is 
dependent on the capacity of installed facilities that are registered within a prescribed 
12-month period. 
The prescribed and progressive annual rates of tariff degression are in addition 
to other tariff reduction strategies that apply to installations that generate electricity 
using solar PV.  The most notable measure in this regard includes a once-off tariff 
reduction to the tariffs for solar PV facilities of between 20.2 to 29 per cent.  These 
reductions took effect on 1 April 2012.137 
The dynamic approach to tariff degression was applied to solar PV facilities to 
address the previously high levels of compensation provided to these installations.  
These high tariff rates were provided following an amendment to the German feed-in 
tariff law in 2004.138  At the time, it was noted that this amendment was necessary to 
overcome this technology’s ‘grave lack of competitiveness’139 which resulted from 
its prohibitively high costs.140  However, because of the generous subsidies, 
electricity from these facilities ‘increased 60% from 2006 to 2007 and more than 
doubled again in 2008’.141  This meant that by 2009 these installations were 
receiving approximately 48 per cent of all tariff payments made under the German 
feed-in tariff law, despite contributing less than nine per cent of the total renewable 
sourced electricity produced in Germany.142  At the same time, the cost of 
developing these installations had dropped dramatically from the time when the tariff 
was initially increased.143 
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A number of observations – both positive and negative – may be made about 
the concept of tariff degression and, more generally, about the design of tariffs under 
the German feed-in tariff law.  In relation to the matter of tariff degression, it has 
been noted that the use of this technique ‘may foster [a] desire [among consumers] to 
rapidly install the currently available, yet not the best technology’.144  The reason for 
this is that by doing so operators of the facilities will be able to obtain the highest 
rate of return for the electricity that the facility produces.145  On this logic, degressive 
tariffs can contribute to suboptimal long-term outcomes as this approach ‘helps 
investors to secure today’s favourable subsidy for the next 20 years at an unvaried 
level, free from the imperative of modernizing with the latest technology’.146  
Further, it may be noted that the use of dynamic tariff degression can undermine the 
stability and dependability of a regulatory regime by sending signals to potential 
investors and developers that tariffs may be changed without due regard for the need 
for long-term tariff stability to encourage investment. 
While these criticisms have merit, they fail to consider the broader context in 
which this technique is designed to operate.  The German feed-in tariff law is 
designed to provide stable and secure returns on investment in order to encourage an 
increase in the production of renewable sourced electricity.  To do so, it uses a 
variety of techniques to ensure that the rate of the tariff is set at an appropriate level.  
These techniques include using a stepped tariff approach, bonuses, repowering and 
degressive tariffs.  For this reason, the concept of tariff degression is but one of the 
many levers that are used by the German feed-in tariff law to determine the rate of 
the tariff, as it is designed to operate in conjunction with the other tariff-setting 
techniques.  Considered in this broader context, it should be noted that tariff 
degression is designed to encourage innovation and ensure that tariffs reflect the 
declining cost of technologies while, at the same time, operating in conjunction with 
the other features of the German feed-in tariff law that contribute to technological 
innovation and encourage upgrades to existing facilities. 
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There are also a number of more general criticisms that have been made about 
the design of the tariff setting methodology used by the German feed-in tariff law.  
Most of these concern the impact of the overly generous tariffs that were offered to 
facilities that used solar PV to generate electricity from 2004.  Most generally, it has 
been noted that the overcompensation provided by the German feed-in tariff law to 
these facilities has undermined the economic credentials of this regulatory regime.147  
In this regard, it has been observed that the use of unsustainably generous tariffs for 
solar PV facilities has encouraged a high level of investment into these facilities 
since 2004 that, together with the more recent limits imposed on these tariffs, has 
contributed to a ‘boom-and-bust [investment] scenario’.148  This has occurred at the 
expense of ‘smooth industry growth [that] accommodate[s] predictable changes in 
technology costs and price movements’.149  These criticisms are certainly valid in 
relation to the approach towards the tariff for solar PV facilities prior to the 
amendments that took effect in 2012. 
Some commentators extrapolate the above criticisms by noting that the German 
feed-in tariff law uses a very expensive approach to reduce the production of 
greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity generation sector.  Such a view was set 
out in the Australian Productivity Commission’s 2011 report, Emission Reduction 
Policies and Carbon Prices in Key Economies.150  In this report, the Australian 
Productivity Commission noted that: 
in 2009 the [German feed-in tariff] provided subsidies for around 65 Mt of 
[greenhouse gas emissions] abatement.  The estimated value of the subsidy 
equivalent was €5.6 billion.  This suggests that for the [German feed-in 
tariff] as a whole, the implicit abatement subsidy was around €95/t CO2 
($137).151 
However, there are a number of problems with this assessment.  The first is 
that it is concerned only with the cost of abating greenhouse gas emissions.  
However, this is not the immediate focus of the German feed-in tariff law.  Rather, 
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its role is to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity and, in doing so, 
contribute to the sustainable development of the German energy supply.  As a result, 
an economic analysis that is concerned only with the costs relating to the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions reflects an overly simplistic and narrow approach.  This 
is because it fails to take account of the broader societal implications of the German 
feed-in tariff law that support the pursuit of a sustainable and dignified approach to 
electricity production. 
In this regard, it is useful to consider the societal impacts of the German feed-
in tariff law.  In 2009, some of the broader social benefits that have been noted to 
have been delivered by this regulatory regime include the reduction in Germany’s 
energy imports (delivering an approximate saving of €5.7 billion), the creation of 
more than 370,000 domestic jobs (2010) and the addition of more than €33 billion to 
Germany’s economic turnover.152  Some commentators have also contended that the 
German feed-in tariff law has contributed to positive economic outcome because of 
the ‘merit order effect’.153  The ‘merit order effect’ refers to the ‘downward pressure 
that the deployment of renewable resources place on wholesale energy prices’.154 
Notwithstanding the valid criticisms relating to the overly generous tariffs 
previously offered to solar PV facilities, the use of a regulated 20-year cost covering 
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remunerative model represents an integral and a beneficial feature of the German 
feed-in tariff law.  The reason for this is that the nuanced approach to setting the 
tariff for various renewable sources establishes the basis for a regulatory instrument 
to encourage the use of the widest number of renewable sources to generate 
electricity in a stable, prudent and flexible manner. 
Further, the use of predetermined and, in most cases, readily transparent tariffs, 
provides the appropriate signals to investors that the German feed-in tariff law offers 
a dependable mechanism to encourage the production of renewable sourced 
electricity for the duration of a facility’s payback period.  For these reasons, the 
German feed-in tariff law’s long-term approach to remuneration provides the basis 
for a regulatory regime that can encourage a meaningful increase in the generation of 
renewable sourced electricity. 
c. A review of the mandatory purchase obligation 
The German feed-in tariff law is concerned with increasing the production of 
renewable sourced electricity by offering potential investors long-term price stability 
in the form of suitably generous tariffs.  However, before being able to receive a 
tariff, eligible generators must first sell their electricity.  This gives rise to a 
mandatory purchase obligation that requires that electricity transmission grid 
operators must purchase all renewable sourced electricity that is generated from 
eligible sources, regardless of the present demand for electricity.155  This obligation 
specifically provides that electricity grid operators must ‘immediately and as a 
priority purchase, transmit and distribute the entire available quantity of electricity 
from renewable energy sources’.156  This feature of the German feed-in tariff law is 
designed to ensure that operators of eligible renewable sourced electricity generating 
facilities have certainty that their electricity will be purchased and, in consideration 
for this, will receive the prescribed tariff. 
The mandatory purchase obligation that applies in relation to the fixed tariff 
component of the German feed-in tariff law may be contrasted with the design of the 
premium tariff component where there is no such mandatory obligation.  To receive 
the tariff under the premium component of the feed-in tariff law, eligible generators 
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must sell their electricity in the competitive wholesale electricity market.157  Once 
they have done so, they will receive the tariff. 
The mandatory purchase obligation that applies to the fixed tariff component of 
the German feed-in tariff law is designed to operate in conjunction with the long-
term and stable tariffs to provide investment security and certainty to renewable 
sourced electricity generating facilities.158  The mandatory purchase obligation does 
so by ensuring that, to the extent that the obligation does not interfere with the 
stability of the electricity grid, eligible renewable sourced electricity will always be 
purchased for the amount of the prescribed tariff.159  Therefore, this feature of the 
German feed-in tariff law reflects that this law is designed to provide a stable and 
dependable regime that guarantees the purchase of renewable sourced electricity.  
The practical manifestation of this feature is to lower ‘the costs of financing’160 
renewable sourced electricity generating projects.  This occurs because the risks relating 
to achieving a return on investment that might otherwise exist are negated. 
In addition to the provision of investment certainty, a mandatory purchase 
obligation also contributes to the pursuit of a sustainable approach to electricity 
production in Germany.  It does so by prioritising not only the purchase of renewable 
sourced electricity, but also the transmission and distribution of this form electricity 
before electricity that is produced by non-renewable sources.  Practically, this feature 
is designed to ensure that ‘in times of low demand, the grid operator will reduce the 
amount of “grey” [(non-renewable)] electricity while all “green” [(renewable)] 
electricity is incorporated into the electricity mix’.161 
Despite the importance of the mandatory purchase obligation to the long-term 
dependability of the German feed-in tariff law, this feature has been criticised for 
distorting the operation of an otherwise liberalised wholesale electricity market in 
Germany.162  The reason for this is that the application of a mandatory purchase 
obligation requires that all renewable sourced electricity be purchased in priority to 
non-renewable sourced electricity.  As a result, it has been noted that the application 
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of the mandatory obligation imposes an unnecessary financial burden on electricity 
transmission grid operators to purchase electricity that is typically more expensive 
than electricity that is generated using non-renewable sources.  This additional cost 
(which is equal to the tariff paid for renewable sourced electricity by an operator of 
the electricity transmission grid minus the revenue it receives from the sale of that 
electricity163) is then passed on to electricity consumers.164  While these criticisms do 
have merit, the removal of the mandatory purchase obligation would undermine one 
of the key tenets of the German feed-in tariff law.  Therefore, while this feature of 
the law does create a level of tension with the concept of a liberalised electricity 
market, it is suggested that this is necessary to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity in a dependable and effective manner. 
While the mandatory purchase obligation represents a critical component of the 
German feed-in tariff law, the law does contain one measure that is designed to 
lessen its financial impact on certain electricity consumers.  This is provided for 
under a ‘special equalisation scheme’.165  Under this scheme, ‘electricity-intensive 
manufacturing enterprises with high electricity consumption or rail operators’166 are 
able to reduce their exposure to the higher electricity costs resulting from the German 
feed-in tariff law so that they may: 
maintain their international and intermodal competitiveness, insofar as this is 
compatible with the goals of this Act and the limit imposed is still 
compatible with the interest of the electricity users as a whole.167 
Put simply, the special equalisation scheme entitles electricity-intensive 
manufacturing enterprises with high electricity consumption or rail operators to 
mitigate their exposure to some of the costs associated with the German feed-in tariff 
law for the purpose of avoiding any substantial loss of competitiveness. 
The equalisation scheme in the German feed-in tariff law is important.  It 
enables electricity-intensive industries and rail operators to remain competitive.  The 
limitations of the special equalisation scheme are equally relevant, however.  This is 
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because the special equalisation scheme is to be provided only to the extent that it 
does not undermine the broader object of the German feed-in tariff law, which is to 
pursue a sustainable energy supply for Germany.  Therefore, the design of the special 
equalisation scheme recognises the importance of maintaining the competitiveness of 
electricity-intensive industries while, at the same time, not allowing the available 
exemptions to subvert the goal of German feed-in tariff law by disproportionately 
burdening other electricity consumers with higher electricity prices. 
However, while the basic principle of the special equalisation scheme is 
relevant to balance the concepts of cost and social development, the German feed-in 
tariff law fails to specify how the limitation of the special equalisation scheme is to 
apply.  Therefore, it is not clear how and to what extent the objects of the German 
feed-in tariff law may limit the application of the special equalisation scheme in 
practice.  Arguably, therefore, one may need to revert to the grundnorm of the law 
and to its subsidiary commitments.  However, this is not clear. 
A further limitation of the special equalisation scheme is that it has no regard 
for electricity consumers that may be unable to meet the higher costs of electricity 
that are associated with the German feed-in tariff law.  The reason for this is that the 
scheme applies only to reduce the cost of the tariff for a very select group of 
electricity consumers and does not consider the financial impact of the law for 
individuals.168  Given that the grundnorm of the German feed-in tariff law is to 
promote the sustainable development of its energy sector, it might therefore be useful 
to extend the scope of the special equalisation scheme so that it can be applied to 
those electricity consumers that are currently or may become unable to pay for the 
increased price of electricity. 
While the limitations concerning the distribution of costs under the German 
feed-in tariff law contribute to higher electricity costs and potential inequality among 
electricity consumers, the mandatory purchase obligation is an important feature of 
this regulatory regime.  Together with the operation of transparent and long-term 
tariffs, the mandatory purchase obligation provides investment security that enables 
generators of renewable sourced electricity to rely on the revenue offered by the 
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regime’s tariffs.169  This is fundamental to pursue, in a meaningful and dependable 
way, a sustainable and dignified approach to electricity production. 
d. The issue of integration 
In addition to offering a stable and dependable stream of revenue to eligible 
generators of renewable sourced electricity, the German feed-in tariff law is also 
designed to integrate renewable sourced electricity into the electricity transmission 
grid.  The issue of integration concerns two matters.  The first concerns the 
connection of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities to the electricity 
grid.  The second matter relates to the ability for the electricity transmission grid to 
utilise electricity that is generated from renewable sources without threatening the 
stability of the broader electricity transmission grid. 
Connecting facilities to the grid 
The Energy Industry Act170 governs access to the German electricity 
transmission grid in general.  The Energy Industry Act requires that access to the 
electricity transmission grid be conducted in a manner that is ‘adequate, free of 
discrimination [and] transparent’.171  To realise this objective, the Energy Industry 
Act ‘relies on a model of negotiated grid access as opposed to ... regulated grid 
access’.172  This means that connection of new electricity generating facilities is 
typically a dynamic process rather than a regulated one. 
While the Energy Industry Act governs access to the German electricity 
transmission grid in general, it is the German feed-in tariff law that provides for the 
specific rules that govern the connection of renewable sourced electricity generating 
facilities.173  The German feed-in tariff law provides that electricity transmission grid 
operators 
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shall immediately and as a priority connect installations generating 
electricity from renewable energy sources and from mine gas to that point in 
their grid system (grid connection point) which is suitable in terms of the 
voltage and which is at the shortest linear distance from the location of the 
installation if no other grid system has a technically and economically more 
favourable grid connection point.174 
In addition, electricity transmission grid operators must also ‘without delay after 
receiving the necessary information’175 provide a ‘timetable for immediately 
establishing the grid connection, including all necessary procedural steps’.176  The 
costs involved in connecting the facility to the electricity grid ‘shall be borne by the 
installation operator’.177 
The facility connection methodology prescribed by the German feed-in tariff 
law has ‘led to a timely process of getting connected to the grid for renewable 
generators’.178  This view is supported by evidence that suggests that Germany has 
the shortest electricity grid connection time in the European Union.179  This is 
despite Germany having a significant number of new projects compared to other 
European Union Member States.180 
To enable the expeditious connection of new renewable sourced electricity 
generating facilities, the German feed-in tariff law also prescribes a particular 
methodology to augment the existing electricity transmission grid in Germany.  The 
German feed-in tariff law provides that, subject to it not being economically 
unreasonable to do so:181 
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[u]pon the request of those interested in feeding in electricity, grid system 
operators shall immediately optimise, strengthen and expand their grid 
systems in accordance with the best available technology in order to 
guarantee the purchase, transmission and distribution of the electricity 
generated from renewable energy sources or from mine gas.182 
The obligation to meet the costs involved in augmenting the electricity 
transmission grid lies with the electricity transmission grid operator.183  The cost-
sharing methodology prescribed by the German feed-in tariff law therefore reflects a 
typical shallow cost allocation method that is designed to favour generators of 
renewable sourced electricity ‘because the costs for the grid connection [and 
augmentation] are minimised’.184  The costs that are borne by the electricity 
transmission grid operators are then, like the tariffs themselves, passed on to 
electricity consumers in the form of higher electricity prices.185 
In the first instance, it may appear inappropriate to burden electricity 
consumers with additional costs as they are already subject to higher electricity costs 
as a result of the mandatory purchase obligation under the German feed-in tariff law.  
However, the application of a shallow cost approach is a sensible and sustainable 
approach as it allows the costs borne by the electricity transmission grid operators to 
be shared between electricity consumers rather than operate as a barrier to prevent 
the further development of renewable sourced electricity.  This view is supported by 
research that suggests that consumers in Germany are generally willing to pay higher 
tariffs for electricity that has been generated from renewable sources.186  Further, a 
shallow charging method has been found to contribute directly to higher uptake of 
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renewable sourced electricity than other charging methods.187  Notwithstanding these 
conclusions, as was noted earlier in respect of the mandatory purchase obligation, a 
particular limitation of the German feed-in tariff law is that it fails to minimise the 
impact of the higher costs associated with this regime on electricity users that are 
currently unable (or may become unable) to meet the rising cost of electricity. 
A more general limitation of the shallow-cost methodology is that the 
obligations relating to grid augmentation that lie with electricity transmission grid 
operators can contribute to a lack of concern among renewable sourced electricity 
generators for the overall stability of the electricity transmission grid.188  This is 
because renewable sourced electricity generators are concerned only with issues 
relating to electricity generation and connection.   
Expanding the grid 
The second issue relevant to the concept of integration relates to the ability of 
the existing transmission grid to incorporate new renewable sourced electricity 
generating facilities and the ease with which this infrastructure can be expanded 
without undermining its effective operation.  To appreciate how this issue is dealt 
with in Germany, it is necessary to consider the way in which the German electricity 
transmission grid is managed to enable the transmission of renewable sourced 
electricity. 
It has been noted that ‘grid infrastructure is proving to be the bottleneck and 
hindrance to the further dynamic expansion of [renewable sourced electricity]’189 in 
Germany.  The primary reason for this is that the German electricity grid is not 
designed to manage the inflow of weather dependant renewable sources that ‘are 
subject to considerable fluctuations due to climatic conditions and their expansion is 
focused on specific, generally suitable regions’.190  As a result, the stability and 
security of the electricity transmission grid in Germany is being threatened by the 
increase in generation of electricity from renewable sources. 
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In light of the challenges facing the German electricity grid, it has been noted 
that ‘[t]he power system [must] be remodelled and made more flexible’.191  In doing 
so, ‘consideration has to be given to the fluctuation over time of some variable 
sources like wind power’192 in order to ‘maintain power system stability and to 
ensure security of supply’.193  In a similar context, but speaking not only in regard to 
the management of fluctuating power sources, the German Energy Agency has noted 
that of central importance to the future of renewable sourced electricity in Germany 
is the need to: 
[c]onsiderabl[y] expan[d] ... existing infrastructure, especially ... power 
transmission lines ... to enable increased levels of power transport and avoid 
bottlenecks in the power grid.194 
In conjunction with the Energy Industry Act, the German feed-in tariff law is 
designed to address these issues.  In this regard, the German feed-in tariff law 
includes the following features that are designed to assist with the security and 
stability of the electricity grid: 
• a duty on the operator of an electricity transmission grid to ‘optimise, 
boost and expand their grid systems ... in order to guarantee the 
purchase, transmission and distribution of the electricity generated 
from renewable energy sources’;195 
• offering a bonus by way of an additional tariff payment for wind 
turbines that support grid stability by controlling real and reactive 
power;196 
• requiring renewable sourced generation facilities to be able to 
remotely reduce their electricity output ‘in the event of grid 
overload’;197 
• allowing an operator of an electricity transmission grid to enter into a 
contract with the operator of a renewable sourced generation facilities 
                                                 
191 Grid Study II, above n 190, 2. See also: Rosenkranz et al, above n 189, 16 and Langniß, Diekmann 
and Lehr, above n 190, 1289-92. 
192 Langniß, Diekmann and Lehr, above n 190, 1292. 
193 Grid Study II, above n 190, 6. 
194 Ibid, 2. 
195 Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) [Act on Granting 
Priority to Renewable Energy Sources] (Germany) 1 April 2000, BGBI I, 2000, 2074, 9(1). 
196 Ibid, 29(2) and 6(5). 
197 Ibid, 6(1), (2) and 11. 
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to ‘deviate ... from [the] priority purchase in order to better integrate 
the installation into the grid system’;198 and 
• allowing operators of an electricity transmission grid to take control 
over renewable sourced facilities if the capacity of the electricity 
transmission grid would otherwise be overloaded on the account of the 
electricity generated by that facility in order to ‘guarantee the safety 
and reliability of the electricity supply system’.199 
While each of these features is useful, arguably the most important feature of 
the German feed-in tariff law in this regard is the obligation on an operator of an 
electricity transmission grid to optimise, boost and expand the electricity grid.  This 
feature is designed to affect the stability of the entire electricity grid as it commits 
operators of electricity transmission grids to ‘[c]onsiderabl[y] expan[d] [and 
improve] ... existing infrastructure’200 so that renewable sourced electricity can be 
effectively distributed to end users without compromising the security of the broader 
electricity system.  In this sense, it is a positive feature while many of the others are 
negative as they facilitate a reduction in the load of an electricity generating 
facility.201  However, while this feature is particularly important in addressing the 
effective use of renewable sourced electricity, its application is limited by the 
regulatory regime that governs the expansion and optimisation of the electricity grid 
in Germany under the Energy Industry Act.202 
The purpose of the Energy Industry Act is to, among other things, provide for 
the 
most secure, low-priced, consumer-friendly, efficient, and environmentally 
compatible ... supply of electricity ... for society as a whole [and to ensure 
                                                 
198 Ibid, 8(3). 
199 Ibid, 11. 
200 Grid Study II, above n 190, 2. 
201 Kai Schlegelmilch, 'Editorial Board Commentary: Further Improved Framework Conditions for 
Wind Power in Germany since 2009' (2011) 1 Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review 51, 54. 
202 Rosenkranz et al, above n 189, 6.  See also: Corinna Klessmann, Christian Nabe and Karsten 
Burges, 'Pros and cons of exposing renewables to electricity market risks--A comparison of the market 
integration approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UK' (2008) 36(10) Energy Policy 3646, 3659-61 
and 'Pathways towards a 100% renewable electricity system' (German Advisory Council on the 
Environment, 2011), 10-2. 
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the] efficient and reliable operation of energy supply systems for the long-
term.203 
While it is arguable that the scope of the objects of the Energy Industry Act is broad 
enough to capture the need to support the effective integration of renewable sourced 
electricity into the German electricity grid, this law does not do so in any express 
manner.  Rather, the official approval procedure set out in the Energy Industry Act 
notes that any extension of the electricity grid may only be undertaken once all land, 
environmental and planning approvals have been obtained from the relevant federal 
and regional authorities.204  This means that to improve or expand on the existing 
electricity transmission grid, operators of these systems must comply with a range of 
complex and administratively burdensome regulatory requirements that operate 
outside of the scope of the German feed-in tariff law.  This reflects a lack of effective 
coherence between the German feed-in tariff law and other regulatory regimes to 
which it is connected. 
The lack of integration between the German feed-in tariff law and the Energy 
Industry Act led the German Energy Agency and the German Government to 
develop a regulatory strategy to address a number of the limitations of the regime 
governing the expansion and optimisation of the German electricity grid.205  This 
strategy was formalised in the Grid Expansion Acceleration Act,206 which, among 
other things, amended the existing regime for grid expansion.  The key amendments 
made by the Grid Expansion Acceleration Act in this regard concern: 
• the standardisation of the approval procedures for new renewable 
sourced electricity generating facilities to enable one federal regulator 
– the Federal Network Agency – to carry out federal planning in 
conjunction with the affected Länder; 
                                                 
203 Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts und Gasversorgung (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz) [Act on the Supply of 
Electricity and Gas (Energy Industry Act)] (Germany) 13 December 1935, RGBI, 1451, 1(1) and (2). 
204 Ibid, 43. 
205 See, eg, 'Planning of the Grid Integration of Wind Energy in Germany Onshore and Offshore up to 
the Year 2020 (dena Grid study)' (Deutsche Energie-Agentur, 2005), Grid Study II, above n 190, and 
Eckpunktepapier für ein Netzausbaubeschleunigungsgesetz (NABEG) – Verfahrensvereinfachung, 
Akzeptanz, Investitionen [Key Issues Paper for a network expansion Acceleration Act ("NABEG") – 
Simplifying procedures, acceptance, investment] (2011) Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology, Germany <http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/E/eckpunkte-netzausbau-
nabeg,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf>. 
206 Entwurf eines Gesetzes über Maßnahmen zur Beschleunigung des Netzausbaus Elektrizitätsnetze 
[Act on the Acceleration of Grid Expansion (Grid Expansion Acceleration Act)] (Germany) 2011 
BGBI I, 1690. 
  
 124 
• the reduction of the bureaucracy of involved authorities that currently 
contributes to the delay in grid expansion; and 
• the use of a simplified permitting procedure so that the various 
permits required to expand the grid can be obtained more 
expeditiously.207 
These amendments are useful additions to the design of the German regulatory 
framework governing the integration and expansion of renewable electricity sources 
in the electricity transmission grid.  Most importantly, the amendments made by the 
Grid Expansion Acceleration Act are designed to provide for a coherent and 
streamlined approach to the development and integration of new renewable sourced 
electricity generating facilities.  Therefore, this approach ‘should help reduce red 
tape and thus accelerate grid expansion across federal state borders’.208 
However, the Grid Expansion Acceleration Act stopped short of what was 
necessary, as its amendments do not address the central problem of the Energy 
Industry Act.  That is, these amendments do not address the failure of the Energy 
Industry Act to prioritise the promotion of renewable electricity through effective 
laws that are designed specifically to expand and optimise the electricity grid for this 
purpose.  This is because, to have done so would have required that: 
the [purpose] set out in § 1 of the ... [Energy Industry Act] be extended to 
include the promotion of [renewable electricity], and the mandate of the 
[regulator] ... be adapted correspondingly.209 
In light of this assessment, it is appropriate to conclude that the aspect of the 
German feed-in tariff law that is designed to connect new renewable sourced 
electricity generating facilities to the electricity grid reflects a robust and meaningful 
commitment to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  However, 
due to a lack of coherence with the regulatory framework governing the expansion of 
the electricity grid, the German feed-in tariff law is limited in its ability to encourage 
                                                 
207 Germany’s Network Expansion Acceleration Act for the power industry: First step in the right 
direction - others must follow! (2011) Deutsche Bank Research 
<http://www.dbresearch.eu/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000275871.pdf>, 
Change in energy policy (2011) Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
<http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2011/sep11/31221.pdf> and Matthias Lang and U 
Mutschler, BNetzA Consultation on Grid Expansion Scenarios (2012) German Energy Blog 
<http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?p=6839#more-6839>. 
208 Germany’s Network Expansion Acceleration Act for the power industry, above n 207, 1. 
209 Rosenkranz et al, above n 189, 25. 
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the complete integration of renewable sourced electricity into the German electricity 
grid.  This is an issue that must be addressed if the German feed-in tariff law is to 
contribute to the achievement of sustainable and dignified electricity generation 
sector. 
CONCLUSION 
The concepts of sustainable development and human dignity inform the 
ambitions of the German nation.  It seems only natural therefore that the express 
purpose of the German feed-in tariff law is to promote the sustainable development 
of the German energy system.  Further, although not as overt in its text, the German 
feed-in tariff law is also designed to promote the concept of human dignity, as the 
pursuit of this concept also requires an increase in the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.  Therefore, it is evident that the grundnorm of the German feed-
in tariff law is designed specifically to contribute to a more sustainable and dignified 
electricity generation sector. 
In addition to the law’s grundnorm, the regulatory rules of the German feed-in 
tariff law are designed to contribute to a sustainable and dignified electricity 
generation sector.  The German feed-in tariff law sets meaningful objects, which it 
then seeks to realise by relying on stable, dependable and cost conscious regulatory 
rules.  In this regard, the German feed-in tariff law is designed to offer sufficiently 
generous, yet generally stable, financial incentives to potential investors to invest in 
the production of renewable sourced electricity.  In doing so, this law is also 
cognisant of the need to minimise overly generous tariffs and to encourage 
innovation and cost reductions among producers of renewable sourced electricity. 
However, the design of the German feed-in tariff law is not without its 
limitations.  Arguably, the most profound shortcoming relates to its approach to 
integrating new renewable sourced electricity generating facilities into the electricity 
transmission grid.  This limitation is borne out of the lack of structural and regulatory 
coherence between the German feed-in tariff law and the Energy Industry Act.  
While certain amendments have been made to address these limitations, effective 
integration of these regulatory regimes requires changes that extend beyond ensuring 
administrative efficiency.  What is also required is an overt recognition in the 
regulatory instrument governing the German electricity transmission grid that the 
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principle underlying all grid management and expansion efforts must have ultimate 
regard to the sustainable development.  By taking this step, any decision made with 
regard to the development of the electricity transmission grid will be cognisant of the 
promotion of renewable sourced electricity and, ultimately, will therefore support the 
achievement of a more sustainable and dignified approach to electricity production in 
Germany. 
So much for the regulatory approach in Germany to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  Let us now turn to consider the design of the primary 
regulatory technique that is used (as well as that which has been proposed) in Great 
Britain to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  This analysis will 
provide a useful comparison to that which has just been completed.  Together, these 
analyses will then inform the review of the dominant Australian regulatory regime 
that is designed to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
 127 
5. A review of the British Renewables 
Obligation and the proposed feed-in 
tariff law 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic efficiency.  Competition.  Market-based economics.  These concepts 
reflect the themes that have defined the economic, political and social transformation 
that British society experienced during the 1980s and early 1990s.  While the 
prominence of these neo-liberal values in social, political and economic discourse 
has been tempered in recent years, the reforms that were instigated during the 1980s 
and 1990s continue to have a profound legacy on the regulatory architecture in Great 
Britain. 
The legacy of neo-liberal values in the British regulatory architecture can be 
usefully observed in the regulatory regimes that have been designed to increase the 
generation of renewable sourced electricity from utility-scale facilities.  The first 
regulatory regime designed specifically to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity was the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (the NFFO).  This scheme 
commenced in 1990.  In 2002, the Renewables Obligation replaced the NFFO as the 
principal regulatory regime to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity.  This scheme remains the primary regulatory regime designed for this 
purpose.1  Together, these regimes increased the production of renewable sourced 
electricity in Great Britain by eight-and-a-half per cent, from 1 per cent in 1991 to 
9.5 per cent in 2011.2  From mid-2013, the Government has proposed to introduce a 
market-based feed-in tariff mechanism, which, over time, is proposed to replace the 
Renewables Obligation.3  In this regard, the principal task of this chapter is to review 
the current and proposed regulatory regimes that are designed to increase production 
                                                 
1 See, eg, Explanatory Memorandum, The Renewables Obligation Order 2005 (UK), Explanatory 
Memorandum, The Renewables Obligation Order 2006 (UK), Explanatory Memorandum, The 
Renewables Obligation (Amendment) Order 2007 (UK), Explanatory Memorandum, The Renewables 
Obligation Order 2009 (UK) and Explanatory Memorandum, The Renewables Obligation 
(Amendment) Order 2010 (UK). 
2 'Main Economic Indicators' (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1993) and 
'Energy Trends - March 2012' (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2012), 45. 
3 'Planning our electric future: A White Paper for secure, affordable and low-carbon electricity' (CM 
8099, Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2011) (2011 White Paper). 
  
 128 
of renewable sourced electricity in Great Britain, namely the Renewables Obligation 
and the feed-in tariff that is proposed to replace it. 
This chapter contends that these regulatory regimes are not designed 
effectively to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  The reason 
for this assessment is that both regimes are designed to fulfil a common, but 
misguided, objective.  That is, they are both designed to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity, but only to the extent that this can be achieved while 
furthering the concepts of economic efficiency and competition.  Consequently, 
because of their subservience to the concepts of economic efficiency and 
competition, the design of these regimes fail to provide a robust commitment to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity in a stable, coherent and 
dependable manner.  For this reason, this chapter contends that these regimes are ill 
equipped to contribute effectively to a more sustainable and dignified electricity 
generation sector in Great Britain. 
This chapter is organised into four sections.  The first section is concerned with 
providing a contextual overview of the regulatory architecture in Great Britain that 
has led to the current regulatory efforts to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.  This section begins by reflecting on the grundnorm of the 
electricity generation sector in Great Britain.  Understanding the basic norm of the 
British electricity generation sector is important, as it is from within this broader 
context that the regulatory efforts to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity have emerged.  This section then considers the emergence of the NFFO, 
which was the first regulatory regime that was designed specifically to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity in Great Britain. 
The chapter’s second section considers the design of the Renewables 
Obligation.  The third section considers the feed-in tariff mechanism that is proposed 
to replace the Renewables Obligation during the course of this decade.  The final 
section offers some concluding remarks. 
THE REGULATORY CONTEXT 
Following the election of the Conservative Government in 1979, the policies of 
privatisation and deregulation came to dominate the political discourse in Great 
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Britain.4  The privatisation of natural public utilities began with the sale of the 
government-owned telecommunications infrastructure in 1984.5  This was followed 
by the privatisation of the gas supply sector in 1986, water and sewerage services in 
1989, the electricity sector in 1990 and 1991 and the railway service from 1993 to 
1996.6  Together, the sale of these assets contributed to more than £60 billion of state 
assets being sold by the government to the private sector.7 
Of particular relevance to this chapter is the privatisation of the British 
electricity generation sector and the principles that informed the regulatory regime 
that emerged to govern this sector in its privatised form.  The reason for this is that it 
is from within the broader regulatory framework that governs the privatised 
electricity generation sector that the regulatory regimes to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity in Great Britain have emerged. 
A. Principles informing the British electricity generation sector 
The principles informing the privatisation of the British electricity generation 
sector were set out in the 1988 White Paper, Privatising electricity.8  The central 
theme of this document was concerned with developing a regulatory approach that 
could effectively protect consumers’ interests.9  In essence, this meant their 
economic interests.10  The 1988 White Paper posited that the privatisation of the 
electricity sector was designed to do so by increasing competition within this sector, 
as this was ‘the best guarantor of customers’ interests’.11  In this regard, it was noted 
that regulation was required that could ‘promote [competition], oversee prices ... 
protect the customers’ interests ... and [ensure that] security of supply be 
maintained’.12 
                                                 
4 John Surrey, 'Introduction' in John Surrey (ed), The British electricity experiment: privatization: the 
record, the issues, the lessons (Earthscan, 1996) 3, 5 and Xin Cui, The UK Electricity Markets: Its 
Evolution, Wholesale Prices and Challenge of Wind Energy (Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, University 
of Stirling, 2010), 21-2. 
5 Paul Cook, 'Privatisation in the UK: Policy and Performance' in David Parker (ed), Privatisation in 
the European Union: theory and policy perspectives (Routledge, 1998) 218, 218.   
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 'Privatising electricity: The government's proposals for the privatisation of the electricity supply 
industry in England and Wales' (Department of Energy, 1988) (1988 White Paper). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Energy Market Experience: Lessons from Liberalised Electricity Markets (International Energy 
Agency/OECD Publishing, 2005), 171. 
12 Ibid. 
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Shortly after the call for regulation of the electricity generation section, in 1989 
the Electricity Act 1989 (UK)13 (the Electricity Act) was enacted.  The Electricity 
Act ‘laid the legislative foundations for the restructuring and privatisation of the 
electricity industry in Great Britain’.14  Practically, it did so by facilitating ‘a change 
in ownership from the state to private investors, the introduction of competitive 
markets, and a system of independent regulation’.15  However, of greater influence 
were the strategic values of the Electricity Act – its grundnorms – as it is these 
values that have since informed the development of the British electricity generation 
sector, including the regulatory regimes that govern the production of renewable 
sourced electricity. 
The Electricity Act notes that its ‘principal objective ... is to protect the 
interests of existing and future consumers’.16  The Electricity Act has defined these 
interests as: 
[t]hose interests ... taken as a whole, including — 
(a) their interests in the reduction of electricity-supply emissions of 
targeted greenhouse gases; and 
(b) their interests in the security of the supply of electricity to them.17 
When read together, this is the basic value informing the design of the Electricity 
Act.  That is, this is its grundnorm.18 
In order to realise the basic norm of the Electricity Act, the Secretary of State 
and the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem)19 – which are the institutions 
charged with pursuing the principal objective of the Electricity Act – are required to: 
                                                 
13 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29. 
14 Gillian Simmonds, 'Regulation of the UK Electricity Industry' (CRI Industry Brief, University of 
Bath, 2002), 2. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, s 3A(1) and s 3A(1A).  The reference to ‘existing and future 
consumers’ was included following amendments to the Electricity Act in 2008 (see: Energy Act 2008 
(UK) c 32, s 83). 
17 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, s 3A(1A)(a).  The recognition that consumers’ interests includes 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions relating to the supply of electricity was only included in 2010 
following amendments to the Electricity Act made by the Energy Act 2010 (UK) (see: Energy Act 
2010 (UK) c 27, s 17(3)). 
18 The grundnorm of the Electricity Act is critical to understanding the Act’s design and procedural 
approach that is considered shortly.  It is for this reason, that the entire analysis that follows in relation 
to the Act is conducted in light of this assessment. 
19 Ofgem is governed by the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (GEMA).  GEMA is the 
government regulator for the electricity and downstream natural gas markets in Great Britain.   
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carry out their respective functions ... in the manner which [they consider] is 
best calculated to further the principal objective, wherever appropriate by 
promoting effective competition between persons engaged in, or in 
commercial activities connected with, the generation, transmission, 
distribution or supply of electricity.20 
In performing this primary duty, Ofgem and the Secretary of State must have regard 
to, among other things: 
• the need to secure all reasonable demands for electricity are met;21 and 
• the interests of individuals who are disabled, are chronically sick, are 
of a pensionable age or who have low incomes.22 
Further complicating the manner in which the principal object of the Electricity 
Act is to be pursued is the requirement for the Secretary of State and Ofgem to 
adhere to a number of secondary duties.  The first of these duties was introduced in 
2000, more than one decade after the commencement of the Electricity Act.23  
Initially, these secondary duties were limited to protecting the stability and viability 
of the electricity supply sector.24  However, since their inclusion, they have been 
expanded to compel Ofgem and the Secretary of State to have regard to ‘the need to 
contribute to the achievement of sustainable development’.25  The inclusion of this 
latter duty reflects the growing importance of the intersection between the 
environment and the electricity sector.26 
                                                 
20 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, s 3A(1B). 
21 Ibid, s 3A(2)(a). 
22 Ibid, s 3A(3). 
23 Utilities Act 2000 (UK) c 27, s 3A(2). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, s 3A(2)(c).  The duty relating to sustainable development was 
included into the Electricity Act by an amendment made to it pursuant to the Energy Act 2008 (UK) 
(see: Energy Act 2008 (UK) c 32, s 83(1)(b)).  An earlier amendment was also made to the Electricity 
Act by the Energy Act 2004 (UK) (see: Energy Act 2004 (UK) c 20, s 83(a)).  These amendments 
required that the Secretary of State and Ofgem account for sustainable development in its decisions.  
However, following the 2004 amendment to the Electricity Act, the duty to have regard to sustainable 
development was inferior to the duties that are concerned with protecting the viability and stability of 
the electricity supply sector.  Therefore, it was not until the amendments made to the Electricity Act in 
2008 that the duty to contribute to sustainable development was regarded on equal footing with the 
other supplementary duties. 
26 See, eg, 'Draft Social and Environmental Guidance to the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority' 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2003), 'Social and Environmental Guidance to the Gas and 
Electricity Markets Authority' (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003) and Simmonds, above n 14, 
107-8. 
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Therefore, as a matter of first priority, the Electricity Act compels Ofgem and 
the Secretary of State to take action to fulfil the Act’s principal object.  That is, to 
protect the interests of existing and future electricity consumers, particularly their 
economic interests.  In order to fulfil this objective, the Electricity Act specifies the 
issues to which the Secretary of State and Ofgem must have regard in carrying out 
their functions in the manner best calculated to further the principal objective.  The 
primary duty dictates that it is preferable that any action that is taken to fulfil the 
Act’s principal objective must promote effective competition between persons 
engaged in the electricity generation sector. 
Supplementary to the primary duty, Ofgem and the Secretary of State must also 
take action to protect the security and stability of the electricity generation sector and 
to contribute to the achievement of sustainable development.  While these secondary 
duties are considered to be important, they are only relevant to the extent that they do 
not impede the pursuit of the primary duty.  Therefore, the concept of sustainable 
development is considered to be of lesser importance than the pursuit of competition 
among electricity generators, as the latter concept is considered more important to 
protect the interests of electricity consumers. 
This conclusion is supported by a variety of sources that have considered the 
interaction of the principal object and the primary and secondary duties of the 
Electricity Act.  For example, a comment contained in the Explanatory Notes to the 
Energy Act 200827 noted that: 
[t]he Electricity Act 1989 ... set[s] out the general duties of the Secretary of 
State and [Ofgem].  These general duties are formed in a hierarchy of a 
primary duty and a number of secondary duties and other issues which they 
must keep under consideration in exercising their primary duty ... 
[Previously], the formulation of secondary duties placed the need to ensure 
security of supply ... at the top of the list of secondary duties.  The duty to 
promote sustainable development was added near the end of that list.  
However, since that time, sustainability has been growing in importance in 
                                                 
27 Explanatory notes, Energy Act 2008 (UK) c 32, paras 431-2. 
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energy policy.  [Therefore,] sustainability and security of supply [are now 
regarded to be] on an equal footing in the hierarchy of secondary duties.28 
A similar interpretation of the Electricity Act was presented in a 2010 guidance 
document that was issued by the British Department of Energy and Climate Change.  
This document was designed to assist Ofgem to fulfil its duties under the Electricity 
Act.29  In this document, it was noted that: 
[Ofgem’s] principal objective is to protect the interests of consumers, 
existing and future, wherever appropriate by promoting effective 
competition.  [Ofgem] must carry out its functions in the manner which it 
considers best calculated to further the principal objective, having regard to 
the need to secure that all reasonable demands for electricity ... It must also 
have regard to ... the need to contribute to the achievement of sustainable 
development.30 
While these views confirm the substance of the hierarchy of duties established 
by the Electricity Act, they do not consider how the hierarchy operates in practice.  
This was a matter that was considered specifically by the former Sustainable 
Development Commission of Great Britain in its 2007 publication Lost in 
Transmission?31  This report noted that: 
[i]n taking a decision, [Ofgem] must consider how each of the secondary 
duties might be relevant.  So the duty to have regard to [sustainable 
development] is just one factor influencing a final decision.  The influence 
this secondary duty has on the decision could be considerable, but only so 
long as the final decision is considered to be still in line with the primary 
duty.  Therefore Ofgem’s interpretation of its primary duty is of paramount 
importance in assessing its perceived ability, or willingness, to actively 
contribute to [British] energy policy.32 
While the interpretation of the duties in the Electricity Act by the Sustainable 
Development Commission indicated that the concept of sustainable development 
might be influential in the decision making of Ofgem and the Secretary of State, the 
                                                 
28 Ibid.  See also: 'Social and environmental guidance to the gas and electricity markets authority: 
Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 4AB(4) of the Gas Act 1986 and section 3B(4) of the 
Electricity Act 1989' (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010), 6. 
29 Social and environmental guidance to the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, above n 26, 6. 
30 Ibid. 
31 'Lost in Transmission? - The role of Ofgem in a changing climate' (Sustainable Development 
Commission, 2007). 
32 Ibid, 27. 
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Sustainable Development Commission noted that this is not the approach that has 
been adopted in practice.  Rather,  
[i]n evaluating the relative importance of the secondary duties against the 
primary duty, [Ofgem] gives a value to the social cost of environmental 
damage and incorporates this into its economic calculations.  Ofgem has ... 
routinely undervalue[ed these costs] in its calculations.  [Therefore,] 
[d]ecisions that enable environmental improvements are effectively only 
those with minimal economic impact, and therefore the scope to implement 
environmental improvements is severely restricted.33 
Based on these assessments, it is evident that the underlying value of the 
Electricity Act is to encourage competition within the electricity generation sector in 
order to protect the interests – namely the economic interests – of consumers.  
Therefore, while the concepts of sustainable development and energy security may 
be prescribed considerations in pursuit of this goal, these concepts will only prove 
influential to the extent that they have ‘minimal economic impact’.  Consequently, 
the secondary duties established by the Electricity Act appear to have limited 
influence in the pursuit of the principal objective under the Act.34 
It is through this lens of competition and economic efficiency that the 
regulation governing the British electricity generation sector – including the 
renewable electricity generation sector – has developed since this sector was first 
privatised in the early 1990s.  In this regard, let us now turn to consider how the 
regulation governing the renewable electricity generation sector has developed. 
B. The Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation 
Emerging from within the cost-driven process of the electricity generation 
sector’s privatisation was the NFFO.  This regulatory regime, which was introduced 
in 1990, represents the first dedicated regulatory regime in Great Britain to 
encourage the deployment of utility-scale renewable sourced electricity generating 
                                                 
33 Ibid.  This view has been shared by other commentators that have noted that ‘the energy regulator is 
constraining the move to a sustainable energy economy and its duties will have to change, possibly in 
addition to wider institutional change’ (see: Catherine Mitchell, The Political Economy of Sustainable 
Energy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 137). 
34 Despite the limited impact of sustainable development in the broader decision making process for 
Ofgem, more recently this organisation has been promoting this concept within its decision making 
framework (see, eg, 'Strengthening strategic and sustainability considerations in Ofgem decision 
making' (Ofgem, 2012) and 'Sustainable Development Focus: April 2011 - March 2012' (Ofgem, 
2012)).  
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facilities.  While a dedicated support mechanism for non-competitive technologies 
seemed to contradict the values that had informed the deregulation of the electricity 
generation sector, the government held that such action would in fact enhance the 
reforms delivered during privatisation.35  In this regard, the Government suggested 
that: 
a 'market-pull' support mechanism such as the NFFO was appropriate policy 
... [because it] would increase the number of independent power producers ... 
into the [electricity generation sector], an aim of the privatization process.36 
However, a number of scholars have offered different explanations for the 
emergence of the NFFO.37  These scholars contend that during the process of 
privatisation, the government was faced with the difficult task of privatising existing 
nuclear-powered electricity generating facilities.38  This was borne out of the high 
operating and decommissioning costs of these facilities, particularly when compared 
to coal-fired electricity generating facilities.39  For these reasons, the NFFO was 
originally devised ‘as a means to subsidise nuclear generation, which had proved too 
difficult to privatise’.40  However, to make the regime more palatable for the public 
and the European Commission (whose authorisation was required for this regime to 
be enacted) the British Government expanded its scope so that it was designed to 
support both renewable and nuclear sourced electricity generating facilities.41 
The NFFO was established in 1990 in accordance with the powers set out in 
the now superseded subsections 32(1) and (2) of the Electricity Act.42  These 
provisions entitled the Secretary of State to order that each supplier of electricity in 
England make available a prescribed amount of electricity that had been generated 
                                                 
35 Catherine Mitchell, 'The renewables NFFO: A review' (1995) 23(12) Energy Policy 1077, 1079. 
36 Ibid. 
37 See, eg, Curtis Moore and Jack Ihle, Renewable Energy Policy Outside the United States 
(Renewable Energy Policy Project, 1999) and Catherine Mitchell and Peter Connor, 'Renewable 
energy policy in the UK 1990-2003' (2004) 32(17) Energy Policy 1935, 1936. 
38 Moore and Ihle, above n 37. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Mitchell and Connor, above n 37, 1936. 
41 Ibid, 1936, Mitchell, above n 35, 1078, Sylvia Breukers, Changing institutional landscapes for 
implementing wind power: A geographical comparison of institutional capacity building: The 
Netherlands, England and North Rhine-Westphalia (Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 144 and 
Michael G. Pollitt, 'UK Renewable Energy Policy Since Privatisation' (EPRG Working Paper 1002 
and Cambridge Working Paper in Economics 1007, Electricity Policy Research Group, University of 
Cambridge, 2010), 19. 
42 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, ss 32(1) and (2) (superseded). 
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from renewable sources.43  The particulars of the NFFO were set out in The 
Electricity (Non-Fossil Fuel Sources) (England and Wales) Order 1990 (UK).44 
By way of background, this two-tiered legislative approach is reflective of a 
technique that is used frequently in Great Britain to establish subject specific 
regulatory regimes.  When this approach is used, a regulatory regime is commonly 
given legislative force in primary legislation, such as the Electricity Act, which, 
among other things, establishes the regime’s grundnorms.  The particulars of the 
regime – the regulatory rules – are then contained in a separate statutory instrument, 
which in the case of the NFFO was The Electricity (Non-Fossil Fuel Sources) 
(England and Wales) Order 1990 (UK). 
Under the NFFO, Regional Electricity Companies (who, at the time, were 
responsible for the transmission and supply of electricity in Great Britain) were 
required to purchase a prescribed amount of nuclear or renewable sourced electricity 
for a contracted period.45  In consideration for purchasing the prescribed form of 
electricity, the Regional Electricity Companies were required to pay the relevant 
generator of electricity a premium price for its electricity.  The difference between 
the premium price and the average monthly electricity price of electricity was then 
reimbursed to the Regional Electricity Companies by the Non-Fossil Purchasing 
Agency from funds that were raised by the Fossil Fuel Levy.46  This levy was a tax 
                                                 
43 Ibid, ss 32(1) and (2) (superseded). 
44 The Electricity (Non-Fossil Fuel Sources) (England and Wales) Order 1990 (UK) SI 1990/263.  
This order was replaced and amended at various times.  For the remainder of this analysis, reference 
will be made to the most recent Order in respect of the NFFO: The Electricity from Non-Fossil Fuel 
Sources Saving Arrangements Order 2000 (UK) SI 2000/2727.  Other than those already listed, the 
complete list of orders made in respect of the NFFO for Great Britain are set out as follows: The 
Electricity (Non-Fossil Fuel Sources) (England and Wales) (Amendment) Order 1990 (UK) SI 
1990/494; The Electricity (Non-Fossil Fuel Sources) (England and Wales) (No. 2) Order 1990 (UK) 
SI 1990/1859; The Electricity (Non-Fossil Fuel Sources) (England and Wales) Order 1991 (UK) SI 
1991/2490; The Electricity (Non-Fossil Fuel Sources) (England and Wales) Order 1994 (UK) SI 
1994/3259; The Electricity (Non-Fossil Fuel Sources) (England and Wales) Order 1997 (UK) SI 
1997/248; The Deregulation (Non-Fossil Fuel) Order 1997 (UK) SI 1997/1185; The Electricity (Non-
Fossil Fuel Sources) (England and Wales) Order 1998 (UK) SI 1998/2353; The Electricity from Non-
Fossil Fuel Sources Saving Arrangements Order 2000 (UK) SI 2000/2727; The Electricity from Non-
Fossil Fuel Sources (Locational Flexibility) Order 2001 (UK) SI 2001/3914; The Electricity from 
Non-Fossil Fuel Sources Saving Arrangements (Amendment) Order 2001 (UK) SI 2001/3268 and The 
Electricity from Non-Fossil Fuel Sources Arrangements (England and Wales) Order 2006 (UK) SI 
2006/2388. 
45 The Electricity from Non-Fossil Fuel Sources Saving Arrangements Order 2000 (UK) SI 
2000/2727, O 3 and 4. 
46 Mitchell, above n 35, 1077. 
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imposed on electricity that was paid by electricity consumers as an additional charge 
on their electricity bills.47 
For renewable or nuclear-sourced electricity generators to have been eligible to 
receive funding under the NFFO, they were required to participate in auctions (which 
were won by the lowest bidder).48  This approach encouraged ‘significant bids in 
each of the auction rounds’49 with ‘falling bid costs in each successive round’.50  
Other than the first auction, each auction was separated into technology-specific 
categories (or bands).51  Within each of these auctions, prospective generators were 
required to submit bids that reflected the price at which they were prepared to sell 
electricity for the contracted period.52  Initially the term of these contracts was 
limited to eight years.  However, this was extended to 15 years during the course of 
the NFFO.53 
Despite the significant bids by prospective developers of renewable sourced 
electricity, the common consensus among commentators that have reviewed the 
NFFO is that ‘it failed rather spectacularly in one key respect: delivery of actual 
investment by the winning bidders’.54  This is reflected in the Digest of United 
Kingdom Energy Statistics: 2009,55 which noted that of the 933 contracts that were 
awarded as part of the NFFO auction process only 477 had been developed by 
2009.56 
The reason for the limited construction of winning NFFO projects reflects a 
design failure of the NFFO.  In this regard, it has been observed that there were two 
principal design limitations with the NFFO.  The first was that the NFFO sought to 
exploit the ‘pent-up demand’57 for renewable sourced electricity through a 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 Pollitt, above n 41, 19, Robert Gross and Phil Heptonstall, 'Time to stop experimenting with UK 
renewable energy policy' (ICEPT/WP/2010/003, Imperial College Centre for Energy Policy and 
Technology, 2010), 8 and Mitchell, above n 35, 1079-84. 
49 Pollitt, above n 41, 19. 
50 Ibid.  The five auction rounds occurred in 1990, 1992, 1997 and 1998.  
51 Mitchell, above n 35, 1079-84. 
52 Ibid, Pollitt, above n 41, 19 and Gross and Heptonstall, above n 48, 8. 
53 Mitchell, above n 35, 1079, Pollitt, above n 41, 19 and Gross and Heptonstall, above n 48, 8.  The 
final contract under the NFFO is scheduled to terminating at the end of 2018 (see: About NFPA (2012) 
Non-Fossil Purchasing Agency <http://www.nfpa.co.uk/about.html>). 
54 Pollitt, above n 41, 20.  See also: Mitchell, above n 33, 126. 
55 'Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics: 2009' (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 
2009). 
56 Ibid, table 7.1.2. 
57 Mitchell and Connor, above n 37, 1937. 
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competitive process that relied on the availability of limited funds.58  Consequently, 
this led to overly 
optimistic assessments of the various project cost factors (e.g. obtaining 
planning permission; overestimating the extent of cost reductions through 
technology development ... ) [which] meant that the later NFFO bids were 
often ‘best-situation’ bids and too low.  They were therefore uneconomic 
and were not taken-up.59 
The second reason identified for the poor performance of the NFFO was that 
the regime did not contain any effective enforcement provisions.60  That is, it was not 
designed to penalise companies that did not take up their contracts despite being 
successful at the auction stage.  Consequently, the combination of the highly 
competitive nature of the auctions and the failure to include any enforcement 
mechanisms encouraged entities to submit low bids because this ‘provided the 
possibility of a contract which did not have to be taken up if it turned out to be 
uneconomic’.61  Therefore, rather than encouraging competitive behaviour that could 
contribute to sound economic outcomes for electricity consumers, the NFFO in fact 
encouraged anti-competitive behaviour.  Such behaviour occurred because the NFFO 
allowed prospective generators to enter low bids at auction in order to reduce the 
chance of a competitor being successful at the same auction, even if the winning 
bidder had little intention of actually developing the project.62  Therefore, the 
motivation of participating in the NFFO auctions for many entities was not to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity, but, rather, to prevent this 
from occurring. 
While the design of the NFFO is only relevant to establish the context for the 
analysis that follows, appreciating its design limitations is instructive to understand 
why this regime was replaced in 2002 with the Renewables Obligation.  However, of 
greater relevance to the narrative of this chapter is the observation that the principal 
object and the primary duty of the Electricity Act informed the market-based and 
competitive design of the NFFO.  Therefore, while the NFFO did not achieve great 
longevity (or great success), it has been observed that its application of the values 
                                                 
58 Ibid.  See also: Mitchell, above n 33, 126. 
59 Mitchell and Connor, above n 37, 1937. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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underlying the Electricity Act opened the door to a ‘pro-market approach to 
renewable energy’.63  It is this approach that informs the design of the Renewables 
Obligation and the feed-in tariff mechanism that is proposed to replace it. 
With this knowledge, this chapter can now consider the primary regulatory 
regimes in Great Britain that are designed specifically to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity, namely the Renewables Obligation and the feed-in 
tariff law that is proposed to replace it. 
A REVIEW OF THE RENEWABLES OBLIGATION 
The Renewables Obligation was established in 2002.  At this time, it was 
designed to operate as a ‘relatively straightforward renewable portfolio standard’64 to 
stimulate ‘the development of new technologies necessary to provide the basis for 
continuing growth of the contribution from renewables in the longer term’.65 
The Renewables Obligation was established under the authority provided to the 
Secretary of State pursuant to (the now superseded) sections 32 and 32C of the 
Electricity Act.66  The Renewables Obligation is now authorised under sections 32 to 
32M of the Electricity Act.67  When it was first established, the particulars of the 
Renewables Obligation were set out in the Renewables Obligation Order 2002 
(UK).68  This Order has subsequently been replaced by the Renewables Obligation 
Order 2009 (UK),69 which, together with sections 32 to 32M of the Electricity Act, 
contains the details of the Renewables Obligation. 
Of central importance to the design of the Renewables Obligation is its overall 
target for renewable sourced electricity.  When it was first established, the 
Renewables Obligation was designed to increase the amount of renewable sourced 
electricity supplied in Great Britain from 1.8 per cent to 10.4 per cent as a proportion 
                                                 
63 Mitchell, above n 33, 125. 
64 Catherine Mitchell and Bridget Woodman, 'Learning from experience? The development of the 
Renewables Obligation in England and Wales 2002–2010' (2011) 39(7) Energy Policy 3914, 3915. 
65 'New and Renewable Energy: Prospects for the 21st century - The Renewables Obligation Statutory 
Consultation' (Department of Trade and Industry, 2001), 31. 
66 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, ss 32 and 32C (superseded). 
67 Ibid, ss 32-32M.  These amendments to the Electricity Act were made by section 37 of the Energy 
Act 2008 (UK) c 32. 
68 The Renewables Obligation Order 2002 (UK) SI 2002/914 (superseded).  
69 The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785. 
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of the total electricity supplied.70  This target was to be achieved gradually over the 
course of eight years.71  Once achieved, the target was designed to remain steady 
until the regime’s end date of 2027.72  In 2005, the overall target prescribed by the 
Renewables Obligation was increased from 10.4 per cent to 15.4 per cent.  This 
target is now to be achieved by 2015.73  Once achieved, the target is to remain in 
place until the regime’s revised end date of 2037.74 
Under the Renewables Obligation, operators of eligible renewable sourced 
electricity generating facilities are issued with a Renewables Obligation Certificate 
(or ROC).  A ROC is the Renewables Obligation’s equivalent of a renewable 
electricity certificate.  At the time when the Renewables Obligation was 
implemented, an eligible operator received one ROC for each megawatt hour of 
electricity that it generated.75  However, since 2009, the number of ROCs allocated 
to these entities is dependent on the renewable source that is used to generate the 
renewable sourced electricity.76  This approach is known as banding. 
Once issued with its ROCs, an eligible operator is able to sell these to an 
electricity supplier or, alternatively, trade these in a secondary market that operates 
to facilitate the exchange of these certificates.  This transaction can occur separately 
from the sale of the underlying renewable sourced electricity that is represented by a 
ROC.  The revenue generated from the sale of a ROC is designed to provide 
financial support to eligible operators of renewable sourced electricity.  This 
financial support is in addition to and separate from the revenue that is derived from 
the sale of the underlying renewable sourced electricity.  In this regard, it represents 
the financial benefit offered by the Renewables Obligation to encourage the 
production of electricity from renewable sources. 
So that owners of ROCs can derive a value from the sale of these certificates, 
the Renewables Obligation imposes an obligation on all licensed electricity suppliers 
                                                 
70 The Renewables Obligation Order 2002 (UK) SI 2002/914, sch 1 and 'Energy Trends - June 2010' 
(Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010). 
71 The Renewables Obligation Order 2002 (UK) SI 2002/914, sch 1. 
72 Ibid. 
73 The Renewables Obligation Order 2005 (UK), sch 1. 
74 The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785, sch 1 and The Renewables Obligation 
(Amendment) Order 2010 (UK) SI 2010/1107. 
75 The Renewables Obligation Order 2002 (UK) SI 2002/914, O 12(d). 
76 The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785, pt 6. 
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– each defined as a ‘designated electricity supplier’77 – to purchase and surrender a 
prescribed number of ROCs annually to Ofgem, the regime’s regulator.78  The 
obligation imposed on these liable electricity suppliers corresponds with the regime’s 
annual target.  However, rather than being calculated as a percentage of the total 
amount of electricity that these entities have supplied, the obligation requires that 
liable electricity suppliers surrender a certain number of ROCs for each megawatt 
hour of electricity that they have supplied during a year.79  For example, for the 
2012-13 compliance year, the Renewables Obligation requires that liable electricity 
suppliers surrender 0.158 ROCs per megawatt hour of electricity that they supply.80  
This means that for a liable electricity supplier that supplies 1000 megawatts of 
electricity in the 2012-13 compliance year, it can demonstrate compliance by 
surrendering 158 ROCs to Ofgem. 
In order to comply with its obligations, a liable electricity supplier is able to 
purchase ROCs directly from an eligible operator of a renewable sourced electricity 
generating facility or from brokers that participate in a secondary market in which 
ROCs are traded.  To ease the burden of compliance, a liable electricity supplier is 
entitled to discharge up to 25 per cent of its obligation by surrendering ROCs that 
were produced in the immediately preceding year.81  This allows liable electricity 
suppliers to ‘bank’ excess certificates from a previous year. 
Further, to comply with its obligations, a liable electricity supplier may choose 
not to purchase and surrender ROCs.  Instead, it may choose to pay a ‘buy-out price’ 
for each megawatt of supplied electricity for which it did not surrender a ROC.82  All 
money collected by Ofgem resulting from the payment of the buy-out price 
contributes to the ‘buy-out fund’.83  The money in the buy-out fund is recycled 
annually to liable electricity suppliers that comply that surrender ROCs during the 
                                                 
77 Ibid, O 2(1) (definition of ‘designated electricity supplier) and 5(1). 
78 Ibid, pt 2. 
79 Ibid, O 5(2), 12. 
80 Renewables Obligation - Total Obligation Level for 2011-12 (2012) Ofgem 
<http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/Environment/RenewablObl/Documents1/RO%20total%20o
bligation%20August%202012.pdf>. 
81 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, s 32A(6) and The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 
2009/785, O 13(2). 
82 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, s 32G and The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 
2009/785, O 43. 
83 The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785, O 43-4. 
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preceding compliance year.84  The amount of money that is recycled to each supplier 
is calculated by dividing the number of ROCs surrendered by that eligible electricity 
supplier by the total number of ROCs surrendered in that year.85  To the extent that 
there is a shortfall in the amount of money in the buy-out fund (for example, due to a 
liable electricity supplier entering into administration or becoming insolvent), liable 
electricity suppliers will be required to make additional payments into the buy-out 
fund.  This process is known as ‘mutualisation’.86   
The structure of the Renewables Obligation is depicted in Figure 5.1 below. 
 
Figure 5.1. Design of the Renewables Obligation (Great Britain)87 
This represents the basic design of the Renewables Obligation.  With this in 
mind, what follows is an assessment of the most critical features of the Renewables 
Obligation. 
A. The issue of grundnorms 
A useful point to commence an analysis of the Renewables Obligation is with 
its grundnorms.  The Renewables Obligation is given authority by the Electricity 
                                                 
84 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, s 32H and The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 
2009/785, O 47. 
85 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, s 32H and The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 
2009/785, O 47. 
86 The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785, O 48-52. 
87 Mitchell and Woodman, above n 64, 3915. 
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Act.  This is its primary legislation.  While the Electricity Act contains some of the 
particulars of the regime, the Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) – being the 
statutory instrument that was created to give effect to the regime that was authorised 
by the primary legislation – contains many of the regime’s regulatory rules.  For this 
reason, in order to identify the grundnorms of the Renewables Obligation, one must 
consider the values informing the Electricity Act in the context of the Renewables 
Obligation. 
The principal object of the Electricity Act is to protect the interests of existing 
and future consumers, primarily their economic interests.  Ofgem and the Secretary 
of State are charged with fulfilling this object.  To do so, they must comply with a 
hierarchy of duties.  First among these duties is the obligation to protect the interests 
of consumers by increasing the competition between those entities involved in the 
generation of electricity.88  In addition to the primary duty, Ofgem and the Secretary 
of State must also seek to achieve the principal object by, among other things, 
contributing to the achievement of sustainable development and the stability of the 
British electricity generation sector.  This much is already obvious from the earlier 
assessment of the Electricity Act.  Therefore, the question that is relevant to this 
review of the Renewables Obligation, is how does the grundnorm of the Electricity 
Act inform the design of the Renewables Obligation? 
In essence, the Renewables Obligation must be designed to further the concept 
of competition, as this is considered paramount to protecting the interests of 
electricity consumers in Great Britain.  Within the paradigm of competition, Ofgem 
and the Secretary of State also have a duty to consider how to contribute to the 
achievement of sustainable development and energy security.  However, these 
considerations are of lesser importance and are therefore subject to the pursuit of a 
competitive approach.  In short, this means that the Renewables Obligation is 
concerned with increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity in a 
sustainable manner, but only to the extent that such an approach conforms with the 
competitive and economic efficient principles established in the Electricity Act.  This 
represents the grundnorm of the Renewables Obligation. 
                                                 
88 A thorough analysis of the grundnorm of the Electricity Act was conducted in the earlier section of 
this chapter titled, ‘Principles informing the British electricity generation sector’. 
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The ‘market-based ideology’89 of the Renewables Obligation and its failure to 
prioritise sustainable development over economic efficiency reflects a restricted – 
rather than a robust and meaningful – commitment to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  For this reason, it is concluded that the Renewables 
Obligation is not principally concerned with increasing the production of renewable 
sourced electricity, as it does not provide an unfettered strategic commitment to 
realise this objective.   
If the grundnorm of the Renewables Obligation was considered in isolation, the 
conclusion that its strategic direction does not offer a meaningful and robust 
commitment to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity might not be 
problematic.  However, as is the case for all grundnorms, their role is to set the 
strategic tone for a regime’s regulatory rules.  In this regard, the grundnorm of the 
Renewables Obligation lays the foundation for a regulatory regime that is 
consequently ill equipped to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  
Ultimately, this means that the Renewables Obligation is not informed by the values 
that are necessary for this regime to be able to contribute to a more sustainable and 
dignified approach to the production of electricity. 
With this in mind, let us consider how the grundnorm of the Renewables 
Obligation is reflected in its regulatory rules. 
B. The regulatory rules of the Renewables Obligation 
a. The issue of eligibility 
The Renewables Obligation mandates that an operator of a facility that 
generates electricity from ‘renewable sources’ in Great Britain is entitled to receive 
ROCs for the electricity that it generates.90  The term ‘renewable sources’ is defined 
to mean: 
                                                 
89 Judith Lipp, 'Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark, Germany and the 
United Kingdom' (2007) 35(11) Energy Policy 5481, 5490. 
90 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, s 32B(1) and The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 
2009/785, O 17 and 24. 
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sources of energy other than fossil fuel or nuclear fuel, but includes waste of 
which not more than a specified proportion is waste which is, or is derived 
from, fossil fuel.91 
The inclusive meaning of the concept of ‘renewable sources’ indicates that the 
Renewables Obligation is designed to permit the use of all major renewable sources 
that are available to generate renewable sourced electricity.  However, 
notwithstanding the inclusive definition of ‘renewable sources’, the Renewables 
Obligation does impose certain limitations on the type of renewable sources and 
facilities that are eligible to participate in the regime.  First, while not an express 
exclusion, the Renewables Obligation allows small renewable sourced electricity 
generating facilities (those with a capacity of five megawatts or less) to opt out of the 
Renewables Obligation.92  By doing so, these facilities can elect to receive the 
benefit offered by the small-scale feed-in tariff that operates in Great Britain to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity from non-utility-scale 
facilities.93 
The second limitation to the otherwise inclusive approach of the Renewables 
Obligation limits the eligibility of hydropower facilities.  This limitation provides 
that: 
ROCs are not to be issued in respect of any electricity generated by a large 
hydro generating station (wherever that station is located) if the station was 
first commissioned on or before 1st April 2002.94 
A ‘large hydro generating station’ means a ‘hydro generating station which has, or 
has had at any time since 1st April 2002, a declared net capacity of more than 20 
megawatts’.95  The final limitation imposed by the Renewables Obligation, which 
                                                 
91 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, s 32M(1) (definition of ‘renewable sources’).  The reference to 
waste in this context is a reference to ‘waste’ as defined in section 75 of the Environmental Protection 
Act 1990 (UK).  The categories of waste captured by this definition refer to products that ‘have been 
discarded’, such as ‘[s]ubstances which no longer perform satisfactorily (e.g. contaminated solvents, 
exhausted tempering salts, etc.)’ (see: Environmental Protection Act 1990 (UK) c 43, s 75 (definition 
of ‘waste’) and sch 2B and The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785, O 3. 
92 The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785, O 17B-17E.  See also: Electricity Act 
1989 (UK) c 29, s 41 and The Feed-in Tariffs (Specified Maximum Capacity and Functions) Order 
2010 (UK) SI 2010/678. 
93 The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785, O 17B-17E.  See also: Electricity Act 
1989 (UK) c 29, s 41 and The Feed-in Tariffs (Specified Maximum Capacity and Functions) Order 
2010 (UK) SI 2010/678. 
94 The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785, O 17(4). 
95 Ibid, O 2 (definition of ‘large hydro generating station’). 
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was only introduced in 2010, limits the eligibility of a renewable sourced electricity 
generating facility to 20 years.96 
Each of these limitations has merit.  First, the ability for smaller facilities to 
elect not to participate in the Renewables Obligation in favour of a feed-in tariff 
mechanism enables the Renewables Obligation to focus on the development of 
utility-scale renewable sourced electricity generating facilities.  This facilitates a 
coherent regulatory framework with minimal overlap, as a separate feed-in tariff 
mechanism is designed to encourage the dissemination of renewable sourced 
electricity from smaller facilities. 
Second, the exclusion of large hydropower facilities that predate the 
commencement of the regime is a useful feature as these facilities produce ‘many 
mostly negative impacts’97 on the environment in which they operate and use mature 
technologies that do not require the same level of financial assistance as other 
renewable technologies.98  However, this limitation is not considered to be 
sufficiently robust, as it entitles new hydropower facilities to be developed if they 
were commissioned after the commencement of the Renewables Obligation.  
Therefore, while this limitation concerning large hydropower facilities is useful, to 
be effective it needs to be more robust.  
Third, limiting the period of eligibility for each facility to 20 years is a further 
positive feature as it limits the support provided by the Renewables Obligation to the 
approximate payback period of renewable sourced electricity generation facilities.  
By doing so, this feature is designed to reduce the likelihood of windfall profits 
among generators of renewable sourced electricity and, more generally, ensure that 
the regime operates cost-effectively. 
While certain aspects of the approach to eligibility under the Renewables 
Obligation are well designed, it is not without its shortcomings.  In addition to those 
already identified, arguably the most notable problem relates to the entitlement of 
certain renewable sourced electricity generating facilities that operated in 1990, and 
                                                 
96 Ibid, O 17A(1), 17AA, 17AB.  These changes were made in 2010, following an amendment to the 
Renewables Obligation (see: The Renewables Obligation (Amendment) Order 2010 (UK) SI 
2010/1107). 
97 'Dams and Development: A New Framework For Decision-Making - The Report of the World 
Commission on Dams' (World Commission on Dams, 2000), 74. 
98 Ibid.  The relative maturity of hydro technologies compared to other renewable technologies was 
considered in more detail in the introduction to this thesis. 
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which have not been updated since that date, to receive ROCs.99  This approach 
allows existing facilities that have passed their payback period to receive the 
financial support offered by the Renewables Obligation that is intended to increase 
the production of renewable sourced electricity by contributing to the deployment of 
new renewable sourced electricity generating facilities.  Therefore, rather than 
limiting the financial support to a facility’s payback period, this feature undermines 
the economic credentials of the regime by making the effective value of the 
Renewables Obligation percentage less than the nominal percentage.  In the long run, 
it is the relationship between the percentage for each year and the marginal cost of 
certificates (or the level of buy-out price, whichever is lower) which will set the 
certificate price, which can only work effectively if there is sufficient demand. 
Despite the noted shortcomings of the approach to eligibility under the 
Renewables Obligation, the current approach to eligibility under this regime does 
posses a number of positive attributes.  These positive attributes support the 
conclusion that this regulatory rule is designed to encourage the production of 
electricity from a diverse portfolio of renewable sources, albeit in a way that can still 
make use of mature technologies that may not necessarily support the development 
of technologies that are less mature. 
b. The issue of compliance 
Under the Renewables Obligation, liable electricity suppliers are able to 
comply with their obligations in two ways.  First, they may purchase ROCs – for all 
or part of their liability – and surrender these to Ofgem.100  Second, they may pay a 
prescribed penalty – the ‘buy-out price’ – for the number of ROCs that they did not 
surrender to Ofgem during a particular year.   
The compliance options available to a liable electricity supplier are not 
mutually exclusive.  Therefore, a liable electricity supplier may comply with a 
portion of its liability by purchasing and surrendering ROCs.  For the remainder of 
its obligation it may then pay the buy-out price. 
                                                 
99 The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785, O 18. 
100 Ibid, O 5. 
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The purpose of the dual-phased approach to compliance is to enable liable 
electricity suppliers to meet their obligations in the most cost efficient manner.101  
Therefore, if the cost of purchasing a ROC is more than the sum of the buy-out price 
(taking into account the amount that it may receive from the buy-out fund), a liable 
electricity supplier will purchase conventionally sourced electricity and pay the buy-
out price, as this option will be more cost-effective.102  For this reason, rather than 
encouraging liable electricity suppliers to purchase ROCs, the compliance regime is 
concerned principally with enabling liable electricity suppliers to comply with their 
obligations at least cost.103  In this regard, the regime’s principal concern is not to 
provide consistent and stable financial support to generators of renewable sourced 
electricity, which is necessary to underpin an increase in the production of renewable 
sourced electricity,.  Rather, its purpose is to minimise the financial impact of the 
regime on liable electricity suppliers. 
In addition, the dual phased compliance approach under the Renewables 
Obligation also exacerbates the high degree of control among the dominant 
electricity suppliers in Great Britain.  In Great Britain, the electricity generation and 
supply sectors are controlled by the ‘Big Six’ vertically integrated electricity utility 
companies.104  These companies collectively supply electricity to over 97 per cent of 
the domestic electricity market.105  They also produce more than two-thirds of the 
electricity that they supply, including the renewable sourced electricity.106  The Big 
                                                 
101 Mitchell and Woodman, above n 64, 3915. 
102 Catherine Mitchell, Bridget Woodman and James Aldridge, 'United Kingdom' in Dörte Fouquet 
and Christopher Jones (eds), EU Energy Law: Renewable Energy in the Member States of the 
European Union (Claeys & Casteels BVBA publishing house, 2nd ed, 2010) vol III, Book II, 9, 
Catherine Mitchell, D Bauknecht and P M Connor, 'Effectiveness through risk reduction: a 
comparison of the renewable obligation in England and Wales and the feed-in system in Germany' 
(2006) 34(3) Energy Policy 297, 300 and F Santokie, 'Trading environmental benefits to make the RO 
work' (2002) Energy World 8. 
103 Mitchell, Woodman and Aldridge, above n 102, 9.  See also: Huizhong Zhou, 'Impacts of 
renewables obligation with recycling of the buy-out fund' (2012) Energy Policy, 7. 
104 The ‘Big Six’ companies are: Centrica, E.ON, RWE npower, SSE, Scottish Power and EDF.  For a 
history and overview of the Big Six electricity utility companies see, eg, 'UK Big 6 utility investment 
trends: A report for Greenpeace UK on the generation investments of the Big 6 utilities' (Bloomberg 
New Energy Finance, 2012). 
105 David Newbery, 'Contracting for wind generation' (EPRG Working Paper 1120/Cambridge 
Working Paper in Economics 1143, Electricity Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge, 
2011), 2 and UK Big 6 utility investment trends, above n 104, 4.  See also: 'Electricity Market 
Reform: 4th Report - Electricity Market Reform (Volume 1)' (HC 742, House of Commons, Energy 
and Climate Change Committee, 2011), 20. 
106 Newbery, above n 105, 2 and UK Big 6 utility investment trends, above n 104, 4.  See also: 
Electricity Market Reform: 4th Report, above n 105, 20. 
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Six electricity companies are therefore able to exert control over how the electricity 
generation sector operates.107 
In relation to the Renewables Obligation, the Big Six electricity utilities exert 
their control over the electricity generation sector by limiting the number of ROCs 
that they sell (to liable electricity suppliers) and purchase (from electricity 
generators) in order to maximise the amount of money that they will receive from the 
buy-out fund.108  Therefore, the availability of the dual modes of compliance and the 
recycling of the buy-out fund encourages liable electricity suppliers that are part of 
the Big Six vertically integrated electricity utilities to ‘avoid complete compliance 
with the RO ... to ensure that there are buyout funds to be redistributed at the end of 
the year’.109 
Consequently, the Renewables Obligation is designed to encourage the 
production of renewable sourced electricity, but only to the extent that this can be 
achieved with the least amount of financial impact on liable electricity suppliers.  
This is because the Renewables Obligation provides a ‘clear incentive for companies 
to source the cheapest available power to meet their obligation’.110  The result of the 
flexible and cost focussed compliance regime under the Renewables Obligation is 
that the regime provides developers of renewable electricity generation projects with 
little ‘guarantee of firm contracts for output from any supplier, and certainly no 
guarantee of a long term contract’111 or price.112  As a result, this ‘brings ... risks for 
developers who know neither the volume nor the price at which they will be able to 
sell their [ROCs]113 over the long-term.114  Therefore, rather than offering a financial 
support scheme that is premised on the concept of certainty and dependability, the 
‘price’ and ‘volume’ risks inherent in the design of the Renewables Obligation 
                                                 
107 David Toke, 'Are green electricity certificates the way forward for renewable energy? An 
evaluation of the UK’s Renewables Obligation in the context of international comparisons' (2005) 
23(3) Environment and planning 361, 9-10. 
108 Greg Buckman, Renewable Electricity Support Policy: Lessons for Australia from Overseas 
Experience (Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, Australian National University, 2011), 88, Mitchell, 
Woodman and Aldridge, above n 102, 10 and Toke, above n 107, 10-1. 
109 Mitchell, Woodman and Aldridge, above n 102, 10.  See also: Catherine Mitchell and Bridget 
Woodman, The Burning Question: Is the UK on Course for a Low Carbon Economy? (Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 2004), 42. 
110 Mitchell and Woodman, above n 64, 3915. 
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112 Ibid and David Toke and Volkmar Lauber, 'Anglo-Saxon and German approaches to neoliberalism 
and environmental policy: The case of financing renewable energy' (2007) 38(4) Geoforum 677, 685. 
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exacerbate the existing barriers that impede the deployment of renewable sourced 
electricity generation.115  This represents a major failing of the Renewables 
Obligation to provide a dependable regime that is committed to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity and, ultimately, contribute to a more 
sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector in Great Britain. 
c. A review of the support provided to eligible renewable sources 
When it was implemented, the Renewables Obligation was designed to provide 
a ‘technology neutral’ approach.  That is, it was designed to offer all eligible 
renewable sources the level same support regardless of the renewable technologies 
used.  The rationale for applying a technology neutral approach was to encourage the 
deployment of facilities in the most cost effective manner.  A technology neutral 
approach is designed to do so as it dictates that renewable sources and technologies 
that are already relatively mature (or near market) will be deployed before less 
mature resources, as the financial risks in doing so are less.116  Therefore, when the 
Renewables Obligation was implemented, its role was not to ‘pick winners or to 
introduce artificial distortions into the marketplace’.117  Rather, it was designed to 
create a competitive market to provide ‘a strong incentive for technologies [that 
were] already near-market’.118 
As was its intention, the use of a technology neutral approach encouraged the 
deployment of more mature resources.  This meant that the ‘more expensive 
technologies [were] effectively priced out of the mechanism’.119  This had the effect 
of stifling ‘rather than stimulat[ing] innovation’120 of new technologies that could 
produce renewable sourced electricity.121 
                                                 
115 See, eg, Mitchell, Bauknecht and Connor, above n 102, 304-5, Toke and Lauber, above n 112, 685 
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As a result, in 2007 the Government revisited its commitment to technology 
neutrality.  In its 2007 report, Meeting the Energy Challenge,122 the Government 
detailed its intention to redefine the operation of the Renewables Obligation by 
introducing the concept of banding.123  Banding was designed to: 
offer differentiated levels of support to different renewable technologies.  [It 
was designed to] encourage the increased development and deployment of a 
broader set of renewable technologies.124 
Banding was introduced into the Renewables Obligation on 1 April 2009.125  
The banding rates are determined on the expected and future costs associated with 
using certain technologies to generate electricity from the various eligible renewable 
sources.126  Banding is therefore designed to encourage the use of a diversity of 
renewable sources to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.   
The way that the banding regime works is that facilities that rely on mature 
renewable resources must generate more electricity than a facility that relies on a less 
mature renewable resource in order to earn the same number of ROCs.  As a result, 
ROCs now represent different amounts of renewable sourced electricity.  The current 
banding rates under the Renewables Obligation are set out in Table 5.1 below.   
                                                 
122 'Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Energy' (CM 7124, Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2007) (2007 White Paper). 
123 For a useful review of the 2007 White Paper see Peter D Cameron, 'New directions in UK energy 
policy' (2007) 1(3) International Journal of Energy Sector Management 218. 
124 2007 White Paper, above n 122, 14 and 151.  When the Government determined that it would 
introduce banding into the Renewables Obligation, renewable sourced electricity as a proportion of 
total electricity in the United Kingdom was only 4.8 per cent.  This was only three per cent more than 
the amount of renewable sourced electricity when the Renewables Obligation commenced in 2002 
(see: 'Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics: 2011' (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 
2011), 217).  This was well below the United Kingdom’s 2007 target of 7.9 per cent. 
125 Banding was introduction by the Energy Act 2008 (UK) c 32, which introduced a new section 32D 
of the Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29. 
126 Wood and Dow, above n 118, 2232. 
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Table 5.1 
Banding rates under the Renewables Obligation for the period 2012-13127 
Generation type Amount of electricity to 
be stated in a ROC in 
2012-13 
Landfill gas 4 MWh 
Sewage gas and co-firing of biomass 2 MWh 
Onshore wind, hydro-electric, co-firing of energy crops, energy from 
waste with CHP, co-firing of biomass with CHP, geopressure, 
standard gasification and standard pyrolysis 
1 MWh 
Offshore wind, biomass and co-firing of energy crops with CHP, 
dedicated biomass 
2/3 MWh 
Wave, tidal stream, advanced gasification, advanced pyrolysis, 
anaerobic digestion, dedicated energy crops, dedicated biomass with 
CHP, dedicated energy crops with CHP, solar photovoltaic, 
geothermal, tidal impoundment – tidal barrage and tidal lagoon and 
offshore wind accredited between April 2010 and 2014. 
½ MWh 
The introduction of the concept of banding represents a positive development 
for the Renewables Obligation.  The reason for this is that ‘in broad terms, banding is 
a step forward to the degree that the non-mature renewable energy technologies will 
receive a higher level of subsidy’.128 
However, the introduction of banding has not been without its problems.  First, 
it ‘has made a complicated mechanism even more complex’.129  Further, ‘its success 
from both the suppliers’ and generators’ point of view remains to be seen,’130 as 
there has been little significant improvement in the performance of the Renewables 
Obligation since banding was introduced on 1 April 2009.  This is reflected in Table 
5.2 below.  The reason for the lack of significant improvement relates to the inability 
for banding to address the risks and uncertainties created by the least-cost and overly 
                                                 
127 The Renewables Obligation Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785, pt 2 of sch 2.  For post 2013 banding 
rates, see: 'Government response to the consultation on proposals for the levels of banded support 
under the Renewables Obligation for the period 2013-17 and the Renewables Obligation Order 2012' 
(Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2012), 15-21. 
128 Mitchell and Woodman, above n 64, 3919. 
129 Ibid.  See also: Pollitt, above n 41, 25. 
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flexible approach afforded to liable electricity suppliers under the Renewables 
Obligation. 
Therefore, while the concept of banding has merit (at least in theory), on 
balance it fails to address the fundamental risks that generators of renewable sourced 
electricity are exposed to under the Renewables Obligation.  For this reason it must 
be concluded that the concept of banding, without any more substantial reforms, does 
not contribute to ‘a satisfactory ... way forward’131 for the Renewables Obligation to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.132 
Table 5.2 
Performance of the Renewables Obligation: 2002-10133 
Year Target of renewable 
sourced electricity (%) 
Percentage achieved of 
renewable sourced 
electricity (%) 
Percentage of 
Renewables Obligation 
target achieved (%) 
2002-03 3.0 1.8 60 
2003-04 4.3 2.2 51 
2004-05 4.9 3.1 63 
2005-06 5.5 4.0 73 
2006-07 6.7 4.5 67 
2007-08 7.9 4.8 61 
2008-09 9.1 5.4 59 
2009-10 9.7 6.6 68 
2010-11 10.4 7.4 71 
d. A review of the target 
When the Renewables Obligation was first implemented, the governing 
statutory instrument prescribed the annual target for each liable electricity 
                                                 
131 Pollitt, above n 41, 49.  See also: Mitchell and Woodman, above n 64, 3919. 
132 Mitchell and Woodman, above n 64, 3919, Pollitt, above n 41, 49 and Wood and Dow, above n 
118, 2237. 
133 The Renewables Obligation Order 2002 (UK) SI 2002/914, sch 1, The Renewables Obligation 
Order 2009 (UK) SI 2009/785, sch 1, Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics: 2009, above n 55, 
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supplier.134  The target was set at a percentage of the total electricity supplied by a 
liable electricity supplier.  For example, in 2002, the Renewables Obligation 
prescribed that three per cent of the electricity supplied by liable electricity suppliers 
would have to be sourced from eligible renewable sources.135  Following the 
introduction of banding in 2009, the target under the Renewables Obligation 
specified the number of ROCs that a liable electricity supplier must surrender for 
each megawatt hour of electricity that it supplies. 
The purpose of the target is to engender a level of certainty and transparency 
among all participants in the Renewables Obligation regarding the future demand for 
ROCs.  In turn, this certainty was designed to contribute to stability of the price of 
ROCs, which was then intended to encourage investment in new renewable sourced 
electricity generating facilities. 
Despite the benefits offered by a transparent and stable target, developers of 
renewable sourced electricity considered this approach unsatisfactory.136  The 
reasons for this was that if ‘eligible renewable generation were to consistently exceed 
the level of the Obligation (or was perceived likely to exceed this level), the ROC 
price could collapse to zero,’137 as supply of ROCs would exceed demand.138  This 
scenario became known as the ‘cliff edge phenomenon’ as it was suggested that if 
this scenario eventuated the price of ROCs would fall, resembling a cliff edge.139   
As a result of the cliff edge phenomenon, the incentive to invest in new 
renewable sourced electricity generating facilities diminished because investors and 
potential developers considered that the price that they could sell ROCs for over the 
life of the project was not stable.  In essence, the potential of the cliff edge meant that 
the Renewables Obligation was considered not to offer certain and dependable 
financial support to generators of renewable sourced electricity. 
To address these concerns, in 2009 the concept of a ‘guaranteed headroom’ 
was introduced into the Renewables Obligation.140  Instead of a ‘hard’ target, the 
                                                 
134 See, eg, The Renewables Obligation Order 2002 (UK) SI 2002/914, sch 1. 
135 Ibid, sch 1. 
136 Mitchell and Woodman, above n 64, 3916. 
137 'Creating ski slopes from cliff-edges: removing volume risk from the Renewables Obligation' 
(Poyry, 2006), 6. 
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guaranteed headroom prescribes that the target for an annual period is to be set at a 
level that is based on the expected generation of renewable sourced electricity plus a 
prescribed percentage.141  This percentage is the guaranteed headroom.  In 2009, the 
additional percentage was eight per cent.142  The level of the guaranteed headroom 
increased to 10 per cent on 1 April 2010.143  The rationale for the guaranteed 
headroom was to impose a target that was in excess of the proposed annual 
production of ROCs so that the risks posed by the cliff edge phenomenon could be 
mitigated. 
While the introduction of the guaranteed headroom has been described as ‘a 
major evolutionary step’,144 practically it has had little effect.  The reason for this is 
that Ofgem has noted that the guaranteed headroom will only be invoked if ‘the 
amount of renewable generation is likely to be close to (or exceed) [the prescribed] 
targets’.145  For this to occur it would mean that almost all liable electricity suppliers 
would have to surrender ROCs rather than pay the buy-out price to meet their 
compliance obligations.  However, as Table 5.2 above indicated, the percentage of 
the Renewables Obligation achieved has never been particularly high, which means 
that the guaranteed headroom has never been required. 
More generally, however, the guaranteed headroom does not address the 
fundamental design limitations of the Renewables Obligation that relate to the price 
and volume risks created by the flexible and cost-focussed compliance regime.  For 
this reason, while the guaranteed headroom might appear useful, in reality it achieves 
little in the way of encouraging a more coherent, robust and stable approach to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity in Great Britain.  This can 
only be achieved by reducing the flexibility afforded to liable electricity suppliers 
and by offering generators of renewable sourced electricity greater certainty and 
stability relating to their income under the regime. 
                                                 
141 Ibid. 
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e. The issue of integration 
The Renewables Obligation is designed to establish ‘a demand for renewable 
electricity’146 among liable electricity suppliers.  It is not designed to do any more.  
The Renewables Obligation is therefore not designed to facilitate the connection of 
new renewable sourced electricity generation facilities to the electricity transmission 
grid nor does it regulate how such electricity may be used once it is connected.  In 
short, the Renewables Obligation is not concerned with the integration of renewable 
sourced electricity into the British electricity transmission grid. 
The failure to address the issue of integration is a shortcoming of the 
Renewables Obligation.  This is because the provision of financial support for new 
renewable sourced electricity does ‘not matter if you [can] not access the grid ... This 
is because what you need ... [is] a longer-term commitment of both transmission 
access and prices.147 
While the Renewables Obligation is silent on the issue of integrating renewable 
sourced electricity into the grid, the regime’s concerns for competition and 
contributing to least cost outcomes does, almost accidentally, affect the way that 
renewable sourced electricity is integrated into the British electricity transmission 
grid.  The reason for this is that the cost-oriented design of the Renewables 
Obligation compels developers of renewable sourced electricity generation facilities 
to ‘seek out the most effective site for renewable resources’148 that will enable them 
to generate electricity most efficiently.149 
The impact of the Renewables Obligation on grid integration is usefully 
explained by reference to the development of onshore wind facilities in Great Britain, 
which have ‘arguably been the main beneficiary of the original [Renewables 
Obligation] arrangements’.150  In this regard, it has been noted that the Renewables 
Obligation has encouraged ‘siting projects in the windiest locations to ensure an 
adequate rate of return’.151  As a result, this has contributed to a ‘disproportionate 
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number of onshore wind projects proposed or developed in Scotland,’152 as this 
jurisdiction has better wind resources that England or Wales. 
Seeking out the most effective site for renewable resources is not of itself a 
problem, as such behaviour can contribute to the use of the most efficient renewable 
sources.  However, such an approach may also contribute to fundamental problems 
relating to the operation of the electricity transmission grid, as the siting of numerous 
facilities in a particular location can impose constraints on the grid’s capacity.153  
Further, the siting of facilities in close proximity can also contribute to delays in 
connecting new facilities to the electricity transmission grid, particularly if the grid 
needs to be extended or augmented to allow for such connections to occur. 
Again, this problem has been considered by reference to the development of 
onshore wind powered facilities in Scotland.  In this regard, it has been noted that the 
installation of wind-powered facilities in Scotland, whose electricity is then 
transmitted to England, has imposed ‘constraints on the capacity of transmission 
lines’154 between these jurisdictions.  Consequently, the transmission constraints 
between Scotland and England have resulted in the delay of the ‘construction of 
dozens of onshore wind projects ... because of the inability to connect them to the 
network’.155 
On this basis, two conclusions are relevant to the Renewables Obligation’s 
approach to integrating renewable sourced electricity into the electricity transmission 
grid.  First, this regime fails to address the matter of integration specifically and 
therefore does not heed the requirement for a ‘longer-term commitment of both 
transmission access and prices’.156  Second, because of its focus on cost-efficiency 
and competition, the Renewables Obligation encourages the siting of new facilities 
only at locations where renewable sources are most robust.  As a result, this regime 
ignores the impact that it may have on the congestion of the electricity transmission 
grid and the subsequent delays in the construction of new renewable sourced 
electricity generating facilities.  Both of these conclusions represent failures in the 
Renewables Obligations to operate in a manner that is coherent and consistent with 
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the design of the broader regulatory framework governing the electricity generation 
and transmission sectors to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
Given that the Renewables Obligation is not designed to integrate renewable 
sourced electricity into the British electricity transmission grid, it is useful to 
consider briefly how this matter is addressed outside of the parameters of this 
regime.  Since the release of its 2007 White Paper,157 the British Government has 
recognised that the challenges associated with connecting renewable sourced 
electricity is a major obstacle to the deployment of renewable sourced electricity.158  
This matter was again emphasised in a 2009 report, The UK Renewable Energy 
Strategy,159 in which the Government explicitly considered how to provide for the 
‘swifter delivery’160 of renewable sourced electricity.  Of central importance to the 
2009 report was the need to provide for ‘quicker, smarter grid connection’161 as the 
failure to do so was preventing the deployment of renewable sourced electricity.162  
For example, at the time that the 2009 report was prepared, the failure to address the 
matter of grid connection had contributed to: 
17 GW of renewable electricity developments – of which nearly 6 GW [had] 
received planning consent – [were] awaiting connection to the grid, and 
developers in some parts of the country hav[ing] been offered an earliest 
connection date of 2020.163 
To overcome these barriers, the Government devised a new approach to 
manage this issue.164  Initially, in 2009, this took the form of an interim approach 
that was premised on the concept of ‘connect and manage’.165  This approach 
replaced the ‘first come, first served’ approach.166  In 2011, the Government 
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subsequently translated the interim measure into an enduring one.167  The enduring 
approach to connect and manage (like the interim approach that preceded it) is ‘set in 
the context of protecting the interests of consumers, including minimising the cost to 
consumers’.168  This approach is designed to: 
• [p]rovide sustained, commercially viable connection 
opportunities and firm connection dates reasonably 
consistent with project development timescales which will 
ensure the right environment for investment in new 
generation[;] 
• [d]eliver security of supply and a clear path to delivering our 
renewable energy targets[; and] 
• [i]mplement in a time-scale consistent with delivery of the 
Government’s aspirations [relating to the deployment of 
renewable sourced electricity] for 2020.169 
In this regard, the approach of ‘connect and manage’ is designed to allow 
electricity generating facilities, whether they generate electricity from renewable 
sources or not, to connect to the electricity transmission grid once the least amount of 
work has been done to reinforce the existing infrastructure to enable such a 
connection to be made.170  These works are known as ‘enabling works’.171  Once an 
electricity generation facility is connected, further work must be completed to 
reinforce the electricity transmission grid in order to accommodate the new 
generating facility and to ensure compliance with the relevant system security and 
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quality supply standards.172  These further works are known as ‘wider transmission 
reinforcement works’.173  The distinction between these two different levels of grid 
reinforcement work is intended to accelerate the connection of electricity generation 
facilities to the electricity transmission grid.174 
Under the connect and manage methodology, the financial responsibility for 
connecting a new electricity generating facility to the electricity transmission grid 
rests with the facility.175  In relation to the enabling and wider transmission works, 
the costs related to these activities must be borne by the operator of the British 
electricity transmission grid.176  These costs are then passed on to electricity 
consumers.  Therefore, the approach to connection and integration of electricity 
generating facilities in Britain relies on a shallow cost methodology.177 
Broadly speaking, it may be suggested that the adoption of the enduring 
‘connect and manage’ approach that relies on a shallow cost allocation methodology 
is adequately designed to assist with the effective siting and integration of new 
renewable electricity generating facilities.  This is because it is designed to facilitate 
the connection of all electricity generation facilities in an expeditious and fiscally 
prudent manner.   
However, such a conclusion does not explicitly support an increase in the 
production of renewable sourced electricity.  This is because the approach to connect 
and manage is concerned primarily with offering a technology neutral or non-
discriminatory approach.  It does not however prioritise the connection of renewable 
sourced electricity generating facilities.  Therefore, the current approach to 
connecting renewable sourced electricity to the British electricity transmission grid is 
not designed specifically to address the failure of the Renewables Obligation to 
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n 167, 28. 
175 Connection and Use of System Code (UK), s 2.14. 
176 Ibid, s 14.2. 
177 Céline Hiroux, 'The integration of Wind Power into competitive electricity Markets: The case of 
transmission grid connection charges' (Paper presented at the 28th Annual IAEE International 
Conference, Taipei, 2005), 16. 
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provide a dedicated regime concerning the integration of renewable sourced 
electricity.  This failure reflects a shortcoming of the broader regulatory framework 
in Great Britain to provide a coherent approach to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity. 
This concludes the discussion of the design of the internal features of the 
Renewables Obligation.  That is, the design of the mechanism itself.  However, it 
does not conclude this chapter’s review of the regulatory regime in its entirety.  This 
is because to appreciate how the Renewables Obligation is designed to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity, one must also consider how renewable 
sourced electricity is sold in Great Britain.  The reason for this is that together with 
the revenue derived from the sale of ROCs, the revenue achieved from the sale of the 
underlying renewable sourced electricity also contributes to the overall financial 
support provided by the regime to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity.  
C. The issue of interacting with the electricity market 
Like most orthodox renewable portfolio standards, the Renewables Obligation 
is designed to provide generators of renewable sourced electricity with an additional 
stream of renewable so that they receive two principal streams of revenue for the 
electricity that they generate.178  The first stream relates to the money that a 
                                                 
178 In addition to the two established streams of revenue that participants in renewable portfolio 
standards rely on, in Great Britain such generators are also entitled to receive a further stream of 
income.  This source of revenue is derived from the sale of Levy Exemption Certificates (or LECs).  
LECs are issued to renewable sourced electricity generators under the Climate Change Levy (or 
CCL).  The CCL is a tax on energy (including electricity) used by businesses.  For a detailed 
overview of how the CCL operates see: 'A general guide to Climate Change Levy' (HM Revenue & 
Customs, 2011). 
Under the CCL, electricity that is produced from designated renewable sources is exempt from the 
levy.  To reflect this, these sources are issued with an exemption certificate – an LEC.  These 
certificates can be bundled with the underlying electricity that is generated by a renewable sourced 
electricity generator when this commodity is sold to a supplier.  These certificates entitle generators of 
renewable sourced electricity to charge a premium for its electricity, as the electricity that they are 
supplying is exempt from the CCL.  The reason for this explained by the following statement: 
[i]f the electricity is exempt from [the] CCL the supplier can either reduce the price of its 
power, thus passing the saving on to the customer and increasing its own competitiveness in 
the electricity market.  Or, it can charge the customer [the] full CCL and add the difference to 
its own operational margin.  In either case, the presence of a CCL Exemption Certificate is 
worth something to the supplier, and the generator can therefore charge more for [its] 
renewable source. 
(see: John Constable and Bob Barfoot, 'UK Renewables Subsidies: A Simple Description and 
Commentary' (Renewable Energy Foundation, 2008) <http://docs.wind-
watch.org/renewables-obligation-paper.pdf>. 7.) 
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generator derives from the sale of ROCs.  This stream of revenue represents the 
financial support offered by the Renewables Obligation.  The second stream of 
revenue is derived from the sale of the renewable sourced electricity itself.  This 
stream of revenue operates separate from the Renewables Obligation, but is equally 
critical to support the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
To understand how the second stream of revenue is realised, one must first 
understand how electricity is transacted in Britain.  For the purpose of this review, 
only transactions that take place in the wholesale electricity market in Britain are 
considered.  Transactions that may occur separate to or alongside this market are not 
considered, as the vast majority of electricity sales involving renewable sourced 
electricity occur through the British wholesale market.179 
Shortly after the privatisation and deregulation of the British electricity 
generation sector, a new market was created to enable the trading of electricity.  This 
arrangement was known as the electricity pool.180  The electricity pool was designed 
to allow electricity generators to bid a price for their electricity into a single 
transparent market – the pool.181  Based on the available bids in the pool, electricity 
was then dispatched at specific intervals throughout the day to meet demand.  
Electricity was dispatched based on the cost of the bids, with the cheapest electricity 
being dispatched first until the demand was met.  This approach was designed to 
facilitate greater competition in the electricity sector by encouraging lower electricity 
prices.182 
In 2001, the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (or NETA) replaced the 
British electricity pool, as it was considered that the former regime could contribute 
                                                                                                                                          
While the availability of LECs for generators of renewable sourced electricity is relevant to the 
financial support available to these generators, the price of these certificates is only marginal when 
compared to the sale of ROCs and the underlying renewable sourced electricity that the ROCs 
represent.  Therefore, this thesis does not consider this matter any further (see: 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/Environment/cclrenexem/Pages/CCLRenewablesExemption.
aspx). 
179 For a review of the power purchase arrangements that generators of renewable sourced electricity 
enter into with electricity suppliers see, eg, David Toke and Aikaterini Fragaki, 'Do liberalised 
electricity markets help or hinder CHP and district heating? The case of the UK' (2008) 36(4) Energy 
Policy 1448 and Toke, above n 115. 
180 David M. Newbery and Michael G. Pollitt, 'The Restructuring and Privatisation of Britain's CEGB 
- Was It Worth It?' (1997) 43(3) The Journal of industrial economics 269, 275. 
181 Ibid. 
182 See, eg, ibid. 
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to a more competitive market among electricity generators and suppliers.183  The 
NETA was introduced by Part 4 of the Utilities Act 2000 (UK).184  The NETA 
created a new regulatory framework that governed the way that electricity was sold 
in England and Wales.  In 2005, Part 3 of the Energy Act 2004 (UK)185 extended the 
jurisdictional scope of the NETA to Scotland and Northern Ireland.186  At this time, 
the NETA became the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements 
(or BETTA).  While the BETTA extended the jurisdictional scope of the NETA, the 
principles and mechanics of the original scheme remained largely unchanged.  The 
particulars of the BETTA are contained in various codes and industry agreements 
that are governed by, among others, Ofgem and the National Grid company.187  
These codes and agreements define the terms under which industry participants can 
access and interact with the electricity transmission grid. 
Given that the NETA and then, more recently, the BETTA were designed to 
respond to the perceived lack of competition that existed under the former electricity 
pool, the foundational principle of these arrangements was concerned with increasing 
the level of competition among electricity generators.188  This also reflects the 
grundnorm of the Electricity Act. 
The BETTA were designed to: 
• meet the needs of customers with respect to price, choice, quality 
and security of supply; 
• enable demand to be met efficiently and economically; 
• enable costs and risks to be reduced and shared efficiently; 
• provide for transparency in the operation of the pricing mechanism 
and the market generally; [and] ... 
• promote competition in electricity markets.189 
                                                 
183 For a critique of the electricity pool see, eg, Newbery, above n 105, 2, David M Newbery, 'Power 
markets and market power' (1995) 16(3) Energy Journal 39, Cui, above n 4, Simmonds, above n 14 
and 'The New Electricity Trading Arrangements' (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, 1999) 
<http://www2.env.uea.ac.uk/gmmc/energy/env2e02/pdf/neta1.pdf>. 
184 The NETA was enacted under the Utilities Act 2000 (UK) c 27, pt 4. 
185 Energy Act 2004 (UK) c 20. 
186 The BETTA was enacted under the Energy Act 2004 (UK) c 20. pt 3. 
187 The relevant and agreements and codes are: (i)the Balancing and Settlement Code (UK); (ii) the 
Connection and Use of System Code (UK); (iii) the Distribution Code (UK); (iv) the Grid Code (UK); 
(v) the Master Registration Agreement (UK); (vi) the System Operator-Tranmission Owner Code 
(UK); and (vii) Distribution Connection and Use of System Agreement (UK). 
188 The New Electricity Trading Arrangements, above n 183, 17. 
189 Ibid. 
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To achieve these objectives, the BETTA established market arrangements for the 
trading of electricity that were designed to encourage ‘bilateral trading of electricity 
... between generators, suppliers, traders and customers’.190  It is through these 
trading arrangements that all electricity – including all renewable sourced electricity 
– is traded in Great Britain. 
To encourage the trading of electricity, the BETTA market is divided into four 
components.  These are: 
• a forwards and futures market;  
• a short-term spot market;  
• a balancing mechanism; and  
• an imbalance settlement process.191 
The first three components of the BETTA relate to the wholesale market for 
electricity.  That is, the market in which electricity is traded between generators and 
suppliers (or traders).  The last component concerns a post-event settlement process.  
These arrangements are illustrated in Figure 5.2 below. 
 
Figure 5.2. Overview of the BETTA market structure (Great Britain)192 
                                                 
190 Explanatory notes, Energy Act 2004 (UK) c 20, para 323. 
191 The New Electricity Trading Arrangements, above n 183, 4-7. 
192 'National Electricity Transmission System Seven Year Statement' (National Grid, 2011), 2. 
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The forwards and futures market is designed to encourage confidential bilateral 
contracts for electricity for periods ranging from several years to 24 hours ahead of 
gate closure (which is one hour before electricity is dispatched).  The short-term spot 
market, which operates from one to 24 hours before the dispatch of electricity, allows 
participants to enter into short-term bilateral trades to supplement any long-term 
contracts that they have already entered into. 
The third aspect of the BETTA is the balancing mechanism.  In this role, the 
operator of the national grid – the National Grid company – ‘accepts offers and bids 
for electricity in close to real time’.193  This enables it to balance the supply and 
demand for electricity.  Under the balancing mechanism, which is regulated by the 
Balancing and Settlement Code,194 all market participants (whether they have 
committed to long or short-term contracts for the sale of electricity) are required to 
notify the National Grid company of their contract positions one hour prior to 
dispatch of the electricity.195  To the extent that it is required, the National Grid 
company is then able to balance the supply and demand for electricity during that 
period by purchasing or selling electricity to ensure that the system is optimally 
balanced and that all demand is met. 
The final component – the imbalance settlement process – is designed to 
impose ‘settlement charges’ on market participants if they do not meet the 
contractual positions to which they have agreed and that they have notified to the 
National Grid company.196  The effect of this post-trading mechanism is to require ‘a 
generator [that] generates more or less electricity than they have contracted to 
provide, or a supplier [that] requires more or less electricity than they have 
contracted to buy’197 to be charged for this discrepancy.198  The imposition of such a 
charge is designed to encourage market participants to comply with their stated 
positions relating to either demand for or supply of electricity to ensure security of 
the electricity market in Great Britain. 
                                                 
193 Cui, above n 4, 50. 
194 Balancing and Settlement Code (UK). 
195 The time that is one hour ahead of dispatch is known as ‘gate closure’.  Following gate closure, no 
more trades of electricity are permitted that relate to the electricity that will be dispatched immediately 
following that hour. 
196 Balancing and Settlement Code (UK), s N.  See also: Electricity Market Reform: 4th Report, above 
n 105, 9. 
197 Electricity Market Reform: 4th Report, above n 105, 9. 
198 Balancing and Settlement Code (UK), s N. 
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While each of the four features of the BETTA are relevant to generators of 
renewable sourced electricity, it is the balancing mechanism and the corresponding 
charges that are imposed under the imbalance settlement process that are most 
critical.  The reason for this is that the National Grid company requires that all 
generators of electricity forecast accurately the amount of electricity that they are 
able to supply in the future.  This is a relatively straightforward task for ‘large, 
centralised, predictable fossil-fuelled and nuclear generation’199 as these generating 
facilities are able to determine with great specificity their long-term electricity 
output.200  However, for electricity generating facilities that rely on intermittent 
renewable sources to generate electricity – such as wind, solar or marine – it is 
difficult to predict their electricity output with the same level of certainty.201  This is 
because, electricity from these sources can only be produced when a particular 
resource is available, which, by its very nature, is intermittent.  Because of this, 
generators that rely on intermittent renewable sources must deal with the burden of 
complying with the balancing mechanism and the subsequent imbalance charges 
imposed by the BETTA. 
In its 2011 report, Electricity Market Reform,202 the House of Commons 
Energy and Climate Committee considered the interaction of intermittent forms of 
renewable technologies with the BETTA market.203  In its report, the Committee 
noted that: 
the current [balancing] approach depends on predictable generation capacity 
which can commit to deliver precise volumes of electricity a year or even 
more in advance on long-term contracts.  Suppliers can fine-tune their 
portfolio of contracts closer to delivery as actual demand becomes clearer. 
This may not be suitable for the low-carbon future needed.  Wind power 
may be predictable in the short term and can be forecast accurately a few 
hours ahead of delivery, but it cannot be guaranteed for a particular half-hour 
slot in the weeks, months or further ahead.204 
                                                 
199 Electricity Market Reform: 4th Report, above n 105, 9. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Newbery, above n 105, 2. 
202 Electricity Market Reform: 4th Report, above n 105. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid, 10-11.  See also, eg, Newbery, above n 105, Mitchell, Bauknecht and Connor, above n 102, 
Wood and Dow, above n 118, Mitchell, above n 33, Mitchell, Woodman and Aldridge, above n 102, 
Mitchell and Connor, above n 37, Foxon and Pearson, above n 118, Lipp, above n 89, David Elliot, 
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On this view, the BETTA market arrangements favour electricity generating 
facilities that are capable of forecasting their future supply of electricity with 
accuracy.205  For renewable sourced electricity generating facilities, the BETTA is 
only appropriate to the extent that a facility can forecast its future output or is able to 
self-balance.  Self-balancing refers to the situation where electricity that is generated 
by a renewable sourced electricity generating facility can be balanced by an entity 
that has entered into contracts as a generator and a supplier and therefore may amend 
its contractual positions to suit actual generating capabilities.  By doing so, an entity 
that can self-balance is able to avoid the post-settlement charges imposed by the 
BETTA.   
However, in reality, the option of self-balancing is only available to the Big Six 
vertically integrated electricity companies that have a portfolio of electricity 
generating facilities and are also electricity suppliers (and therefore can influence and 
manage issues relation to the demand for electricity).  By virtue of these positions, 
they can ‘reduce their exposure to the balancing market by some internal 
balancing’.206  However, for those independent generators of renewable sourced 
electricity that are not vertically integrated, the exposure to the risk posed by the 
balancing market contributes to the risk of participating in the BETTA.207 
The risk associated with balancing electricity from renewable sources is 
reflected in the end price of electricity.208  The reason for this is that the exposure to 
the balancing mechanism and the corresponding settlement charges is passed on to 
consumers in the form of higher electricity prices, as this represents the way that 
generators are able to recoup their increased production costs that are associated with 
these imposts.209  In turn, these higher electricity costs act as a disincentive for 
                                                                                                                                          
'Comparing Support for Renewable Power' in Volkmar Lauber (ed), Switching to Renewable Power: 
A Framework for the 21st Century (Earthscan, 2005) 219 and Peter M Connor, 'The UK Renewables 
Obligation' in Volkmar Lauber (ed), Switching to Renewable Power: A Framework for the 21st 
Century (Earthscan, 2005). 
205 Mitchell, above n 33, 145. 
206 Mitchell, Bauknecht and Connor, above n 102, 304. 
207 See, eg, 'Cost-reflectivity of imbalance charges' (ILEX Energy Consulting Limited, 2002) 
<http://www.ilexenergy.com/pages/Documents/Reports/Electricity/CostReflectivityOfImbalanceChar
ges.pdf>, 'NETA - The Next Phase' (ILEX Energy Consulting Limited, 2002) 
<http://www.poyry.co.uk/linked/en/news/NetaTheNextPhase.pdf> and R Tudway, 'Actions speak 
louder than words' (2003) 28 Utility week 24, 25. 
208 Mitchell, above n 33, 145.  See also: Corinna Klessmann, Christian Nabe and Karsten Burges, 
'Pros and cons of exposing renewables to electricity market risks--A comparison of the market 
integration approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UK' (2008) 36(10) Energy Policy 3646, 3657. 
209 Mitchell, above n 33, 145 and Toke, above n 107, 11-3. 
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potential purchasers to purchase this electricity.  Consequently, this limits the 
revenue that a generator that is exposed to the imbalance charges will achieve by 
participating in the BETTA market.  This, in turn, adds to the existing price related 
barriers faced by generators of renewable sourced electricity. 
A more general conclusion to draw from the analysis of the interaction of 
renewable sourced electricity and the BETTA market is that the current market 
arrangements for trading electricity are not designed to operate coherently with the 
Renewables Obligation to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  
This is because the BETTA market is not designed to enable the efficient and 
effective sale of renewable sourced electricity, which is critical for a generator to 
supplement the already uncertain income that it derives from participation in the 
ROC market.210  Therefore, rather than mitigating the financial barriers that are faced 
by generators of renewable sourced electricity, the design of the BETTA market 
operates to exacerbate these.  In this regard, the critical ‘external’ feature of the 
Renewables Obligation is not designed effectively to enhance the certainty of the 
regime so that it can increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.   
D. Concluding remarks 
The Renewables Obligation has been the subject of significant reforms since it 
was introduced.  When it commenced, it was designed to operate as a technology 
neutral mechanism.  However, with the introduction of banding, it has become more 
cognisant of the differences between mature and less developed technologies.  
Further, the recent introduction of the concept of a guaranteed headroom and a 20-
year limit on eligibility is further evidence that the Renewables Obligation is 
concerned, at least to some extent, with projecting the idea that the regime is 
designed to offer a stable and dependable approach to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.211 
Despite these well-intentioned measures, however, the Renewables Obligation 
is poorly designed to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  The 
origin of this failure can be traced to the regime’s grundnorm, which is concerned 
principally with the concepts of cost-efficiency and competition.  Consequently, 
                                                 
210 Mitchell, above n 33, 145-6. 
211 Mitchell and Woodman, above n 64, 3920. 
  
 169 
these concepts have informed the design of the Renewables Obligation in a manner 
that undermines its ability to provide a meaningful commitment to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity in a dependable and coherent manner. 
The impact of the regime’s grundnorm is particularly evident in its overly 
flexible liability regime that operates to undermine a certain a predictable demand for 
ROCs.  For a renewable portfolio standard to be effective, such a demand is critical.  
However, this is not present in the design of the Renewables Obligation, as the 
presence of price and volume risk undermines the ability of the regime provide a 
predictable level of demand. 
A further limitation that originates from the regime’s grundnorm is the limited 
ability that generators of renewable sourced electricity generators have to sell their 
electricity through the British wholesale electricity market.  This is due to the design 
of the BETTA market, which is not designed to facilitate bilateral transactions 
involving electricity that has been generated from an intermittent renewable source.  
Consequently, the value of the electricity that is achieved by these generators on the 
BETTA market does not support a robust and dependable income stream, which is 
critical to support an increase in the production of renewable sourced electricity.  In 
addition, the existence of an uncertain revenue stream from the sale of ROCs means 
that the Renewables Obligation is not designed to provide generators of renewable 
sourced electricity with a regulatory framework that engenders certainty or stability. 
The final criticism of note relating to the Renewables Obligation concerns its 
failure to provide an effective regime to integrate renewable sourced electricity into 
the electricity transmission grid.  This omission is not however surprising given that 
orthodox renewable portfolio standards are typically designed in this way.  However, 
this omission is compounded by the failure of the so-called ‘external’ regulatory 
regime governing the connection of new electricity facilities to support explicitly the 
integration of new renewable sourced electricity generating facilities.  In this regard, 
the Renewables Obligation represents a sub-optimal regulatory approach to increase 
the production of renewable sourced electricity.  Therefore, it ultimately appears 
incapable in its current form of contributing to a more sustainable and dignified 
electricity generation sector in Britain. 
This concludes the analysis of the Renewables Obligation.  However, it does 
not mark the end of the analysis of the regulatory efforts in Britain to increase the 
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production of renewable sourced electricity form utility-scale facilities.  This is 
because following the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democratic Coalition 
Government in May 2010, the new government noted in that it would seek to 
‘establish a full system of feed-in tariffs in electricity’212 that would eventually 
replace the Renewables Obligation.  With this in mind, the following section 
considers the proposal for a feed-in tariff mechanism that is designed to replace the 
Renewables Obligation in time. 
A REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED FEED-IN TARIFF MECHANISM 
In the months following its election, the Conservative-Liberal Democratic 
Coalition Government released a consultation document that set out a range of 
proposals to reform various aspects of the British electricity system.213  These 
reforms were designed to address some of the ‘major new challenges’214 facing the 
British electricity sector.  Foremost among these challenges was the need to 
decarbonise the electricity sector while ensuring an adequate and affordable supply 
of electricity.215  Following a period of consultation, many of the reforms that were 
first set out in the 2010 consultation document were formalised in the Government’s 
2011 White Paper: Planning our electric future.216 
In the 2011 White Paper, the Government noted that at the heart of its strategy 
to decarbonise the electricity generation sector in Britain was a feed-in tariff 
mechanism that relies on ‘long-term contracts for ... low-carbon energy’.217  This 
arrangement is also referred to as a feed-in tariff mechanism that relies on a contract 
for difference, with the contract for difference being ‘a long-term contract between 
an electricity generator and a contract counterparty’.218 
                                                 
212 'The Coalition: Our Programme For Government' (HM Government, 2010), 16. 
213 Electricity Market Report, 'Electricity Market Reform: Consultation document' (Cm 7983, 
Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010). 
214 Ibid, 4. 
215 Ibid, 5. 
216 2011 White Paper, above n 3, 5. 
217 Ibid, 7.  The Government also suggested two further reforms to contribute to the achievement of its 
electricity reform strategy.  These concerned: (i) the imposition of minimum emissions performance 
standards on coal-fired electricity generating facilities; and (ii) the creation of a carbon price floor for 
the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme to ‘top up the ... carbon price’ in order to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and encourage the production of non-fossil fuel sourced electricity (see: 
ibid, 33-6 and 49-58).  
218 2011 White Paper, above n 3, 38. 
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In May 2012, the Government released the draft Energy Bill 2012 (UK)219 (or 
Draft Energy Bill) that contained some of the most basic details of the regulatory 
framework for the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism with contracts for difference.  
The Draft Energy Bill was accompanied by the Draft Operational Framework,220 
which effectively contains a number of the government’s proposals for the design of 
the feed-in tariff mechanism.  At the time of the release of these draft documents, the 
government noted that the aim was for the Draft Energy Bill to receive Royal Assent 
by the end of 2013 so that the first low-carbon projects can be supported by the 
proposed regime in 2014.221  If this schedule were met, the proposed feed-in tariff 
mechanism would operate alongside the Renewables Obligation until 31 March 
2017.222  After this date, it is proposed that the Renewables Obligation will close to 
new generation (but it will continue to support projects already eligible under this 
regime).223  Following the closure of the Renewables Obligation, the feed-in tariff 
mechanism would represent the principal regulatory regime to increase the 
production of large-scale renewable sourced electricity in Great Britain.224 
At the time of writing, the Government had not released specific details of the 
proposed feed-in tariff mechanism.  The Draft Energy Bill is merely enabling 
legislation that affords the Secretary of State very broad powers to ‘make regulations 
about contracts for difference for the purpose of encouraging low carbon electricity 
generation’.225  It contains few of the critical details that are required to appreciate 
how this regime will operate (such as its price, duration and eligibility).226  The 
failure of the government to include full and complete details of the proposed feed-in 
tariff mechanism has been subject to criticism, as it prevents those interested in the 
                                                 
219 Draft Energy Bill 2012 (UK). 
220 'Feed-in tariff with contracts for difference: Draft operational framework' (Department of Energy 
and Climate Change, 2012) (hereafter, the Draft Operational Framework).  This document is set out 
in Annex B to the 'Electricity market reform: policy overview' (Department of Energy and Climate 
Change, 2012). 
221 'Electricity Market Reform: Inidicative electricity market reform implementation roadmap' 
(Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2012), 4.  This document is set out in Annex E to the 
Electricity market reform: policy overview, above n 220. 
222 Inidicative electricity market reform implementation roadmap, above n 221, 8-9. 
223 Ibid. 
224 It is proposed that the small-scale feed-in tariff mechanism will continue to operate alongside the 
Renewables Obligation and the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism that relies on contracts for 
difference. 
225 Draft Energy Bill 2012 (UK), s 1(1). 
226 'Overview of the Draft Energy Bill' (CM 8362, HM Government, 2012), 24 and 28.  See also: 
'Draft Energy Bill: Pre-legislative Scrutiny (Volume 1)' (HC 275-I, House of Commons, Energy and 
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regulatory regime to appreciate its implications.227  However, despite this 
shortcoming, the details of the regime, which will be contained in secondary 
legislation are not likely to be made available until mid-to-late 2013.228 
Therefore, the only substantive documents that are available at the time of 
writing are the Draft Energy Bill, the Draft Operational Framework and the 2011 
White Paper.  As a result, while these documents represent policy rather than any 
definitive legal framework, together they inform the following assessment of the 
proposed feed-in tariff mechanism. 
A. The design of the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism 
The Draft Operational Framework provides the following explanation of how 
the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism is proposed to operate: 
The [contract for difference] works by stabilising revenues for generators at 
a fixed price level known as the ‘strike price’.  Generators will receive 
revenue from selling their electricity into the market as usual.  However, 
when the market reference price [(being some form of average market price 
for a class of electricity that is sold on market)] is below the strike price 
[generators] will also receive a top-up payment from suppliers for the 
additional amount.  Conversely if the reference price is above the strike 
price, the generator must pay back the difference.229 
The design of the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism is illustrated in Figure 5.3 
below. 
                                                 
227 Draft Energy Bill: Pre-legislative Scrutiny, above n 226, 11. 
228 Inidicative electricity market reform implementation roadmap, above n 221, 4. 
229 Draft Operational Framework, above n 220, 3.  The Draft Energy Bill specifies who may be an 
eligible ‘electricity generator’ as well as who is classified as an ‘electricity supplier’ (see: Draft 
Energy Bill 2012 (UK), ss 1(7) and 3). 
  
 173 
 
Figure 5.3. The operation of a feed-in tariff with a Contract for Difference (Great Britain)230 
In order to receive the benefit of the feed-in tariff mechanism, eligible 
generators will be required to sell electricity through the existing British electricity 
trading arrangements – the BETTA.  Electricity suppliers will have no obligation to 
purchase renewable sourced electricity.  However, if they do, then the terms of the 
proposed feed-in tariff mechanism using contracts for difference will apply. 
While the eligibility of resources will not be confirmed until the release of 
secondary legislation, the Draft Operational Framework notes that the technologies 
that are eligible under the Renewables Obligation (but not under the small-scale 
feed-in tariff) are expected to also be eligible under the proposed feed-in tariff 
mechanism.231  In addition, nuclear facilities and electricity generating facilities that 
are equipped with carbon capture and storage will be eligible under the proposed 
feed-in tariff mechanism.232  This approach represents a departure from the 
Renewables Obligation, as it broadens the scope of the regime to include low-carbon 
electricity generating technologies. 
                                                 
230 2011 White Paper, above n 3, 38. 
231 Draft Operational Framework, above n 220, 19. 
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The government has noted that it favours a 15-year term for the duration of the 
contract for difference (and the accompanying tariff).233  However, despite this 
general position, the government has noted that the term of a contract may vary for 
certain projects, which may be determined on a project-specific basis.234 
In addition, the contracts for difference will place obligations on supported 
projects relating to ‘build progress ... and to construct and commission the agreed 
size and type of low-carbon plant within agreed timescales’.235  Failure to comply 
with the prescribed milestones will incur penalties that will most likely involve ‘a 
reduction in the agreed term of the [contract] commensurate with the length of any 
delay’.236 
The Draft Energy Bill proposes a multiparty payment model that will be 
administered by the National Grid company (as the ‘System Operator’237 of the 
BETTA) under which ‘liabilities [are] borne collectively by all energy suppliers’.238  
Under this approach, the contract for difference 
would be an instrument created by statute that set out obligations on the 
generator on one side, and on all licensed suppliers on the other side ... 
Regular but variable payments would flow to and from generators and 
suppliers and in both directions.239 
This approach has been the subject of criticism, principally because it is regarded as 
not being legally effective (as the exact counterparty is not known) and because 
participating generators are not able assess the creditworthiness of the various (and 
unknown) counterparties.240 
Critically, the legal framework governing the contracts for difference will not 
be limited to legislation and regulations.  The reason for this is that the Draft Energy 
Bill specifies that when a contract for difference is issued to an electricity generator, 
it ‘imposes obligations in accordance with the terms of the instruments’.241  These 
                                                 
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid, 57. 
235 Ibid, 29-31. 
236 Ibid, 31. 
237 Draft Energy Bill 2012 (UK), s 2(1) and Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, s 4(4). 
238 Draft Energy Bill: Pre-legislative Scrutiny, above n 226, 24. 
239 Ibid, 24. 
240 Ibid, 24. 
241 Draft Energy Bill 2012 (UK), s 1(3).  See also: Draft Energy Bill 2012 (UK), ss 1(4) and 4. 
  
 175 
obligations would be ‘crystallised’ when the contract is issued.242  This means that 
the obligations set out in the contract would ‘come into force and stand separate from 
the underlying legislation’,243 although the contract, rather than being a conventional 
contract, would be an instrument created by statute.244  The creation of additional and 
independent legal obligations would therefore mean that even if the legislation 
governing the feed-in tariff mechanism were amended, the contracts for difference 
issued before such amendment would remain unaltered (unless the legislation or the 
contract itself noted otherwise).245 
Given that the BETTA are designed to enable the trading of electricity using 
bilateral contracts, eligible generators may sell their electricity for an amount that is 
above or below the reference price prescribed by the contract for difference.  As a 
result, ‘[t]he price that a generator ... receive[s] for [its electricity] output is defined 
by the market price at which it is sold as well as the level of the top up tariff’246 
(which reflects the difference between the reference price and the strike price).  
Therefore, if an eligible electricity generator sells its electricity for an amount that is 
below the prescribed reference price, the total revenue that it will receive will be 
lower than if it had sold the electricity for an amount that exceeded the reference 
price.  For this reason, for an electricity generator to be able to receive the benefit of 
the proposed regime, it will be critical that they are able to sell their electricity for a 
price at or above the reference price.  This is illustrated in Figure 5.4 below. 
                                                 
242 Draft Operational Framework, above n 220, 68. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid, 70. 
245 Ibid, 68. 
246 Mitchell and Woodman, above n 64, 3920. 
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Figure 5.4. Revenues for different generators under a contract for difference scheme based on 
electricity sale price (Great Britain)247 
B. A critique of the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism 
The proposal for a feed-in tariff mechanism that relies on contracts for 
difference represents the ongoing trend towards greater government intervention in 
the electricity market, which commenced with the introduction of banding and the 
guaranteed headroom under the Renewables Obligation.  At first glance, such an 
approach appears to distance itself from the market-driven and fiscally focussed 
Renewables Obligation and Electricity Act.  However, when considered more 
closely, the design of the proposed feed-in tariff exhibits – and in some instances 
extends – many of the most fundamental shortcomings of the Renewables 
Obligation. 
Given that at the time of writing, the proposal for a feed-in tariff mechanism 
with contracts for difference was still in its relative infancy, the assessment of this 
regime does not follow the form of the previous analyses.  Instead, this assessment 
identifies the most profound shortcomings of the proposed regime that are based on 
the limited information that was available at the time of writing.  In this regard, this 
assessment considers that the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism that uses contracts 
for difference has four critical shortcomings. 
                                                 
247 Electricity Market Reform: Consultation document, above n 213, 53. 
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The first fundamental shortcoming of the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism is 
the obligation for generators of renewable sourced electricity to sell their electricity 
via the established BETTA market.  While the current design of the BETTA is 
already not conducive to the sale of certain types of renewable sourced electricity, 
these issues will be exacerbated by the design of the proposed feed-in tariff 
mechanism.  The reason for this is that the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism will 
only support generators of renewable sourced electricity to the extent that they are 
able to sell their electricity in the BETTA.  Therefore, because of the barriers 
inherent in the design of the BETTA, the design of the proposed feed-in tariff 
mechanism could limit its benefit for generators of renewable sourced electricity. 
The second fundamental failing of the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism is the 
lack of a prescribed obligation on any entity to purchase renewable sourced 
electricity.  In other words, the proposed regime imposes no obligation on any party 
to purchase renewable sourced electricity.  This risk exists because, unlike a 
conventional feed-in tariff mechanism that relies on a mandatory purchase 
obligation, the proposed feed-in tariff imposes no obligation on a licensed electricity 
supplier to purchase renewable sourced electricity.248  This represents a position that 
is inferior to that which currently exists under the Renewables Obligation where 
there is at least an obligation for liability electricity suppliers to support the activities 
of renewable sourced electricity generators by purchasing ROCs. 
Third, the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism fails to address how renewable 
sourced electricity can be integrated effectively into the electricity transmission 
grid.249  The final critical shortcoming in the design of the proposed feed-in tariff 
mechanism relates to the failure of the Draft Energy Bill to establish with clarity and 
precision the objectives of the regime.  In addition to the other shortcomings, this 
failure contributes further to the uncertainty inherent in the design of the proposed 
regime, as it is not clear what outcomes are being sought and how, with specific 
clarity, these are to be achieved.250 
                                                 
248 RenewableUK response to the Electricity Market Reform Consultation, 'RenewableUK response to 
the Electricity Market Reform Consultation' (RenewableUK, 2011) 
<http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/consultations/emr/emr.aspx>, 4. 
249 The issue of integrating renewable sourced electricity into the British electricity transmission grid 
was considered earlier in this chapter under the section titled ‘The issue of integration’. 
250 Draft Energy Bill: Pre-legislative Scrutiny, above n 226, 12. 
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For these reasons, it is suggested that the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism 
represents a move away from the commitment in Great Britain to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity.  Given the vast number of limitations of 
the Renewables Obligation, a new approach to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity represents a positive step forward.  However, the proposed feed-in 
tariff with contracts for difference does not represent an optimal approach, at least 
not to support the generation electricity that is sourced from intermittent renewable 
sources.  The principal reason for this is that the proposed regime has not been 
designed to address the specific barriers that limit the deployment of renewable 
sourced electricity.  Instead, it has been suggested that it is designed to ‘develop 
large amount of new nuclear generation’251 that faces different barriers to 
deployment than renewable technologies. 
In light of these criticisms, it has been suggested that a logical (and far less 
complex) approach to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity from 
renewable sources is to adopt a fixed feed-in tariff mechanism.252  By doing so, the 
risks inherent in the design of the BETTA market for intermittent renewable sourced 
electricity generating technologies would be avoided, as the mandatory purchase 
obligation under a fixed feed-in tariff mechanism would remove the requirement to 
sell electricity through this market.  While this approach may not conform to the 
market-based and competitive principles that inform the British electricity generation 
sector, such an approach could nonetheless contribute more effectively to the 
production of renewable sourced electricity and, ultimately, to a more sustainable 
and dignified approach to generating electricity. 
CONCLUSION 
The trend towards privatisation in the 1990s informed a realignment of the 
legal, political and economic discourse in Great Britain.  This caused the principles 
of economic rationalism and market-based competition to become the dominant 
                                                 
251 Electricity Market Reform: 4th Report, above n 105, 35. 
252 Catherine Mitchell et al, 'Response to the Electricity Market Reform Consultation' (Energy Policy 
Group, University of Exeter 2011), 8, David Newbery, 'Reforming Competitive Electricity Markets to 
Meet Environmental Targets' (EPRG Working Paper 1126/Cambridge Working Paper in Economics 
1154, Electricity Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge, 2011), David Newbery, 'High 
level principles for guiding GB transmission charging and some of the practical problems of transition 
to an enduring regime' (University of Cambridge, 2011) and RenewableUK response to the Electricity 
Market Reform Consultation, above n 248, 4. 
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factors informing regulatory design.  It was as a result of this shift towards neo-
liberal values that the founding principles of the electricity generation sector were 
developed.  In more recent times, the neo-liberal values that informed the design of 
the Electricity Act have been tempered by the recognition of the concept of 
sustainable development.  While this represents an important development in the 
regulation of the British electricity generation sector, the recognition of sustainable 
development has been introduced in a confusing manner and in such a way that it 
remains subordinate to the neo-liberal values that underpin the Electricity Act. 
It is from within this regulatory framework governing the electricity generation 
sector that the Renewables Obligation and the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism 
using contracts for difference have emerged.  These regimes represent the principal 
regulatory regimes – both current and proposed – that are designed to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity in Great Britain.  They are designed to 
do so by relying on a shared premise: economic efficiency and competition.  This is 
reflected by the design of both regimes, as they are both concerned primarily with 
facilitating the operation of competitive markets.   
While the use of markets is not in and of itself antithetical to the pursuit of a 
more sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector, the reliance on markets 
under the Renewables Obligation and the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism 
increases the risks and uncertainties associated with the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.  For this reason, the market-based and flexible nature of both 
regimes limits their ability to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity 
in Great Britain, at least in a manner that is dependable.  In addition, neither regime 
seeks to address the issues relating to integration of renewable sourced electricity, 
which are critical to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  
Therefore, the design of the principal regulatory regimes in Great Britain to increase 
the production of renewable sourced electricity (both current and proposed) is ill 
equipped to contribute to the achievement of a more sustainable and dignified 
electricity generation sector. 
To address the systemic failures of the Renewables Obligation and the 
proposed feed-in tariff a new approach is required.  This new approach must 
permeate both the renewable electricity sector and its interaction with the broader 
electricity supply sector, which currently operates as a distinct (and at time resistant) 
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regulatory framework.  That is, it must provide a coherent and integrated approach to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity that is cognisant of the 
matters of price and transmission.  Further, it must be designed so that it mitigates 
the volatility and risk that are inherent within the design of the markets in which 
renewable sourced electricity is forced to operate. 
Therefore, in place of the overreliance on markets, a more effective approach 
may be to create stable and robust regulatory conditions that allow developers of 
renewable sourced electricity to conduct their activities with confidence and 
certainty.  To do so, this may require a substantial reorganisation of the concepts that 
inform the British electricity-generating sector.  In essence, this will require a 
reassessment of the grundnorm of the Electricity Act, so that the Act contributes 
more immediately to the achievement of sustainable development and human 
dignity. 
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6. A synthetical analysis of the German and 
British regulatory regimes 
INTRODUCTION 
The regulatory regimes in Great Britain and Germany that are designed to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity represent vastly different 
approaches to address the same issue.  While it might be simple to attribute these 
differences to the regulatory techniques that are employed by the respective regimes, 
such a conclusion is overly simplistic.  The reason for this is that the use of different 
– and often competing techniques – reflect differences of a deeper and more 
fundamental nature that are often borne out of competing social and political values, 
which are then reflected by a regime’s grundnorms and regulatory rules. 
With this in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to complete a synthetical 
review of the German and British regulatory regimes that consumed the attention of 
the previous two chapters.1  This exercise will consider the most salient features of 
the German and British regimes in order to understand to what extent these features 
contribute to a dependable, meaningful, coherent and cost-conscious approach to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  These findings will then 
inform the assessment of the principal regulatory regime that operates in Australia to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  In this regard, this exercise 
in synthesis and review will enable this thesis to address one of its most critical 
questions: how should an Australian regulatory regime be designed to encourage 
effectively the production of renewable sourced electricity? 
A REVIEW OF DIVERGENT APPROACHES TO REGULATORY DESIGN 
To appreciate the fundamental differences between the British and German 
regulatory regimes that are designed to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity, one must consider the regimes’ grundnorms and regulatory rules.  
However, not all of the regulatory rules are relevant in this regard, as only those that 
                                                 
1 To avoid any confusion, references in this chapter to the German feed-in tariff law are to the fixed 
tariff component of this law.  Therefore, references to the German feed-in tariff law do not include 
references to the premium feed-in tariff that was introduced on 1 January 2012. 
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are most critical to the basic structural design of a regime are relevant.  In this regard, 
the regulatory rules that are considered by this review are those that are concerned 
with the following issues: 
• the nature of the financial support that is offered to eligible operators 
of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities; and 
• the regulatory approach that is used to integrate new renewable 
sourced electricity with the existing electricity transmission grid. 
The regulatory rules that address these matters are a regime’s first order 
regulatory rules.  These rules are classified in this way as they are designed to 
address (more than any other) the most persistent barriers that limit the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  Therefore, these rules represent the most critical 
features of a regulatory regime that is designed to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  The importance of these first order regulatory rules is 
also reflected by the fact that they operate to colour the other, supplementary 
regulatory rules.  These supplementary regulatory rules are a regime’s second order 
regulatory rules.   
Second order regulatory rules therefore represent those rules that are not as 
critical to the regime’s overall structure and method of encouraging the deployment 
of renewable sourced electricity.  Examples of such rules include those that are 
concerned with the issues of eligibility and liability.  For the purpose of this review, 
only the first order regulatory rules of the British and German regimes are 
considered.  However, before doing so, let us first consider the issue of grundnorms. 
A. A review of the grundnorms 
Arguably, the greatest point of divergence between the regulatory regimes in 
Great Britain and Germany is the grundnorm that informs each regime.  In Germany, 
the feed-in tariff law notes that its purpose is to ‘facilitate [the] sustainable 
development of [Germany’s] energy supply’.2  This means that, above all else, 
Germany’s feed-in tariff law is concerned with creating an energy generation sector 
                                                 
2 Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) [Act on Granting 
Priority to Renewable Energy Sources] (Germany) 1 April 2000, BGBI I, 2000, 2074, 1(1).  The 
grundnorm of the German feed-in tariff law is considered in Chapter 4, while the grundnorm of the 
British Renewables Obligation is considered in Chapter 5.  The grundnorm for the feed-in tariff 
mechanism that has been proposed for Great Britain was not considered, as none was specifically 
identifiable from the limited information made available in the Draft Energy Bill 2012 (UK). 
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that is cognisant of balancing environmental, social and economic matters for current 
and future generations.  To realise this grundnorm, the German feed-in tariff law 
‘aims to increase the share of renewable energy sources in electricity supply’3 by up 
to 80 per cent by 2050.4  Therefore, not only is the grundnorm concerned specifically 
with increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity by furthering the 
principle of sustainable development, but it also offers a practical and meaningful 
commitment to do so.  Therefore, there can be little debate about how to realise its 
grundnorm. 
Unlike the German feed-in tariff law, the grundnorm of the British Renewables 
Obligation is less concerned with increasing the production of renewable sourced 
electricity.  Instead, the grundnorm of the Renewables Obligation, which is 
contained in the Electricity Act, states that it is to ‘protect the interests of existing 
and future consumers’;5 particularly, the economic interests of consumers.  This is to 
be achieved by the further development of competition in the electricity generation 
sector.  Supplementary to this task is the enhancement of the security of energy 
supply in Britain and the contribution to the achievement of sustainable 
development.  In the context of the Renewables Obligation, this means that the 
regime is concerned with increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity, 
but only to the extent that such an approach conforms to the competitive and 
economic principles that ultimately inform the regime.  Therefore, the grundnorm of 
the Renewables Obligation offers only a limited commitment to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity. 
While identifying the differences in the design of the grundnorms that inform 
the design of the British and German regulatory regimes is relevant, of greater 
importance is an understanding of the practical impact of these differences.  In this 
regard, it is useful to recall that grundnorms operate to formalise the non-legal values 
and aspirations of society.  They also set the strategy for ‘what a society is trying to 
achieve’.6  While their quasi-legal status means that they do not themselves possess 
the same normative status as specific legal rules, these norms operate to create the 
                                                 
3 Ibid, 1(2). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29, s 3A(1) and s 3A(1A). 
6 Douglas E Fisher, 'A view of jurisprudential architecture for sustainable environmental governance' 
(2010) 3 Environmental Liability 83, 86. 
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context within which the specific, normative and enforceable legal rules that 
contribute to form a regulatory regime are designed. 
For this reason, if a regulatory regime is to be designed to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity so that it may ultimately contribute to a 
more sustainable and dignified electricity production sector, the regime’s grundnorm 
must express an unequivocal desire to do so.  Such an unequivocal approach is 
apparent in the grundnorm of the German feed-in tariff law.  However, this is not the 
case for the Renewables Obligation in Britain, whose grundnorm is more concerned 
with furthering the concept of competition and cost-efficiency.  This occurs at the 
expense of contributing the achievement of a sustainable and dignified electricity-
generating sector.  These profound differences are reflected in the regulatory rules of 
the respective regimes. 
B. A synthesis of the first order regulatory rules 
a. The issue of financial support 
The German and British regulatory regimes that are designed to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity rely on economic instruments.  These 
instruments operate by offering a financial incentive to generators of renewable 
sourced electricity.  This incentive is designed to address a number of the financial 
and non-financial barriers that prevent the deployment of renewable sourced 
electricity.  While this may be the underlying premise of the German and British 
regulatory regimes, the approaches adopted by the regimes are vastly different. 
Under the German feed-in tariff law, the financial incentive offered to 
generators of renewable sourced electricity is provided in the form of a fixed price 
tariff.7  The tariff is paid to generators of eligible renewable sourced electricity for 
every kilowatt-hour of electricity that they produce and feed into the electricity 
transmission grid.  The tariff is predetermined and is prescribed by law.   
The rate of the tariff is calculated separately for each eligible renewable source.  
Tariffs are also informed by the size and location of a renewable sourced electricity 
generating facility.  In this regard, the tariffs are designed to reflect the specific 
electricity generating costs of each technology that is used to generate eligible 
                                                 
7 The design of the German feed-in tariff law is considered in Chapter 4. 
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renewable sources.  Therefore, technologies that are more mature receive a lower 
tariff than those technologies that are less mature.  This approach is designed to 
ensure that the financial support offered by the feed-in tariff law reflects the nuanced 
financial requirements of all eligible renewable technologies.  Further, the use of 
degression is designed to minimise the occurrence of overly generous tariffs.  
Therefore, the German feed-in tariff law is designed to contribute to a diverse and 
robust portfolio of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities by supporting 
mature and less mature technologies. 
The tariff is provided for a period of 20 calendar years and represents the total 
income that an eligible generator receives for its electricity during that period.  
Operators of the electricity transmission grid are required to pay the tariff following 
the purchase of the electricity.  Under a mandatory purchase obligation, operators of 
the electricity transmission grid must purchase all of the electricity that is generated 
by an eligible renewable sourced electricity generator.  This obligation applies 
regardless of the current demand for electricity and is subject only to the 
maintenance of the security and stability of the electricity transmission grid.  For this 
reason, generators of renewable sourced electricity are not required to sell their 
electricity through the wholesale electricity market.  This approach engenders a high 
degree of certainty among investors and generators alike that the regime will provide 
a dependable, predictable and largely transparent stream of revenue.  This, in turn, is 
designed to encourage the financially secure production of renewable sourced 
electricity. 
In contrast to the German feed-in tariff law, the British Renewables Obligation 
operates to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity by using a highly 
competitive market-based system.8  Under the Renewables Obligation, operators of 
eligible renewable sourced electricity generating facilities are allocated a particular 
number of ROCs for every megawatt of electricity that they produce.  Once these 
ROCs are monetised, which occurs by virtue of their sale, they represent the financial 
benefit offered by the Renewables Obligation.  However, unlike the tariff provided 
under the German feed-in tariff law, ROCs are not designed to offer a certain and 
predictable return for operators of renewable sourced electricity-generating facilities.  
Rather, the value of these certificates is determined by the operation of the market.  
                                                 
8 The design of the British Renewables Obligation is considered in Chapter 5. 
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Further, unlike the tariff offered under German feed-in tariff law, ROCs are not 
designed to provide the total income for generators of renewable sourced electricity.  
Instead, they are merely designed to supplement the income that is derived from the 
sale of the underlying renewable sourced electricity that a ROC represents. 
The competitive nature of the ROC market means that the demand for ROCs 
(and ultimately the price of these certificates) is subject to fluctuation.  While supply 
and demand inform the design of every market, the fluctuations created by these 
principles are exaggerated by the flexibility afforded to liable electricity supplies to 
comply with their obligation under the Renewables Obligation.  This is due in large 
part to the availability of a low buy-out price, which entitles liable electricity 
supplies to avoid purchasing ROCs. 
While the liability regime offers liable electricity suppliers flexibility, it limits 
the financial benefit offered by the Renewables Obligation to generators of 
renewable sourced electricity.  The reason for this is that the inherent flexibility of 
the regime undermines the demand among liable electricity suppliers for ROCs.  As 
a result, generators of renewable sourced electricity have little certainty about the 
revenue that they may generate from the sale of their ROCs during the life of a 
project.  This means that rather than mitigating the financial risks associated with the 
production of renewable sourced electricity, the market-based and flexible 
compliance approach under the Renewables Obligation heightens the financial risks 
associated with generating renewable sourced electricity in Britain. 
The second stream of revenue that generators of renewable sourced electricity 
rely on in Britain is that which they derive from selling their electricity in the British 
wholesale electricity market – the BETTA.  The BETTA is designed to support 
electricity sources whose output can be readily forecast for months or even years in 
advance and which can be generated at least cost.  If sources are unable to comply 
with these objectives, they are subject to financial penalties.  Consequently, the 
design of the BETTA disadvantages many sources of renewable sourced electricity, 
particularly those that rely on intermittent renewable sources.  The reason for this is 
that renewable sourced electricity is often more expensive to generate than electricity 
that is sourced from fossil fuels.  Therefore, in a market-driven system, these sources 
are at a natural disadvantage.  Further, a number of renewable sources rely on 
intermittent sources – such as wind, solar and wave – to generate electricity.  This 
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means that electricity generated from these sources cannot be forecast with any 
specificity for periods of more than couple of days and are therefore exposed to 
financial penalties. 
The design of the BETTA means that electricity generators that rely on 
intermittent renewable sources are forced to increase the price of the electricity that 
they sell in order to recover the higher transaction costs (namely the penalties or the 
technology costs) with which they are faced.  These higher costs manifest themselves 
in a lower demand for this form of electricity.  Consequently, this limits the revenue 
that operators of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities are able to derive 
with respect to their second (but equally critical) income stream.  This represents a 
different – and ultimately inferior – approach to that used by the German feed-in 
tariff law. 
When the details of the British feed-in tariff law with contracts for difference 
were released, it was suggested that this regime was designed to address many of the 
risks and uncertainties that currently undermine the design of the Renewables 
Obligation.9  However, it does not appear that the proposed feed-in tariff law will be 
designed to do so.  The reason for this is that the tariff is conditional upon the sale of 
electricity in the BETTA.  Because of the limitations inherent in the design of the 
BETTA, the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism will be limited by the same factors 
that currently undermine the design of the Renewables Obligation.  Therefore, 
instead of addressing one of the key deficiencies of the Renewables Obligations, the 
feed-in tariff will exacerbate it. 
One can draw a number of critical conclusions from this review.  Most 
generally, the design of the regimes in Great Britain – both current and proposed – is 
limited by their concern for competition and economic efficiency.  As a result, rather 
than being designed to mitigate the financial risks inherent in the generation of 
renewable sourced electricity, the underlying concern for competition and efficiency 
heightens such risk. 
By contrast, the German feed-in tariff law is designed to offer a stable, 
guaranteed and long-term tariff that is calculated using a cost covering remuneration 
methodology.  This approach is designed to offer investors and generators of 
                                                 
9 The design of the British feed-in tariff law with contracts for difference is considered in Chapter 5. 
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renewable sourced electricity with a dependable, yet fiscally appropriate, source of 
income for the duration of the payback period of their facility.  This revenue stream 
is not subject to market fluctuations or variable demand.  Critically, this approach 
also provides the certainty required to address many of the financial barriers that 
limit the deployment of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities.  
Therefore, this regime is concerned principally with increasing the production of 
renewable sourced electricity by offering a stable, transparent and guaranteed source 
of income to all eligible generators of renewable sourced electricity.  In this sense, 
the core structure of the German feed-in tariff law is designed to contribute to the 
regime’s grundnorm – a sustainable energy supply sector. 
Therefore, as this thesis prepares to apply the lessons from the British and 
German regulatory regimes to the Australian context, arguably the most important 
conclusion to draw in this regard is that a regulatory regime that is concerned with 
increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity must have as its first 
priority this very object.  That is, its grundnorm must be to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  The grundnorm must then inform the design of the 
regulatory rules.  To be effective, these regulatory rules must be designed to offer 
dependable, stable, certain and fiscally appropriate financial support to investors in 
and generators of renewable sourced electricity.  It is only by doing so that many of 
the financial and non-financial barriers that currently limit the deployment of 
renewable sourced electricity can be effectively overcome. 
b. The issue of integration 
The second of the so-called first order regulatory rules relates to the issue of 
integrating new renewable sourced electricity generating facilities into the existing 
electricity transmission grid.  While this matter is distinct from the financial barriers 
that limit the deployment of renewable sourced electricity, it is no less important.  
The reason for this is simple: ‘[p]rice [does] not matter if you [can] not access the 
grid, or [can] only be assured of your price for five weeks or five months or five 
years’.10 
                                                 
10 Timothy P. Duane, 'Greening the grid: Implementing climate change policy through energy 
efficiency, renewable portfolio standards, and strategic transmission system investments' (2010) 34 
Vermont Law Review 711, 755. 
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The German feed-in tariff law explicitly addresses issues relating to 
integration.11  It does so by including in its design a number of techniques that are 
concerned with addressing this issue in a manner that encourages a coherent 
regulatory approach.  The most prominent of these techniques are designed to: 
• impose a shallow costs regime on generators or renewable sourced 
electricity in order to minimise their costs to connect to the electricity 
transmission grid; 
• oblige operators of the electricity transmission grid to immediately, 
and with priority, connect renewable sourced electricity generating 
facilities to the grid; and 
• require that operators of the electricity transmission grid immediately 
optimise, strengthen and expand their grid systems so that the 
electricity transmission grid is able to guarantee the transmission of all 
available renewable sourced electricity. 
While these features operate to serve different purposes, each is important to 
the broader goal of integrating renewable sourced electricity into the German 
electricity transmission grid.  The first feature – the imposition of a shallow costs 
regime – is concerned with minimising the grid connection costs for a renewable 
sourced electricity generator.  The second and third features place obligations on the 
operators of the electricity transmission grid to assist with the process of connection 
and transmission.  The initial obligation requires that an operator of the electricity 
transmission grid enable a new electricity generating facility to be connected 
immediately and with priority to any non-renewable sources.  Further, once a new 
facility has been connected, the operator of an electricity transmission grid must then 
optimise, strengthen and expand its electricity transmission grid to ensure that it is 
capable of transmitting all available renewable sourced electricity.   
Unlike the German feed-in tariff law, the design of the British Renewables 
Obligation and the proposed feed-in tariff mechanism is not concerned explicitly 
with integrating new renewable sourced electricity generating facilities with the 
electricity transmission grid.12  The reason for this is simple: these regimes are 
                                                 
11 The issue of integration under the German feed-in tariff law is considered in Chapter 4. 
12 The issue of integration under the Renewables Obligation and the feed-in tariff law that is proposed 
to replace it are considered in Chapter 5. 
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concerned only with establishing ‘a demand for renewable electricity’.13  In other 
words, both regimes are concerned with the concept of price and not with facilitating 
effective transmission. 
Given the deliberate omission by the current and proposed regimes in Great 
Britain to address the issue of integration, the analysis of these regimes considered 
how this issue is addressed by the broader regulatory architecture in Great Britain.  
While the more general regulatory framework offers a shallow costs allocation 
methodology, its connection regime uses a technology neutral approach.  This means 
that unlike the German feed-in tariff law it does not positively discriminate in favour 
of renewable sourced electricity.  This reflects a disconnect between the Renewables 
Obligation, the proposed feed-in tariff law and the regulatory framework governing 
the integration of electricity in Britain.  More importantly, however, it reflects how 
the British regulatory framework fails to provide a longer-term commitment of both 
transmission access and prices in order to encourage the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.14 
From this review, it is evident that the German and British regulatory 
approaches offer distinctly different approaches to the issue of integration.  While 
these differences are in and of themselves instructive, the lesson to carry forward into 
the remaining sections of this thesis is this: to encourage the production of renewable 
sourced electricity using an effective regulatory regime, it is critical that the most 
prominent barriers that limit the production of renewable sourced electricity are 
overcome.  This means that in addition to creating a demand for new renewable 
sourced electricity by way of stable, predictable and guaranteed financial incentives, 
a regulatory regime must also be designed to support the integration of renewable 
sourced electricity into the existing electricity transmission grid.  By addressing both 
of these issues, a regulatory regime will be well placed to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity, so that it may ultimately contribute to the achievement 
of a sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector. 
                                                 
13 Catherine Mitchell, D Bauknecht and P M Connor, 'Effectiveness through risk reduction: a 
comparison of the renewable obligation in England and Wales and the feed-in system in Germany' 
(2006) 34(3) Energy Policy 297, 303. 
14 Duane, above n 10, 755. 
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CONCLUSION 
In preparation for the review of the Australian regulatory regime, this chapter 
has identified the principal differences between the regulatory regimes in Germany 
and Great Britain that are designed specifically to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  In this regard, this chapter has considered the 
grundnorms and the first order regulatory rules of these regimes, as it is these 
features that provide the greatest insight into a regulatory regime’s desire and ability 
to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
The British and German regulatory regimes reflect divergent approaches to 
deliver the same outcome.  At one end of the spectrum, the British Renewables 
Obligation and the feed-in tariff mechanism that has been proposed to replace it 
represent regimes that are particularly concerned with utilising the competitive 
nature of markets.  At the other end of the spectrum, the German feed-in tariff law is 
designed to operate independently of any market.  This means that the financial 
incentive that it provides to generators of renewable sourced electricity is 
predictable, transparent, certain and guaranteed, as it is not affected by issues such as 
supply and demand.  Further, the effort to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity is shared among many entities within the broader electricity 
generation supply chain so that, unlike the British regimes, the German feed-in tariff 
law adequately addresses issues of connection and transmission.  This represents a 
superior approach to the British regimes – both current and proposed – as it reflects a 
coherent approach to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity in 
Germany. 
While the identification of these differences in regulatory design is important, 
arguably of greater importance for the analysis that follows is the recognition that 
these design features are manifestations of the grundnorm that informs each regime.  
Based on this analysis, three lessons may be observed that will assist in the review of 
the Australian regulatory approach to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity: 
• First, for a regulatory regime to be able to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity in an effective manner and, ultimately, 
contribute to the achievement of a sustainable and dignified electricity 
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generation sector, it must contain a transparent and precise grundnorm 
that is directly referrable to this task.   
• Second, a regime must be designed to offer financial certainty to 
investors in and generators of renewable sourced electricity.  This 
requires a stable, dependable and guaranteed financial incentive that is 
not subject to fluctuating demand or values.   
• Third, a regulatory regime that is designed to increase the production 
of renewable sourced electricity must address the related (but 
separate) issues of price and transmission.  It must not, as the British 
regulatory regimes do, focus only on the former and ignore the latter.
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7. A review of Australia’s Renewable 
Electricity Act 
INTRODUCTION 
Writing on the state of Australia’s political leadership in 1964, Donald Horne 
suggested that: 
Australia is a lucky country run mainly by second rate people who share its 
luck ... [that] has managed to achieve what may be the most evenly 
prosperous society in the world.1 
It has been suggested that Horne’s use of the word ‘luck’ was ‘ironic and critical, 
warning ... of the serious danger of relying on luck’.2  Horne’s critique extended to a 
variety of subjects, including education, Australia’s political leadership and the 
relationship that existed between Australia and Asia.  In his critique, Horne also 
considered Australia’s rich endowment of fossil fuels.  The presence of these 
resources, Horne suggested, provided the basis for much of Australia’s economic 
prosperity and reflected that its wealth was borne out of luck rather than effective 
leadership.3   
While many aspects of Horne’s commentary have been disputed, at least one 
contention holds true: Australia’s rich deposits of fossil fuel resources make a 
profound contribution to the prosperity of the Australian society.4  The impact of 
fossil fuels is most acute in Australia’s electricity generation sector.  This sector 
relies almost exclusively on fossil fuels to provide secure and affordable electricity.  
This is reflected by the fact that approximately 90 per cent of the electricity 
                                                 
1 Donald Horne, The Lucky Country (Penguin Australia, 6th ed, 2008), 233.  The first edition of The 
Lucky Country was published in 1964 (introduction by Hugh McKay). 
2 Ibid, ix. 
3 Ibid. 
4 The Australian Energy Resource Assessment, the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 
Geoscience Australia and Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics have noted that 
‘Australia’s coal resources are world class in magnitude and quality ... Australia also has significant 
resources of gas’ and is therefore ‘the world’s sixth largest [liquefied natural gas] exporter and 
accounted for 9 per cent of world LNG trade in 2008’ (see: 'Australian Energy Resource Assessment' 
(Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Geoscience Australia and Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2010), 18-20, 83). 
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generated in Australia is sourced from fossil fuels.5  The majority of this – 75 per 
cent – is sourced from coal while 15 per cent is sourced from gas.6  In contrast, only 
eight per cent of Australia’s electricity is sourced from renewable sources.7 
Despite the reliance on fossil fuels to generate electricity in Australia and the 
small contribution that is made by renewable sources in this regard, it has been 
suggested that Australia’s renewable resources are so robust that if they were used 
effectively they would be capable of generating Australia’s ‘current output of 
electricity many times over’.8  In this light, two questions arise: (i) what are the 
governance arrangements in Australia that are designed to encourage the generation 
of electricity from renewable sources? and (ii) how are these designed?   
The principal task of this chapter is to respond to these questions.  To do so, 
this chapter considers the principal regulatory regime that is designed specifically to 
encourage the generation of renewable sourced electricity in Australia: the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) (the Renewable Electricity Act).9  
                                                 
5 'Energy in Australia 2012' (Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Australian Government, 
2012), 33. 
6 Ibid.  See also: Hugh Saddler, 'The Australian energy system: Is it moving towards sustainability? 
Can it move faster?' (Paper presented at the Rio+20: Towards sustainable development forum, 
Canberra, 23-24 November 2011). 
7 Energy in Australia 2012, above n 5. 
8 Greg Buckman, 'Weaknesses and reform of Australia's renewable electricity support' (2010) 66 
Journal of Australian Political Economy 71, 81.  For commentary on the ability of renewable sources 
to displace highly emitting fossil fuel sources to generate electricity in Australia see, eg, Australian 
Energy Resource Assessment, above n 4, 20, Greg Buckman and Mark Diesendorf, 'Design 
limitations in Australian renewable electricity policies' (2010) 38(7) Energy Policy 3365, 3369, Hugh 
Saddler, Mark Diesendorf and Richard Denniss, 'Clean energy scenarios for Australia' (2007) 35(2) 
Energy Policy 1245 and Matthew Wright and Patrick Hearps, 'Australian Sustainable Energy: Zero 
Carbon Australia Stationary Energy Plan' (The University of Melbourne and the Energy Research 
Institute, 2010). 
9 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth).  The regulatory regime created by the Renewable 
Electricity Act is supplemented by the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth), the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Small-scale Technology Shortfall Charge) Act 2010 (Cth) and the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Large-scale Generation Shortfall Charge) Act 2000 (Cth). 
At the time of writing, Australia’s Climate Change Authority is conducting a detailed review of the 
Renewable Electricity Act.  This review is scheduled to be completed before 31 December 2012 (see: 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), 162(5)).  The scope of this review has been defined as 
covering: 
• ‘the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target (see the section titled ‘Large-scale renewable 
energy target’ below), including the target trajectory ...; 
• the structure of the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (see the section titled ‘Small-
scale renewable energy scheme’ below), including how its annual target is set; 
• the liability framework, exemptions and shortfall charge of both the large-scale and small-
scale schemes; 
• the eligibility framework for both schemes and the diversity of renewable energy; 
• the impact of the [Renewable Energy Target] on the electricity market in terms of costs, 
prices and energy security; and 
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This chapter contends that the design of the Renewable Electricity Act is inadequate 
to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity in an effective manner.  In 
this regard, this chapter contends that Australia’s principal regulatory regime to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity is not designed to contribute 
effectively to a more sustainable or dignified electricity production sector in 
Australia. 
While the Renewable Electricity Act represents the primary regulatory regime 
in Australia to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity, it is useful to 
note that this Act is not the only regulatory regime that is designed for this purpose.  
For example, a number of state governments have at various times relied on premium 
feed-in tariff mechanisms to increase the production of predominantly small-scale 
renewable sourced electricity.10  While these regimes have had some success, their 
scale is limited by their narrow focus on mostly small-scale facilities (primarily 
residential or small commercial solar PV facilities). 
At the federal level, the government has established an economy-wide carbon 
pricing mechanism, which commenced on 1 July 2012.  This mechanism is designed 
to internalise the cost of greenhouse gas emissions for the largest emitters of these 
gases in Australia.11  This mechanism is designed initially to operate by imposing a 
fixed price on the emissions of liable entities.  From 2015, this fixed price will be 
replaced with a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme, where liable entities will be 
required to participate in a market-based system that will require them to reduce 
regulated emissions.   
                                                                                                                                          
• the frequency and scope of future review under the [Renewable Electricity Act]’ 
('Renewable Energy Target Review: Issues Paper' (Climate Change Authority, 2012), 6). 
While the outcome of this review is likely to have an impact on the design of the Renewable 
Electricity Act, at the time of writing the Climate Change Authority had only published two 
preliminary papers – an Issues Paper and Discussion Paper (see: 'Renewable Energy Target Review: 
Issues Paper' (Climate Change Authority, 2012) and 'Renewable Energy Target Review: Discussion 
Paper' (Climate Change Authority, 2012)). 
10 See, eg, Electricity Supply Act 1995 (NSW), s 15A and pt 8A, Electricity (Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions) Act 2004 (ACT), Electricity Feed-in (Renewable Energy Premium) Act 2008 (ACT), 
Electricity (Feed-In Scheme-Solar Systems) Amendment Act 2008 (SA), Electricity Act 1994 (Qld), ss 
44A and 55DB and Energy Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Vic).  For an overview of how the state-
based feed-in tariff mechanisms operate (or operated) see Tim Nelson, Paul Simshauser and James 
Nelson, 'Queensland solar feed-in tariffs and the merit-order effect: economic benefit, or regressive 
taxation and wealth transfers?' (2012) (Working Paper No.30 – FiT II) AGL Applied Economic and 
Policy Research 1, 5. 
11 See, eg, 'Securing a clean energy future – The Australian Government’s climate change plan' 
(Australian Government, 2011), v and Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth), s 3. 
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The government contends that the carbon pricing mechanism ‘will change 
Australia’s electricity generation by encouraging investment in renewable energy’.12  
In addition, it is the government’s view that together with the Renewable Electricity 
Act, the carbon pricing mechanism ‘will deliver around $20 billion of investment in 
renewable energy by 2020’.13  While the carbon pricing mechanism may eventually 
encourage the production of renewable sourced electricity, it has been noted that the 
limited economic impact of the mechanism on large emitters of greenhouse gas 
emissions is unlikely to displace coal and, to a lesser extent, gas as the primary 
sources of electricity in Australia.14  Therefore, while the carbon pricing mechanism 
is relevant to understand the broader regulatory architecture in Australia to encourage 
the production of renewable sourced electricity, its role at present is to supplement 
(rather than replace) the Renewable Electricity Act.15 
Following this introduction, this chapter is divided into four sections: 
contextual, descriptive, analytical and synthetical.  The contextual section considers 
Australia’s historical reliance on fossil fuels.  This section also considers the trigger 
that led to the birth of the Renewable Electricity Act.  The second section offers an 
overview of the design of the various iterations of the Renewable Electricity Act.  
The third section considers the effectiveness of the Renewable Electricity Act to 
increase the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
The final section of this chapter then offers some concluding remarks.  These 
conclusions – together with those from the previous chapters – inform the 
recommendations that are presented in the following chapter. These 
recommendations are concerned with designing a regulatory regime in Australia that 
can effectively increase the production of renewable sourced electricity in order to 
                                                 
12 Securing a clean energy future, above n 11, v).  The objects of the Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth), 
which established the carbon pricing mechanism, note that it is designed to ‘encourage investment in 
clean energy’ (see Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth), s 3(d)(i)). 
13 Securing a clean energy future, above n 11, v. 
14 'Will gas or renewables usurp king coal? Executive summary' (RepuTex and Standard & Poor's 
Ratings, 2012) <http://www.reputex.com/newsletter/2012-march/>, 7-9. 
15 See, eg, Tristan Edis, 'Q&A: Pacific Hydro's Lane Crockett', Climate Spectator (Melbourne), 26 
April 2012 <http://www.climatespectator.com.au/commentary/qa-pacific-hydros-lane-crockett>.  In 
addition to the measures considered earlier, the Federal Government has also implemented a number 
of measures that are designed to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity, namely by 
providing additional funding to support such activity.  These policies include: the creation of the 
Australian Renewable Energy Agency, the Solar Flagships Program, the Clean Energy Finance 
Corporation (see: Securing a clean energy future, above n 11, app B). 
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contribute to the achievement of a sustainable and dignified electricity generation 
sector. 
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Australia’s reliance on fossil fuels 
The global oil crises that occurred during the 1970s forced many nation states 
to re-evaluate and, in some instances, reconceptualise their domestic energy 
strategies.  Before the oil crises, many states were prepared to rely on imported fuel 
sources to underpin their domestic electricity generation sector.  However, the 
economic, political and strategic uncertainty that was caused by the quadrupling of 
the world oil price during the first and second oil crises led many states to reduce 
their reliance on foreign energy sources.  Many countries also sought to develop 
domestic resources in order to strengthen their energy autonomy.  The pursuit of 
greater energy autonomy contributed directly and immediately to the genesis of 
regulatory efforts to utilise indigenous renewable sources that were previously 
underutilised. 
Notwithstanding the transition towards greater energy independence that took 
place in overseas jurisdictions in response to the oil crises, Australia’s energy 
strategy underwent only minimal changes in response to these events.  This reflected 
Australia’s relative energy autonomy, which was due to its ‘significant indigenous 
reserves of oil, and [its] self-sufficiency in natural gas and coal’.16  At the time of the 
oil crises, Australia 
was totally self-sufficient in black coal, lignite (brown coal) [and] natural 
gas ... [Further,] the price of Australian crude oil had been fixed ... just above 
import parity in September 1970 ... [and] it was not until 1978 that 
Australian refineries had to pay the world price for Australian crude oil.17 
Adding further credibility to Australia’s energy independence was its 
developed hydropower resources.  These facilities, which were located in New South 
Wales and Tasmania, contributed to approximately one-fifth of Australia’s total 
                                                 
16 Adrian J Bradbrook and Alexandra S Wawryk, 'Government Initiatives Promoting Renewable 
Energy for Electricity Generation in Australia' (2002) 1 University of New South Wales Law Journal 
124, 125. 
17 Robert E Marks, 'Energy Issues and Policies in Australia' (1986) 11(1) Annual Review of Energy 47, 
47. 
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generated electricity during the 1970s.18  Therefore, the reliance in Australia on its 
natural and indigenous resources – both renewable and non-renewable – meant that 
the factors that were precipitating the re-evaluation of energy strategies overseas had 
less of an impact domestically.19 
While Australia’s energy independence sheltered it from the global oil crises, it 
remained cognisant of the need to maintain its energy autonomy.  For this reason, 
successive federal governments focussed on the development and further exploitation 
of Australia’s indigenous fossil fuel sources.  For example, in November 1977, the 
energy policy of the government was to: 
• achieve ‘the highest degree of self-sufficiency in liquid fuels 
consistent with the broadly economic utilization of energy reserves’;20 
and 
• develop ‘economic oil and gas reserves ... to encourage individual 
major energy projects to meet overseas demand for energy 
minerals’.21 
Similar objectives were promulgated by the government seven years later.  For 
example, the central tenets of Australia’s energy policy in 1984 were concerned with: 
maintenance of adequate energy supply, pursuit of a high level of liquid-fuel 
self-sufficiency, the efficient development of Australia’s energy resources 
for domestic and overseas supply, and an equitable sharing of the benefits of 
energy resource development among the whole community.22 
Therefore, for much of the latter part of the twentieth century Australia’s energy 
independence was predicated on its rich deposits of fossil fuels.  One consequence of 
this was that other than the development of hydro sources, there was little emphasis 
on the development of Australia’s indigenous renewable sources. 
                                                 
18 'Renewable Opportunities: A Review of the Operation of the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 
2000' (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2003), 11.  The hydroelectricity in New South Wales is 
generated by the Snowy River Scheme.  This scheme, which commenced in 1949, has (among other 
things) seven hydroelectric generation facilities.  The Tasmanian hydroelectric facilities were 
developed progressively from the turn of the twentieth century.  Currently there are 28 hydroelectric 
generating facilities in Tasmania (see: Australian Energy Resource Assessment, above n 4, 232-3). 
19 Marks, above n 17, 47.  This source also provides a very useful account of the developments in 
Australia’s energy policy up until 1986. 
20 J D Anthony, National Energy Policy (Commonwealth of Australia, 1977). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Marks, above n 17, 62.  Original quote sourced from 'Energy Policies and Programmes of IEA 
Countries: 1983 Review' (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1984). 
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B. Towards a regime to encourage renewable sourced electricity 
Given Australia’s robust energy independence it seemed unlikely that, without 
different challenges from that which were presented during the global oil crises, 
Australia’s electricity generation sector would end its marriage to fossil fuels.  This 
new challenge emerged in the form of an international legal framework to mitigate 
anthropogenic climate change.  This framework emerged in 1992 at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, during 
which the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the 
UNFCCC)23 was created.  In its preamble, the UNFCCC noted that the ‘change in 
the earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind’.24  
The UNFCCC further noted that it is (and its signatories are) committed to 
‘protect[ing] the climate system for present and future generations’.25 
In 1995, negotiations commenced among the parties to the UNFCCC to 
elucidate the principles contained in that document into an active and enforceable 
legal instrument.  These negotiations led to the creation and subsequent adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol26 on 11 December 1997.27  It was with the emergence of the 
Kyoto Protocol, whose principal objective is the reduction of anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions, that an international legal regime to mitigate the 
challenges of climate change was borne.28 
The emergence of an international climate change regime elicited a direct 
response from the Australian Government.  This response was set out in the 
government’s climate change manifesto of 1997: Safeguarding the Future.29  This 
document noted that Australia required ‘sober, sensible but forward-looking action to 
                                                 
23 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature on 4 June 1992, 
31 ILM 849 (entered into force on 21 March 1994). 
24 Ibid, Preamble. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for 
signature 16 March 1998 (entered into force on 16 February 2005). 
27 The Kyoto Protocol took effect on 16 February 2005 following the ratification by the Russian 
Federation in November 2004. 
28 The objective of the Kyoto Protocol is to pursue the object of the UNFCCC (see: Kyoto Protocol to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 16 March 1998 
(entered into force on 16 February 2005), introductory paragraphs).  The ‘ultimate objective’ of the 
UNFCCC ‘is to achieve ... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ (see: United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature on 4 June 1992, 31 ILM 
849 (entered into force on 21 March 1994), art 2). 
29 John Howard, 'Safeguarding the future: Australia's response to climate change' (Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament of Australia, 1997). 
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reduce greenhouse gases’.30  It was suggested that to be effective such action had to 
focus on ‘seeking realistic, cost effective reductions in key [economic] sectors where 
emissions are high or growing strongly’.31 
Targeting the most emissions-intensive sectors of the Australian economy 
directed the government to focus on the electricity generation sector.  At the time, 
this sector was producing approximately 37 per cent of Australia’s total greenhouse 
gas emissions.32  This sector was also showing ‘phenomenal levels of growth’.33  
Therefore, it was suggested that if the greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity 
generation sector were left unabated they would increase by approximately 150 per 
cent by 2010 compared with their recorded levels in 1990.34 
To pursue ‘sober and sensible’ reductions in the electricity generation sector’s 
greenhouse gas emissions, the government adopted a ‘no regrets’ policy.35  This 
policy supported action that could achieve economic benefits, or at least no economic 
losses, while also pursuing a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions’.36  To realise 
this policy ambition, the government developed a suite of initiatives that were 
concerned with the following matters: 
• ‘contributing $21 million to create a specialist renewable energy 
innovation fund to provide government and private sector venture 
capital for companies with high growth potential’;37 
                                                 
30 Ibid, 2. 
31 Ibid, 4.  See also: Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts 
References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Bill 2000, Renewable 
Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Bill 2000 (2000), 3 and Explanatory Memorandum, Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Bill 2000 (Cth), 5. 
32 See, eg, Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts References 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Bill 2000, Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) (Charge) Bill 2000 (2000), 3 and Senate Environment, Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts Committee, Parliament of Australia, The Heat is On: Australia's Greenhouse 
Future (1999), xxxv. 
33 See, eg, Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts References 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Bill 2000, Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) (Charge) Bill 2000 (2000), 3. 
34 Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, The Heat is On: Australia's Greenhouse Future (1999), xxxv. 
35 A no regrets policy was first suggested as an approach to respond to climate change in the 'National 
Greenhouse Response Strategy' (Department of the Arts, Sport, Environment, Tourism and 
Territories, 1992). 
36 Harriet Bulkeley, 'No regrets?: Economy and environment in Australia's domestic climate change 
policy process' (2001) 11(2) Global Environmental Change 155, 3. 
37 John Howard, 'Safeguarding the future: Australia's response to climate change' (Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament of Australia, 1997), 5. 
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• ‘contributing $30 million worth of loans and grants for the 
development and commercialisation of the renewable energy 
industry’;38 
• ‘providing $10 million for some leading edge renewable energy 
“showcase” projects in areas such as tidal power solar thermal power 
and photovoltaic technologies’;39 and 
• ‘[setting] a mandatory target for electricity retailers to source an 
additional two per cent of their electricity from renewable energy 
sources by 2010’.40 
While each of these measures were designed to contribute to the growth of 
renewable sourced electricity in Australia, the final initiative was designed to lead 
this effort.  The purpose of the mandatory target for renewable sourced electricity 
was to: 
accelerate the uptake of renewable energy in grid-based electricity and 
provide a larger base for the development of commercially competitive 
renewable energy.41 
However, unlike the other policies that were designed to satisfy the government’s ‘no 
regrets’ policy, the mandatory target to source an additional two per cent of 
electricity from renewable sources was one of the few exceptions to this approach.42  
In this regard, it was anticipated that this policy would lead to economic costs.43 
Following a period of review and consultation, in 2000 the Renewable 
Electricity Act was established to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity by approximately two per cent by 2010.44  While a number of other 
regulatory regimes and policy measures were subsequently developed to encourage 
the production of renewable sourced electricity, the Renewable Electricity Act 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 14 August 2000, 16242 (Ian Campbell, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts). 
43 Renewable Opportunities, above n 18, 32. 
44 The review is set out in the 'Renewables Target Working Group - Final Report to the Greenhouse 
Energy Group: Implementation Planning for Mandatory Targets for the Uptake of Renewable Energy 
in Power Supplies' (Australian Greenhouse Office, 1999). 
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remains the centrepiece of Australia’s efforts to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity. 
THE DESIGN OF THE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY ACT 
The Renewable Electricity Act establishes a mandatory target for liable entities 
to source an additional amount of their electricity from renewable sources.  When the 
Renewable Electricity Act was first enacted, it reflected a relatively straightforward 
renewable portfolio standard.  However, following a number of amendments, the Act 
is now designed to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity using a 
more complex regulatory framework that is limited by various shortcomings.  
Therefore, it is the contention of this chapter that the Renewable Electricity Act is ill-
equipped to contribute to a more sustainable and dignified electricity generation 
sector in Australia. 
A. The design of the Renewable Electricity Act: 2001-2009 
Like most conventional renewable portfolio standards, the Renewable 
Electricity Act prescribes a target for the production of renewable sourced electricity 
that must be achieved within a given timeframe.  When it was enacted, the target 
(and the accompanying regulatory regime) took the name of the Mandatory 
Renewable Energy Target (or MRET) scheme.  The target for the MRET scheme 
was expressed in generation hour terms; it was designed to increase the amount of 
grid-connected electricity that was generated from renewable sources by 9,500 
gigawatt hours by 2010.45  Once the MRET scheme target was achieved, its target 
was designed to remain stable until 2020, at which time the MRET scheme would 
end.  The original annual targets under the MRET scheme are set out in Table 7.1 
below. 
                                                 
45 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 14 August 2000, 16242 (Ian Campbell).  Grid-
connected electricity accounts for approximately 90 per cent of all electricity generation in Australia 
(see: Buckman and Diesendorf, above n 8, 3369 and Iain MacGill, 'Electricity market design for 
facilitating the integration of wind energy: Experience and prospects with the Australian National 
Electricity Market' (2010) 38(7) Energy Policy 3180, 3183). 
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Table 7.1 
Required gigawatt hours of renewable sourced electricity under the MRET scheme46 
Year Required additional 
gigawatt hours 
 Year Required additional 
gigawatt hours 
2001 300  2006 4500 
2002 1100  2007 5600 
2003 1800  2008 6800 
2004 2600  2009 8100 
2005 3400  2010-2020 9500 
According to the government’s projections, an increase in the production of 
grid-connected renewable sourced electricity of 9,500 gigawatt hours by 2010 was 
designed to increase the share of renewable sourced electricity in Australia by 
approximately two per cent – from 10.5 per cent to 12.5 per cent.47  However, 
notwithstanding these projections, other commentators have noted that the mandated 
increase in renewable sourced electricity would be marginal because of the rapid 
growth in electricity consumption in Australia.48  In this regard, an increase in the 
production of renewable sourced electricity that was prescribed by the Renewable 
Electricity Act in 2001 would result in approximately the same amount (in 
percentage terms) of electricity generated from renewable sources in 2010 as was 
produced from these sources in 2001.49 
Given the concern about the modesty of the MRET scheme’s ambition and the 
ongoing need to respond to the challenges posed by climate change, eight years after 
the scheme was introduced its target was increased from 9,500 gigawatt hours to 
45,000 gigawatt hours.50  It was noted that this revised target was intended to deliver 
                                                 
46 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) (superseded), s 40. 
47 Explanatory Memorandum, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Bill 2000 (Cth), 9-10 and 41, 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 14 August 2000, 16242 (Ian Campbell), Anthony 
Kent and David Mercer, 'Australia's mandatory renewable energy target (MRET): an assessment' 
(2006) 34(9) Energy Policy 1046, 1049 and Buckman and Diesendorf, above n 8, 3369. 
48 Greg Buckman, Renewable Electricity Support Policy: Lessons for Australia from Overseas 
Experience (Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, Australian National University, 2011), 133-4. 
49 Buckman and Diesendorf, above n 8, 3369 and Buckman, above n 48, 133-4. 
50 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth), s 8 (which amended section 40 of the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth)), Explanatory Memorandum, Renewable Energy 
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‘the equivalent of at least 20 per cent of Australia’s electricity ... from renewable 
sources by 2020’.51  The revised target included all renewable sourced electricity 
generated in Australia, not just that which would be produced in response to the 
Renewable Electricity Act.  The revised annual targets continued to be expressed in 
generation hour terms, as set out in Table 7.2 below.  The revised target was to be 
achieved by 2020.  After 2020, the target would remain stable until 2030, after which 
time the scheme would end.52   
The changes to the Renewable Electricity Act were accompanied by a slight 
revision to the scheme’s title.  The ‘MRET’ scheme became the ‘enhanced 
Renewable Energy Target’ (or RET) scheme. 
Table 7.2 
Required gigawatt hours of renewable sourced electricity under the RET scheme: 2009 – 203053 
Year Required additional 
gigawatt hours 
 Year Required additional 
gigawatt hours 
2009 8100  2015 22850 
2010  12500  2016 27450 
2011 14825  2018 32050 
2012 17150  2019 41250 
2013 19050  2020 45850 
2014 20950  2021-2030 45000 
While the MRET scheme and its successor had different targets, until January 
2011 both schemes were designed to operate using the same regulatory architecture.  
Therefore, unless otherwise noted, the following description of the RET scheme 
(which reflects the design of the scheme prior to January 2011) also reflects the 
design of the MRET scheme. 
                                                                                                                                          
(Electricity) Amendment Bill 2009 (Cth), 1 and Angus Martyn and Julie Styles, 'Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Amendment Bill 2009' (Department of Parliamentary Services, 2009). 
51 Explanatory Memorandum, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 2009 (Cth), 1. 
52 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth), s 8 (which amended section 40 of the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth)), Explanatory Memorandum, Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Amendment Bill 2009 (Cth), 1 and Martyn and Styles, above n 50. 
53 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) (superseded), s 40. 
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As with most conventional renewable portfolio standards, the central tenet of 
the Renewable Electricity Act was to encourage the production of renewable sourced 
electricity.  This was to be done by providing financial support to facilities that 
generated such electricity.  The financial support was provided in the form of a 
Renewable Energy Certificate (or REC).  A REC was granted to a registered person 
for each megawatt hour of electricity that an ‘eligible power station’54 produced 
using ‘eligible energy sources’.55  Once in possession of a REC, a person could sell 
the certificate.  By doing so, the holder of the REC could realise a value for the 
certificate. 
The sale of the RECs could occur either by a bilateral trade or through a 
regulated secondary market.  The secondary market emerged specifically to facilitate 
the trading of RECs.  Despite the availability of the dedicated secondary market, it 
has been noted that since the Renewable Electricity Act was implemented up to 80 
per cent of transactions involving the sale of RECs are completed via bilateral 
trades.56  The reason for this is that such transactions negate the risks associated with 
the operation of the secondary market.  However, it has also been noted that RECs 
sold via bilateral trades are generally sold at a discount to the prevailing market 
price.  This is done to reflect the risks associated with the regulatory regime, many of 
which are considered in this chapter.57 
The sale of RECs occurred separately from the sale of the underlying 
renewable sourced electricity.  Therefore, the sale of RECs was designed to provide 
an operator of a renewable sourced electricity generating facility with an additional 
stream of revenue for the electricity that it produced.  That is, an operator could 
derive one source of income from the sale of RECs and another from the sale of the 
underlying renewable sourced electricity.  It has been noted that the revenue derived 
from the sale of RECs represents between 40 and 60 per cent of the income that it 
receives for its electricity, with the balance being derived from the sale of the 
underlying renewable sourced electricity.58  Therefore, as with all renewable 
                                                 
54 Ibid, s 13. 
55 Ibid, s 5 (definition of ‘eligible energy sources’). 
56 Walter Gerardi et al, 'Review of REC Markets' (J1424 Final Report, McLennan Magasanik 
Associates, 2007), 18. 
57 Kann Shayle, 'Overcoming barriers to wind project finance in Australia' (2009) 37(8) Energy Policy 
3139, 3145. 
58 '20-20 Vision: Investment Challenges and Opportunities Arising From Australia’s 20 per cent 
Renewable Energy Target' (Ernst & Young, 2008), 8. 
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portfolio standards, it is the additional revenue stream created from the sale of RECs 
that is the regime’s most critical feature. 
The Renewable Electricity Act was designed to create a demand for RECs by 
imposing an obligation on ‘liable entities’ to purchase and surrender annually to the 
regime’s regulator – currently the Clean Energy Regulator (the Regulator) (formerly 
the Renewable Energy Regulator) – the number of RECs that correspond to an 
entity’s ‘relevant acquisitions’ of electricity.59  To ease the burden of compliance, 
liable entities were entitled (and continue to be able) to discharge their obligation by 
surrendering an unlimited number of RECs that were produced in earlier years.  This 
entitles liable entities to ‘bank’ excess certificates purchased during a previous year, 
which they can then surrender in future years.  
‘Liable entities’ are ‘[a] person who, during a year, makes a relevant 
acquisition of electricity’.60  Subject to certain qualifications,61 a ‘relevant 
acquisition’ of electricity is ‘a wholesale acquisition of electricity’62 and ‘a notional 
wholesale acquisition’ of electricity.63   
The Renewable Electricity Act defines a ‘wholesale acquisition’ as ‘an 
acquisition of electricity from [the Australian Energy Market Operator]’64 or from ‘a 
person who did not acquire it from another person’.65  Essentially, a ‘wholesale 
acquisition’ refers to an acquisition of electricity that is made directly from a 
centralised wholesale electricity market, such as Australia's National Electricity 
                                                 
59 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), ss 3, 31, 36 and 38. 
60 Ibid, s 35. 
61 An acquisition of electricity will not be a ‘relevant acquisition’ where: 
• the electricity that is acquired is delivered on a grid that has a capacity of less than 100 
megawatts and that grid is not connected to a grid with a capacity of greater than 100 
megawatts (see: ibid, s 31(2)(a)); 
• the electricity is generated by the end user of that electricity and ‘the point at which the 
electricity is generated is less than 1 kilometre from the point at which the electricity is used' 
or the transmission or distribution network between the point of generation and the end user 
is used solely for transmitting electricity between those two points (see: ibid, s 32(2)(b)); or 
• the electricity is subsequently acquired by the Australian Energy Markets Operator (that is, 
the electricity is later sold through Australia's national electricity market) (see: ibid, s 
32(2)(c)). 
62 Ibid, s 31. 
63 Ibid.  In its preliminary recommendations, the Climate Change Authority noted that it recommends 
introducing an opt-in mechanism under the Renewable Electricity Act under which large users of 
electricity can opt-in to the regime so that they become liable entities.  The Authority contends that 
such a mechanism would allow businesses that decide to opt-in to manage the financial imposition of 
the regime directly (rather than being subject to contractually imposed increases in electricity prices).  
This approach would also make the REC market more liquid (Discussion Paper, above n 9, 103-4). 
64 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 32(1)(a). 
65 Ibid, s 32(1)(b). 
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Market (the NEM).66  Entities that would normally make such an acquisition are 
electricity retailers or large electricity consumers. 
A ‘notional wholesale acquisition’ is a slightly more complicated concept.  It 
refers to electricity that is not acquired through a centralised wholesale electricity 
market.67  A ‘notional wholesale acquisition’ can occur in two situations.  First, 
‘where the end user of the electricity acquires the electricity from the person who 
generated the electricity’68 and where the end user of that electricity does not 
purchase that electricity from a centralised electricity market.69  In this case,  
the person who generated the electricity is taken to be 2 persons (the 
notional generator and the notional wholesaler) and [the Renewable 
Electricity Act] applies as if the notional wholesaler acquired the electricity 
from the notional generator at the time that the end user acquired the 
electricity.70  
Therefore, an entity that generates and then supplies electricity to another party will 
be deemed to be making a notional wholesale acquisition if the entire transaction 
occurs outside of a wholesale electricity market. 
The second situation in which a notional wholesale acquisition occurs is: 
where the end user of the electricity generated the electricity ... [except 
where] the point at which the electricity is generated is less than one 
kilometre from the point at which the electricity is used [or] the electricity is 
transmitted or distributed between the point of generation and the point of 
[end use on a line] that is used solely for transmission or distribution of 
electricity between those two points.71 
A useful example of how this test may apply is where an entity owns and 
operates an electricity generating facility and an aluminium refinery that are located 
at different, yet proximate, sites.  The refinery consumes the electricity that is 
produced at the generating facility.  The transmission lines between the generating 
                                                 
66 The NEM is a wholesale market for the supply of electricity to retailers and end-users.  The NEM 
operates in Queensland, New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory, Victoria, South Australia 
and Tasmania.  The structure and regulation of the NEM is discussed in more detail below in the 
section titled ‘The interaction of the Renewable Electricity Act with the electricity market’. 
67 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 33(1). 
68 Ibid, s 33(2). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid (emphasis in original). 
71 Ibid, s 33(3). 
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facility and the refinery are able to receive electricity that is not generated at the 
generating facility that is located close by.  This may be necessary where the refinery 
requires more electricity than the generating facility can supply.  In this scenario, the 
entity in control of the generating facility and the aluminium smelter makes a 
notional wholesale acquisition of electricity.  These definitions continue to have 
effect under the current design of the Renewable Electricity Act. 
Under the Renewable Electricity Act as it existed prior to January 2011, a 
liable entity was required to discharge its obligations by surrendering a prescribed 
number of RECs to the Regulator at the end of a compliance year.  Failure by a liable 
entity to surrender the required number of RECs to the Regulator attracted a 
‘renewable energy shortfall charge’ for each megawatt hour of electricity for which a 
liable entity did not surrender a REC.72 
B. The design of the Renewable Electricity Act: 2009-2011 
When the Renewable Electricity Act was amended in 2009, the features that 
defined it as a renewable portfolio standard remained largely untouched.  
Nonetheless, certain critical changes were made that distinguished it from its 
predecessor.  Arguably, the most profound of these amendments related to the 
increase in the regime’s target and the accompanying extension of its operation from 
2020 to 2030. 
In addition, the changes that were made to the Renewable Electricity Act in 
2009 also delivered two further amendments of note.  First, the Renewable 
Electricity Act began to offer more generous financial support to solar water heaters, 
air source heat pump water heaters and ‘small generation units’.  Small generation 
units are small electricity generating devices that rely on hydro, wind or solar PV to 
generate electricity.73  The second amendment was the inclusion of a partial 
legislative exemption for liable entities that conducted electricity-intensive, trade-
exposed activities.74  While the latter amendment is considered in detail in the 
following paragraphs,75 of more immediate concern is the amendment that increased 
                                                 
72 Ibid (superseded), s 36. 
73 Ibid, s 5 (definition of ‘small generation unit’) and Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 
2001 (Cth), reg 3 (definition of ‘small generation unit’). 
74 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth), sch 2. 
75 The partial exemption regime under the Renewable Electricity Act is considered in more detail in 
this chapter under the section titled ‘The issue of compliance’. 
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the subsidies for solar water heaters, air source heat pump water heaters and small 
generation units.  The reason for this is that these amendments ultimately led to the 
most recent restructuring of the Renewable Electricity Act that took effect from 1 
January 2011. 
The financial support offered to small generation units was known as the ‘Solar 
Credits scheme’.  This support was designed solely to support an increase in the 
installation of small-scale solar PV systems following the termination of the Federal 
Government’s Photovoltaic Rebate Programme.76  This scheme continues to operate 
under the current design of the Renewable Electricity Act.  This scheme is designed 
to support an increase in the uptake of prescribed small generation units (namely, 
eligible solar PV units).77  Under the Solar Credits scheme, eligible solar PV units 
receive an allocation of RECs (or, if this right is assigned, the assignee will pay the 
assignor an amount equal to the RECs78) that is calculated by reference to the rules 
set out in the Renewable Electricity Act and the Regulations.79  Once the total 
number of RECs is determined, the multiplier increases the allocation of RECs by 
the factor of the multiplier.80  For example, if a person is entitled to five RECs 
following the installation of an eligible solar PV unit and the multiplier is five, then 
the number of RECs to be allocated will increase to 25. 
When the Solar Credits scheme was first introduced, the multiplier was set at 
five.81  The multiplier was designed to decrease gradually before being phased out by 
1 July 2015.82  The gradual reduction of the multiplier has since been expedited so 
that the Solar Credits scheme ends by 1 July 2013.83 
                                                 
76 See, eg, Solar Credits—frequently asked questions (FAQs) (2011) Department of Climate Change 
and Energy Efficiency <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/renewable-
target/need-ret/solar-credits-faq.aspx>.  
77 Martyn and Styles, above n 50, 10-1. 
78 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 23C(2). 
79 See: ibid, s 23B and Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth), regs 20 and 20AA. 
80 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth),pt 2, div 4, subdiv BA and Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth), regs 20 and 20AA. 
81 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 23B(2). 
82 Ibid. 
83 Greg Combet, Solar credits changes to ease electricity prices (2011) Australian Government 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/minister/greg-combet/2011/media-
releases/May/mr20110505.aspx.>.  The Climate Change Authority has made a preliminary 
recommendation that the Renewable Electricity Act should contain a mechanism where the Minister 
in charge of regulating the Renewable Electricity Act can apply a discounting method when 
determining the number of RECs that should be allocated to small-scale technologies.  The use of this 
method would be premised on the consideration of the following issues: (i) the technology costs; (ii) 
electricity prices (and the contribution of the SRES to these prices); and (iii) whether the payback 
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Similar to the Solar Credits scheme, in 2009 the Renewable Electricity Act 
offered owners of solar water heaters and air source heat pump water heaters (or, if 
this right is assigned, the assignee will pay the assignor an amount equal to the 
RECs84) an upfront allocation of RECs on the installation of these technologies.85  
This scheme continues to operate under the current design of the RET scheme.  The 
upfront allocation of RECs was designed to provide a generous subsidy to the 
recipient (or the assignee specified by the recipient) to encourage the uptake of 
eligible technologies.  The number of RECs allocated to certain categories of solar 
water heaters and air source heat pump water heaters was (and continues to be) 
reflected in the Register of Solar Water Heaters and Heat Pumps.86 
The decision to favour certain technologies over others is similar to the 
rationale underpinning the use of banding under the Renewables Obligation in 
Britain.87  However, its application is very different.  To the extent that a design 
feature supports the uptake of underutilised or immature technologies, it has some 
merit.  However, the design adopted under the Renewable Electricity Act in relation 
to small-scale technologies had (and continues to have) one major flaw. 
Under the Renewable Electricity Act, each REC was intended to represent one-
megawatt hour of electricity that had been generated using renewable sources.  
However, the application of the multiplier and the overly generous allocation of 
RECs to solar water and air source heat pump water heaters meant that the RECs 
awarded to these facilities did not reflect an actual amount of electricity.  As a result, 
the support mechanism for small-scale technologies created additional or ‘phantom 
credits’88 that operated to ‘exaggerate the real amount of renewable electricity 
generated’.89  This meant that there was a disconnect between the number of RECs 
issued to eligible persons and the amount of renewable sourced electricity 
                                                                                                                                          
period for small-scale technologies falls below 10 years.  This would mean that facilities eligible to 
receive SRECs could receive less than one certificate for each megawatt-hour of electricity that they 
produce (see: Discussion Paper, above n 9, 92-4). 
84 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 23C(2). 
85 Ibid,pt 2, div 4, subdiv B.  See also: Fact sheet: Support for small-scale renewable energy systems 
(2012) Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/en/government/initiatives/renewable-target/fs-small-scale-
renewable-energy.aspx>. 
86 Register of Solar Water Heaters/Heat Pumps and Postcode Zones (2011) Australian Government 
<http://www.orer.gov.au/Hot-Water-Systems/Eligible-Solar-Water-Heaters/eligible-swhs>. 
87 The concept of banding is considered in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
88 Scott Valentine, 'Braking wind in Australia: A critical evaluation of the renewable energy target' 
(2010) 38(7) Energy Policy 3668, 3672. 
89 Ibid. 
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generated.90  As a result, liable entities (and electricity consumers who had the cost 
of the regime passed through to them) had to pay an amount for renewable sourced 
electricity that did not in fact reflect the amount of renewable sourced electricity that 
was being generated.91 
The continued operation of the Solar Credits scheme and the generous support 
provided to solar water heaters and air source heat pump water heaters means that 
this limitation continues to undermine the effective design of the Renewable 
Electricity Act.  The ongoing presence of this support is considered further in the 
following sections.92 
The consequence of the generous support for small-scale technologies led to 
the oversupply of RECs in 2009.93  This is reflected in the fact that ‘[b]etween 1 
January 2009 and 13 November 2009, solar and electric heat pump hot water 
technologies were responsible for 45% of all RECs created in Australia’.94  This is 
reflected by Figure 7.1 below.  The oversupply of RECs led to the market price for 
these certificates dropping sharply in 2009, which is illustrated by Figure 7.2 below. 
                                                 
90 Ibid. 
91 Submission by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales to the 
Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Draft Energy White Paper 2011: Strengthening the 
Foundation for Australia's Energy Future, March 2012, 14-5. 
92 Issues relating to the solar multiplier and the eligibility of small-scale renewable technologies are 
considered in this chapter under the section titled ‘The issue of eligibility’. 
93 Buckman, above n 48, 144.  See also: Hugh Saddler, 'Australian policy in hot water' (2009) 
(November/December) Ecogeneration. 
94 Buckman and Diesendorf, above n 8, 3373.  See also: Saddler, above n 93. 
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Figure 7.1. Approved small-scale installations: 2001-2011 (Australia)95 
 
Figure 7.2. Renewable Energy Certificate prices: January 2009 – July 2012 (Australia)96 
The consequence of the oversupply of RECs and the subsequent fall in the 
price of these certificates meant that the larger renewable projects that relied on the 
                                                 
95 Renewable Energy Target Review: Issues Paper, above n 9, 33. 
96 Ibid, 22.  The data used to create this graph was originally sourced from Nextgen (2012) Nextgen 
<http://www.nges.com.au/>. 
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revenue generated from the sale of RECs were no longer economically viable.97  It 
was noted, therefore, that the oversupply of RECs from small-scale technologies 
‘was delaying investment in large-scale renewable energy projects’.98  This led to the 
further reform of the Renewable Electricity Act. 
C. The current design of the Renewable Electricity Act 
In mid-2010, regulators responded to the shortcomings of the Renewable 
Electricity Act by reforming its design.  The principal reform that was made to the 
Renewable Electricity Act at this time was to divide the RET scheme into two sub-
schemes: a ‘large renewable energy target’ (or LRET) and a ‘small-scale renewable 
energy scheme’ (or SRES).99  These amendments took effect on 1 January 2011 and 
continue to reflect the design of the Renewable Electricity Act.  While each sub-
scheme operates independently of one another, liable entities are required to comply 
with the obligations under both aspects of the revised Renewable Electricity Act.  
The design of the revised Renewable Electricity Act is considered below. 
For the remaining sections of this chapter, a reference to the Renewable 
Electricity Act is to the LRET and the SRES while a reference to a REC is to the 
certificates created under each sub-scheme. 
a. Large-scale renewable energy target 
The LRET is designed to operate in much the same way as the former RET 
scheme.  Under the LRET, large-scale generators receive Large-scale Generation 
Certificates (or LGCs) at a rate of one per megawatt hour of renewable sourced 
electricity that they generate.100 
On the creation of the LRET, the target relating to the generation of renewable 
sourced electricity was reduced to 41,000 gigawatt hours (from the previous target of 
                                                 
97 Explanatory memorandum, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth), 4.  See 
also: Valentine, above n 88, 3672, Buckman and Diesendorf, above n 8, 3373 and Buckman, above n 
8, 79. 
98 Explanatory memorandum, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth), 4. 
99 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Act 2010 (Cth), sch 1 pt 1.  While the division of the 
RET scheme was intended to overcome the oversupply of RECs from small-scale technologies, the 
transitional provisions in the legislation that gave effect to this split noted that all existing RECs were 
to be treated as LGC (see: ibid, sch 2 cl 4(1)).  This meant that all certificates created before 1 January 
2011 by small-scale technologies continue to affect the supply of certificates under the LRET. 
100 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), pt 2, div 4, subdiv A. 
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45,000 gigawatt hours).101  The revised target for the LRET continues to be 
expressed in generation hour terms.  This target is to be achieved by 2020.  After this 
time, the target remains stable until 2030, after which time the scheme concludes.102  
The revised annual targets are set out in Table 7.3 below. 
Table 7.3 
Required gigawatt hours of renewable sourced electricity under the RET scheme following 1 January 
2011103 
Year Required additional 
gigawatt hours 
 Year Required additional 
gigawatt hours 
2011 10400  2016 22600 
2012 12300  2017 27200 
2013 14200  2018 31800 
2014 16100  2019 36400 
2015 18000  2020-2030 41000 
While the final target under the LRET is slightly lower than the overall target 
under the previous version of the RET scheme, ‘[t]he apparent reduction of the 
target, from ... 45 000 [gigawatt hours], is a recognition that the separate SRES will 
account for at least 4000 [gigawatt hours] of generation’.104  Therefore, the reduction 
in the scheme’s target is not intended to reduce the ambition of the Renewable 
Electricity Act.  Instead, by effectively creating two independent markets for RECs 
(one for large and one for small-scale technologies) it was projected that under the 
revised design of the RET scheme that ‘[l]arge renewable energy generation [would] 
expand markedly’.105   
                                                 
101 Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Act 2000 (Cth), s 40. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) (superseded), s 40. 
104 Senate Environment, Communications and the Arts Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Parliament of Australia, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 2010 [Provisions], 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Amendment Bill 2010 [Provisions], Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) (Small-scale Technology Shortfall Charge) Bill 2010 [Provisions] (2010), 3.   
105 Walter Gerardi, 'Impacts of Changes to the Design of the Expanded Renewable Energy Target' 
(McLennan Magasanik Associates, 2010), 25. 
  
 216 
However, this projection has not come to fruition, at least not yet.106  The 
reason for this is that the measures governing the transition of the Renewable 
Electricity Act to a dual system provided that all RECs that were created prior to 1 
January 2011 would be deemed to be LGCs.107  This meant that the oversupply of 
RECs created by small-scale technologies prior to 1 January 2011 has continued to 
undermine the demand for LGCs, as these certificates (by virtue of being able to be 
banked and surrendered in later years) continue to be used to meet obligations under 
the LRET.  The consequence of this is that the LRET remains subject to the 
limitations relating to oversupply.108  This problem is not expected to be resolved 
until 2015 or 2016.109  This means that it is unlikely that the LRET will have the 
desired effect of encouraging the development of large-scale renewable electricity 
projects, at least in the near term.110 
The renewable technologies that are eligible to participate in the LRET are 
those that are not eligible to participate in the SRES.  These technologies include 
‘wind farms, solar arrays, hydroelectricity, geothermal facilities and other accredited 
renewable generators’111 that are of a utility-scale.112 
                                                 
106 See, eg, Adam Morton, 'Country's largest wind turbine maker sacks 24 workers', The Age 
(Melbourne), 2012 <http://www.theage.com.au/national/countrys-largest-wind-turbine-maker-sacks-
24-workers-20120606-1zwp6.html> and Buckman, above n 48, 138-9. 
107 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), sch 2. 
108 'Quarterly Market Review: Quarter ending June 2011' (SKM MMA for the Clean Energy Council, 
2011), 2. 
109 See, eg, ibid, 'Electricity Statement of Opportunities for the National Electricity Market' 
(Australian Energy Market Operator, 2012), 2-17 and Marco Stella, 'Enviro markets of uncertainty', 
Climate Spectator (Melbourne), 2012 <http://www.climatespectator.com.au/commentary/enviro-
markets-
uncertainty?utm_source=Climate%20Spectator&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=3746335ea2-
CSPEC_DAILY>. 
110 Giles Parkinson, 'Some critical lessons from Solar Flagships…', Reneweconomy (Sydney), 2012 
<http://reneweconomy.com.au/2012/some-critical-lessons-from-solar-flagships-10578>. 
111 Senate Environment, Communications and the Arts Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Parliament of Australia, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 2010 [Provisions], 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Amendment Bill 2010 [Provisions], Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) (Small-scale Technology Shortfall Charge) Bill 2010 [Provisions] (2010), 11. 
112 For the SRES, only the following facilities are eligible to receive STCs: 
• hydroelectric systems with a capacity of 6.4 kilowatts or less and a total annual electricity 
output of 25 megawatt hours or less (see: Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 5 
(definition of ‘small generation unit’) and Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 
(Cth), r 3(2)(a) (definition of ‘small generation unit’)); 
• wind systems with a capacity of 10 kilowatts or less that and a total annual electricity output 
of 25 megawatt hours or less (see: Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 5 
(definition of ‘small generation unit’) and Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 
(Cth), r 3(2)(b) (definition of ‘small generation unit’)); 
• solar PV systems with a capacity of 100 kilowatts or less and a total annual electricity output 
of 250 megawatt hours or less (see: Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 5 
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Subject to the application of any available exemptions, liable entities under the 
LRET are required to surrender annually to the Regulator the number of LGCs that 
correspond to the amount that is calculated by multiplying its relevant acquisitions of 
electricity (in megawatt hours) by the applicable ‘Renewable Power Percentage’ for 
large-scale generation.113  The ‘Renewable Power Percentage’ reflects the number of 
LGCs, in percentage terms, which a liable entity has to surrender as a proportion of 
its total relevant acquisitions of electricity in a given year.114  In effect, the 
Renewable Power Percentage reflects a liable entity’s annual quota. 
To ease the burden of compliance, a liable entity is entitled to surrender an 
unlimited number of banked LGCs.  Failure to surrender the required number of 
LGCs attracts a ‘large-scale generation shortfall charge’ of $65 for each megawatt 
hour of electricity for which a LGC was not surrendered.115  This amount is not tax 
deductible, meaning that in real terms the charge equates to approximately $93.116  
The design of the LRET is depicted in Figure 7.3 below. 
                                                                                                                                          
(definition of ‘small generation unit’) and Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 
(Cth), r 3(2)(c) (definition of ‘small generation unit’)); and 
• solar water heaters and air source heat pump water heaters that meet certain capacity and 
accreditation standards (see: Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 5 (definition 
of ‘air source heat pump water heater’ and ‘solar water heater’) and Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth), r 3A). 
In its preliminary recommendations relating to the Renewable Electricity Act, the Climate Change 
Authority has noted that it is considering whether there is a case for transferring certain technologies 
from the SRES into the LRET.  In particular, the Authority noted that careful consideration must be 
given to lowering the capacity limit for small-scale solar PV from 100 kilowatts to 10 kilowatts, in 
order to make it more consistent with the capacity caps that apply to the other small-scale technologies 
under the SRES (Discussion Paper, above n 9, v and 85-7). 
Such a change would enable producers of the noted solar PV technologies to receive a larger source of 
revenue, as they would be entitled to LGCs which are likely to exceed $40 in value (which is the cap 
currently placed on SRECs), particularly as the LRET target increases.  However, this change would 
also contribute to the risk that small-scale solar PV technologies that fall within the LRET could 
cannibalise this target.  As such, this would undermine the confidence of investors that are committing 
funds to truly large-scale renewable sourced electricity generating projects (see: Tristan Edis, 'A tricky 
trap ahead for solar', Climate Spectator (Melbourne), 2012 
<http://www.climatespectator.com.au/commentary/tricky-trap-ahead-solar>). 
113 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), ss 5 (definition of ‘renewable power percentage’), 
38 and 39. 
114 Ibid, s 5 (definition of ‘renewable power percentage’) and s 39.  Renewable Energy (Electricity) 
Regulations 2001 (Cth) (the Regulations), reg 23.  To the extent that the Regulations do not prescribe 
a ‘renewable power percentage’ the Renewable Electricity Act provides a formula to determine this 
percentage (see: Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), ss 39 and 40A). 
115 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), ss 36-38 and Renewable Energy (Electricity) 
(Large-scale Generation Shortfall Charge) Act 2000 (Cth), 6. 
116 Peter Osman, 'Review of Progress to Achieving Targets Under Section 7 of the Climate Change 
And Greenhouse Emissions Reduction Act 2007' (CSIRO, 2009), 17. 
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To appreciate how the regime works operates in practice, it is useful to 
consider an example of how the LRET is designed to impose liability.  This liability 
is in addition to that which exists under the SRES.  In this example, a liable entity 
was responsible for 1000 megawatts of relevant acquisitions of electricity in 2011.  
The liable entity did not have any partial exemptions that operated to reduce its 
liability.  It also did not have any banked LGCs.  In 2011, the renewable power 
percentage was 5.62 per cent.117  Therefore, according to the methodology to 
calculate the number of LGCs that a liable entity was required to surrender in 2011, 
the liable entity would have had to surrender 56 LGC to the Regulator by the 
specified compliance date (which is no later than 14 February in 2012).118 
 
Figure 7.3. Design of the Large Renewable Energy Target (Australia)119 
b. Small-scale renewable energy scheme 
Like the LRET, the SRES shares many features with the design of the RET 
scheme that it replaced.  However, is also contains a number of nuances that are 
intended to support the development of only small-scale renewable technologies.  
The design of the SRES is depicted in Figure 7.4 below. 
Under the SRES: 
                                                 
117 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth), r 23(k). 
118 This amount was calculated by the author. 
119 'Increasing Australia’s renewable electricity generation: The Large-scale Renewable Energy Target 
(LRET), The Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES)' (Office of the Renewable Energy 
Regulator, 2011), 7. 
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owners of small-scale technologies ... are eligible to create Small-scale 
Technology Certificates [(or STCs)] at a rate of one per [megawatt hour] of 
electricity generation equivalent [subject to the application of] [t]he existing 
Solar Credits scheme [(and the support offered to solar water and heat pump 
heaters)].120 
The technologies that are eligible to receive STCs are small hydroelectric 
systems,121 wind systems,122 solar PV systems,123 solar water heaters and air source 
heat pump water heaters that meet certain capacity and accreditation standards.124  
The number of STCs that a recipient receives is calculated on the estimated output of 
the technology.  The estimated output of a given technology relies on information 
such as the model installed, the expected lifespan of the unit and the location of the 
installation.125  Further, deeming arrangements operate under the SRES that enable 
recipients of STCs to receive their certificates for the expected lifetime generation of 
their unit upfront, rather than over the life of the technology.126  This is designed to 
provide upfront assistance with the installation of the relevant technology. 
                                                 
120 Senate Environment, Communications and the Arts Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Parliament of Australia, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 2010 [Provisions], 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Amendment Bill 2010 [Provisions], Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) (Small-scale Technology Shortfall Charge) Bill 2010 [Provisions] (2010), 6. 
121 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 5 (definition of ‘small generation unit’) and 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth), r 3(2)(a) (definition of ‘small generation 
unit’). 
122 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 5 (definition of ‘small generation unit’) and 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth), r 3(2)(b) (definition of ‘small generation 
unit’). 
123 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 5 (definition of ‘small generation unit’) and 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth), r 3(2)(c) (definition of ‘small generation 
unit’). 
124 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 5 (definition of ‘air source heat pump water 
heater’ and ‘solar water heater’) and Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth), r 3A. 
125 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), ss 22(1) (for solar hot water and heat pump water 
heaters) and 23A (for small generation units) and Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 
(Cth), rr 19B (for solar hot water and heat pump water heaters) and 19D (for small generation units).  
See also: Senate Environment, Communications and the Arts Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Parliament of Australia, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 2010 [Provisions], 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Amendment Bill 2010 [Provisions], Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) (Small-scale Technology Shortfall Charge) Bill 2010 [Provisions] (2010), 19. 
126 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), ss 22(1) (for solar hot water and heat pump water 
heaters) and 23A (for small generation units) and Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 
(Cth), rr 19B (for solar hot water and heat pump water heaters) and 19D (for small generation units).  
See also: Senate Environment, Communications and the Arts Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Parliament of Australia, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 2010 [Provisions], 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Amendment Bill 2010 [Provisions], Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) (Small-scale Technology Shortfall Charge) Bill 2010 [Provisions] (2010), 19.   
In respect of the issue of deeming, Saddler notes that the current arrangements under the Renewable 
Electricity Act are ‘not compatible with a well designed renewable electricity ... scheme’ because 
certificates are not based on measured generation of electricity.  Further, Saddler recognises that the 
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Unlike the LRET, the SRES does not prescribe an annual or overall target for 
renewable sourced electricity.  Rather, the SRES requires that liable entities purchase 
and surrender all STCs that are created during a compliance year.127  Liability under 
the SRES is calculated by multiplying a liable entity’s relevant acquisitions of 
electricity by the Small-scale Technology Percentage.128  The Small-scale 
Technology Percentage is similar to the Renewable Power Percentage, but is specific 
to the determination of liability under the SRES.129  Liable entities must comply with 
their obligations under the SRES on a quarterly (rather than an annual) basis.130  
Failure by a liable entity to surrender the required number of STC attracts a 
small-scale technology shortfall charge of $65 for each megawatt hour of electricity 
for which a STC was not surrendered.131  Like the corresponding charge under the 
LRET, this charge is not tax deductible. 
                                                                                                                                          
allocation of certificates using this approach ‘assumes systems are all correctly installed … will work 
at capacity for their entire life … [and will] [b]ring forward modelled lifetime electricity 
generated/saved in full to the year of installation’.  Saddler notes that these features indicate further 
weaknesses of the regime’s design (see: Hugh Saddler, 'Reducing the emissions intensity of electricity 
supply: implementation of Australia's expanded Mandatory Renewable Energy Target' (Paper 
presented at the Law and Policy to Advance Renewable Energy: A Comparative Colloquium, 
Canberra, 29-30 November 2010)).   
In this respect, the Climate Change Authority noted in its preliminary recommendations that it is 
currently considering ‘whether shorter deeming periods (such a five years at a time) should be 
considered for larger PV systems’ (see: and Discussion Paper, above n 9, 148). 
127 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 38AE.  See also: Senate Environment, 
Communications and the Arts Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Parliament of 
Australia, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 2010 [Provisions], Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) (Charge) Amendment Bill 2010 [Provisions], Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Small-
scale Technology Shortfall Charge) Bill 2010 [Provisions] (2010), 20. 
128 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), ss 5 (‘small-scale technology percentage’) and s 
40A. 
129 Ibid, s 40A. 
130 Ibid, ss 38AA(6) and 38AE. 
131 Ibid, ss 38AA-38AI and Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Small-scale Technology Shortfall 
Charge) Act 2010 (Cth), s 6. 
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Figure 7.4. Design of the Small-Scale Renewable Energy Scheme (Australia)132 
The sale and purchase of STCs can occur in one of two ways.  First, an STC 
can be sold via a bilateral contract.  This is the same as for LGCs.  STCs can also be 
sold into a voluntary clearing house that caps the price of STCs.133  The clearing 
house is designed to reduce the market risk associated with the sale of STCs by 
offering a certain, predictable price.134 
The clearing house operates by adding to a list any STC that an owner chooses 
to sell via this mechanism.  The clearing house then offers the STCs that it holds for 
sale in the order that it received them.135  When a sale of an STC from the clearing 
house occurs, the STC is sold for a fixed price of $40 (plus a 10 per cent goods and 
services tax).  The funds from the transaction are then remitted to the seller of that 
certificate.  To the extent that no STCs are sold to the clearing house, the clearing 
                                                 
132 Increasing Australia’s renewable electricity generation, above n 119, 11. 
133 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), pt 2A. 
134 Explanatory memorandum, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth), 2. 
135 In its preliminary recommendations, the Climate Change Authority has suggested that a change be 
made to the rules regulating certificates on the clearing house transfer list.  The reason for this is that 
the clearing house currently does not provide for an efficient and timely process for certificates in the 
clearing house to be sold for the prescribed $40 amount.  In this regard, the Authority’s preliminary 
view is that: 
the clearing house should be amended to a ‘deficit sales facility’, whereby certificates are 
only allowed to be entered on the clearing house transfer list when the clearing house is in 
deficit (that is, only when regulator-created certificates have been issued to liable entities).  
This would allow the continued operation of the clearing house as a price cap, while making 
it clear that it is unable to guarantee a set price for certificates.  Such an amendment would 
also allow the clearing house price to be more easily amended as there would be no need for 
transitional arrangements for certificates on the transfer list (see: Discussion Paper, above n 
9, v). 
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house can create additional certificates for sale at $40 if a liable entity wishes to 
purchase a STC to avoid payment of the shortfall charge.  Certificates that are 
created by the clearing house will be cancelled as soon as a new STC is registered. 
To appreciate how the regime works in practice, it is useful to consider an 
example of how the SRES is designed to impose liability.  This liability is in addition 
to that which is imposed under the LRET.  Liability under the SRES is calculated 
quarterly and in some instances is based on the previous year’s relevant electricity 
acquisitions.136 
In this example, a liable entity was responsible for 1000 megawatts of relevant 
acquisitions of electricity in 2011.  The liable entity did not have any partial 
exemption certificates that operated to reduce its liability.  It also did not have any 
banked STCs. 
To calculate its liability for the first quarter (January to March), the liable 
entity was required to calculate 35 per cent of its previous year’s relevant 
acquisitions of electricity.  Having done so, it was then required to multiply this 
amount by the Small-scale Technology Percentage.137  In this example, in 2010 the 
liable entity was also responsible for 1000 megawatts of relevant acquisitions of 
electricity.  The Small-scale Technology Percentage for 2011 was 14.80 per cent.  
Therefore, for the first quarter of 2011, the liable entity was required to surrender 52 
STCs.138 
For the second (April to June) and third (July to September) quarters, the liable 
entity was required to calculate 25 per cent of the previous year’s relevant electricity.  
Having done so, it was then required to multiply this amount by the Small-scale 
Technology Percentage.139  Applying this methodology to the current example, the 
liable entity was required to surrender 37 STCs in each of the second and third 
quarters.140 
For the final quarter (October to December), the liable entity was required to 
calculate the current year’s relevant electricity acquisitions, multiply this by the 
Small-scale Technology Percentage and then subtract from that amount all of the 
                                                 
136 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 38AE. 
137 Ibid. 
138 This amount was derived by the author’s own calculations. 
139 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 38AE(2) and (3). 
140 This amount was derived by the author’s own calculations. 
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STCs that it had already surrendered in that year.141  The answer to this calculation 
equals the number of STCs that the liable entity was required to surrender in the final 
quarter of 2011.  For the present example, this amount equals 22 STCs.142 
This overview reflects the current design of the Renewable Electricity Act.  
With this broad overview of the Act now completed, this chapter now considers the 
most critical design features of the Renewable Electricity Act in order to determine 
whether the regime is designed to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity in an effective manner. 
A REVIEW OF THE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY ACT 
A. The issue of grundnorms 
The analysis of the Renewable Electricity Act commences with a review of its 
grundnorms.  Such an analysis is intended to elucidate the direction in which the Act 
is designed to steer society, which is reflected in the design of the Act’s regulatory 
rules. 
The objects of the Renewable Electricity Act are: 
(a) to encourage the additional generation of electricity from 
renewable sources; and 
(b) to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the electricity sector; 
and 
(c) to ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically 
sustainable.143 
The Renewable Electricity Act notes that these objects are to be achieved by: 
the issuing of certificates for the generation of electricity using eligible 
renewable energy sources and requiring certain purchasers ... to surrender a 
specified number of certificates for the electricity that they acquire during a 
year.144 
                                                 
141 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 38AE(4). 
142 This amount was derived by the author’s own calculations. 
143 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 3.  In 2000, when the Renewable Electricity Act 
was first enacted, paragraph (b) of its objects did not include a reference to the ‘electricity sector’.  
Rather, the object to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was of a general nature.  In 2009, paragraph (b) 
was amended to include a specific reference to the ‘electricity sector’ (see: Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth), sch 1, cl 1). 
144 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 3 
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Therefore, the Renewable Electricity Act is designed to achieve its three objects by 
using a renewable portfolio standard. 
On an initial reading of the objects, the Renewable Electricity Act appears not 
to discriminate between its three objects.  However, on a closer reading of the Act 
and the material that provides context to its design, it is evident that the objects are 
not to be treated equally.  Rather, a closer assessment of the Act indicates that its 
objects fall into two categories.  These categories denote their importance. 
The first category contains the first two objects of the Renewable Electricity 
Act that are listed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the above extract.  These are the Act’s 
‘principal objectives’ as they appear to operate in an unqualified manner.  The 
second category contains the object that is listed in paragraph (c) of the above 
extract.  This is the Renewable Electricity Act’s ‘secondary object’, as it appears to 
be supplementary to the first two objects. 
In relation to the principal objects, the language of the Renewable Electricity 
Act indicates that these objects operate independently of one another.  This means 
that the Renewable Electricity Act is designed to ‘encourage the additional 
generation of electricity from renewable sources’ and ‘to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases in the electricity sector’.  On this interpretation, the Renewable 
Electricity Act is designed specifically to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.  Therefore, at least on an initial reading, it appears that one of the 
Act’s grundnorms is to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  If 
this is correct, such a grundnorm is appropriate to contribute to the achievement of a 
sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector. 
Notwithstanding the above interpretation, offering further insight into the 
principal objects of the Renewable Electricity Act is its explanatory memorandum.145  
When read together with the objects of the Renewable Electricity Act, the 
explanatory memorandum provides a more nuanced view of the meaning of the Act’s 
objects.  While only slight, this nuance has a profound impact on the grundnorm of 
the Renewable Electricity Act. 
                                                 
145 Explanatory Memorandum, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Bill 2000 (Cth). 
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The explanatory memorandum noted that the Renewable Electricity Act is 
designed ‘to accelerate the uptake of renewable [electricity] ... so as to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions’.146  Moreover, the explanatory memorandum noted that: 
[t]he renewables target is primarily a long-term greenhouse response 
measure achieved through development of industry capacity ... As there is 
the potential for substantial emissions reductions to be required from the 
electricity sector in the future, occurring at the same time as growing 
electricity demand, a shift towards renewables will be particularly important 
for the electricity generation sector.  However, if Australia is to position 
itself to cost-effectively reduce emissions in the long run by increased use of 
renewables, action will be required now.147 
The extract from the explanatory memorandum contradicts the earlier 
conclusion that the two principal objects of the Act are designed to operate 
independently.  Instead, the explanatory memorandum indicates that the Act’s 
principal objects are interdependent.  On this interpretation, the uptake of renewable 
sourced electricity is necessary only to the extent that it can assist with the reduction 
of the electricity sector’s greenhouse gas emissions.  Therefore, rather than having 
two principal objects, the Renewable Electricity Act has only a single object: to 
reduce emissions in the electricity sector by encouraging the generation of renewable 
sourced electricity.  This latter view is consistent with the policy rationale for the 
Renewable Electricity Act that was set out in Safeguarding the Future, which was 
that renewable sourced electricity should be increased to assist with Australia’s 
efforts to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.148  Therefore, this more nuanced 
approach is the Act’s grundnorm. 
While the explanatory memorandum’s contribution to the grundnorm of the 
Renewable Electricity Act is only subtle, its practical effect is profound.  The reason 
for this is that the conflation of the principal objects of the Renewable Electricity Act 
limits the Act’s strategic direction.  Rather than encouraging the production of 
renewable sourced electricity – which is critical to contributing to a more sustainable 
and dignified electricity generation sector – the objects of the Act are limited to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector.  Limiting the 
                                                 
146 Ibid, 7. 
147 Ibid. 
148 John Howard, 'Safeguarding the future: Australia's response to climate change' (Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament of Australia, 1997), 5. 
  
 226 
production of renewable sourced electricity in such a way ignores the many and 
varied benefits that renewable sourced electricity can deliver beyond reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.  For example, the generation of electricity from renewable 
sources can contribute to greater access to stable, secure, affordable and 
environmentally benign electricity, each of which is important for an electricity 
sector that promotes human dignity and sustainable development.  On this view, the 
grundnorm of the Renewable Electricity Act is suboptimal, as it does not exhibit a 
meaningful commitment to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity 
and therefore, ultimately, fails to provide the strategic direction that is required to 
contribute to a more sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector. 
In relation to the supplementary object of the Renewable Electricity Act, this is 
concerned with ensuring that any renewable sourced electricity that is generated is 
derived from an ecologically sustainable renewable source.  The Renewable 
Electricity Act defines ‘ecologically sustainable’ as: 
an action [that] is consistent with the following principles of ecologically 
sustainable development: 
(a) decision-making processes should effectively integrate both long-
term and short-term economic, environmental, social and equitable 
considerations; 
(b) if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation; 
(c) the principle of inter-generational equity, which is that the present 
generation should ensure that the health, diversity and productivity 
of the environment is maintained or enhanced for the benefit of 
future generations; 
(d) the conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity 
should be a fundamental consideration in decision-making; 
(e) improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms should be 
promoted.149 
In short, this means that any renewable source that is used to generate electricity 
under the Renewable Electricity Act must do so in such a way as to meet the needs of 
the present without compromising the needs of future generations.   
                                                 
149 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), 5 (definition of ‘ecologically sustainable’). 
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The use of ecologically sustainable resources is, in itself, a beneficial and 
necessary object to contribute to a sustainable and dignified electricity generation 
sector.  However, this object applies to limit the type of renewable sources that are 
used to generate electricity.  This object does not itself encourage an increase in the 
generation of renewable sourced electricity in Australia in such a way as to 
contribute to sustainable development.  Therefore, while important to the overall 
pursuit of a sustainable electricity generation sector, the secondary object 
supplements the grundnorm of the Act. 
The above interpretation indicates that the grundnorm of the Renewable 
Electricity Act is concerned with reducing the greenhouse gases emitted by the 
electricity generation sector.  To do so, the Renewable Electricity Act is designed to 
encourage the generation of renewable sourced electricity from ecologically 
sustainable sources.  In this regard, the grundnorm of the Renewable Electricity Act 
is designed to address the discrete issue of climate change mitigation rather than the 
more general concepts of sustainable development and human dignity through the 
promotion of renewable sourced electricity generation.  For this reason, the basic 
norm informing the Renewable Electricity Act is not designed to contribute to a 
sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector.  This represents a fundamental 
shortcoming of the Renewable Electricity Act. 
The failure of the Renewable Electricity Act is not limited to the design of its 
grundnorm, however.  It is also reflected in its regulatory rules, which give practical 
effect to the regime’s grundnorm.  To understand why this is so, the following 
sections consider the regulatory rules of the Renewable Electricity Act.  This analysis 
considers the Act’s regulatory rules within the hierarchical framework of first and 
second order regulatory rules that was first considered in Chapter Six.150 
B. A review of the first order regulatory rules 
a. The issue of financial support 
The Renewable Electricity Act offers different types of support to facilities that 
participate in the LRET and the SRES.  In relation to the LRET, large-scale 
generators receive LGCs at a rate of one per megawatt hour of renewable sourced 
                                                 
150 The concept of first and second order regulatory rules was first considered in Chapter 6. 
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electricity that they generate.151  Under the SRES, the number of STCs that an owner 
of a facility (or its assignee) receives is calculated by reference to the multiplier 
operating under the Solar Credits Scheme or the regime supporting solar water 
heaters and heat pump water heaters.   
While the support offered to small-scale technologies is relevant to the overall 
deployment of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities, of more immediate 
concern to this thesis is the nature of the support provided to eligible renewable 
sources under the LRET.  This is because the LRET is designed to support the 
deployment of utility-scale renewable sourced electricity generating facilities, which 
is the particular concern of this thesis. 
The LRET is designed to operate using a technology neutral approach.  That is, 
it is designed to offer all eligible renewable sources the same level of support.  While 
the rationale for such an approach is to avoid ‘picking winners’ and to facilitate the 
deployment of least-cost facilities, this approach undermines the deployment of a 
diverse portfolio of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities.152  The reason 
for this is that such an approach will only succeed in stimulating the least-cost 
renewable sourced electricity generating facilities, as the financial benefit derived 
from the sale of LGCs will be greatest if the development and electricity generating 
costs are low.153  Therefore, under a technology neutral approach, the ‘big losers’ 
will be the more expensive technologies that require higher levels of financial 
support.154 
The technology neutral approach of the Renewable Electricity Act may be 
contrasted with the use of banding under the British Renewables Obligation, which 
itself, is designed to operate like the stepped tariff that operates under the German 
feed-in tariff law.155  The purpose of banding and stepped tariffs alike is to address 
the very problem that encourages investors to focus only on deploying mature 
technologies by offering greater financial support to more immature renewable 
technologies.  In this regard, the failure by the Renewable Electricity Act to adopt 
                                                 
151 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), pt 2, div 4, subdiv A. 
152 See, eg, Buckman and Diesendorf, above n 8, 3370 and Saddler, 93. 
153 Buckman and Diesendorf, above n 8.  See also: Buckman, above n 8, 80. 
154 Buckman and Diesendorf, above n 8, 3370. 
155 The concept of banding is considered in more detail in Chapter 5.  Stepped tariffs are considered in 
more detail in Chapter 3.  In the context of the German feed-in tariff law, stepped tariffs are 
considered in Chapter 4. 
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such a nuanced approach to subsidising the production of renewable sourced 
electricity means that it is only designed to stimulate investment into least-cost 
facilities.  This represents a further shortcoming of the regime, as it is contrary to 
providing a robust and meaningful commitment to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity from a diversity of renewable sources by offering cost-
appropriate financial support to all eligible facilities. 
b. The interaction of the Renewable Electricity Act with the electricity market 
Renewable portfolio standards are designed to encourage the generation of 
renewable sourced electricity by creating an additional source of income for 
generators of renewable sourced electricity.  This ‘additional’ income stream is 
derived from selling RECs, which is supplementary to the income that a generator of 
renewable sourced electricity derives from the sale of the underlying electricity.  
Therefore, in addition to understanding how the revenue is derived from the sale of 
RECs it is also critical to appreciate how the stream of revenue relating to the 
underlying electricity is regulated and whether the relevant regulatory regime 
operates coherently with the Renewable Electricity Act to encourage the production 
of renewable sourced electricity. 
In Australia, electricity generators (both renewable and non-renewable) sell 
their electricity through a wholesale electricity market, such as the NEM.156  Certain 
financial mechanisms (such as hedging) can be used to complement the transactions 
that occur in the NEM (and other wholesale electricity markets) to mitigate price 
fluctuations that are inherent in any market for wholesale electricity.157 
The NEM, which was established in 1998 as part of the national privatisation 
of Australia’s electricity sector,158 is Australia’s primary ‘wholesale market for the 
                                                 
156 Australian Energy Regulator v Stanwell Corporation Limited [2011] FCA 991, 11.  See also: 
MacGill, above n 45, 3183. 
157 Hedging contracts operate outside of the NEM and are designed to stabilise the ‘net price ... 
received by generators’ for a specific volume of electricity, ‘irrespective of the Spot Price’ (see: 
Australian Energy Regulator v Stanwell Corporation Limited [2011] FCA 991, 20).  For a detailed 
review of the hedging arrangements used by participants in the NEM see Australian Energy Regulator 
v Stanwell Corporation Limited [2011] FCA 991, 20, Australian Gas Light Company (ACN 052 167 
405) v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (No. 3) [2003] FCA 1525 (19 December 
2003), paras 124-133 and 'An introduction to Australia's National Electricity Market' (Australian 
Energy Market Operator Limited, 2010) <http://www.aemo.com.au/corporate/0000-0262.pdf>, 20. 
158 Mike Roarty, 'Electricity Industry Restructuring: The State of Play' (Research Paper No 14 1997-
98, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 1998), 4.  A useful overview of the ‘history and 
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supply of electricity to retailers and end-users’.159  Currently, the electricity that is 
bought and sold in the NEM meets approximately 90 per cent of Australia’s 
electricity demand.160  The NEM is therefore the dominant means by which 
electricity is transacted in Australia.  For this reason, only the sales of electricity that 
occur through the NEM are considered in this chapter. 
In this regard, to appreciate how renewable sourced electricity generators 
derive their income from the sale of electricity, it is first important to understand the 
design of the NEM.  Having done so, this section then considers how the NEM 
interacts with the Renewable Electricity Act.  On completion of this analysis, it will 
be evident that the design of the NEM does not support an increase in the production 
of renewable sourced electricity, as it fails to provide a coherent approach that is 
designed to complement the Renewable Electricity Act. 
The design of the NEM 
The NEM is Australia’s national electricity market.  The NEM operates as the 
wholesale electricity market in Queensland, New South Wales, the Australian 
Capital Territory, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania.  It does not operate in 
Western Australia and the Northern Territory.  These jurisdictions regulate their 
wholesale electricity supplies separately from the NEM.161   
The NEM was established by the National Electricity (South Australia) Act 
1996 (SA)162 (the National Electricity Law).  For constitutional and practical 
reasons, the Commonwealth Parliament did not enact the National Electricity 
Law.163  Instead, identical legislation was enacted separately in each of the 
participating jurisdictions.  South Australia was the first jurisdiction to do so in 
                                                                                                                                          
origins’ of the NEM is provided by French J in Australian Gas Light Company (ACN 052 167 405) v 
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (No. 3) [2003] FCA 1525 (19 December 2003). 
159 An introduction to Australia's National Electricity Market, above n 171, 4.   
160 MacGill, above n 45, 3183. 
161 For an overview of the wholesale electricity markets in Northern Territory and Western Australia 
see: 'State of the Energy Market 2009' (Australian Energy Regulator, 2009), 108-121.  See also: 'State 
of the Energy Market 2011' (Australian Energy Regulator, 2011), 67. 
162 National Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996 (SA).  See: also: National Electricity (South 
Australia) Regulations 1998 (SA). 
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1996.164  Every other participating State and Territory (other than Tasmania, which 
did not join the NEM until 2005)165 did the same shortly after.166  The operation of 
the NEM is governed by the National Electricity Rules.167  The Australian Energy 
Markets Operator (or AEMO) is responsible for monitoring and enforcing these 
rules,168 which have the force of law.169 
The principal objective of the National Electricity Law is to: 
promote efficient investment in, and efficient operation and use of, 
electricity services for the long term interests of consumers of electricity 
with respect to— 
(a) price, quality, safety, reliability and security of supply of 
electricity; and 
(b) the reliability, safety and security of the national electricity 
system.170 
In order to realise these objectives, AEMO’s charter is to ‘focus specifically on 
efficiency, security and reliability of power supply’.171 
In this regard, the National Electricity Law is merely concerned with efficiency 
and stability of the electricity system; ‘[e]nvironmental considerations are noticeably 
absent from this market objective’.172  Therefore, the National Electricity Law and 
the rules that accompany it create ‘a regulatory environment where decision makers 
are not [obliged] to consider issues such as environmental sustainability’.173  It is 
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worth recalling that a similar approach informs the design of the Electricity Act 1989 
(UK)174 and the BETTA in Great Britain, both of which were found to undermine the 
promotion of renewable sourced electricity in Britain.175 
The NEM is designed to facilitate the efficient and stable supply of electricity.  
The NEM does so by facilitating the exchange of electricity between generators and 
wholesale customers by using a market based system.  This market is a ‘gross pool’ 
system.176  This means that all electricity sales must occur through a spot market.  
Under the spot market, ‘[g]enerators provide AEMO with generation price and 
quantity offers (bids) for each 5 minute dispatch period’.177  These bids are intended 
to be based on a generator’s electricity generating costs.178  However, in reality these 
bids will be determined by a variety of commercial factors, including electricity 
production costs, compliance costs and the underlying need to sell electricity that 
cannot be stored.  Once all bids are received for a given period, ‘AEMO dispatches 
the cheapest generator bids first, then progressively more expensive offers until 
enough electricity is dispatched to satisfy demand’.179  This process is referred to as 
the merit order.180   
The price paid for electricity and the corresponding remuneration received by a 
generator is the ‘Spot Price’.181  The Spot Price is the ‘cost to supply the last 
megawatt of electricity to meet demand’182 at a particular point in time.  It is ‘the 
price that all generators receive for their supply [in a given period] ... and the price 
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174 Electricity Act 1989 (UK) c 29. 
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Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective (Elsevier Science, 2006) 173, 186 and State 
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177 State of the Energy Market, above n 161, 33. 
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see Australian Energy Regulator v Stanwell Corporation Limited [2011] FCA 991, 20. 
179 State of the Energy Market 2011, above n 161. 
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Energy Regulator v Stanwell Corporation Limited [2011] FCA 991 and Australian Gas Light 
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that customers pay for the electricity they use in that period’.183  The maximum price 
that a generator may receive is $12,500 (the ‘market price cap’) while a generator 
may receive a price as low as -$1,000 (the ‘market floor price’).184 
The Spot Price is calculated every 30 minutes, with each 30-minute period 
being a ‘trading interval’.185  The Spot Price is calculated to be the average of the six 
previous five-minute intervals at which electricity was dispatched, with each of these 
intervals being a ‘dispatch interval’.186 
The National Electricity Rules state that all electricity-generating facilities with 
a capacity equal to or greater than 30 megawatts (excluding intermittent sources) 
must submit bids a day before their intended dispatch.187  However, these generators 
are permitted to rebid their quantities at any time up to the next five minute 
dispatch.188  These generators are defined as ‘Scheduled Generators’.189  Scheduled 
Generators are generally those that are capable of forecasting with great accuracy 
their future electricity output.  This reflects the nature of fossil fuel sourced 
electricity-generating facilities.  However, certain renewable sourced electricity 
generation facilities, such as certain hydropower facilities and those that use 
geothermal energy (although the latter remains an emerging technology) also fall 
within this category, as the output from these facilities may be forecast for long 
periods prior to dispatch. 
While the process of dispatching electricity that is generated by a Scheduled 
Generator is relatively simple, some complexity arises in relation to the generating 
facilities that do not fall within this category.  This is particularly relevant for 
renewable sourced electricity facilities that generate electricity intermittently and 
therefore find it challenging to provide long-term and accurate forecasts relating to 
electricity that they will produce.  In this regard, the National Electricity Rules 
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provide for two additional generating categories – a ‘Non-Scheduled Generator’190 
and a ‘Semi-Scheduled Generator’.191   
A Non-Scheduled Generator is an electricity-generating facility with a capacity 
of less than 30 megawatts.192  A Non-Scheduled Generator is not required to 
participate in the NEM’s central dispatch process.  Instead, the electricity produced 
by a Non-Scheduled Generator is dispatched automatically when it is generated.193  
This means that the Spot Price of electricity at the time that a Non-Scheduled 
Generator’s electricity is dispatched determines the remuneration that these 
generators receive.  In this sense, these generators are price takers.194  While Non-
Scheduled Generators can participate in the NEM, some of these generators ‘are too 
small to make participation in the NEM economic’.195  If this is the case, these 
generators will simply sell their electricity via bilateral contracts.196 
Following a rule change to the National Electricity Rules in 2009, the concept 
of a Semi-Scheduled Generator was introduced.197  This was done to enable the 
better integration of ‘intermittent generation participating in the NEM’.198  A Semi-
Scheduled Generator is an electricity-generating facility that has a capacity of equal 
to or greater than 30 megawatts and produces electricity intermittently.199  A Semi-
Scheduled Generator is required to ‘submit dispatch offers in a similar manner to 
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scheduled generating units’.200  These bids are then ‘optimised in conjunction with 
the bids and offers from [S]cheduled [G]enerating units’.201  These generators are 
required to prepare a forecast of the total capacity (in megawatts) for dispatch.202  
AEMO, as the market operator, is also able to constrain the maximum output of 
Semi-scheduled Generating units to secure the electricity system.203   
The implications of the NEM design for renewable sourced electricity 
The categorisation of generators that exist under the NEM may appear sensible 
given that Scheduled, Semi-Scheduled and Non-Scheduled Generators produce 
electricity differently.  However, given that the Spot Price in the NEM reflects the 
highest price bid for electricity that is dispatched at a particular time, such an 
approach is disadvantageous for generators that are not categorised as Scheduled 
Generators.  For electricity generating facilities that are categorised as Non-
Scheduled Generators this may be so because they are price takers, which means that 
their remuneration is typically determined by the bids offered by Scheduled 
Generators that have a lower cost of producing electricity. 
For Semi-Scheduled Generators their intermittent generating capabilities 
means that they have less control over when they can generate electricity.  Therefore, 
once a Semi-Scheduled Generator generates electricity it must sell it into the NEM if 
it wishes to derive an income for that electricity.  However, the demand for 
electricity at the time will determine the price that a generator can bid into the 
market.  This means that a Semi-Scheduled Generator may be required to bid 
negative prices for its electricity into the NEM to ensure that it is dispatched.  If an 
electricity generator does so, it must then rely ‘on the value of the renewable energy 
certificates they earn to cover their costs’.204  An example of such an occurrence was 
provided in the State of the Energy Market 2011,205 which noted that: 
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several instances of negative prices [for wind powered facilities] near the –
$1000 market floor were driven by [a large generator] rebidding large 
amounts of capacity at times of high wind generation and low demand.206 
The occurrence of these ‘negative prices caused other generators, including wind 
farms, to shut down,’207 as they were unable to cover their production costs by 
selling electricity at a negative price and relying on the revenue derived from the sale 
of LGCs to cover their costs. 
The impact of this problem was recognised in a 2011 report – Impact of the 
enhanced Renewable Energy Target208 – that was prepared by the Australian Energy 
Market Commission (or AEMC).  The AEMC is the statutory authority that is 
charged with rule making and market development for Australia’s electricity and gas 
markets.209  In the report, the AEMC modelled a number of different scenarios to 
determine how the operation of the NEM was likely to affect an increase in the 
production of renewable sourced electricity in Australia.210  Its conclusion was 
simple: the Spot Price for electricity under the NEM has a profound impact on the 
realisation of the LRET.211  In particular, where policies contribute to an increase in 
the Spot Price of electricity in the NEM, it is more likely that the target prescribed by 
the Renewable Energy Act will be achieved.212  The reason for this is that ‘higher 
wholesale [electricity] prices ... are able to provide sufficient revenue to renewable 
generators to ensure they remain profitable’.213  In other words, higher wholesale 
electricity prices together with the revenue derived from the sale of LGCs can 
contribute to an increase in the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
                                                 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
208 'Impact of the enhanced Renewable Energy Target on energy markets' (EMO0017, Australian 
Energy Market Commission, 2011). 
209 Australian Energy Market Agreement, cl 5.1(a). 
210 The three scenarios that the report model are: 
• a reference case scenario.  This scenario reflects the continuation of announced policy 
settings as at late June 2011, mid range economic growth, capital costs, demand and gas 
price forecasts were assumed. 
• a carbon emissions price scenario.  This scenario considered the impact on the NEM and the 
RET scheme if a price on carbon emissions commenced in Australia at $24/t CO2-e. 
• a counterfactual scenario.  This scenario considered the situation where there was no 
expanded RET or price on carbon emissions and committed levels of renewable plant as at 
late June 2011 were capped. 
(see: 'Impact of the enhanced Renewable Energy Target on energy markets’, above n 208, 2). 
211 Ibid, 6. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Ibid. 
  
 237 
The report prepared by the AEMC also considered a countervailing scenario 
where the Spot Price of electricity in the NEM was depressed, which may occur 
because of the softening in electricity demand.  If such a scenario were to eventuate, 
the AEMC noted that it would lead to a ‘lower level of renewable generation’.214  
The reason given for this conclusion was that a 
lower level of [electricity] demand results in a lower level of dispatch.  This 
in turns results in slightly lower wholesale electricity prices.  This reduces 
the profitability of renewable generators, who are [therefore] required to rely 
on revenue from the sale of LGCs to a greater degree to remain profitable.215 
Therefore, under the two scenarios considered, it is evident that the Spot Price of 
electricity in the NEM is likely to have a profound impact on the ability to support an 
increase in the production of renewable sourced electricity under the Renewable 
Electricity Act.   
From this, three conclusions are evident about the design of the NEM and its 
ability to operate coherently with the Renewable Electricity Act to encourage the 
production of renewable sourced electricity.  First, to be able to support the 
production of renewable sourced electricity, it is necessary for the NEM to support a 
robust price for renewable sourced electricity, as a low Spot Price combined with the 
price of LGCs is insufficient to encourage an increase in the production of renewable 
sourced electricity. 
Second, the cost-centric and market-based design of the NEM is not concerned 
with delivering a stable and robust electricity price to encourage the generation of 
renewable sourced electricity.  Rather, its design engenders a level of market risk 
among generators of renewable sourced electricity.  This is because the price at 
which generators of renewable sourced electricity are able to sell electricity is 
determined by the demand for electricity and the availability of generating facilities 
that are able to produce electricity cheaply (namely fossil fuel facilities) to meet this 
demand.  This means that generators of renewable sourced electricity are not able to 
rely on a stable or guaranteed rate of return for the electricity that they sell through 
the NEM. 
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The third conclusion to draw is that the design of the NEM is similar to the 
design of the BETTA market in Britain, where the wholesale electricity market is 
designed to favour large, predictable fossil fuel sourced electricity generating 
facilities.216  This occurs to the detriment of renewable sourced electricity, 
particularly those that rely on intermittent renewable sources.  For this reason, it is 
suggested that the NEM is ill equipped to respond to the differences between fossil 
fuel sourced electricity generating facilities and those facilities that rely on renewable 
sourced electricity.  In this regard, it is unable to provide the dependable and certain 
financial support that is required by generators of renewable sourced electricity to 
realise the full value of the electricity that they produce, and which is required to 
supplement the uncertain levels of support offered by a cost-driven market for LGCs 
The analysis of the NEM has considered the underlying weaknesses of this 
regime to increase the generation of renewable sourced electricity.  While these 
shortcomings are design faults that are peculiar to the NEM, they also reflect the 
failure of the Renewable Electricity Act to provide a suitable forum in which 
renewable sourced electricity can be sold in order to support the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  The reason for this is that the design of the Renewable 
Electricity Act ignores the implications of a poorly designed wholesale electricity 
market on the financial viability of renewable sourced electricity generators.   
More generally, this indicates that the Renewable Electricity Act has failed to 
create a coherent, dependable and robust approach to encourage the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  For this reason, without a greater degree of coherence 
between the Renewable Electricity Act and the NEM (or a more robust regulatory 
approach on the part of the Renewable Electricity Act itself), it is difficult to 
conceive how the Act may be able to encourage the production of renewable sourced 
electricity in a stable, dependable and robust manner. 
c. The issue of integration 
The Renewable Electricity Act is designed like most orthodox renewable 
portfolio standards.  This means that it is designed simply to create a demand for 
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renewable sourced electricity among liable entities.217  It is not designed to do any 
more.  Therefore, the Renewable Electricity Act is not concerned with the integration 
of renewable sourced electricity into the Australian electricity transmission grid.  The 
omission by the Renewable Electricity Act to address the issue of integration is one 
of the principal shortcomings of the regime.  The reason for this is that to be 
effective, a regulatory technique that is designed to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity will only work if there is ‘a longer-term commitment 
of both transmission access and prices’.218 
Despite the deliberate omission by the Renewable Electricity Act to address the 
issue of integration, the design of this regulatory regime to facilitate least-cost 
outcomes does, almost accidentally, affect the way that renewable sourced electricity 
is integrated into the electricity transmission grid in Australia.  This is because the 
Renewable Electricity Act, by virtue of its support for least-cost approaches, 
encourages investors to ‘seek out the most effective site for renewable resources’.219  
This allows generators to produce renewable sourced electricity at the most efficient 
rate.  In turn, this enables them to be competitive within the least-cost environment 
created by the Renewable Electricity Act.  However, as was observed in relation to 
the British Renewables Obligation, such an approach ignores the need to manage the 
congestion of the electricity transmission grid and the potential planning delays that 
may result from the overdevelopment of new facilities at the most effective sites.220  
Therefore, rather than contributing to an increase in the production of renewable 
sourced electricity, the examination of the British Renewables Obligation has 
indicated that an approach to integration that is premised on least-cost outcomes 
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contributes to significant planning delays and management issues for the broader 
electricity transmission grid. 
The failure of the Renewable Electricity Act to include a regime that regulates 
the connection and integration of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities 
leads to two conclusions.  First, the Renewable Electricity Act fails to address the 
matter of integration specifically and therefore does not heed the requirement for a 
‘longer-term commitment of both transmission access and prices’.221  Second, 
because of its focus on cost-efficiency, the Renewable Electricity Act encourages the 
siting of new facilities at locations where a renewable source is most robust.  As a 
result, the Renewable Electricity Act ignores the need to manage the potential for the 
congestion of the electricity transmission grid and the subsequent delays in the 
construction of new renewable sourced electricity generating facilities that may arise 
as a result.  Both of these conclusions represent design failures of the Renewable 
Electricity Act, which are typical of the design of renewable portfolio standards. 
Given that the Renewable Electricity Act is not designed to integrate renewable 
sourced electricity into the electricity transmission grid in Australia, it is useful to 
consider briefly how this matter is addressed outside of the parameters of this 
regulatory regime.  The issue of connecting new renewable sourced electricity 
generating facilities to the electricity transmission grid in Australia is governed by 
the National Electricity Rules, at least for those facilities that sell their electricity into 
the NEM.222  This review does not consider the application of the rules that apply to 
markets outside of the NEM. 
The National Electricity Rules define the operating environment for issues 
relating to access of the electricity transmission grid.223  The National Electricity 
Rules do not favour one source over another.  Rather, these rules are designed to 
apply equally to renewable and non-renewable based electricity-generating 
facilities.224  The National Electricity Rules establish the process to be followed by 
proponents of new electricity generation facilities in order to gain access to the 
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electricity transmission grid.225  The process to obtain access is set out below in 
chronological order: 
• the applicant is required to make a connection enquiry to the relevant 
local transmission network service provider;226 
• the relevant local transmission network service provider must provide 
the information necessary to make the connection specified in the 
above application;227 
• based on the information provided by the relevant local transmission 
network service provider, the applicant submits a connection 
application;228 and 
• the transmission network service provider then prepares an offer to 
connect.229 
While the above process reflects the protocol to be followed by a new 
electricity generation facility, the National Electricity Rules do not guarantee 
connection to the electricity transmission grid.  Rather, the Rules merely provide for 
‘the opportunity to form a connection and have access to the network’.230  Because of 
this, the connection to the electricity transmission grid by a proponent will generally 
depend on two factors.  First, the proponent’s ability to comply with the technical 
requirements for all new electricity generating facilities.231  Second, the proponent’s 
ability to meet the costs involved in connecting the proposed facility to the electricity 
transmission grid.232 
The National Electricity Rules are primarily concerned with the first issue – 
that is, the technical standards concerning access to the grid.233  For this reason, the 
National Electricity Rules provide very limited advice on which entity – be it the 
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generator or the operator of an electricity transmission grid – is required to pay for 
connecting a new electricity generating facility to the electricity transmission grid.234  
However, it has been observed that the general approach adopted in this regard is that 
of a ‘shallow access’ cost regime.235  This means that a new electricity generating 
facility is only required to meet the costs associated with connecting the facility to 
the electricity transmission grid.  It is not required to meet any upstream costs 
relating to the expansion or augmentation of the electricity transmission grid. 
While a shallow costs approach represents the general cost allocation 
methodology, it has been noted that this is not necessarily the case for renewable 
sourced electricity generating facilities that are located in remote areas.236  In this 
regard, it has been suggested that: 
if a generator wishes to set-up away from existing transmission 
infrastructure, or where the capacity of this transmission is insufficient to 
support the amount of the generator’s output, this general rule [(of a shallow 
cost allocation regime)] no longer applies.237 
Consequently, this approach ‘tends to be prohibitive for renewable energy 
developers’238 who rely on sources that are often located in remote areas and where 
there is minimal grid infrastructure.239  In this circumstance, renewable sourced 
electricity generation facilities face significant financial barriers to connect to the 
electricity transmission grid.  As a result, 
[g]enerators [of renewable sourced electricity] typically find the cost of 
paying for substantial additional transmission infrastructure makes their cost 
                                                 
234 Kallies, above n 173, 152. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Environment and Natural Resources Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into the Approvals 
Process for Renewable Energy Projects (2010), 226.  See also:  20-20 Vision, above n 58, 6-7 and 
National Electricity Rules (Version 51), r 5.3.6(k). 
237 Environment and Natural Resources Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into the Approvals 
Process for Renewable Energy Projects (2010), 226.  Original quote sourced from 20-20 Vision, 
above n 58, 6-7.  See also: 'Connecting embedded generators, Consultation Paper' (ERC0147, 
Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012), 4 and 'Unlocking barriers to cogeneration: Project 
Outcomes Report' (Property Council of Australia, ClimateWorks Australia and Seed Advisory, 2011), 
11. 
238 Environment and Natural Resources Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into the Approvals 
Process for Renewable Energy Projects (2010), 227.  Original quote sourced from 20-20 Vision, 
above n 58, 6-7. 
239 Environment and Natural Resources Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into the Approvals 
Process for Renewable Energy Projects (2010), 227.  See also: Lee Godden and Anne Kallies, 
'Electricity Network Development: New Challenges for Australia' in Martha Roggenkamp et al (eds), 
Energy Networks and the Law: Innovative Solutions in Changing Markets (Oxford University Press, 
2012) 292, 304. 
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uncompetitive against other existing generators, that do not have to pay for 
use of transmission capacity.240 
Therefore, the current approach to the connection of renewable sourced electricity is 
premised on the view that ‘distance to a suitable grid connection point, and not 
necessarily the question of the best renewable resource’241 is most important.242 
The design of the National Electricity Rules and the Renewable Electricity Act 
indicates that the current regulatory framework governing the integration of 
renewable sourced electricity with the electricity transmission grid is not suited to 
facilitating an increase in the generation of renewable sourced electricity in any 
meaningful manner.  The reason for this is that the National Electricity Rules and the 
Renewable Electricity Act are principally concerned with the issue of cost 
minimisation rather than with increasing the production of renewable sourced 
electricity.  Therefore, like the British regulatory framework that governs the 
production of renewable sourced electricity, the Australian regulatory framework 
fails to provide a dedicated regime that is concerned with the integration of 
renewable sourced electricity.  This failure reflects a shortcoming of the broader 
regulatory framework in Australia to provide a coherent approach to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity. 
With this statement about the lack of coherence between the Renewable 
Electricity Act and the laws governing the broader electricity generation and 
transmission sectors, this chapter concludes its consideration of the Act’s first order 
regulatory rules.  However, this does not conclude the review of the Renewable 
Electricity Act in its entirety.  The reason for this is that to appreciate how the 
Renewable Electricity Act is designed to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity, one must also consider the Act’s second order regulatory rules. 
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C. A review of the second order regulatory rules 
a. The issue of eligibility 
The Renewable Electricity Act provides that a generator that operates an 
electricity generating facility and that generates electricity from ‘[e]ligible energy 
sources’243 is entitled to be issued with RECs.  ‘Eligible energy sources’ are defined 
as ‘eligible renewable energy source[s]’244 and ‘eligible WCMG’245 sources.  
WCMG refers to waste coal mine gas, which means either of the following: 
(a) coal seam gas that, as part of a coal mining operation, is drained 
from a coal mine that is covered by a coal mining lease (however 
called) that authorises coal mining; 
(b) coal seam gas that is drained from a closed coal mine that is, or 
was, covered by a coal mining lease (however called) that 
authorises coal mining.246 
Eligible renewable energy sources are defined to include all of the major 
renewable sources that are available to produce renewable sourced electricity.247  
These include hydro, wind, solar, biomass and landfill gas.  An eligible renewable 
energy source excludes all ‘fossil fuels [and] materials or waste products derived 
from fossil fuels’.248 
The inclusive definition of ‘eligible renewable energy sources’ indicates that 
the Renewable Electricity Act is designed to assist with the production of renewable 
sourced electricity from all major renewable sources.  In addition, eligibility under 
the LRET and SRES is limited by the size of a facility and the renewable source that 
is used generate to electricity.  For example, in relation to the SRES, only the 
following facilities are eligible to receive STCs: 
                                                 
243 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), s 5 (definition of ‘eligible energy sources’). 
244 Ibid, s 5 (definition of ‘eligible renewable energy source’) and s 17. 
245 Ibid, s 5 (definition of ‘eligible WCMG’) and s 17A. 
246 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth), r 10B. 
247 The Renewable Electricity Act defines the following sources as ‘eligible renewable energy 
sources’: (a) hydro; (b) wave; (c) tide; (d) ocean; (e) wind; (f) solar; (g) geothermal-aquifer; (h) hot 
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248 Ibid, s 17(2). 
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• hydroelectric systems with a capacity of 6.4 kilowatts or less and a 
total annual electricity output of 25 megawatt hours or less;249 
• wind systems with a capacity of 10 kilowatts or less that and a total 
annual electricity output of 25 megawatt hours or less;250 
• solar PV systems with a capacity of 100 kilowatts or less and a total 
annual electricity output of 250 megawatt hours or less;251 and 
• solar water heaters and air source heat pump water heaters that meet 
certain capacity and accreditation standards.252 
The renewable technologies that are eligible to participate in the LRET are those that 
are not eligible to participate in the SRES.  These technologies include ‘wind farms, 
solar arrays, hydroelectricity, geothermal facilities and other accredited renewable 
generators’.253 
The Renewable Energy Act excludes the use of any product that is derived 
from ‘native forest[s]’254 from receiving RECs.  The Renewable Electricity Act 
defines ‘native forest’ as: 
a local indigenous plant community: 
(a) the dominant species of which are trees; and 
(b) containing throughout its growth the complement of native species 
and habitats normally associated with that forest type or having the 
potential to develop those characteristics; and 
(c) including a forest with those characteristics that has been 
regenerated with human assistance following disturbance; and 
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(d) excluding a plantation of native species or previously logged native 
forest that has been regenerated with non-endemic native 
species.255 
The exclusion of electricity that is derived a native forest has merit, as it is designed 
to further the use of ecologically sustainable renewable sources by protecting 
Australia’s natural ecosystems.256   
Notwithstanding this exclusion, the inclusive approach to eligibility under the 
Renewable Electricity Act has a number of shortcomings.  The most notable 
limitations in this regard relate to: 
• an overly inclusive approach that supports the generation of electricity 
from waste coal mine gas, large hydropower facilities and the use of 
heat producing (rather than electricity producing) technologies; and 
• the failure to impose a period during which facilities are eligible to 
earn RECs. 
The inclusive approach to resource eligibility 
In relation to the eligibility of waste coal mine gas, the Renewable Electricity 
Act entitles generators who use this resource to generate electricity to be issued with 
LGCs.257  The number of LGCs to be issued in this regard is capped at an amount 
prescribed by the Renewable Electricity Act and operates separate from the general 
cap imposed by the regime, which reflects the transitional nature of this measure.258  
While it is not a novel approach to allow waste coal mine gas to participate in a 
regime that is designed to encourage the production of renewable sourced 
electricity,259 this feature represents a measure that is counterproductive to promote 
the production of renewable sourced electricity.260  The reason for this is that 
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offering support to a facility that generates electricity from mine gas does not support 
an increase in the production of renewable sourced electricity.261   
It is useful to recall that a similar conclusion was posited in relation to the 
eligibility of waste coal mine gas under the German feed-in tariff law.  In that 
analysis, it was suggested that waste coal mine gas should not be able to receive the 
support offered by a demand-pull mechanism that is designed specifically to 
contribute to increasing the production of renewable sourced electricity.  However, if 
it is the policy of the government to encourage the production of electricity from 
waste coal mine gas because of its potential environmental, social or economic 
benefits, then this activity should be supported by a separate regulatory regime that is 
designed to reduce greenhouse gases. 
A further limitation to the issue of eligibility under the Renewable Electricity 
Act concerns the inclusion of hydropower facilities.  The premise for this criticism 
relates to the fact that hydropower facilities represent a mature technology that needs 
minimal support to be deployed and which can ‘have potentially large environmental 
impacts’.262  Further, from a deployment perspective, ‘Australia is generally thought 
to have developed nearly all [of] its large hydro generating potential’.263 
It is worth recalling that a similar criticism was made of the German and 
British regulatory regimes, which also support hydropower facilities.  However, in 
recognition of the ecological shortcomings of hydropower facilities and the relative 
maturity of the technology used by these facilities, the German and British regulatory 
regimes limit their eligibility.264  In Germany, the limitation is imposed by requiring 
that hydropower facilities satisfy requirements concerning its location, environmental 
credentials and ecological impact.  In relation to the British Renewables Obligation, 
this regime contains an outright prohibition on the use of large hydropower facilities 
that are of a particular age.  In contrast to the two overseas regulatory regimes, no 
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such limitations apply to the eligibility of hydropower facilities under the Australian 
Renewable Electricity Act.  This represents a design failure of the Renewable 
Electricity Act, as the unrestricted eligibility for hydropower facilities is not designed 
to encourage the uptake of new renewable sources, particularly those that are 
‘ecologically sustainable’. 
The final shortcoming concerning the inclusive approach to resource eligibility 
under the Renewable Electricity Act relates to the generous support offered to solar 
water heaters and air source heat pump water heaters under the SRES.265  The 
Renewable Electricity Act defines a ‘solar water heater’ as ‘a device that heats water 
using solar energy’.266  The concept of a ‘solar water heater’ also captures ‘air source 
heat pump water heaters’, which is a 
device that uses a vapour compression cycle incorporating a compressor, an 
evaporator that collects energy from the latent and sensible heat of the 
atmosphere and a condenser that delivers heat either directly or indirectly to 
a hot water storage container.267 
Unlike solar water heaters, air source heat pump water heaters do not use solar 
energy to heat water. 
Solar water heaters and air source heat pump water heaters operate to reduce 
the consumption of electricity when compared to all-electric water heaters.  
Therefore, these technologies are energy displacement technologies rather than 
electricity generation technologies.  Solar water heaters, for example, consume only 
half as much electricity as an all-electric system, while an air source heat pump water 
heater consumes about two thirds.268  Therefore, these technologies ‘reduce demand 
for electricity at the point of end use, and thus have far more in common with energy 
efficiency measures’.269 
While promoting greater energy efficiency is critical to developing a more 
sustainable and dignified electricity sector, such support should not be provided by 
the Renewable Electricity Act.  The reason for this is that the regime established by 
the Act is not designed to increase energy efficiency.  For this reason, the eligibility 
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of solar water heaters and air source heat pump water heaters under the Renewable 
Electricity Act is ‘in conflict with the stated goals of the legislation’.270  Therefore, 
while important to the broader concept of a contributing to the achievement of a 
more sustainable and dignified energy sector, this feature of the Renewable 
Electricity ‘represent[s] a severe undermining of the ostensible purpose of the 
legislation’.271 
The implications of no prescribed period of eligibility 
The approach to eligibility under the Renewable Electricity Act is further 
undermined by its failure to impose a period of eligibility for operators of eligible 
electricity generating facilities.  This means that once a facility is eligible, it is 
entitled to receive RECs for the duration of the regime’s operation. 
The failure of the Renewable Electricity Act to define an eligibility period is in 
contrast to the approach of the German feed-in tariff law and the British Renewables 
Obligations.  Both of these regulatory regimes limit the period of eligibility to 20 
years.272  This is intended to ensure that an eligible facility receives support for the 
duration of the payback period while limiting ‘the potential for significant windfall 
profits’.273  Further, the use of a defined period of eligibility in a competitive regime 
is designed to limit the period during which RECs are issued to older facilities in 
order to encourage new facilities to be deployed that can meet the demand for RECs 
among liable entities. 
Therefore, the omission by the Renewable Electricity Act to limit the period of 
eligibility to the approximate payback period for eligible facilities contributes to two 
systemic design failures.  First, it increases the potential for existing facilities to 
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receive windfall profits, as they will be able to receive the benefit of the regime 
beyond their payback period.  Second, it exacerbates the risk of a ‘boom and bust 
investment cycle’.274  This concept refers to the situation where renewable sourced 
electricity generating facilities are developed primarily during the early years of the 
regime because, by doing so, facilities will receive the greatest financial benefit.  
However, as the duration of the financial benefit offered by the regime diminishes 
(as the regime’s end date approaches), so too does the incentive to develop new 
facilities.275 
The failure concerning the existence of a defined period of eligibility is 
compounded by the ability for facilities that pre-date the Renewable Electricity Act 
to receive RECs.  Facilities that pre-date the commencement of the Renewable 
Electricity Act can earn RECs in one of two ways.  First, if a facility became 
operational on or after 1 January 1997, it is able to earn RECs for all of its electricity.  
However, for a facility that was constructed before 1997, it can only earn RECs for 
an increase in its output above the ‘1997 eligible renewable power baseline’.276 
The entitlement for facilities that pre-date the commencement of the 
Renewable Electricity Act to earn RECs allows facilities that were arguably 
financially viable without the regime to receive windfall profits.  Further, it also 
allows existing facilities that have passed their payback period to receive financial 
support offered by the Renewable Electricity Act for the duration of the scheme.  
Therefore, rather than limiting the financial support to a facility’s payback period, 
this feature undermines the economic credentials of the regime by potentially 
contributing to windfall profits for older facilities.  In a competitive regime, this can 
militate against the development of new electricity generating facilities that rely on 
renewable sources. 
For these reasons, it is concluded that the approach to eligibility under the 
Renewable Electricity Act is particularly concerning.  The design of the Renewable 
Electricity Act entitles technologies that do not generate electricity to receive the 
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benefit of the regime while also providing unfettered support to facilities whose 
design is not aligned with the concept of sustainable development.  Further, the 
failure to specify any period of eligibility – let alone one that is linked to the payback 
period of eligible facilities – undermines the economic credentials of the regulatory 
regime.  In this regard, the approach to eligibility under the Renewable Electricity is 
not consistent with encouraging the deployment and generation of renewable sourced 
electricity in a manner that reflects a meaningful commitment to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity in a cost appropriate manner.  
Ultimately, therefore, it is suggested that the shortcoming of the regime is a further 
reason why the Renewable Electricity Act is not designed to contribute to the 
achievement of a more sustainable and dignified electricity-generating sector. 
b. The issue of compliance 
When the Renewable Electricity Act was first implemented, all liable entities 
were required to comply with their obligation by purchasing and surrendering to the 
Regulator the number of RECs that corresponded to its relevant acquisitions of 
electricity.  Failure to do so meant that a liable entity would incur a penalty. 
When compared with the liability regime under the British Renewables 
Obligation, the single mechanism for compliance indicates that the Renewable 
Electricity Act is committed to ensuring that all liable entities satisfy their 
obligations.  Further, by setting a penalty rate that exceeds the market price for 
RECs, the liability regime under the Renewable Electricity Act appears to be 
relatively robust.277 
While the compliance regime under the Renewable Electricity Act continues to 
operate in the manner described, since the amendments made to the Act in 2009, 
certain liable entities are now entitled to ‘partial exemptions’ from liability.278  As 
the name suggests, a partial exemption reduces an entity’s liability under both the 
LRET and the SRES for the year in which the exemption applies.279 
A partial exemption is to be provided to: 
                                                 
277 See, eg, Edis, above n 15. 
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[an] entity who makes a relevant acquisition of electricity ... where the liable 
entity sells the electricity for use by another entity in an emissions-intensive 
trade-exposed activity, or where the liable entity itself uses the electricity to 
carry on an emissions-intensive trade-exposed activity.280 
In order to obtain a partial exemption, an application must be made to the Regulator 
for a ‘partial exemption certificate’.281  The person that may apply to the Regulator 
for such a certificate may be either the liable entity or the person carrying out the 
emissions-intensive trade-exposed activity that acquires electricity from a liable 
entity.282  When the Regulator issues a partial exemption certificate, the certificate 
must state ‘the amount of the liable entity’s partial exemption [(in megawatt hours)] 
for the year in relation to the emissions-intensive trade-exposed activity’.283  To the 
extent that the certificate is issued to a liable entity, the amount stated in the 
certificate will then be subtracted from that entity’s total relevant acquisitions of 
electricity for the year to which the certificate relates.284  This will enable that liable 
entity to surrender a reduced number of RECs for that year.  Where the beneficiary 
of the partial exemption certificate is not a liable entity (but is an emissions-intensive 
trade-exposed business), the beneficiary of the certificate must nominate a liable 
entity (which is usually the EITE business’s electricity retailer) against which the 
exemption can be recognised.285 
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The partial exemption regime emerged during the consultation process for the 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (or CPRS).286  The CPRS represents a failed 
proposal for an Australian emissions trading scheme.  During the design process of 
the CPRS, the government noted that: 
in the absence of carbon constraints being applied in other countries, 
Australia’s trade-exposed industries may be constrained in their ability to 
pass through ... costs, potentially reducing their profitability.  This effect will 
be most pronounced for the most emissions-intensive trade-exposed 
sectors.287 
The government therefore contended that it was necessary to exempt partially 
emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries from the CPRS in order to: 
reduce the risk of carbon leakage – that is, to reduce the risk that industries 
would move from Australia to elsewhere, with no benefit in terms of global 
emissions reductions ... [T]his assistance would [also] help these industries 
transition to an economy that appropriately prices carbon emissions.288 
The government also recognised that it was necessary to provide similar 
support for emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries under the Renewable 
Electricity Act.  The government suggested that such an approach was necessary to 
avoid carbon leakage and to mitigate ‘the cumulative impact of the renewable energy 
target and the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme’.289  While the CPRS never 
                                                                                                                                          
intensive trade-exposed] business may receive a lower value for their [partial exemption 
certificate] than the amount of the RET compliance costs that are passed through to them 
by the retailer (see: Discussion Paper, above n 9, 112). 
In this respect, the Climate Change Authority has recommended that partial exemption certificates 
should be tradable, as this would: 
enable [emissions-intensive trade-exposed] entities to sell [partial exemption certificates] to 
other electricity retailers, potentially allowing them to receive better value.  As the [partial 
exemption certificate] would not be solely usable by the [emissions-intensive trade-
exposed] firm’s electricity retailer, it could also eliminate the need to consider the value of 
[partial exemption certificates] as part of electricity contract negotiations between the 
[emissions-intensive trade-exposed] entity and its electricity retailer (see: Discussion Paper, 
above n 9, 113). 
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became law, the partial exemption regime that was included in the Renewable 
Electricity Act scheme in 2009 has remained a core feature of its design. 
The purpose of the partial exemption regime under the Renewable Electricity 
Act has merit as it is designed to protect local industries that compete internationally.  
In this regard, this regime supports those industries that may be disadvantaged 
because of the higher input costs that result from the operation of the Renewable 
Electricity Act.290  However, the failure to include any limitations to the operation of 
the partial exemption regime represents a shortcoming of its design.  The reason for 
this is that generally under a renewable portfolio standard ‘liabilities accrue to 
electricity users, in proportion to the quantity of their usage’.291  However, with the 
partial exemptions afforded to energy-intensive trade-exposed industries, the 
contribution that these entities would otherwise be required to make must 
subsequently be shared among a smaller pool of liable entities.  This means that 
liabilities no longer accrue in proportion to an entity’s relevant acquisitions of 
electricity.292   
While this is the purpose of the partial exemption regime, its design does not 
consider whether it will undermine the fundamental objects of the Renewable 
Electricity Act.  Further, the exemptions ‘are not connected to any empirical analysis 
of Australia’s electricity prices compared to its major trading partners nor any 
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Energy and Environmental Markets, Submission to Senate Economics Committee inquiry into 
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Renewable Energy Target Scheme, February 2009, 4and Renewable Opportunities, above n 18, 41. 
  
 255 
analysis of future REC prices’.293  Both of these issues represent shortcomings in the 
design of the Renewable Electricity Act. 
In light of the design of the partial exemption regime under the Renewable 
Electricity Act, it is worth recalling the operation of a similar regime that operates 
under the German feed-in tariff law – the ‘special equalisation scheme’.294  Under the 
special equalisation scheme in Germany, an exemption is available to electricity-
intensive manufacturing enterprises with high electricity consumption and rail 
operators.  This partial exemption operates by reducing the amount of renewable 
sourced electricity delivered to the eligible facilities.  The effect of doing so is to 
minimise the increase in costs associated with the use of renewable sourced 
electricity that is produced under the feed-in tariff law in order to protect, among 
others, trade-exposed industries.  To this extent, the rationale for the special 
equalisation scheme and the partial exemption regime under the Renewable 
Electricity Act are the same. 
However, where these regimes diverge is that the application of the special 
equalisation scheme in Germany operates only ‘insofar as [it] is compatible with the 
goals of [the] Act and the limit imposed is still compatible with the interest of the 
electricity users as a whole’.295  This is done to ensure that the German feed-in tariff 
law mitigates the potential for inequality and ensures that it contributes to the 
sustainable development of its electricity sector.  Therefore, the German partial 
exemption regime operates only if the promotion of a sustainable electricity sector is 
not undermined by the regime.  In this way, the German partial exemption regime 
represents a useful contrast to the Australian regime.  The reason for this is that the 
former seeks to balance the pursuit of a sustainable electricity generation sector with 
other economic and political necessities while the latter regime merely seeks to 
reduce the impact of the regime on liable entities without being cognisant of its effect 
on other liable entities.  For this reason, the design of the partial exemption regime 
under the Renewable Electricity Act represents a further failure of the Act to provide 
a meaningful commitment to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity 
in Australia in a manner that is conscious of its costs on all members of society. 
                                                 
293 Buckman, above n 48, 234. 
294 This scheme is considered in Chapter 4. 
295 Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) [Act on Granting 
Priority to Renewable Energy Sources] (Germany) 1 April 2000, BGBI I, 2000, 2074, s 43(1) 
(emphasis added).   
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c. The issue of the target 
The Renewable Electricity Act prescribes a target for renewable sourced 
electricity to be generated under the LRET.  In contrast, the SRES does not have a 
target.  Under the LRET, the target mandates that by 2020, 41,000 gigawatt hours of 
electricity must be generated using renewable sources.296  As Table 7.3 above 
indicates, the amount of renewable sourced electricity to be generated in 2020 
represents the height of the target.  After 2020, the target remains static until the 
Renewable Electricity Act ends in 2030.297   
Critically, the target is expressed in generation hour terms.  This means that the 
ambition to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity to 
approximately 20 per cent by 2020 is decoupled from Australia’s actual demand for 
electricity.  This means that if electricity demand changes from the projected rate, the 
contribution made by the scheme’s target may not in fact reflect the projected 20 per 
cent target for renewable sourced electricity.298   
It has been suggested that the description of the regime’s target in generation 
hour terms undermines the economic efficiency of the Renewable Electricity Act.299  
This contention is premised on the fact that demand for electricity in Australia is 
projected to decline over the course of the next decade.300  For this reason, the 
current target that is described in generation hours, and which was developed at a 
time when it was projected that Australia’s demand for electricity would continue to 
increase could mean that the current target will exceed the 20 per cent target.  In turn, 
it is suggested that this will impose a burdensome cost on society.301  On this basis, it 
                                                 
296 Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Act 2000 (Cth), s 40. 
297 Ibid. 
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300 Electricity Statement of Opportunities, above n 109. 
301 Electricity retailer TRUenergy contends that the RET could cost $25 billion more than necessary 
through to 2030 due to softer than expected demand for electricity (see: Parkinson, above n 299).  See 
also: King, above n 299, 14-5. 
  
 257 
has been suggested that the most appropriate approach to address this risk is to 
replace the current target with one that is set as a percentage of actual electricity 
demand.302 
The problem with the above contention however is that it undermines the long-
term stability that the target is designed to provide to generators of renewable 
sourced electricity.  For example, if the target were to be calculated as a percentage 
of actual electricity demand, generators of and investors in renewable sourced 
electricity would have little clarity about the long-term demand for renewable 
sourced electricity and the certificates that represent this electricity.  Consequently, 
with little certainty about such demand, these entities would be reluctant to pursue 
opportunities to develop facilities that could increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.  It is specifically for this reason that the first review of the 
Renewable Electricity Act that was conducted in 2003 suggested that a fixed target 
represents the preferred approach.303  More recently, in its 2012 review of the 
Renewable Electricity Act the Climate Change Authority expressed a similar view, 
as it noted that: 
a one-off change to the level of the target risks damage to the investment 
environment, and that a target expressed as a percentage, or one in gigawatt 
hours that was adjusted through time would be even more damaging.304 
On this basis, it is suggested that to the extent that a target is required, the 
current approach offers a robust method that encourages stability and certainty 
among participants in the regime.  For this reason, it represents a positive feature that 
should not be removed because of the risk of overachieving the projected target, 
which itself represents a positive outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
Australia’s electricity generation sector relies almost exclusively on fossil 
fuels.  Renewable sources, particularly those that can generate electricity in a 
sustainable manner, make only a minor contribution to the sources that generate 
                                                 
302 King, above n 299, 14-5. 
303 Renewable Opportunities, above n 18, 120. 
304 Discussion Paper, above n 9, iv.  See also, eg, Clean Energy Council, Submission No 12 to the 
Climate Change Authority, Review of the Renewable Energy Target Scheme Issues Paper, 11 
September 2012, 10-1 and Alstom Limited, Submission No 11 to the Climate Change Authority, 
Review of the Renewable Energy Target Scheme Issues Paper, 14 September 2012.  Cf. Buckman, 
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electricity in Australia.  One might contend that the reason for this is that Australia 
has a rich endowment of fossil fuels and therefore it is financially responsible to rely 
on these sources.  However, this contention has little merit when one considers that 
Australia has some of the world’s most robust renewable resources.  It is in this light 
that this chapter has considered the following questions: (i) what is the principal 
regulatory regime in Australia that is designed to encourage the generation of 
electricity from renewable sources? and (ii) how is it designed?  To respond to these 
questions, this chapter considered the design of the Renewable Electricity Act. 
The Renewable Electricity Act represents the most important regulatory regime 
to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity in Australia.  As such, it 
represents the principal regulatory tool to contribute to the achievement of a more 
sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector.  Notwithstanding its potential, 
however, the design of the Renewable Electricity Act and the broader regulatory 
framework to which the Act relates is undermined by the overbearing concern for 
economic efficiency and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  This is reflected 
by the least-cost, technology neutral and market-based approaches that inform the 
design of Renewable Electricity Act and the National Electricity Law. 
While concern for these matters is not a problem on its face, a problem arises 
when the concern for these issues occurs to the detriment of encouraging the 
production of renewable sourced electricity in a robust, dependable and coherent 
manner.  In the context of the Renewable Electricity Act and the broader regulatory 
framework in which it operates, the reliance on cost related outcomes undermines 
whatever potential the Renewable Electricity Act has to contribute to increase the 
production of a diverse portfolio of renewable sourced electricity.  The reason for 
this is that the focus on cost-driven measures limits the ability for the Renewable 
Electricity Act to deliver a meaningful, dependable and coherent regulatory approach 
to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
Consequently, it is these failures of the Renewable Electricity Act that limit the 
Act’s ability to contribute to the achievement of a sustainable and dignified 
electricity generation sector.  To overcome these systemic design faults, the 
Renewable Electricity Act and its related regulatory framework are in need of 
substantial reform.  Such reform must do more than tinker around the edges of the 
regime’s design.  Instead, it must reconceptualise how this regime is designed to 
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increase the production of renewable sourced electricity – both from the perspective 
of pricing and transmission – so that it is able to contribute effectively to the 
achievement of a more sustainable and dignified electricity generation section in 
Australia.  
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8. Recommendations to reform Australia’s 
Renewable Electricity Act 
INTRODUCTION 
The Renewable Electricity Act represents the principal regulatory regime in 
Australia that is designed to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  
The Act therefore offers the potential to contribute to a more sustainable and 
dignified electricity generation sector in Australia.  Ironically, however, the design of 
the Renewable Electricity Act – including its interaction with the broader regulatory 
framework in which it operates – renders the regime incapable of fulfilling this 
potential.1  The reason for this is simple: the design of the Renewable Electricity Act 
and the regulatory framework in which it operates do not provide a meaningful 
commitment to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  This is 
reflected by the failure of the Renewable Electricity Act to provide a robust, 
dependable, certain and coherent legal strategy to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity.  As a result, the Renewable Electricity Act and the 
regulatory framework in which it operates is ill equipped to contribute to a more 
sustainable and dignified approach to the generation of electricity in Australia. 
With this in mind, this chapter suggests a variety of measures to reform the 
principal shortcomings of the Renewable Electricity Act.  These recommendations 
are intended to effect profound changes to the regime’s current design.  By doing so, 
these recommendations are designed to provide the legal foundations for a regulatory 
regime that can effectively increase the production of renewable sourced electricity 
in Australia.  Ultimately, therefore, these recommendations are designed to 
contribute to the achievement of a sustainable and dignified electricity generation 
sector in Australia. 
This chapter sets out its proposed recommendations to reform the Renewable 
Electricity Act over three sections.  The first section considers how to 
reconceptualise the Act’s grundnorm so that it is better able to contribute to the 
achievement of a sustainable and dignified electricity-generating sector.  The second 
                                                 
1 The Renewable Electricity Act was considered in Chapter 7. 
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section proposes measures to reform the Act’s first order regulatory rules.2  The third 
section then suggests measures to reform the regime’s second order regulatory rules. 
TOWARDS A MORE MEANINGFUL GRUNDNORM 
For the Renewable Electricity Act to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity so that it may contribute to the achievement of a sustainable and 
dignified electricity-generating sector, it must contain a number of well-designed, 
cohesive and complementary features.  Arguably, the most critical feature in this 
regard is the regime’s grundnorm; this feature establishes the regime’s strategic 
direction and provides the lens through which future interpretations of the legal 
regime are considered. 
Currently, the grundnorm of the Renewable Electricity Act is concerned with 
reducing the greenhouse gases emitted by the electricity generation sector.  To do so, 
the Renewable Electricity Act encourages the production of renewable sourced 
electricity from sources that are ecologically sustainable.3  Such an approach has 
merit, as it is focussed on addressing the many and varied challenges associated with 
climate change.  However, a grundnorm that is concerned only with the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity generation sector also represents an 
unhelpfully restrictive approach to contribute to a sustainable and dignified approach 
to the generation of electricity.  The reason for this is that such a narrow commitment 
fails to encourage greater access to stable, secure, affordable and environmentally 
benign electricity. 
In light of this, the grundnorm of the Renewable Electricity Act must be 
reformed so that it is principally concerned with contributing to the achievement of a 
more sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector.  To do so, the 
Renewable Electricity Act’s strategic direction must be designed to encourage the 
deployment and production of environmentally benign, secure, socially acceptable, 
reliable and affordable renewable sourced electricity.4 
While the suggested reform represents a fundamental change to the strategic 
direction of the Renewable Electricity Act, the analysis of the German feed-in tariff 
                                                 
2 The concepts of first and second order regulatory rules are considered in Chapter 6. 
3 The grundnorm of Australia’s Renewable Electricity Act is considered in Chapter 7 within the 
section titled ‘The issue of the grundnorm’. 
4 The relevance of these issues is considered in Chapter 2. 
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law has indicated that a grundnorm with such broad ambition and scope is more 
likely to contribute to a sustainable and dignified electricity generation sector.5  The 
reason for this is that a robust and meaningful commitment in the form of the 
proposed grundnorm can establish the framework within which the regime’s 
regulatory rules can operate to increase the production of renewable sourced 
electricity. 
In addition, a grundnorm that is concerned specifically with contributing to the 
achievement of a sustainable and dignified electricity-generating sector offers a 
number of other, more practical benefits.  First, it is cognisant of the concept of cost, 
as the recognition of dignity requires that renewable sourced electricity be affordable 
and readily available.  Second, an expansive grundnorm that recognises the 
importance of sustainable development is designed to ensure that the regime balances 
the pursuit of economic growth and social development in an environmentally 
responsible manner.  Therefore, such an approach will not only encourage the 
production of renewable sourced electricity, but it will do so in such a way that can 
support the continued (and contemporaneous) pursuit of economic development and 
ecological protection.  In this way, the proposed grundnorm will be able to steer 
society towards the more sustainable and dignified production of electricity. 
REFORMING THE FIRST ORDER REGULATORY RULES 
Reforming the grundnorm of the Renewable Electricity Act in the manner 
suggested represents a fundamental shift in the conceptual and strategic direction of 
the Act.  However, without giving practical effect to the concepts of sustainable 
development and human dignity, the reformed grundnorm is unlikely to have any 
substantive impact.  Therefore, for the grundnorm to have its desired effect, the 
regulatory rules of the Renewable Electricity Act must be reformed.  Most important 
in this respect are the regime’s first order regulatory rules. 
The first order regulatory rules of a demand-pull regulatory technique whose 
principal concern is to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity are 
those rules that regulate the following matters: 
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• the nature of the financial support provided to generators of renewable 
sourced electricity; and  
• the approach that is used to integrate new renewable sourced 
electricity with the existing regulatory architecture governing the 
electricity-generating sector. 
While these features represent two of the most important characteristics of a 
demand-pull regulatory technique that is designed to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity, the Renewable Electricity Act’s approach to these 
matters arguably represents its most profound deficiencies.  There are two principal 
reasons for this.  First, the market-driven and technology neutral approach of the 
Renewable Electricity Act is not designed to offer dependable, transparent and robust 
financial support to investors in and generators of renewable sourced electricity 
generating facilities, particularly where these facilities rely on less mature renewable 
technologies. 
Second, the Renewable Electricity Act and the broader regulatory framework 
in which it operates are not designed to operate in a coherent and consistent manner 
to enable the integration of new renewable sourced electricity generating facilities.  
This is reflected by the difficulty in selling renewable sourced electricity in (or by 
reference to) the NEM and the regulatory challenges associated with developing the 
physical infrastructure to connect renewable sourced electricity generating facilities 
to the electricity transmission grid. 
A. Towards more robust and dependable financial support 
To overcome the Renewable Electricity Act’s inability to offer robust and 
dependable financial support to encourage the deployment of a wide variety of 
renewable technologies, it is necessary that the regime be designed with a more 
nuanced approach to remuneration.  The first step in designing such an approach 
requires that the existing level of uncertainty that is created by the market-driven 
approach of the Renewable Electricity Act and its interaction with the NEM be 
negated.  The most obvious solution to achieve this is to minimise the use of markets 
(or to impose a greater level of regulation on these), as these institutions are premised 
on risk and uncertainty. 
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The question that arises at this point is: if a market-driven, technology neutral 
approach is inappropriate, what mechanism (or mechanisms) should be used in its 
place?  In this regard, it is suggested that the most appropriate mechanism is one that, 
first, operates with a high degree of certainty, and, second, can adequately address 
the many and varied barriers that currently limit the deployment and eventual 
production of renewable sourced electricity.  Practically, this means that such a 
mechanism must be designed to reflect the following values: 
• Transparency and certainty of financial support.  This is critical to 
encourage potential investors in or generators of renewable sourced 
electricity generating facilities to make long-term investment 
decisions; 
• Sufficiency of financial support.  The financial support offered by the 
regime must be sufficient to encourage an increase in the production 
of renewable sourced electricity from eligible sources;  
• Robust financial support.  The financial support offered by the regime 
must not be contingent on any other factor, including (but not limited 
to) the sale of the underlying renewable sourced electricity through a 
competitive wholesale market.  In addition, the regime must offer a 
right of recourse (such as compensation or a statutory guarantee) to 
operators of eligible renewable sourced electricity generators in the 
case where the regime is terminated or amended and such action is 
financially detrimental. 
In light of these core values, a number of critical questions need to be 
addressed.  How is the value of the financial support to be calculated?  Who should 
pay for the regime?  How are the regulatory rules to be designed to give effect to 
greater price transparency and consistency? 
In relation to the first question – how the financial support should be calculated 
– it is useful to remind ourselves that one of the principal aims of the Renewable 
Electricity Act must be to encourage the deployment of a broad portfolio of 
renewable sourced electricity generating technologies.  Therefore, unlike the current 
design of the Renewable Electricity Act, the starting premise for a reformed 
approach to remuneration must be that it is cognisant of the nuances of each eligible 
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renewable technology.  Put differently, the financial support must not be technology 
neutral. 
In this regard, it is suggested that the government should be charged with 
administering the process of setting the level of the financial support in accordance 
with a nuanced cost-covering methodology.  By doing so, the level of remuneration 
should be designed to take account of issues such as the size, location and electricity 
yield of each renewable sourced electricity generating facility.6 
A robust and cost conscious approach must also be designed to mitigate the 
opportunity for financial overcompensation.  In this regard, it is suggested that the 
remuneration offered to operators of renewable sourced electricity generating 
facilities be subject to annually prescribed levels of price degression.  This would 
ensure that the remuneration levels could be reduced in accordance with any 
projected reductions in the cost for an eligible facility to generate renewable sourced 
electricity. 
While the use of a cost-covering methodology coupled with degression can 
encourage the production of electricity from a diverse range of renewable sources, 
such an approach is not without its challenges.  The most notable challenge in this 
regard relates to the potential to provide overly generous levels of financial support 
that may then lead to windfall gains among certain eligible generators.  If this arises, 
it can contribute to an unnecessary increase in consumer electricity prices.  To 
address this challenge, it is recommended that in addition to the standard price 
setting methodology, the Renewable Electricity Act must also prescribe that the 
government undertake periodic reviews of these methodologies.  These reviews 
should be conducted every three or four years.  This approach can ensure that the 
financial returns offered by the Renewable Electricity Act effectively balance the 
need to encourage a greater deployment of renewable technologies with the need for 
fiscal responsibility. 
While a price setting process that is administered by the government represents 
the most appropriate course of action in the first instance, it may be possible to 
transition towards a more market driven price setting approach (such as auctions) 
                                                 
6 The concept of a cost covering methodology is considered in Chapter 3 within the section titled 
‘Level of the tariff’. 
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once the regime matures.7  Such an approach would therefore remove the need for 
government involvement in the remuneration setting process.  Further, it would also 
reduce the chance of overcompensation, as a competitive approach to price discovery 
would encourage the lowest bidders to set the financial support offered by the regime 
to each eligible technology.  If this approach were to be developed it would require 
further amendments to (and administration of) the Renewable Electricity Act to 
ensure that the price discovery methodology was sufficiently robust, transparent and 
capable of encouraging the deployment and production of renewable sourced 
electricity.  However, until the regime operates in a stable and effective manner, it is 
suggested that it would be prudent not to add this additional layer of regulatory 
complexity for the sake of furthering principles of competition and economic 
efficiency. 
It is further recommended that the financial support that is offered to operators 
of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities must reflect the total 
remuneration available to these entities in respect of the electricity that they produce.  
To achieve this outcome, it is suggested that a mandatory purchase obligation be 
imposed on each operator of the electricity transmission grid to purchase all of the 
electricity that an eligible renewable sourced electricity generating facility produces.  
To fulfil the mandatory purchase obligation, the relevant operator of the electricity 
transmission grid must be required to pay an operator of an eligible renewable 
sourced electricity generating facility the remuneration that is prescribed by the 
Renewable Electricity Act.  Having done so, the operator of the electricity 
transmission grid could then pass on to consumers the additional cost of meeting the 
mandatory purchase obligation.   
The suggestion to impose a mandatory purchase obligation represents one of 
the most profound recommendations for reform of the Renewable Electricity Act.  In 
essence, if this measure was implemented it would replace the underlying regulatory 
technique that is currently employed by the Act (being a renewable portfolio 
standard) with a technique that is more akin to a conventional fixed price feed-in 
tariff mechanism.  While this represents a philosophical, economic and practical 
change to the approach that is currently used in Australia to increase the production 
                                                 
7 The concept of auction-based price discovery for renewable technologies is considered by Wood in 
Tony Wood, 'Building the bridge: A practical plan for a low-cost, low-emissions energy future' 
(Grattan Institute, 2012). 
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of renewable sourced electricity, the proposed approach offers the greatest 
opportunity for the regime to engender a sense of financial certainty and long-term 
price transparency among current and potential investors in renewable sourced 
electricity.  The reason for this is that the use of a mandatory purchase obligation 
would negate the need for operators of renewable sourced electricity generating 
facilities to participate in two markets to derive their full income – the market for 
renewable energy certificates and the Australian National Electricity Market.  As 
with the price setting methodology, as the reformed regime matures it may be 
appropriate to develop mechanisms that enable generators of renewable sourced 
electricity to become integrated into the market based wholesale electricity market.  
This may include, for example, offering a premium feed-in tariff in addition to a 
fixed one.  However, during the infancy of the scheme this is not recommended, as it 
will distract from the fundamental features of the regime. 
Considered holistically, the suggested reforms to the Renewable Electricity Act 
that relate to the financial support that is offered by the regime would overcome the 
current problems associated with the use of a technology neutral and market-driven 
approach that undermines the deployment of a broad range of renewable sourced 
electricity generating technologies in Australia.  Ultimately, therefore, these 
recommendations would establish the foundations for a more sustainable and 
dignified electricity-generating sector in Australia. 
B. Towards greater regulatory coherence 
In addition to a more stable, predictable and robust approach to remuneration, 
the Renewable Electricity Act must also be reformed to overcome its current failure 
to provide a coherent regulatory approach to the transmission of renewable sourced 
electricity.  In this regard, the Renewable Electricity Act must be designed to provide 
‘a longer-term commitment of both [electricity] transmission access and prices’.8 
With this in mind, it is suggested that the design of the Renewable Electricity 
Act be reformed so that it imposes an obligation on operators of the electricity 
transmission grid to connect immediately and with priority any eligible renewable 
sourced electricity generating facility.  To do so may require that the electricity 
                                                 
8 Timothy P. Duane, 'Greening the grid: Implementing climate change policy through energy 
efficiency, renewable portfolio standards, and strategic transmission system investments' (2010) 34 
Vermont Law Review 711, 755. 
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transmission grid be extended or augmented where the existing infrastructure is not 
suitable.  Where this is necessary, the costs associated with such action should be 
passed on to consumers, as it is ultimately the consumers that derive the benefit from 
an increase in the production of renewable sourced electricity. 
While this represents the broad principles according to which the Renewable 
Electricity Act should be designed, it is critical that this approach encourages the 
deployment of renewable sourced electricity generating facilities in a variety of 
locations.  To ensure that this occurs, it is suggested that the financial remuneration 
offered by the Renewable Electricity Act be designed to balance the development of 
facilities at locations where renewable sources are most robust with the concept of 
fiscal responsibility.  To do so, it is suggested that the remuneration offered to 
eligible facilities include incentives to encourage the development of new facilities in 
locations where it is possible for these facilities to be integrated with the electricity 
transmission grid where this does not require any significant expansion or 
augmentation of the existing transmission infrastructure. 
In relation to the connection costs to be paid by operators of eligible renewable 
sourced electricity generating facilities, these should be limited to shallow costs.9  
This costs regime should apply regardless of a facility’s location.  The reason for this 
is that any other pricing regime will impose too great a financial barrier to the 
production of renewable sourced electricity.  While this approach will require that 
the operators of the electricity transmission grid incur additional costs, the 
Renewable Electricity Act should provide a mechanism by which these costs can 
then be passed on to electricity consumers.  The reason for this is that it is consumers 
who will be the ultimate beneficiaries of any increase in the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.   
Together, these recommendations to reform the first order regulatory rules of 
the Renewable Electricity Act reflect a substantive departure from the current design 
of the Act.  They reflect a rejection of the market-driven and technology neutral 
approach to encourage the production of renewable sourced electricity in favour of 
an approach that offers greater stability, transparency, consistency, fiscal 
responsibility and, above all else, certainty for generators of renewable sourced 
                                                 
9 The concept of ‘shallow costs’ is considered in Chapter 3 within the section titled ‘Minimising grid 
connection costs’. 
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electricity.  In this regard, the proposed reforms provide a practical means to achieve 
the suggested grundnorm. 
REFORMING THE SECOND ORDER REGULATORY RULES 
The suggested reforms to the grundnorm and the first order regulatory rules of 
the Renewable Electricity Act represent those that are most critical to enable the 
regime to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  In addition to 
these reforms, however, it is also critical to reform a number of the regime’s second 
order regulatory rules so that they too support the regime’s proposed strategic 
direction.  Of particular relevance are the following three features of the Renewable 
Electricity Act that are currently not consistent with the proposed strategic direction: 
• the excessively liberal approach to eligibility;10 
• the reliance on a target that is open to criticism;11 and 
• the unrestricted exemption of certain entities from liability.12 
A. Towards a more sustainable approach to eligibility 
The issue of eligibility is critical to determining the renewable sources that a 
regulatory regime will support and the duration for which this support will be 
provided.  It is for this reason that the issue of eligibility represents a critical element 
in the design of a regulatory regime that is concerned with increasing the production 
of renewable sourced electricity. 
The current approach to eligibility under the Renewable Electricity Act 
contains a number of deficiencies.  First, the regime fails to limit the period of 
eligibility for participating facilities.  This failure contributes to the potential for 
long-standing participants in the regime to receive windfall gains if their 
participation exceeds the facility’s payback period.  It also increases the potential of 
a ‘boom and bust’ investment scenario, as it encourages investors to rush to develop 
new electricity generating technologies during the early years of the scheme in order 
to make use of the unrestricted period of eligibility.  In this regard, the approach to 
                                                 
10 Eligibility under Australia’s Renewable Electricity Act is considered in Chapter 7 within the section 
titled ‘The issue of eligibility’. 
11 The target under Australia’s Renewable Electricity Act is considered in Chapter 7 within the section 
titled ‘The issue of the target’. 
12 Exemption from liability under Australia’s Renewable Electricity Act is considered in Chapter 7 
within the section titled ‘The issue of compliance’. 
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eligibility is not concerned with providing support to renewable sourced electricity 
generators in a cost conscious or stable manner. 
Second, the Renewable Electricity Act supports electricity sources that do not 
contribute to sustainable outcomes.  This is reflected by the eligibility of electricity 
generating facilities that rely on waste coal mine gas and that produce electricity 
using large hydropower facilities. 
The third deficiency relates to the eligibility of facilities whose operation 
predates the commencement of the regime.  This feature entitles facilities that were 
financially independent prior to the regime’s commencement to receive the support 
offered by the regime.  This support is provided despite the fact that the underlying 
premise of a demand-pull regime is to encourage the deployment of renewable 
sourced electricity generating facilities that would not have been deployed without 
the financial support offered by the regime. 
The final shortcoming of the Renewable Electricity Act’s approach to 
eligibility concerns the entitlement of technologies that reduce the demand for 
electricity (such as solar hot water heaters) to receive the benefit of the regime. 
In this regard, to give practical effect to the proposed grundnorm it is necessary 
to revise the excessively liberal approach to eligibility under the Renewable 
Electricity Act.  This requires the adoption of a more modest approach to eligibility 
that better reflects the regime’s proposed strategic direction.  It is therefore suggested 
that the regime’s approach to eligibility be reformed in order to give effect to the 
following principles: 
• eligibility must be limited to a facility’s average payback period 
(which is typically between 15 and 20 years);  
• only new facilities – that is, only those facilities that have been 
constructed following the commencement of the Renewable 
Electricity Act – should be entitled to participate in the regime; 
• the regime must only support renewable sourced electricity generating 
facilities that are environmentally benign.  To achieve this objective, 
the regime must define what is meant by the concept of an 
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‘environmentally benign renewable resource’ to reflect its meaning as 
set out in the Johannesburg Declaration;13 and 
• the regime must only support technologies that generate renewable 
sourced electricity, not those that reduce the demand for electricity. 
These recommendations are designed to reduce the breadth of the eligibility 
criteria of the Renewable Electricity Act so that it is concerned solely with 
encouraging the production of environmentally benign renewable sourced electricity.  
However, it should be noted that these recommendations are not intended to 
undermine activities that lead to heightened levels of energy efficiency or a reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions associated with the capture and combustion of waste 
coal mine gas.  Rather, it is suggested that because these activities do not align with 
the stated direction of the regime, they should be supported by other, complementary 
regulatory regimes that are designed principally to achieve the objectives of energy 
efficiency or the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. 
B. Towards a more robust target 
For a renewable portfolio standard, a target (or quota) is critical to its 
operation.  The target defines the annual demand for renewable sourced electricity 
among liable entities.  In this regard, a target is able to contribute to the confidence 
of the broader regime by reflecting a stable and ongoing demand for renewable 
sourced electricity.  However, based on the suggested measures to reform the first 
order regulatory rules of the Renewable Electricity Act, the operational benefit of the 
current target is less relevant.  The reason for this is that if the Renewable Electricity 
Act were reformed in the manner that has been suggested, there would be no need for 
the prescriptive target that currently exists under the Act. 
However, this does not remove the need for a target altogether.  The reason for 
this is that a target offers a number of benefits, even where it does not itself inform 
the dynamics of the regime.  The reason for this is that a target can reflect a regime’s 
aspiration.  It can also provide useful evidence of the regime’s commitment to a 
particular goal.  A target can therefore engender a sense of certainty among 
participants and potential investors in the longevity and commitment of the regime.  
                                                 
13 The concept of an environmentally benign renewable resource in the context of the Johannesburg 
Declaration is considered in Chapter 2. 
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Therefore, in the case of the Renewable Electricity Act it seems sensible to have a 
robust target – which is stated in generation hours rather than as an uncertain 
percentage of future electricity demand.  By doing so, this would support the 
suggested grundnorm of the regime.14 
In addition to a general target for the Renewable Electricity Act, it is suggested 
that the Act also adopt annual targets for each eligible renewable technology.  These 
specific targets – which would need to be designed so that they are consistent with 
the regime’s overall target – would operate to control the rate at which renewable 
facilities are deployed.  Such targets would be useful as they could ensure that the 
rate of technological deployment does not impose an unmanageable economic 
burden on electricity consumers.  In this regard, it is suggested that such targets be 
designed to reduce the level of remuneration for specific technologies where a 
predetermined target for deployment is achieved.  Such a target could also be used to 
increase the level of remuneration if a target is not achieved within a specific 
timeframe.  Critically, the use of technology-specific targets would complement the 
application of a more nuanced approach to remuneration.  As a result, the operation 
of such targets would be designed to encourage the production of electricity from a 
diverse portfolio of renewable sources in a manner that is conscious of the regime’s 
cost on society. 
In this regard, the use of both general and specific targets represents a 
beneficial reform to the Renewable Electricity Act, as it contributes to greater 
certainty among investors and generators, while managing the cost implications of 
the regime. 
C. Towards a more sustainable approach to liability  
Currently, the Renewable Electricity Act offers partial liability exemptions to 
emissions-intensive trade-exposed entities.  The rationale for this is to enable exempt 
entities to remain internationally competitive by minimising the financial imposition 
of the regime.  In this sense, the partial exemption regime has merit.  However, as it 
is currently designed, the partial exemption regime merely seeks to reduce the impact 
                                                 
14 The relevance of a target being stated in generation hour terms is considered in Chapter 7 within the 
section titled ‘The issue of the target’. 
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of the regime on a select group of entities.  This occurs to the detriment of other, 
non-exempted liable entities and electricity consumers. 
Despite the noted deficiency relating to the partial exemption regime, it is 
recommended that the Renewable Electricity Act retain an exemption regime, at least 
in some form.  The reason for this is that if such a scheme is designed effectively it 
can support the realisation of the proposed grundnorm, as in certain instances it may 
be necessary to negate the higher electricity prices that are associated with a demand-
pull regulatory regime in order to contribute to a more dignified and sustainable 
electricity generation sector.  However, in retaining a partial exemption regime, it is 
suggested that such a regime be designed to be consistent with the revised 
grundnorm of the Renewable Electricity Act as well as its refined regulatory 
structure.  This means that the partial exemption regime must encourage the 
sustained deployment and production of environmentally benign, secure, socially 
acceptable, reliable and affordable renewable sourced electricity.  To achieve this 
balance, two specific recommendations are suggested. 
First, the partial exemption regime must not operate as a blanket exemption for 
eligible emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries.  Instead, the exemption must 
be limited to the extent that it is consistent with (and promotes) the regime’s 
grundnorm.  Therefore, for an entity to be entitled to the benefit of a partial 
exemption, the regime’s administrator would need to ensure that by providing such 
an exemption it would not undermine the regime’s ultimate object by placing undue 
price pressure on other, non-exempted liable entities or electricity consumers. 
To give effect to this suggestion, it would be necessary for the regime’s 
administrators to provide ongoing and robust assessments of the financial impacts 
associated with granting a partial exemption to eligible entities.  While this approach 
might involve a greater degree of regulatory administration, it would enable the 
Renewable Electricity Act to encourage the production of the renewable sourced 
electricity in a manner that is more conscious of the costs that the regime imposes on 
all electricity users. 
The second recommendation to reform the partial exemption regime is to 
expand the potential beneficiaries of the regime.  By doing so, the regime could be 
concerned with a number of matters, not simply those relating to international 
competitiveness.  In this regard, it is suggested that the partial exemption regime be 
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designed to minimise the cost of rising electricity prices that is attributed to the 
regime for individuals with low incomes.  Further, to ensure that the Renewable 
Electricity Act does not undermine Australia’s economic development it may also be 
necessary to enable certain domestic industries to minimise their exposure to higher 
electricity prices, particularly if such exposure may threaten their long-term 
economic viability. 
According to the stated recommendations for reform, the partial exemption 
regime represents a mechanism by which the Renewable Electricity Act can balance 
the need to support environmental protection with economic and social development.  
In this regard, the suggested reforms reflect important recommendations to 
encourage a more sustainable and dignified approach to electricity production in 
Australia. 
CONCLUSION 
The Renewable Electricity Act must be reformed if it is to encourage the 
sustained deployment and production of renewable sourced electricity from a broad 
portfolio of sources.  This chapter has made a number of general suggestions to do 
so. 
The most general recommendation for reform suggests that the grundnorm of 
the Renewable Electricity Act must be reconceptualised so that its strategic direction 
extends beyond a narrow concern for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  In 
this regard, the Renewable Electricity Act should be concerned with the more general 
ambition of contributing to the achievement of a sustainable and dignified electricity 
generation sector.  This requires that the Renewable Electricity Act be designed to 
encourage the deployment and production of environmentally benign, secure, 
socially acceptable, reliable and affordable renewable sourced electricity. 
To realise the suggested grundnorm, the regulatory rules of the Renewable 
Electricity Act also require reform.  This requires that substantive changes be made 
to both the first and second order regulatory rules of the Act.  In relation to the first 
order regulator rules, the basic design of the Renewable Electricity Act must be 
redesigned so that it offers robust and dependable support to generators of renewable 
sourced electricity.  This requires that the current market-driven, technology neutral 
approach of the Renewable Electricity Act be replaced with one that enhances 
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transparency and certainty and is able to respond to the varying costs of renewable 
technologies.  This approach to remuneration must operate independent of any 
market. 
It is also suggested that the regime be designed to provide for the effective 
integration of new renewable sourced electricity generating facilities into the 
electricity transmission grid.  By doing so, the Renewable Electricity Act can support 
a stable approach to transmission access for new renewable sourced electricity 
generating facilities. 
To support these reforms, it is also critical that the most important second order 
regulatory rules of the Renewable Electricity Act be revised.  In this regard, it is 
suggested that the Act be reformed by adopting the following recommendations: 
• a modest approach to eligibility that supports only those renewable 
sources that can generate electricity in an environmentally benign 
manner; 
• a defined period of eligibility that limits participation in the regime to 
the average payback period of the facility; 
• a well defined target that is used as an aspirational tool as well as a 
mechanism to manage the costs involved in the deployment of 
technology; and 
• a partial exemption regime that entitles eligible beneficiaries 
(including individuals) to minimise their exposure to increased 
electricity prices that are caused by the operation of the Renewable 
Electricity Act.   
In essence, the proposals to reform the Renewable Electricity Act are intended 
to transform the Renewable Electricity Act from a regime that employs an orthodox 
renewable portfolio standard to one that is designed to operate in a manner that it 
more akin to a conventional fixed price feed-in tariff mechanism.  The reforms that 
are designed to facilitate this transition are intended to transform the Renewable 
Electricity Act from a regulatory regime that is market-driven and cost focussed to 
one that is concerned with providing investors in and generators of renewable 
sourced electricity with certain and dependable long-term support that encourages 
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the production of renewable sourced electricity.  This support would be provided in 
the form of financial subsidies as well as a coherent and robust regulatory strategy. 
To give effect to the reforms that have been suggested in this chapter, the most 
practical approach to do so involves the repeal and replacement of the Renewable 
Electricity Act with a new, more effective legislative framework.  The reason for this 
is that the suggested recommendations to reform the current Renewable Electricity 
Act are so profound that to give effect to them in a coherent and practical manner 
would prove too cumbersome if the current Act were simply to be amended.  In this 
regard, not only do the recommendations for reform require a realignment of the 
conceptual foundations of the regulatory regime that is designed to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity in Australia, but they also require that a 
new legislative framework be developed that will operate in the place of the existing 
Renewable Electricity Act. 
In making these recommendations and recognising the practical means by 
which to achieve them, one must not be blind to the fact that achieving these reforms 
will represent a difficult and complex task.  Undoubtedly, the reforms are likely to 
lead to robust opposition from a number of interested parties, including by those that 
profit from the current design of the Renewable Electricity Act.15  While such 
opposition may not be easy to placate, it should not dampen the commitment to 
reform the Renewable Electricity Act in the manner that this chapter has suggested.  
The reason for this is that such reforms, if undertaken with vigilance and 
underpinned by strong political will, offer the opportunity to encourage the 
production of renewable sourced electricity from a diverse portfolio of 
environmentally benign renewable sources.  In this regard, these measures provide 
the opportunity to contribute in an effective manner to the sustainable and dignified 
production of electricity in Australia, which will have a profound and long-lasting 
benefit for the entire Australian society. 
 
                                                 
15 See, eg, Nigel Morris, 'Duck! Here comes a solar snowball', Reneweconomy (Sydney), 2012 
<http://reneweconomy.com.au/2012/duck-here-comes-a-solar-snowball-81816> and Giles Parkinson, 
'Ten things we learned from AGL Energy’s Michael Fraser', Reneweconomy (Sydney), 2012 
<http://reneweconomy.com.au/2012/ten-things-we-learned-from-agl-energys-michael-fraser-64710>. 
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9. Conclusion 
Energy enables.  The historic energy transitions – first from human power to 
animal power, and then from animal power to mechanical power – were 
major shifts in the human journey toward greater productivity, prosperity, 
and comfort.  It is unimaginable that today’s economies could function 
without electricity and other modern energy services ... 
Today the world faces two urgent and interconnected challenges related to 
modern energy services – based on where they are available and where they 
are not.  One out of every five people on Earth lives without access to 
electricity and the opportunities it provides for working, learning, or 
operating a business ... Where modern energy services are plentiful, the 
challenge is different.  Emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases from fossil fuels are contributing to changes in the Earth’s climate, to 
the detriment of those who depend on the planet’s natural systems for 
survival.1 
These remarks – which were made by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations in his vision statement for a Sustainable Energy for All2 and were included 
in the opening remarks of this thesis – reflect the importance of electricity to the 
modern world.  These remarks also confirm that despite its importance, current 
modes of electricity production are threatening the very livelihood that it underpins.  
A fundamental change is therefore required to the way that electricity is produced to 
ensure that it supports both sustainable and dignified outcomes.  Such a change relies 
on the rapid and sustained increase in the production of renewable sourced 
electricity. 
It is within the context of these multifaceted and complex challenges that this 
thesis has examined the role of regulation to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity in Australia.  The basis for this exercise has been to determine 
how regulation should be designed in order to contribute to a more sustainable and 
dignified electricity production sector in this jurisdiction.  To do so, this thesis has 
                                                 
1 Ban Ki-moon, 'Sustainable Energy for All: A Vision Statement by Ban Ki-moon, United Nations 
Secretary-General' (United Nations and The Secretary-General’s High-level Group on Sustainable 
Energy for All, 2011), 1. 
2 Ibid. 
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examined critically the primary regulatory regime that currently operates in Australia 
to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity: the Renewable 
Electricity Act. 
The examination of the Renewable Electricity Act was conducted within a 
dynamic framework that was informed by both conceptual and practical issues.  
Conceptually, the analytical framework was informed by the issues of sustainable 
development and human dignity.  Of particular interest in this regard was how these 
matters have converged in international environmental law to address the complex 
challenges posed by the current approach to electricity production.  The conceptual 
approach was supported by an appreciation of the design and application of the two 
principal regulatory techniques that are used to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity, namely feed-in tariff mechanisms and renewable portfolio 
standards.  This was achieved by reviewing the application of these regulatory 
techniques in Germany and Great Britain. 
Through this conceptual and practical lens, this thesis has concluded that the 
Renewable Electricity Act does not represent a robust, coherent or dependable 
regulatory regime that is designed effectively to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity.  In this regard, a number of recommendations for reform have 
been suggested.  These reforms provide the legal and conceptual foundations for an 
Australian regulatory regime that can effectively increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity in Australia.  Ultimately, therefore, these 
recommendations are designed to contribute to the achievement of a sustainable and 
dignified electricity generation sector in Australia. 
TOWARDS A MORE SUSTAINABLE AND DIGNIFIED ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION SECTOR IN AUSTRALIA 
The recommendations to reform the Renewable Electricity Act are intended to 
effect profound changes.  They are intended to transform the regime from one that is 
designed to give effect to the concepts of cost minimisation, technology neutrality 
and market driven outcomes to one that is designed to increase the production of 
renewable sourced electricity in a manner that is coherent, meaningful, dependable 
and conscious of the costs that it imposes on society.  To do so, this thesis advocates 
that the three structural foundations of the Renewable Electricity Act – its 
grundnorm and its first and second order regulatory rules – must be reformed. 
  
 280 
This thesis recommends that the regime’s grundnorm must be reconceptualised 
so that it encourages the deployment and production of environmentally benign, 
secure, socially acceptable, reliable and affordable renewable sourced electricity.3  
Such an approach represents a legal strategy that offers a meaningful commitment to 
contribute to the achievement of a sustainable and dignified electricity-generating 
sector.  
To give practical effect to this suggestion, this thesis recommends a number of 
profound changes to the Renewable Electricity Act’s first order regulatory rules.  A 
demand-pull regulatory regime that is concerned with increasing the production of 
renewable sourced electricity has two first order regulatory rules.  The first concerns 
the nature of the financial support that the regime offers to eligible entities.  The 
second concerns the method that is used to integrate new renewable sourced 
electricity generating facilities with the existing electricity transmission grid. 
In relation to the issue of financial support, this thesis recommends that the 
current regime be reformed so that it discloses the following characteristics:4 
• the financial support must be calculated using a nuanced, technology 
driven cost-covering methodology to ensure that the financial support 
covers the costs of developing, constructing and operating a renewable 
sourced electricity generating facility.  This support must also be 
subject to predetermined and continued rates of degression; 
• the financial support regime must be administered by the government 
(or a government agency), at least during the infancy of the reformed 
regime.  The government should undertake regular reviews of the 
cost-setting methodology; 
• the financial support offered must reflect the total remuneration 
available to an eligible generator of renewable sourced electricity.  To 
give effect to this feature, the regime must impose a mandatory 
purchase obligation on operators of the electricity transmission grid to 
                                                 
3 This recommendation was considered in Chapter 8 within the section titled ‘Towards a more 
meaningful grundnorm’. 
4 These recommendations were considered in Chapter 8 within the section titled ‘Towards more robust 
and dependable financial support’. 
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purchase (at the regulated rate) all available renewable sourced 
electricity; and 
• the receipt of the regime’s financial support must not be contingent on 
the participation in or the sale of electricity in a market. 
In relation to the issue of integration, this thesis recommends that the current 
regime relating to this issue be reformed so that it exhibits the following 
characteristics:5 
• the regime must impose an obligation on operators of the electricity 
transmission grid to connect immediately and with priority any 
eligible renewable sourced electricity generating facility; and 
• the approach to integration must impose a shallow costs regime to 
enable operators of eligible renewable sourced electricity generating 
facilities to connect to the electricity transmission grid. 
In addition to the recommendations to reform the Renewable Electricity Act’s 
first order regulatory rules, this thesis also recommends that a number of the 
regime’s second order regulatory rules be reformed.  These reforms concern the issue 
of eligibility, the use of a target and the regime’s approach to liability, particularly 
the exemptions that it offers to minimise liability. 
Concerning the issue of eligibility, this thesis recommends a more conservative 
approach to defining which facilities and entities are eligible to receive the benefit of 
the support offered by the Renewable Electricity Act.  In this regard, this thesis 
makes the following recommendations:6 
• the regime must only support facilities that generate environmentally 
benign renewable sourced electricity; 
• the regime must not support facilities that predate the commencement 
of the regime; and 
                                                 
5 These recommendations were considered in Chapter 8 within the section titled ‘Towards greater 
regulatory coherence’. 
6 These recommendations were considered in Chapter 8 within the section titled ‘Towards a more 
sustainable approach to eligibility’. 
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• the support offered by the regime must be limited to the average 
payback period for a renewable sourced electricity generating facility, 
which is generally between 15-20 years. 
Further, this thesis suggests retaining the use of a target, as this can serve two 
purposes.  In the most general sense, a target should be used to reflect the regime’s 
commitment to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  In addition, 
targets should also be used to encourage and, where necessary, limit the deployment 
of renewable technologies.  This can be achieved by linking the deployment target 
with the financial support offered by the regime to a particular technology.  In this 
regard, these targets could ensure that the rate of technological deployment does not 
impose an unmanageable economic burden on electricity consumers. 
On the issue of liability, this thesis recommends that the current regime that 
operates to reduce an entity’s liability be reformed.  It is recommended that a 
mechanism to negate a liable entity’s exposure to the regime be retained.  However, 
in doing so, the methodology that is used to determine whether an entity is eligible to 
receive an exemption must be reformed so that it corresponds to the regime’s 
grundnorm.  Practically, this means that an exemption should only be provided if it 
does not undermine the ability of the regime to increase the production of renewable 
sourced electricity in a manner that does not impose burdensome costs on non-
exempted liable entities. 
This thesis also advocates broadening the potential application of the partial 
exemption regime to individuals and entities that are not trade-exposed industries.  
Such a reform would enable domestic industries to receive the benefit of the partial 
exemption where their compliance would otherwise prove unsustainable.  Further, by 
broadening the scope of the regime to include individuals the allocation of partial 
exemptions could be used to minimise the cost of rising electricity prices that is 
attributed to the regime for individuals with low incomes. 
CONCLUDING COMMENT 
As the global economy struggles to combat the dangers posed by the current 
approach to electricity production, a growing commitment is emerging among the 
international community to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity.  
This represents a positive approach to reform the electricity generation sector so that 
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it supports sustainable and dignified outcomes.  However, the question that remains 
is how should such regulatory approaches be designed? 
In this regard, this thesis has considered the design of the principal regulatory 
regime in Australia to increase the production of renewable sourced electricity 
through an international and conceptually novel framework.  This analysis has 
revealed that the design of the Australian regime is suboptimal and is therefore 
incapable of realising its potential.  To overcome its acute design failures, this thesis 
has suggested a number of reforms that are designed to refine the design of the 
current Australian regime.  These proposed reforms are designed to provide the legal 
foundations required to underpin Australia’s contribution of a more sustainable and 
dignified approach to electricity production.  For this reason, the thesis is both timely 
and of considerable significance. 
Despite the noted contribution of this thesis, one should not assume that the 
reforms suggested in this thesis are all that is required to contribute to the 
achievement of a more sustainable and dignified approach to electricity production in 
Australia.  Many other reforms are not only relevant, but also necessary.  Such 
reforms concern social, legal, institutional, behavioural, political, economic and 
environmental matters.  From a legal perspective, the breadth of reforms relate to 
such matters as the patterns and modes of electricity transmission, production and 
consumption, technological innovation and planning considerations.  It is for this 
reason that the recommendations contained in this thesis represent but one of the 
many measures – albeit a significant measure – that are necessary to overcome the 
limitations that currently prevent Australia’s electricity generating sector from 
operating in a manner that encourages sustainable and dignified outcomes.   
Despite these complex and interconnected challenges, for the moment the 
attention must lie with reforming the Renewable Electricity Act, as this currently 
represents the most critical component of Australia’s efforts to increase the 
production of renewable sourced electricity. 
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